Fiscal federalism: the study of federal-state fiscal relations in Malaysia by Bakar, Ismail H.
THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL 
Deposit of thesis in the Brynmor Jones Library 
Name: 
Department/Programme: 
Degree: 
I 1 FrC-1t 
ý1 11 CS 
. 
y} 1N 1«A2 ýý() k A, -l., 
SJ-0 616d 
pkq, 
I\S 01 A1L4 Jý, fi-IGppL hereby give consent that a copy of my thesis 
ýºS cý LýC YJ ýWý. \ Si vý :I F-f- E- S tu bY oF }` G+3 C--(L Pi. 
PS c9121 L, ýE Lf-T i 0 N5 im IM 1ý. ýý StA (title) 
If accepted for the degree of Pýq (e. g. PhD, MPhil, MSc) in the 
University of Hull and thereafter deposited in the University Library shall be available for 
consultation, interlibrary loan and photocopying at the disc eta n of the University Librarian. 
Signature: 
Cý 
If, by reason of special circumstances, the author wishes to withhold for a period of not more 
than five years from the date of the degree being awarded the consent required by Senate, and 
if for similar reasons he or she does not wish details of the thesis to be included in the 
University Library's catalogues or forwarded to any indexing or abstracting organisation, he 
or she should complete and sign sections (1) and (2) below, as appropriate. 
(1) I wish access to my thesis to be withheld until for 
the following reason 
Signature: 
(2) I further wish that full details of the title and subject of my thesis are not to be 
included in the University Library's catalogue or forwarded to any indexing or 
abstracting organisation until for the following 
reason 
Signature: 
IN THE EVENT OF THIS FORM NOT BEING RETURNED TO THE GRADUATE 
SCHOOL WITH THE THESIS, IT WILL BE ASSUMED THAT THE AUTHOR 
CONSENTS TO THE THESIS BEING MADE AVAILABLE, FULLY CATALOGUED 
AND DETAILS NOTED TO ANY APPROPRIATE INDEXING OR ABSTRACTING 
ORGANISATIONS. 
THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL 
Fiscal Federalism: 
The Study of Federal-State Fiscal Relations in Malaysia 
being a Thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the University of Hull 
By 
Ismail H. Bakar 
B. Econ (lions), University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 1983 
Dip. in Public Management, National Institute of Public Administration (INTAN), 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 1985 
Master of Business Administration, University of Hull, United Kingdom, 1995 
April 2004 
Abstract 
The subject of fiscal federalism has been associated for many years with economics, in 
particular with the study of public finance. However, its political dimension is often 
neglected. This is the case in the conventional study of fiscal federalism in Malaysia, which 
focuses on the economic perspective. The aim of this thesis is to examine the design, 
implementation and problem of fiscal federalism in Malaysia as a political process in 
promoting national integration and the unity of the federation. This research is based on an 
intrinsic case study approach as the subject of fiscal federalism attracts strong public 
interest, which requires an in-depth study of the case. In doing this research, a combination 
of narrative report, statistical analysis and interview has been used. 
One of the significant findings of this research is that the design of fiscal federalism in 
Malaysia is essentially based not on the federal spirit, but on the strong central government 
theme imposed by the colonial authority concomitant to the historical and political 
background to the formation of the federation. As a result, today, fiscal federalism displays 
a federal bias and mounting centripetal forces, even to the extent of coercion on the states, 
making the federal government grow bigger and more dominant, financially and politically. 
Thus, the working of fiscal federalism depends not on what is enshrined in the Constitution 
and federal spirit but on centre-state political interactions. If states' politics are not affiliated 
with the ruling political party that control the federal government, federal-state fiscal 
relations will be strained. The effects are felt in petroleum royalties payments, disbursement 
of grants, borrowing and other form of fiscal `sanction' imposed by federal executive 
supremacy. On the other hand, if the states are ruled by the same political party, they 
become financially complacent. To all intents and purposes, the exclusive control of 
revenue sources by the centre has enabled the federal government to prevent most states 
from falling to the opposition party, thus ensuring a majority in parliament. The outcome is 
that the states are subordinated and subservient to the centre and hence the futures of the 
states are subject to the federal government's `unilateral action'. In the long run, Malaysia is 
moving towards becoming a unitary state. This is the antithesis of the federal spirit, and thus 
becomes a threat to the federation. Therefore, fiscal federalism is a crucial acid test of the 
viability of any federation. Fortunately, thus far, Malaysian federalism had passed the test, 
though the states find more pain than gain. In the final analysis, this thesis suggests that 
structural reform of the federal-states' financial arrangements should be undertaken in order 
to strengthen the states' finances and subsequently reduce the states' dependence on the 
largesse of the federal government for funds. 
I 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis would never been completed without fullest support from many people and 
organisations who assisted me while I was conducting research for this study. First and 
foremost, I am grateful to the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) who awarded me the 
British Chevening Scholarship tenable at the University of Hull and the Government of 
Malaysia for giving me study leave to do my research. 
Secondly, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Michael 
Burgess of the Department of Politics and International Studies, and Director of the 
Centre of European Study, the University of Hull, who supervised my work on this 
thesis. His invaluable guidance, advice and constructive criticisms on my draft are very 
much appreciated. Without him, this thesis would never been completed. His help and 
advice were a great encouragement to me during the years of my study. 
Many thanks also go to my colleagues at the Ministry of Finance Malaysia and Economic 
Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Department, as well as state governments' Financial 
Officers. I am also indebted to the helpfulness of the staff of the libraries of the 
University of Hull, the University of Malaya, the INTAN Kuala Lumpur, the National 
Libraries, Malaysia, and last but not least to the Fiscal Library, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), Washington. My thanks are also due to persons who prefer to remain 
anonymous, for giving me ideas and criticism, in particular with regard to the Malaysian 
economy and politics. 
Last but not least, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my mother, Semah 
Sidek, for her prayers and encouragement as well as to all my brothers and sisters for 
their moral support, and to my wife, Jamaliah, and my children for their tolerance and 
understanding during my course of study. 
With all of them, I share the credit for this work. 
ISMAIL H. BAKAR 
11 
Table of Contents 
Abstract 
Acknowledgements 
Table of Contents 
Abbreviations 
List of Tables 
List of Figures 
Map of Malaysia 
1 
il 
ill 
viii 
x 
xü 
xiii 
Chapter 1: Introduction: The Problems Outlined 
1.1 Introduction to intergovernmental fiscal relations 2 
1.2 Why does fiscal federalism matter? 5 
1.3 The Federation of Malaysia in brief 8 
1.4 Research background: The problem of Malaysian fiscal federalism 11 
1.5 Research questions 15 
1.6 Research objectives 18 
1.7 Research methodology: A case study approach 18 
1.7.1 What is the case? 19 
1.7.2 Why a case study? 20 
1.8 The significance of the research 24 
1.9 Focus, scope and delimitation of research 26 
1.10 Organisation of the chapters 27 
Chapter 2: Federalism and Fiscal Federalism 
2.1 Introduction 32 
2.2 Federalism and federation 34 
2.3 Fiscal federalism: The financial aspects of intergovernmental 
relations in the federal system 44 
2.3.1 Expenditure assignment 56 
2.3.2 Revenue assignment 64 
2.3.2.1 Efficiency criterion 66 
2.3.2.2 Equity criterion 67 
2.3.3 Intergovernmental transfers 72 
2.3.3.1 Rationale for intergovernmental transfers 75 
2.3.3.1.1 The federal rationale 75 
2.3.3.1.2 The citizenship rationale 76 
2.3.3.1.3 The economic efficiency rationale 77 
2.3.3.1.4 The equity rationale 78 
111 
2.3.3.2 Types of intergovernmental transfers 79 
2.3.3.2.1 Grants system 79 
2.3.3.2.2 Tax base and revenue sharing 85 
2.3.4 Borrowing 89 
2.4 Conclusion 98 
Chapter 3: The Federal Idea and the Design of Fiscal Federalism in Malaysia 
3.1 Introduction 101 
3.2 The idea of the federal system in retrospect 101 
3.3 The federal form of government: The failure of the Malayan Union 
and the second attempt at federal creation 108 
3.3.1 The first stage of federation: The Federation of Malaya (1948) 112 
3.3.2 The Federation of Malaya (1957) 114 
3.3.3 The second stage of federation: The Federation of Malaysia (1963) 117 
3.4 The structure of government 119 
3.4.1 The legislative branch 119 
3.4.2 The executive branch 125 
3.4.3 Federal bias: Debate about federal supremacy 125 
3.5 The design of intergovernmental fiscal relation and its changing faces 130 
3.5.1 Financial arrangement during pre-independence 
of the Federation of Malaya (1948 - 1957) 131 
3.5.1.1 Assignment of revenue and expenditure 134 
3.5.1.2 Weakness of the pre-independence financial arrangements 139 
3.5.2 Financial arrangement for the independence Federation of Malaya 
(1957) 141 
3.5.2.1 Expenditure assignment 146 
3.5.2.2 Revenue assignment 149 
3.5.2.3 Fiscal adjustment: Federal grants and transfers 152 
3.5.2.4 Borrowing powers 154 
3.5.3 Financial arrangement for the Federation of Malaysia (1963) 155 
3.6 Conclusion 160 
Chapter 4: Fiscal Imbalances and Adjustment Measures 
4.1 Introduction 164 
4.2 Analysis of fiscal imbalances 164 
4.2.1 The root cause of fiscal imbalances 165 
4.2.1.1 Revenue side analysis 166 
4.2.1.2 Expenditure side analysis 172 
4.2.2 Vertical imbalance 181 
4.2.3 Horizontal imbalance 184 
iv 
4.3 Fiscal adjustments: An analysis 189 
4.3.1 Constitutional grants 191 
4.3.1.1 Capitation Grant 191 
4.3.1.2 State Road Grant 194 
4.3.1.3 State Reserve Fund 197 
4.3.2 Revenue / tax sharing arrangements 201 
4.3.2.1 Revenue Growth Grant 201 
4.3.2.2 Export duty of tin ore 204 
4.3.2.3 Export duty of iron ore 204 
4.3.3 Special payments 205 
4.3.3.1 Payment to Sabah and Sarawak 205 
4.3.3.2 Payment to Selangor 206 
4.3.4 Administrative payments 206 
4.3.4.1 Payment for the administration of functions under the 
concurrent list 206 
4.3.4.2 Service charges for federal projects 208 
4.3.5 Other type of transfers and financial assistance 208 
4.4 Conclusion 214 
Chapter 5: Fiscal Adjustment: Determinants of Federal Transfers 
and Their Significance for State Governments Finance 
5.1 Introduction 217 
5.2 Theoretical framework 218 
5.3 The model 220 
5.4 The data 225 
5.5 The results 226 
5.5.1 Model 1: The determinants of federal transfers 226 
5.5.2 Model 2: The significance of federal transfers 234 
5.6 Conclusion 238 
Chapter 6: Fiscal Federalism and the Political System: The Maintenance 
of the Single Party System 
6.1 Introduction 241 
6.2 Political system: The impact on federal - state relations and 
fiscal federalism 242 
6.3 Petroleum royalty payment: A case study of party political competition 261 
6.3.1 Political perspectives - is this political punishment of the 
opposition party? 262 
6.3.2 What is the state right? Legal perspectives 275 
6.3.3 The economic perspective 282 
6.4 Conclusion 283 
V 
Chapter 7: Strengthening States' Fiscal Capacity: Minimising State Fiscal Dependency 
7.1 Introduction 286 
7.2 Strengthening states' revenue raising powers 288 
7.3 Improving states' tax collection system 299 
7.4 Fiscal adjustment measures: Improving transfer system 301 
7.5 Enhancing the role of the National Finance Council (NFC) 307 
7.6 Liberalising the borrowing power to states 314 
7.7 Conclusion 320 
Chapter 8: Conclusion: Fiscal Federalism as a Political Process for 
Accomplishing Unity in Diversity 
8.1 Prologue 
8.2 Research findings 
8.2.1 Lack of priority on federal-state fiscal arrangements during the 
322 
325 
creation of the federation 327 
8.2.2 Increasing states' dependence on the largesse of the federal 
government for funds 332 
8.2.3 The `breach of political contract' in the implementation of 
intergovernmental transfers 333 
8.2.4 The National Finance Council (NFC) as an instrument of control 
and centralisation 336 
8.2.5 Increasing states' fiscal complacency, deteriorating fiscal 
responsibility and public governance 338 
8.2.6 The political uses of fiscal federalism 339 
8.2.7 The deterioration of fiscal federalism in the presence of 
`leviathan government' 341 
8.3 Research contribution and direction for future research 
8.3.1 Research contribution 
8.3.2 Directions for future research 
342 
342 
345 
8.3 Epilogue: The future of fiscal federalism - maintaining unity in diversity 346 
vi 
Appendices 
i. Treaty of Federation, 1895 
ii. Agreement between His Majesty's Government within the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the State Government 
354 
355 
iii. The Twenty-Points 356 
iv. Agreement between PETRONAS and State Governments on royalty payment 359 
V. Grants of right, powers, liberties, and privileges in respects of petroleum 361 
vi. The data used for regression analysis (Model 1) 362 
vii. The data used for regression analysis (Model 2) 363 
Bibliography 364 
Abbreviations 
AKAR 
BN 
FDD 
FLC 
FMS 
GDP 
GRM 
IBRD 
IMF 
ISA 
MCA 
MIC 
MOF 
NEP 
NFC 
OLS 
OPP 
PAS 
PBB 
PBS 
PDA 
PETRONAS 
Parti Angkatan Keadilan Rakyat (Sabah) 
(People's Justice Party (Sabah)) 
Barisan Nasional (National Front) 
Federal Development Department 
Federal Level Committee 
Federated Malay States 
Gross Domestic Product 
Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia 
(Malaysian People's Movement Party) 
International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 
International Monetary Fund 
Internal Security Act 
Malaysian Chinese Association 
Malaysian India Congress 
Ministry of Finance 
New Economic Policy 
National Finance Council 
Ordinary Least Square 
Outline Perspectives Plan 
Parti Islam Se Malaysia (Pan Malaysia 
Islamic Party) 
Party Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu Sarawak 
(United Sarawak Native Inheritance Party) 
Parti Bersatu Sabah 
Petroleum Development Act 
Petroleum Nasional Berhad 
PPP 
RM 
SAPP 
SNAP 
SUPP 
UMNO 
UMS 
UPKO 
People's Progressive Party 
Ringgit Malaysia (Malaysian Ringgit) 
Sabah Progressive Party 
Sarawak National Party 
Sarawak United People's Party 
United Malay National Organisation 
Unfederated Malay States 
United Pasok Momogun Kadazandusun 
Organisation (formerly Party Democratic 
Sabah) 
1R 
List of Tables 
1.1 Malaysian Population 9 
1.2 Simplified Research Model 16 
2.1 Economic Functions of Government 54 
2.2 The Distribution of Powers and Functions 57 
2.3 Conceptual Basis of Tax Assignment 68 
2.4 Conditional Transfers as a Percentage of Federal Transfers 84 
2.5 The Design of Intergovernmental Transfers 87 
3.1 State Representation in the Dewan Rakyat 121 
3.2 State Representation in the Dewan Negara (Senate) 123 
3.3 Assignment of Expenditure Functions and Revenue to State 
Governments under the Federation of Malaya, 1948 137 
3.4 The Division of Powers and Responsibilities 144 
3.5 Revenue Assignment to State Governments 150 
3.6 Grants and Revenue Assignment 157 
4.1 Federal and State Governments' Revenue: A Comparison 167 
4.2 Federal and State Governments' Revenue and Expenditure Comparison 167 
4.3 Components of Federal Government Revenue 169 
4.4 Components of Consolidated State Government Revenue 170 
4.5 Federal and State Governments' Expenditure: A Comparison 173 
4.6 Public Sector Revenue and Expenditure 175 
4.7 State Governments' Development Expenditure 176 
4.8 Federal Government Financial Position 177 
4.9 Consolidated State Governments' Financial Position 178 
4.10 State Governments' Financial Position, 2000 179 
X 
4.11 State Governments: Vertical Imbalance 182 
4.12 State Governments' GDP and Own Sources of Revenue 185 
4.13 Horizontal Imbalance: Fiscal Gap 187 
4.14 State Governments' Revenue Per Capita, 1995 188 
4.15 Capitation Grants 193 
4.16 State Road Grants 196 
4.17 State Reserve Funds 198 
4.18 Revenue Growth Grants 203 
4.19 Export Duty of Tin Ore 204 
4.20 Administrative Payments 207 
4.21 Types and Amounts of Federal Transfers to State Governments 211 
4.22 Intergovernmental Fiscal Adjustments: Amounts Received by 
State Governments in 1990 212 
5.1 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Table 227 
5.2 Result of Model 1 228 
7.1 State Governments' Borrowing from the Federal Government 315 
7.2 State Governments' Debt 317 
X1 
List of Figures 
4.1 Federal and State Governments' Revenue 168 
4.2 Federal Governments' Revenue and Expenditure 178 
4.3 Transfers to State Governments, 1990 213 
5.1 Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual 
(Dependent Variable - Federal Transfers) 227 
5.2 Histogram: Dependent Variable - Federal Transfers 228 
5.3 Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual 
(Dependent Variable - State Government Expenditure) 235 
5.4 Histogram: Dependent Variable - State Government Expenditure 235 
I--, 9\21110 a] 4ký rr s -r .+ ,w 
Eýº° ý ý'ý" ý 
". °Y 
r* 
ý ý' 
ýýý 
Äýý 
Chapter 1 
Introduction: The Problems Outlined 
The fundamental aspect of political operations in a federal system is the financial 
arrangements between the centre and its constituent governments, referred to as fiscal 
federalism. According to Watts, `their importance derives from the fact that the scope and 
character of their financial resources play a large part in determining the relative political 
and economic roles and influence of the different governments within the polity' (Watts, 
2002: 2). The conventional approach in the study of fiscal federalism views this important 
subject of federalism almost purely in economic terms (Watts, 2003a; Ter-Minassian, 
1997; Oates, 1972), hence it fails to accentuate the political aspects of the particular 
federation in reference to the concept of federalism (Gramlich and Wood, 2000), for 
instance, the implications of the political and party system for federal-states' fiscal 
relations. Indeed, fiscal federalism is a kind of `political device' (Birch, 1961: 113) as 
well as a `political process' (Bhattacharayya, 2001) in conflict management, involving 
financial aspects of federalism to ensure stable and cordial federal-state relations. As a 
political process, fiscal federalism can be used to achieve the final aim of federating - 
unity in diversity - by facilitating flexibility and adjustment to accommodate diversity 
and changing socio-economic needs and political circumstances of the federation. 
Due to the significant implications of politics as well as economics in the conduct of 
fiscal federalism, this thesis will examine the practice of fiscal federalism in Malaysia 
from both economics and political perspectives. To begin with, this chapter will provide a 
brief interpretation of intergovernmental fiscal relations and fiscal federalism in 
Malaysia, as well as outlining the background of Malaysian federation and the latest 
political developments as they affect the posture of fiscal federalism. The rest of this 
chapter will state the problems to be addressed in this research, and the research 
objectives, research question, and research methodology to be used in this thesis. The 
1 
scope of the research and significance of the study, as well as research delimitation, will 
also be discussed. The organisation of the thesis will be described at the end of this 
chapter. 
1.1 Introduction to intergovernmental fiscal relations 
Initially, it is useful to discuss in brief the definition of intergovernmental fiscal relations 
as used both in a federal and non-federal system of government. In general, the term 
intergovernmental fiscal relations can be defined as a system of financial arrangements 
between central government / federal government and state government / provincial 
government / regional governments, as well as local government (Bird and Vaillancourt, 
1998; Bahl, 1995). 
However, there are significant conceptual differences between intergovernmental fiscal 
arrangements in a federal and non-federal system or in a multi-level financial system. In 
particular, intergovernmental financial arrangements in a federal system of government, 
or fiscal federalism, are constitutionally entrenched, as a result of the political bargaining 
process at the time of federating, while intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in a non- 
federal system or in a multi-level financial system are not constitutionally entrenched; 
instead they are based on concession (Lockwood, 2004: 80; Hopkins, 2002: 170; 
Bhargava, 1953: 86). 1 
In the unitary system of government or multi-level governance, fiscal policy is centrally 
designed and fiscal functions undertaken by regional governments are merely an 
extension of the centre's fiscal policy by way of decentralisation or concession. In federal 
systems, on the other hand, both central and constituent units carry out fiscal policy and 
functions and the relations between them are constitutionally enumerated. Nevertheless, 
it remains the case that, although both central and constituent units in the federal structure 
This includes fiscal decentralisation, devolution, or delegation of powers and functions from the central 
government to lower level of governments - regional or local. 
2 
undertake fiscal functions, the degree of fiscal impact on macroeconomics is different, 
contingent on among others - constituent units' fiscal capacity and administrative 
capability to undertake functions, geographic characteristics and the nature of party 
system (Rodden and Wibbels, 2002; Raimondo, 1992). 
The conventional study of intergovernmental fiscal relations is concerned with what 
functions and taxes should be the responsibility of federal government and which of these 
functions can be undertaken by the state governments. Other issues are what types of 
transfers should state governments receive, and whether state governments should be 
granted borrowing powers. However, as noted above, for fiscal federalism, it is more than 
a matter of financial arrangement: it involves the political aspect of federalism as well as 
the background to the particular federation. In a non-federal system, intergovernmental 
fiscal relations are primarily based on the economic functions of government 
(stabilisation, redistribution and allocation) as well as economic efficiency and equity. 
Intergovernmental fiscal relations in a federal system are guided by three principles: first, 
the economic functions of government (stabilisation, redistribution and allocation) and 
the principles of public / federal finance; second, the federal spirit (cooperation, 
partnership, respect, and mutual trust); and third, the political operation of federation / 
federalism (the political system and political party). However, the last two principles 
have constantly been overlooked or neglected in the design of fiscal federalism (Bird and 
Vaillancourt, 1998; Ter-Minassian, 1997; Oates, 1972). 
Inappropriate design of intergovernmental fiscal relations leads to the problem of fiscal 
imbalance, defined as state governments' inability to raise sufficient own revenue sources 
to undertake the functions and responsibilities assigned to them. Fiscal imbalance arises 
between the centre and lower levels of governments (vertical imbalance) as well as 
among the lower levels of governments (horizontal imbalance), both of which have 
3 
detrimental effects on regional economic development. For a federal system, the effect 
goes beyond economic instability; it may cause conflicts and disunity and might even 
pose a threat of disintegration of the federation itself. However, thus far, no concrete 
theory of intergovernmental fiscal relations has appeared in the literature that relates to 
both economic and political aspects of federalism / federation (Watts, 2003a; Ter- 
Minassian, 1997; Oates, 1972). As a result, economists continue to seek the ideal design 
of intergovernmental fiscal relations. In 1972, Wallace E Oates recognised the 
importance of such relations, which he expressed thus: 
`The increasing interest in intergovernmental fiscal problems has led over the past decade 
to a growing body of economic literature on fiscal federalism. There is yet to appear, 
however, a comprehensive theoretical and empirical treatment of the economic theory 
implies about the division of fiscal functions among levels of government, and examines 
the extent to which such a theoretical structure can explain the organization and workings 
of the publics sectors of different countries' (Oates, 1972: vi). 
For this reason, economists and political scientists are renewing their study of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations, following the movement towards greater 
decentralisation of functions from central to lower levels of government, as well as the 
advancement in public finance management and political development toward democratic 
government (Litvack, el al., 1998) 2 Consequently, in discussion of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations in federal and non-federal systems, the issues of decentralisation of 
functions are a major focus of the debate (Ter-Minassian, 1997; Tanzi, 1996; Bahl, 
1995). This is because economists view fiscal federalism as tantamount to fiscal 
decentralisation (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998). This is grossly inaccurate in the context of 
federalism and federation. 3 Although fiscal federalism is different from fiscal 
decentralisation, the design of fiscal federalism within the federal system can lead to a 
fiscal decentralisation process. 
2 Substantial discussion on the movement toward greater fiscal decentralisation in developed, developing 
and less developed countries can be found from the World Bank official website: 
http: //www. decentralization. org/; http: //www 1. worldbankorg/publicsector/decentralization/; and 
http: //www. worldbank. org/wbi/publicfinanceldecentmhzation/. 
3 See Chapter 2 for discussion on fiscal federalism and federalism. 
4 
1.2 Why does fiscal federalism matter? 
As noted above, there are differences in the systems of intergovernmental fiscal relations 
between federal and non-federal countries. The design of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations in a non-federal system is regarded as a concession, devolution or 
decentralisation of fiscal matters to a local or regional government and hence can be 
rescinded without constitutional complication, while in a federation, it occurs by 
constitutional provisions resulting from the political bargaining process at the time of 
federating (Lockwood, 2004: 80). Hence, it becomes the states' constitutional right and, 
therefore, any changes involve the judicial process and constitutional amendment. As 
discussed above, the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations in a federal system or 
fiscal federalism is based on the federal spirit (co-operation, partnership and respect 
between the federal and state governments) and political aspect of federalism, apart from 
the economic functions of government (stabilisation, redistribution and allocation) and 
the theory of federal finance I public finance. However, for economists, the term `fiscal 
federalism' is used to refer to intergovernmental financial arrangements in the multi-level 
governance regardless of the system of government, as well as to refer to financial 
arrangements in decentralised fiscal systems. 4 This is because a certain terminological 
ambiguity has surrounded this subject, even among political scientists themselves. For 
instance, the term `federalism' has been vaguely defined by many political scientists 
(Burgess, 1986; King, 1982), let alone the term `fiscal federalism'. No clear distinction 
has been made between the terms `federalism' and `federation'; therefore they are often 
used interchangeably. Hence, it is not surprising if both political scientists and 
economists have defined the term `federalism and fiscal federalism' vaguely. These 
interpretive differences are rooted in the fact that federalism is a concept used in political 
science, while fiscal is a public finance / economic term. However, due to a lack of 
harmonisation between the two disciplines regarding fiscal federalism, the economists' 
See Musgrave and Musgrave (1976: 613-614); Oates (1972), and Bird and Vaillancourt (1998) 
5 
design of fiscal federalism suffers from a lack of political values, especially when it 
comes to the understanding of the federal spirit - the pillars of federalism and federation. 
Therefore, the understanding of federalism and federation is an important prerequisite for 
the study of fiscal federalism. 
Why does fiscal federalism matter? The answer should be considered from both 
economic and federalism perspectives. From the economic point of view, 
intergovernmental fiscal relations are an important element in public finance as they 
involve the fiscal interaction between levels of government in the provision of public 
goods and services in an efficient manner, in that goods and services that have 
nationwide benefit are assigned to the federal government and public goods and services 
with localised benefit are assigned to the state governments. This is important to achieve 
balanced economic growth throughout the federation. However, in most federal 
countries, the federating units are characterised as having different social characters, 
economic endowments or geographical advantages. As a result, some states experience 
strong economic growth and others do not. This scenario causes internal migration of 
labour and capital from the `have-not' to `have' states. Failure to undertake corrective 
measures to redress economic imbalances will push the level of economic development 
of the `have not' states further behind, which poses a threat to the political stability of the 
federation. This is because the subject of finance is easily politicised, as it `has (the) 
capacity to divide, to set the centre against the regions and the regions against each other' 
(Jeffery, 2003b: 183). Thus, the role of the federal government to undertake necessary 
corrective measures through fiscal adjustment is of paramount importance to eliminate 
inequalities among members in federation. 
From a federalism point of view, intergovernmental fiscal relations in a federal system 
are regarded as an essential prerequisite for both levels of government to execute what 
Daniel Elazar called the `self-rule and shared rule' principle (Elazar, 1987: 5) originating 
6 
from the federating process. Proper design of intergovernmental fiscal relations can help 
to mitigate and manage tensions/conflicts within the federation to meet the objective of 
federalism. Based on the Canadian experience, Meekison (2002) identified the ten most 
common sources of conflicts in federation: disputes over (i) constitutional jurisdiction, 
(ii) revenue sharing or vertical imbalance, (iii) horizontal imbalance, (iv) federal 
spending power, (v) regional development policy, (vi) control of natural resources, (vii) 
social heterogeneity (cultural, linguistic or religious), (viii) political ideology, (ix) clash 
of personalities among political leaders, and (x) the lack of intergovernmental 
consultation. As can be seen, most of these issues are concerning intergovernmental 
fiscal relations. Therefore, fiscal federalism is more than a matter of economics; it is a 
political process of dealing with the financial conflict between federal and state levels by 
facilitating flexibility and adjustment to accommodate the diversity within the federation. 
This is so because in the federation, the federating units have `states' rights and state 
powers' (Scott, 1964) which are constitutionally enumerated. States' rights imply that the 
federating units have the right to be treated fairly (especially in relation to economic 
wealth), while state power refers to the fact that in a federation, powers (taxation, 
spending and other administrative functions) are divided and some are shared between 
the centre and constituent states (Watts, 1999a). As such, both levels of government have 
their own fiscal functions, to be undertaken within their constitutional fiscal capacities. 
However, in reality, most federating units have different fiscal capacities, which in turn 
prevent them from delivering public goods and services at equal level between states in 
an efficient manner. 
From the economic point of view, as noted above, public goods and services that produce 
nation-wide benefits should be provided by the federal government, while localised 
benefits are best provided by state and local governments (Oates, 1972; Boadway, 1979: 
406). However, due to low fiscal capacity (as a result of the inappropriate design of 
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intergovernmental fiscal relations), constituent governments depend on federal 
government for financial assistance in the form of transfers to remedy inequality and 
fiscal imbalances as well as local externalities. This assertion strengthens the arguments 
that fiscal federalism is a political process as well as a political device to achieve the 
ultimate goal of federating: unity in diversity. In this regard, the words of Burgess and 
Gress (1999b: 180) that `fiscal federalism can ... 
have an indirect impact upon both the 
legitimacy and long term political stability of the federal states' are worth noting as they 
justify the importance of fiscal federalism. Thus, fiscal federalism, as a political process, 
has a significant role in the federation to meet the objectives of federating. 
In short, considering the importance of the subject, it is not surprising that the issue of 
fiscal federalism in federal countries has engendered considerable scholarly attention. 
Thus, from both economic and political points of view, intergovernmental fiscal relations 
are relevant issues in federation and hence should be designed in a way that takes into 
account both economic and political considerations. 
1.3 The Federation of Malaysia in brief 
Malaysia is a parliamentary federation. In the Federal Constitution, the word `federation' 
was explicitly emphasised to codify the system of government for Malaysia and its 
structure (Article 1(1)). 5 The Federation of Malaysia consists of thirteen states: eleven 
states in peninsular Malaysia (Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Malacca, Negeri Sembilan, 
Pahang, Penang, Perak, Perlis, Selangor and Terengganu) and two states, Sabah 
(formerly known as North Borneo) and Sarawak in the northern part of Borneo (Article 
1(2)). In terms of geography, Sabah and Sarawak are separated from peninsular Malaysia 
by the South China Sea by about 430 kilometres (see Map of Malaysia). The present 
Federation of Malaysia is the successor to the Federation of Malaya of 1948, which 
comprised the existing eleven states in peninsular Malaya. These were the founding 
5 See Malaysia (1999). 
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members of the federation when it was first created in 1948, which subsequently gained 
independence from the British in 1957. In 1963, the Federation of Malaysia was formed 
when Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore joined the Federation of Malaya. However, in 1965 
Singapore seceded from the federation to become an independent state, leaving the 
thirteen members of the federation as it exists today. 
Table 1.1 
Malaysian Population 
Total % of total 
(million) Bumiputera* Chinese Indian Others 
1947 4.908 49.8 38.4 10.8 1.0 
1957 6.279 49.8 37.2 11.3 1.7 
1961 7.232 50.0 36.0 11.3 2.7 
1970 8.819 50.0 37.0 11.0 2.0 
1980 11.473 55.1 33.9 10.3 0.7 
1991 18.380 60.6 28.1 7.9 3.4 
2000 23,275 65.1 26.0 7.7 1.2 
Note *: Comprises of Malays and other natives of Sabah and Sarawak 
Source: Department of Statistics, Malaysia 
As with other federations, the Malaysian federation displays wide diversity, as it is 
composed of heterogeneous ethnic groups (multi-cultural, multi-religious, multi-lingual), 
different levels of economic development (different natural resources), and different 
political beliefs. In 2000, the total Malaysian population was 23.3 million; of which 
Bumiputera (which literally means `sons of the soil', and comprises Malay and other 
indigenous/natives group) represented the largest proportion, followed by the Chinese 
and Indians (see Table 1.1). Among Bumiputera, Malays are dominant. Despite these 
differences, Malaysia has maintained `unity in diversity', the common objective of 
federal creation, to the present day. However, tensions between unity and diversity 
surface from time to time over a variety of issues: language, culture, education, religion 
and, predominantly, economic issues. 6 Hence, in a country such as Malaysia, where the 
population is heterogeneous, national unity is vital for political stability and stable 
economic development. In the first Outline Perspective Plan (OPP1) (1971-1990), and 
6 For further discussion on the issue of unity in diversity in Malaysia, see Ismail (2003). 
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OPP2 (1991-2000), 7 it was paramount that the ultimate goal of national development was 
to be national unity. These development plans have been implemented within the 
framework of the New Economic Policy (NEP), 8 which was introduced in 1970, after the 
racial riots in 1969.9 Thus, 
`National unity remains the ultimate goal of socio-economic development because a 
united society is fundamental to the promotion of social and political stability and 
sustained development. Development policies and strategies under the National 
Development Plan take cognizance of the diversities of Malaysians - ethnic, linguistics, 
cultural, and religious as well as regional - so that a harmonious, tolerant and dynamic 
society could be progressively created. Aside from socio-political and cultural 
considerations, continued social and political stability as well as the efficient 
management of the economy are factors crucial to the realization of its goal and 
objectives' (OPP2: 3). 
Nevertheless, the problem faced by the federation is not only due to multi-ethnicity 
issues, but also to political issues. In Malaysia, political conflict arises due to political 
rivalries between the ruling party and the opposition as to who should control the state 
governments. The result is aggressive party competition to win over states: this, in turn, 
causes difficulty in every sphere of federal-states relations, most notably in the conduct 
of fiscal federalism. Thus, Malaysia's ability to maintain unity in diversity is dependent 
on two factors: first, how the government of the day deals with issues of multi-ethnicity, 
and second, to what extent cordial federal-state relations (including its fiscal 
arrangements) can be maintained - and conflicts that arise are solved according to the 
federal spirit, regardless of which political party controls the federal and state 
governments. 
The OPP is a long-term economic blueprint for Malaysian economic development in which Vision 2020 is the ultimate goal of this plan. s The NEP aimed at promoting greater national unity by reduction and subsequently eradication of poverty 
as well as restructuring of society to correct economic imbalance between Bumiputera and non- 
Bumiputera, thus reducing and eventually eliminating the identification of race according to economic function. 
9 The May 13,1969 social unrest was strong evidence of the importance of national unity in the process of 
nation-building. This incident was blamed partly on the failure of economic policies to bring about 
economic well-being to the Malays in comparison to the non-Malays. The events of May 13,1969 were `sparked as a result of political and economic differences between two communities [Malays and Chinese]. The Malays were dissatisfied with their economic welfare, while the Chinese, economically 
superior, wanted more political rights' (Rais Yatim, 1994: 47). 
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1.4 Research background: The problem of Malaysian fiscal federalism 
Intergovernmental fiscal relations or fiscal federalism is only one aspect of the wider 
spectrum of federal - state relations. In Malaysia, intergovernmental relations are 
constitutionally entrenched, in that the division of powers between the federal and state 
governments is clearly spelled out in Part VI of the Federal Constitution, under the 
heading, `Relations between the Federation and the States'. This Part comprises seven 
chapters: Distributions of legislative powers (Chapter 1), Distributions of executive 
powers (Chapter 2), Distributions of financial burdens (Chapter 3), Land, National 
development (Chapter 4), Federal Surveys (Chapter 5), Advice to states and inspections 
(Chapter 6), and National council for local government (Chapter 7). 
Intergovernmental fiscal relations between the federal and the individual states are set out 
under special financial arrangements in Part VII, entitled `Financial Provision'. This 
consists of two chapters: Chapter 1 on general financial arrangements between federal 
and state governments and Chapter 2 on specific arrangements with Sabah and Sarawak. 
Both Parts VI and VII of the Federal Constitution determine the kind of fiscal federalism 
to be employed in Malaysia; they remain the basis of present federal-state fiscal relations. 
Looking at these provisions, clearly federal-states fiscal arrangements in Malaysia is very 
detailed, giving almost no room for conflict to occur. However, one notable observation 
is that fiscal arrangements in Malaysia are heavily centralised, with some elements of 
fiscal autonomy for the states of Sabah and Sarawak. But the question is why fiscal 
arrangements were heavily centralised and to what extent the federal-state relations as set 
out in the Constitution are implemented according to the federal spirit. If they are not 
appropriately implemented, is there any structural shortcoming that prevents the proper 
working of fiscal federalism? This will be investigated in Chapter 3. 
As noted above, the most salient feature of federal - state relations are its fiscal 
arrangements, involving expenditure and revenue assignment, intergovernmental 
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transfers and borrowing powers between federal and state governments. However, the 
design of fiscal federalism in Malaysia has led to the federal government controlling most 
of the productive revenue sources, leaving states with only limited and unproductive 
revenue sources. The result is persistent fiscal imbalance on the part of state 
governments, which requires regular fiscal adjustment. Fiscal imbalance exists in two 
forms, vertical and horizontal imbalance. Vertical imbalance exists as a result of limited 
revenue collections compared to the expenditure functions to be carried out, while 
horizontal imbalance occurs due to differences in fiscal capacities among state 
governments (Wilson, 1995; Holzhausen, 1974). This creates the serious problem of 
fiscal imbalance which further exacerbated by the centralise nature of the Malaysian 
political system. 10 
Fiscal imbalances need to be corrected through proper financial adjustments, notably 
through federal transfers. In the general terms of public finance, `transfers' refer to 
special payments made from a higher level (national, central or federal) of government to 
a lower level of government (sub national, state or local). It is a form of `compensation' 
for what state governments have given up (that is powers to tax) to the federal or central 
government. Theoretically, the role of transfers is to address financial problems faced by 
the constituent government. From the economic point of view, transfers act as a 
redistributive agent to correct any imbalances in socio-economic development and, 
politically, it is a form of political contract between federal and state governments. This 
is important to achieve optimum distribution of income and wealth and ultimately to 
foster and to achieve a more balanced growth throughout the federation, and, more 
importantly, to achieve national integration and national unity in the federation. 
However, in the Federal Constitution, redistributive purposes, such as those involving 
equalisation, are not constitutionally entrenched or recognised, unlike in Canada and 
10 See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion on fiscal imbalance and fiscal adjustment. Also see Chapter 5 on 
the determinants of federal transfers to states and their significance to state governments. 
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Germany. " Furthermore, although flexibility provides for proper fiscal adjustment, the 
problem of fiscal imbalance persists. Initial investigation shows that the design of fiscal 
adjustment was not intended to negate revenue - expenditure discrepancies. This problem 
will be discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of the thesis. 
Another important aspect in the fostering of cordial relations is the need for the 
establishment of an institution of intergovernmental relations. For this purpose, the 
Federal Constitution provides for the establishment of councils for specific matters to 
facilitate relations between the federal and state governments. These councils are the 
National Land Council to deal with land matters (Article 91), the National Council for 
Local Government (NCLG) for local government affairs (Article 95A) and the National 
Finance Council (NFC) for federal - state fiscal matters (Article 108). Recognising the 
fact that the NFC is an important institution to mitigate federal-states fiscal conflicts, as 
envisaged by the framers of the Constitution, the pathology in the role of the NFC is of 
significant importance to this study. 
The NFC is an important body within the Malaysian fiscal federalism, particularly as it 
acts as an institution to foster federal-state fiscal relations, as well as to ensure the smooth 
running of intergovernmental fiscal relations between the federal and state governments, 
should conflict arise. However, the function of the NFC is purely advisory. The federal 
government may consult the NFC in respect of any matter relating to federal - state fiscal 
matters, and similarly the state governments may consult the Council in respect of any 
matter that affects the financial position of the state. Article 108 (4) and (5) of the Federal 
Constitution outlines the main function of the NFC, that is, the making of grants, 
assignment of revenue, states' borrowing requirement, states' development plans, and 
ii For Canada, see Section 36 (2) of the 1982 Constitution Act, and for Germany, see Section 72, Basic 
Law (Constitution). 
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any other matters regarding federal-state fiscal matters. Thus, the Council has a crucial 
role in presiding over the direction of intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
However, this Council is not an impartial one, unlike the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission in Australia and the Finance Commission in India. In practice, the NFC is 
politically influenced in its operation because the members of the NFC represent the 
political echelon of the ruling party, which are the majority in the Council and are 
presided over by the Prime Minister. Hence, looking at the structure of the NFC, political 
influences on centre-state fiscal relations are inescapable. This is due to the fact that the 
executive supremacy of the ruling party in the council is forceful: it can be used to 
reinforce states' political allegiance toward the ruling party. As a result, states are 
continually subservient and subordinated to the centre. Undoubtedly, the conduct of the 
NFC is the antithesis of the federal spirit. Hence, it is not surprising that the NFC can 
become an important instrument of strong centralisation. The influence of the executive 
supremacy of the ruling party on the NFC will be examined in Chapter 7. 
The working of fiscal federalism also suffers as a consequence of serious party 
competition. Political party competition arose due to political differences, in particular 
between the ruling party (the Barisan Nasional led by the United Malay National 
Organisation [UMNO]) that control the federal government and the opposition party, 
which controls the states. For instance, when Kelantan and Terengganu were under the 
Pan Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS) and Sabah under the Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), 12 
political conflict was intense, which made every sphere of federal-state relations more 
difficult, especially with regard to fiscal matters, as proved by the formation of the 
Federal Development Department (FDD) and other `fiscal sanctions' imposed on the 
opposition government aimed at weakening the credibility of the opposition to rule the 
12 Kelantan has been under the opposition party (PAS) since 1990 and Terengganu between 1999-2004. 
Sabah was under the PBS from 1985 to 1994. 
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states. For those states ruled by the opposition party, issues of the fiscal relationship 
between the federal and state government frequently emerge in the political debates. 
These could lead to political instability. The contemporary issue of federal-state relations, 
in particular with the PAS led-Terengganu government (1999-2004), over the cessation 
of petroleum royalties payments, is indeed a manifestation of severe party competition. 
The upshot is incessant `cold war' between the federal and Terengganu government. The 
contemporary significance of these events and circumstances will be examined in 
Chapter 6. 
1.5 Research questions 
Research questions are pivotal in designing the research process. They define what the 
researcher is trying to find out from the research. Research questions can serve to 
organise the research (give direction and coherence); delimit the project (by showing its 
boundaries); keep the researcher focused on the project (clearly stated research questions 
can help the researcher to bring the research back on track when unforeseen problems 
arise in the course of research); provide a framework for writing up the project; and 
determine what data and information are needed (Punch, 1998). Although `there is no 
foolproof, automatic way of generating research questions' (Robson (1993: 25), the 
general rules that can be applied are as follows: first, decide on a general research area 
(focus area); and secondly, refine (identify) more specific research questions (Punch, 
1998). In developing research questions for this study, the researcher discussed the issues 
with fiscal practitioners, as well as carrying out a literature review related to the subjects 
to be studied (Punch, 1998; Robson, 1993). Table 1.2 highlights the research process of 
this study. 
There are many ways of developing research questions. It can be done either deductively 
or inductively. Punch suggests that one way to develop research questions `is to identify a 
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general to specific questions. Another is more inductive; to begin with some specific 
questions and to work from these back to more general questions' (Punch, 1998: 34). As 
such, it is useful to identify the research area before developing general research 
questions and subsequently defining specific research questions. According to Punch, 
general research questions can serve as a guide to the researcher's thinking and help the 
researcher in organising the research project. On the other hand, specific research 
questions, which ideally follow from the general question, can `direct the empirical 
procedures, and they are the questions which actually answered in the research' (Punch, 
1998: 34). 
Table 1.2 
Simplified Research Model 
6 
Research area (review literature and context) 
I 
Identified Problem 
Research Question 
What information / data are required to answer research 
question? 
1 
Design 
ý 
Information / data 
collection 
4 
Analysis 
Finding 
(Answer to the 
research questions) 
Source: Punch (1998: pp 42) 
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Based on the suggestions by Punch (1998) and Robson (1993), as well as a literature 
review and discussions with the fiscal practitioners in Malaysia, the researcher developed 
the following research questions to be answered in this study. The research area / focus of 
the thesis is on intergovernmental fiscal relations in Malaysian fiscal federalism, that is, 
what financial arrangements exist between the federal and state government with regard 
to the assignment of expenditure functions, revenue sources, transfers system and finally 
borrowing powers between the levels of governments. The general research question, 
which is derived from the above research area, is `why is fiscal federalism as set out in 
the Malaysian Constitution not working effectively according to the federal spirit as it 
should be? ' From this general research question, the researcher formulated the following 
specific research questions, 
a. How was fiscal federalism in Malaysia designed in the first place? Is there any 
shortcoming in the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations that causes persistent 
fiscal imbalance? Does the design follow the federal spirit, as well as economic 
considerations? 
b. How effective / significant is the transfer system to overcome the persistent 
problem of fiscal imbalance? The main objective of intergovernmental transfers is to 
equalise the differences in states' financial position and to fill up the budgetary deficit to 
meet their constitutional obligations. 
c. How can the state governments' finances be improved / strengthened for better 
intergovernmental relations in the quest for unity in diversity within the federation? In 
relation to this question, how can the role of the NFC be enhanced from merely being an 
advisory body to the government to become a more effective institution in 
intergovernmental fiscal relations? and, 
d. In view of current political developments and circumstances, how severely was 
fiscal federalism affected? 
4 
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1.6 Research objectives 
In the light of problems identified in relation to intergovernmental fiscal relations in 
Malaysia, the objectives of this research are as follows: 
i. To examine the design of fiscal federalism, (the assignment of expenditure, 
revenue / taxes, grants systems and borrowing powers) and how it conforms to the 
concept of federalism and the theory of fiscal federalism; 
ii. To investigate and analyse the development and characteristics of the grants 
system in Malaysia. This investigation should furnish some insight into the 
problems of the existing grant / transfer system; 
iii. To analyse the implementation of the existing grant / transfer system designed to 
remedy the financial difficulties of the state governments and to investigate 
empirically the determinants of federal transfers and the significance of grants to 
the state governments' expenditure; 
iv. To examine the role of the National Financial Council as an institution of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations to foster federal - state fiscal relations; and 
v. To analyse the importance of fiscal federalism as a political process in promoting 
national integration and unity within the federation. This is an important 
prerequisite for a stable government and sustainable economic development, in 
line with the objective of achieving Malaysia's Vision 2020 - to be a developed 
nation. 
1.7 Research methodology: A case study approach 
There are many research methodologies available for doing research (Mauch and Birch, 
1983). However, as this research is devoted to an investigation of a specific case of 
public interest, a case study approach has been selected. According to Yin (1994), the 
case study is one of several ways of doing social science research; others include 
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experiments, surveys, histories and the analysis of archival information (Yin, 1994). 
Indeed, the case study is a research strategy and as such, is used in many situations, 
including policy analysis and political science research (Yin, 1994; Robson, 1993). 
According to Stake (1994) and Punch (1998), 13 there are four characteristics of a case 
study; first, the case must be a bounded system, that is, the case must have boundaries. 
The researcher should clearly define the boundaries of the case. Secondly, the case must 
be a study of something specific, that is, the researcher must focus the research and 
decide the logic and strategy of the research. S/he must be clear about the selected case. 
Thirdly, the wholeness, unity and integrity of the case should be preserved; and finally, 
multiple sources of data and multiple data collection methods are likely to be necessary. 
Many case studies use methods such as observations in natural settings, interviews, and 
narrative reports as well as questionnaires and numerical data. Hammersley (1989) 
defined the term case study as `the collection and presentation of detailed, relatively 
unstructured information from a range of sources about a particular individual, group, or 
institution' (Hammersley, 1989: 93). 
1.7.1 What is the case? 
The `case' in the case study research approach could be anything. To Punch, `almost 
anything can serve as a case, and the case may be simple or complex' (Punch, 1998: 
150). Huberman and Miles (1994) define a case as a `phenomenon of some sort of 
occurring in a bounded context - the unit of analysis, in effect' (Huberman and Miles, 
1994: 440). Yin (1994) describes a case as the unit of analysis, which forms part of the 
research design in the case study approach (Yin, 1994). Normally, there is a focus of 
attention and a more or less specifically defined temporal, social, and/or physical 
boundary involved. Similarly, Robson (1993) defines a case as a `situation, individual, 
group, organization or whatever it is that we are interested in' (Robson, 1993: 51). Thus, 
13 See Stake (1994: 236), and Punch (1998: 156) 
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it can be concluded that the `case' in case study could be anything, from the simple to a 
complex phenomenon. In this study, the `case' is specific, that is, the conduct of fiscal 
federalism in Malaysia, and the boundary of the case is `within the context of federalism 
and the Malaysian political system'. This is the basis of the general research question 
indicated earlier: why is fiscal federalism as set out in the Constitution not working 
effectively according to the federal spirit as it should be? 
To substantiate the case, however, there is no best single method available. Instead, 
researchers use a combination of methods including observation, interviews, narrative 
reports, questionnaires or numerical data. According to Bell, although observation and 
interviews are most frequently used in case study, other methods cannot be ignored (Bell, 
1993: 6). Methods of collecting information are selected based on their appropriateness 
for the task. Certain case studies involve observation, recording and analysing of the 
background, development, current condition and environmental interaction of one or 
more individuals, groups, communities, business or institutions for stages or patterns in 
relation to internal and external influences (Mauch and Birch, 1983: 72). As such, a 
combination of narrative report, statistical analysis and interview are used in this 
research. 
1.7.2 Why a case study? 
The case study approach used in this study draws on Yin (1994). It also follows 
suggestions from Punch (1998), Stake (1994), Bell (1993), and Robson (1993). Different 
researchers have different purposes in studying a case and basically, case studies can be 
classified into three categories; first, the intrinsic case study, that is, a study that is 
undertaken for better understanding of the particular case; second, the instrumental case 
study, where a particular case is examined to provide in-depth knowledge of the issues or 
refinement of the relevant theory; and third, the collective case study, in which an 
20 
intrinsic case study and an instrumental case study are combined in order to inquire into 
the phenomenon or general condition. 14 
According to Robson (1993), `case study is a strategy for doing research which involves 
an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life 
context using multiple sources of evidence' (Robson (1993: 52) and case studies often 
deal with matters of public interest (Stake, 1994). Besides, a case study can be used as a 
means of identifying key issues in a particular phenomenon which merit further 
investigation, although the majority of case studies are carried out as free-standing 
exercises (Bell, 1993). Using a case study helps the researcher to study the problem in 
depth using a variety of sources (Yin, 1994; Bell, 1993). As Bell (1993) puts it, `the case 
study approach is particularly appropriate for individual researchers because it gives an 
opportunity for one aspect of a problem to be studied in some depth within a limited time 
scale' (Bell, 1993: 7). Furthermore, according to Bell (1993), although a case study is a 
study of a single event, this is `not to say that the study of a single event is not 
worthwhile' (Bell, 1993: 7). Again, as confirmed by Bassey (1981), an important 
criterion for judging the merit of a case study is the extent to which the details are 
sufficient and appropriate. Punch (1998) also agrees that a case study allows the selected 
case to be studied in depth appropriate to its complexity. Further, according to Punch, 
`the case study aim is to understand the case in depth, and in its natural setting, 
recognizing its complexity and its context. It has also a holistic focus, aiming to preserve 
and understand the wholeness and unity of the case. Therefore the case study is more a 
strategy than a method' (Punch, 1998: 150). 
The great strength of the case study method is that it allows the researcher to concentrate 
on a specific instance or situation and to identify, or attempt to identify, the various 
interactive processes at work. As such, a case study can be used as a means of identifying 
14 See Stake (1994: 242), and Punch (1998: 152) 
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key issues, identifying which are worth of further investigation, especially if the case is 
of interest to the public. According to Punch (1998), the basic idea of a case study `is that 
one case (or perhaps a small number of cases) will be studied in detail, using whatever 
methods seem appropriate ... and the general objective 
is to develop as full an 
understanding of that case as possible' (Punch, 1998: 150). Although there are arguments 
promulgated by such as Stake (1994) and Goode and Hatt (1952) as to whether or not the 
case study is a type of research methodology or technique, the most important thing is 
that the case study approach can be used in studies involving a variety of disciplines 
because it provides holistic and meaningful characteristics and it is able to provide a 
variety of evidence on the phenomenon studied (Yin, 1994; Merriam, 1989). According 
to Yin (1994): 
`The case study contributes uniquely to our knowledge of individual, organizational, 
social and political phenomena... the case study is common research strategy in 
psychology, sociology, political science (Yin, 1994: 2). ... the case study allows an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events.. . the 
case study's unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence - 
documents, artifacts, interviews, and observation... ' (Yin, 1994: 8). 
Hence, the case study is an appropriate approach to study a specific issue or particular 
case in-depth, such as issues of public interest, and this is in line with this study of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations, which is a very specific topic within the area of 
federalism. 
Yin (1994) highlighted three types of case study strategies: exploratory, descriptive and 
explanatory (Yin, 1994: 3-4). In a case study, all research strategies (exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory) might be relevant in some situations; in other situations, 
only two strategies may be relevant. In practice, more than one strategy is normally used 
in any given study, for example a survey may be included within a case study or a case 
study within a survey. For instance, explanatory case studies can be complemented by 
other types strategies -'exploratory' and `descriptive' case studies. To this extent, the 
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various strategies are not mutually exclusive. But, in certain circumstances, one specific 
strategy has a distinct advantage. 
Based on works by Stake (1994) and Yin (1994), this study adopts an `intrinsic single 
case study' approach with `explanatory and descriptive strategies', that is, the research is 
undertaken to obtain a better understanding of the particular case by explaining and 
describing the theories in relation to the subject being studied. This is in line with Stake's 
comment that, 
`The bulk of the case study work is done by people who have intrinsic interests in the 
cases. Their intrinsic case study designs draw the researcher towards understanding of 
what is important about the case within its own world, not so much the world of 
researchers and theorists, but developing its issues, contexts, and interpretations' (Stake, 
1994: 242) 
On the question of generalisability of research findings from the case study, that is, how 
far the research findings can be generalised or transferred to other settings or to the 
population as a whole, most researchers agree with Bassey (1981: 73) that relatability of 
the findings is more important than generalisability. Lincoln and Guba (1985) concur 
with Bassey's (1981) statement that research outcomes may usefully to be thought of as 
the lessons to be learned from the study and these lessons are not generalisations but 
working hypotheses that relate to an understanding of the problem under study (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985). Thus, the most important thing in a case study is whether or not the 
finding is relatable to the theory and principles in relation to the subject under study and 
what lessons can be learned. According to Punch (1998), there are two types of case 
study situations where generalisation would not be the objective. First, the case may be 
so important, interesting, or misunderstood that it deserves study in its own right. Or it 
may be unique in some very important respects, and therefore worthy of specific study 
(intrinsic case study). Secondly, a strong argument can often be made about studying a 
negative case (instrumental case study), such as where a particular case seems to be so 
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different from others, or even sometimes completely opposite to others, that it needs 
special attention. 
Denzin (1983) claims that whether or not a case study should seek generalisation and 
representativeness depends on the context and purposes of the particular case. As such, 
generalisation should not necessarily be the objective of all research projects, whether 
case studies or not (Denzin, 1983). Nevertheless, according to Punch, there are many case 
studies where the researcher has in mind more than just the case being studied, and where 
researchers want to find something more broadly applicable (Punch, 1998). In short, how 
can generalisability be produced from a case study? It depends on the purposes of the 
case study and the way its data are analysed. Taking the experience of these researchers, 
it suggests that for the case study approach, generalisation of research findings is not the 
main issue. This is because the case being investigated is so important, and attracts such 
public interest, that it deserves to be studied in its own right. 
1.8 The significance of the research 
The choice of this topic is important for several reasons. First, there is a noticeable void 
in the existing body of literature concerning fiscal federalism in Malaysia, especially on 
the political background leading to the design of fiscal federalism. There is, to date, no 
single study which traces how fiscal federalism evolved, from a federalism perspective, 
since the early days of the first federal idea in Malaysia. Previous studies on fiscal 
federalism were conducted merely for economic purposes, concentrating in particular on 
whether or not the federal principle was adhered to in the design process, and therefore 
provide little analysis on the design of fiscal federalism in Malaysia. It is important to 
analyse the root cause of the problems facing Malaysian fiscal federalism and to examine 
why fiscal federalism is not working as effectively as it should within the federal spirit. 
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Second, it has been found that only limited study has been done on fiscal federalism in 
Malaysia from both federalism and the political perspective. Most of the studies on fiscal 
federalism in Malaysia are devoted to meeting economic objectives, and hence are 
focused on economic considerations of equity and efficiency. Examples are the studies by 
Lai (1968), Holzhausen (1974), and Umikalsom (1991). Lai (1968) focused on the 
working of federal finance in the context of the plural society in Malaysia, while 
Holzhausen (1974) analysed the working of federal finance in the context of economic 
development. Umikalsom (1991) also analysed the performance of federal-states 
financial arrangements from a public finance point of view, especially with regard to 
revenue, expenditure, and borrowing performance. For this reason, this study utilises a 
combination of economics and politics approaches rather than a purely economics 
perspective. Furthermore, past studies lack analysis on the proper interpretation of 
federalism in reference to fiscal federalism. Therefore discussion of the terminological 
interpretation of federalism is useful to link the theory and practice of fiscal federalism. 
This has been the principal shortcoming of the past studies on fiscal federalism in 
Malaysia. This study therefore intends to fill the gap left by previous studies. It is in this 
spirit of enquiry that the researcher undertakes this study to provide increased 
understanding of fiscal federalism in Malaysia. 
Third, a review of past research and theses on intergovernmental fiscal relations in 
Malaysia confirms the fact that no similar study has been attempted concerning 
federalism and the political perspective. In this respect, this study is different from 
previous studies, which largely adopted an economic approach. Moreover, most of the 
studies were conducted more than twenty years ago and were not specifically devoted to 
intergovernmental fiscal relations / fiscal federalism. Since then, important changes and 
developments have taken place in the Malaysian Federation which have reshaped the 
conduct of intergovernmental fiscal relations. Thus, it is timely to undertake a study of 
univ'`=e 
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intergovernmental fiscal relations in the light of these developments in order to suggest 
how intergovernmental fiscal relations can better contribute to economic progresses and 
the achievement of the Vision 2020, which is the long term vision for Malaysia to be a 
developed nation by the year 2020. The former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed in his 
statement affirmed that: 
`There can be no fully developed Malaysia until we have finally overcome the nine 
central strategic challenges that have confronted us from the moment of our birth as an 
independent nation. The first of these is the challenge of establishing a united Malaysian 
nation with a sense of common and shared destiny. This must be nation at peace with 
itself, territorially and ethnically integrated, living in harmony and full and fair 
partnership... ' (Mahathir Mohamad, 1991). 
Finally, research on intergovernmental fiscal relations has engendered considerable 
scholarly attention from all over the worldly following the increasing trend towards 
political and fiscal decentralisation and the growing demand for fiscal autonomy by 
subnational governments. However, these researches are based purely on economic 
considerations. 
In line with the new political development in Malaysia, federal states' fiscal 
arrangements have attracted strong public reaction, especially after the federal 
government terminated the payment of petroleum royalties to the Terengganu 
government. Therefore, it is timely to study the current practices of fiscal federalism in 
Malaysia to explore the problem and to investigate ways to improve intergovernmental 
fiscal relations to promote and strengthen national integration (between states in the 
federation) and national unity (among different ethnic groups) within the federal system, 
towards the achievement of the Vision 2020 - to be a developed nation. 
1.9 Focus, scope and delimitation of research 
According to Punch (1998), `delimitation means the drawing of boundaries around a 
study, and showing clearly what is and is not included' (Punch, 1998: 272). As described 
is Sec for instance Ter-Minassian (1997), Wildasin (1997), Bird and Vaillaincourt (1998), Litvack, et. al, 
(1998), and Bahl 2000). 
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earlier, this study focuses on the intergovernmental fiscal relationship between the federal 
and state governments. As such, the coverage of the study is limited to the following: 
i. Analysis of the intergovernmental fiscal relations in Malaysia as stipulated in the 
Federal Constitution, that is, revenue and expenditure function, federal transfers 
and borrowing powers. 
ii. An investigation into the problems of intergovernmental fiscal relations within the 
Malaysian federation, that is, fiscal imbalances (vertical and horizontal) as a result 
of (i) above, as well as the implications of the political system for the conduct of 
fiscal federalism. 
iii. Analysis of how to improve the intergovernmental fiscal relationship, notably in 
respect of revenue-raising powers, expenditure assignment and the grant system. 
This study combines both economic and political perspectives. It also discusses the 
structure of government, as well as the Malaysian political and party systems, as these 
aspects directly affect the conduct and efficiency of intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
However, this study does not include research on fiscal relations between the federal and 
local governments, interstates fiscal relations, and fiscal relations between state and local 
governments. This is the delimitation of this research. 
1.10 Organisation of the chapters 
The research is divided into eight chapters, including this introductory chapter, and the 
rest of this research is organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the `theory of fiscal federalism', the nature of fiscal 
federalism and the problems of fiscal federalism. The definitions of federalism and 
intergovernmental fiscal relations are also discussed extensively in this chapter, as they 
are relevant to this study. The discussion on the terminological interpretation of 
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federalism is important in order to understand how intergovernmental fiscal relations in a 
federal system should work. According to Punch (1998), `in the traditional model of 
research, the literature is reviewed (often comprehensively) as part of the research 
planning and question development stage ... the 
literature can be a fruitful source of 
concepts, theories and evidence about the topic' (Punch, 1998: 43). The theory of public 
finance is also briefly examined and discussed in this chapter. This is important to link 
the theory and practice in the conduct of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. 
Chapter 3 surveys the kind of fiscal federalism practiced in Malaysia. This includes 
discussion on the evolution of federalism in Malaysia from the historical perspective, the 
design of fiscal federalism, and the structure of the government. Discussion on the 
evolution of federalism is essential in order to gain deeper understanding of the design of 
fiscal federalism in Malaysia; in particular, the division of power (legislative and 
executive) as well as other aspects of fiscal federalism, as enshrined in the Constitution. 
From this chapter, we will see how strong the power of the federal government is, as 
compared to the states, and why the federal government assumes it supervisory role as a 
`care taker' or `stakeholder' of states. 
The main issue of intergovernmental fiscal relations arising from such a design of fiscal 
federalism is a problem of fiscal imbalances, originating from the fact that the federal 
government controls most of the more productive and flexible tax sources, whereas the 
states, despite their dynamic and expanding functions, are left with less productive 
sources of income. This is the main focus of Chapter 4. The upshot of inappropriate 
assignment of revenue sources is that the individual state revenue is rarely suffices to 
fulfil its constitutional obligations. This type of fiscal imbalance, known as vertical 
imbalance, denotes the need of all the states for financial support from the federal 
government. Another type of fiscal imbalance, horizontal imbalance, shows fiscal 
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imbalances between states arising from differences in their fiscal capacities and from the 
differences in the cost of fulfilling state functions to a certain minimum standard. These 
fiscal imbalances require financial adjustment by way of federal transfers to the state 
governments. Hence, this chapter is mainly devoted to the discussion and analysis of 
fiscal imbalances and transfers to remedy this problem. 
Chapter 5 investigates the determinants of federal transfers to states using regression 
analysis. The aim of this analysis is to examine whether or not significant factors such as 
the federal and state governments' revenue and expenditure, national Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), and size of population have any significant relationship in the making of 
the grants system to redress fiscal imbalances. This analysis is followed by an 
examination of the significance of federal transfers to the state governments' finance. 
From empirical assessments, it has been found that the current transfers system does not 
take into consideration federal government revenue performance, as the amount of 
transfers is still far too low compared to the amounts of federal government revenue 
collection. Hence the current system fails to negate states' revenue-expenditure gap. The 
situation is exacerbated by the political considerations influencing the disbursement of 
grants; payments are not forthcoming smoothly if the states are led by a political party 
different from that of the centre. 
In Chapter 6, the actual working of fiscal federalism, the problems and challenges facing 
intergovernmental fiscal relations in Malaysia, are analysed, in particular the implications 
of the political operations and the party system. This is important because fiscal 
federalism is a political process inherent in the quest for unity within the diversity of a 
federation. In particular, this chapter considers to what extent the working of fiscal 
federalism in Malaysia is actually shaped by the states' political affiliation with the ruling 
party at the centre. Because of their particular importance, the federal-state conflicts over 
fiscal matters are also discussed. The petroleum royalties payment issue is used as a case 
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study to examine the implications of different political parties governing at the federal 
and state levels and their effect on the working of fiscal federalism. It is found that if 
political cohesion cannot be maintained at both levels of government, there is no 
guarantee that fiscal federalism will work effectively. Therefore, state governments' 
finances need to be strengthened. 
The issue of strengthening state governments' finances is the focus of discussion in 
Chapter 7. To investigate this issue, interviews have been conducted with the fiscal 
practitioners, chosen on the basis of their expert knowledge of the specialist technical 
nature in the field of intergovernmental fiscal relations. The main objective of these 
interviews has been to obtain opinions about how to make improvements to the state 
governments' finance. The role of the NFC as an institution to foster federal-state fiscal 
relations is also examined. In short, this chapter suggests ways to overcome the existing 
shortcomings of intergovernmental fiscal relations, with the aim of strengthening state 
governments' finances, and hence reducing states' over-dependence on funds from the 
federal government. 
The last chapter, Chapter 8, discusses the overall research findings in reference to the 
research questions set out in Chapter 1. One of the significant findings of this research is 
that fiscal federalism can only work well when the same party is in control at both federal 
and state levels. Otherwise, fiscal federalism will be strained and engulfed with conflicts. 
This is due to structural shortcomings in the design of fiscal federalism that gave 
exclusive powers, both legislative and executive, to the central government. Due to the 
centralised nature of the Malaysian political system and given the strong central financial 
power, any state government that is not politically affiliated to the centre's political elites 
will be subject to financial sanctions from the federal government. Based on the research 
findings, this chapter also highlights the contribution of research to the general body of 
knowledge as well as to the enrichment of literature on Malaysian fiscal federalism. It is 
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an important aspect of research, as pointed out by many researchers such as Bell (1993) 
and Punch (1998) that research findings should contribute to the enhancement of the 
body of knowledge. Finally, this chapter will offer some observations and directions for 
future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Federalism and Fiscal Federalism 
2.1 Introduction 
There has been a resurgence of interest in fiscal federalism within most federal systems 
of government, following the renewal of interest in fiscal decentralisation in recent years 
and advancements in economic theory, as well as new sources of financing in public 
finance and public expenditure management (Bird, et a[, 2003; Bird and Vaillancourt, 
1998; Ter-Minassian, 1997). Fiscal federalism, which refers to the intergovernmental 
fiscal arrangement between the federal and the constituent governments in the federal 
system, is the salient feature of the federation. ' As briefly discussed in Chapter 1, the 
economic aspects of fiscal federalism are concerned with 
a. the assignment of the expenditure function; 
b. the assignment of revenue sources (taxation) to each level of government; and 
c. how fiscal adjustments are designed to solve the problem of fiscal imbalance 
arising from these arrangements. 
However, for the political scientist, fiscal federalism is not merely an economic matter, 
but is a political process towards achieving unity in diversity. Hence, the problem of 
federal-state fiscal arrangements is a fundamental problem in most federations, both in 
politics and economics, and has been the source of much federal-state dispute and 
conflict. Unlike in a unitary system, intergovernmental fiscal relations in federal systems 
are constitutionally entrenched, and cannot be changed unilaterally without consent from 
all members in the federation. Economists have debated the issue of fiscal federalism for 
many years in order to find the ideal fiscal arrangement that suits the theory of public 
finance and overall macroeconomic management. But political scientists have argued that 
The terms federal government or central government and the constituent governments or subnational 
governments (governments below the federal government) will be used throughout in this chapter. 
Central government refers to the upper tier of government in the federation while constituent 
governments or subnational government refer to state, Länder, canton, or province. The terms federal 
government and central government will be used interchangeably. 
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fiscal federalism should not be viewed strictly from the economic perspective per se, as it 
involves government and politics? Consequently, political scientists regard fiscal 
federalism as part of the political economy issue (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997; Beer, 
1977) and hence the design of fiscal arrangements should also take into account both 
fiscal and non-fiscal issues, in particular, the political aspects of federalism `within which 
these financial arrangements operate' (Watts, 2002: 2). This development has engendered 
great interest among many scholars and policymakers in every federation to reinvigorate 
the intergovernmental fiscal arrangement, and consequently calls for structural reform of 
federal-state fiscal relations. 
In this chapter, the discussion will focus on the theoretical aspects of fiscal federalism as 
found in the current literature. However, before embarking on this task, it is imperative to 
review the terms `federalism and federation' from the perspective of political science. 
This is of key importance, as the term federalism is drawn from the study of politics 
rather than economics. That is why a substantial portion of this chapter will be devoted to 
a discussion of terminological interpretations of such terms, in order to understand the 
working of fiscal federalism. Then the study will move on to the examination of 
federalism from an economist's point of view. There seem to be contrasting views among 
social scientists regarding the term federalism, as well as federation, due to the absence of 
linkage between the two disciplines. By making such a link, the thesis hopes to ensure 
impartiality in the analysis of fiscal federalism in Malaysia, which is the essence of this 
study. Hence, this chapter is in part intended to investigate that missing link. Analysis of 
the mainstream literature of fiscal federalism reveals that this aspect of political science 
has not been given due consideration. Therefore the lack of convergence between 
economics and the political science perspectives in the study of fiscal federalism results 
in a serious deficiency in the body of knowledge. From here, the study will examine 
2 Beer (1977), for instance, suggests that the design of fiscal federalism should take into consideration both fiscal and non-fiscal issues of the particular federation. See also Watts (2002). 
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fiscal federalism and its theory, concerning the question of assignment of powers: 
taxation, expenditure functions, borrowing powers as well as intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers. The analysis of terminological interpretation of federalism and federation, 
division of powers and functions will serve as a guideline for the study of fiscal 
federalism in Malaysia in the subsequent chapters. 
2.2 Federalism and federation 
What is meant by federalism? This is a simple and very basic question in the study of 
federalism and fiscal federalism. However, there is no direct answer to this simple 
question, and the term is `notoriously difficult to define with precision' (Watts, 1998: 5). 
A review of federalism literature reveals that different writers give different 
interpretations of federalism, `it has meant different things to different people' (Carnell, 
1961: 16), which, more often than not, creates more confusion than clarification. Some 
see little difference between the terms `federalism', `federation' and `federal 
government'. Hence, most of them have used the words federalism and federation 
interchangeably. In actual fact, there is a clear interpretive terminological difference 
between federalism and federation. Therefore, it is vital to begin with a terminological 
clarification before any analysis of the fiscal aspects involved in federalism can be made. 
As noted in Chapter 1, there have been many debates among scholars, especially political 
scientists, about the definition of federalism and federation. Scholarly debate on the 
definitions of federalism and federation is not new (Watts, 1999a; Burgess, 1986; King, 
1982). It has been debated for long a time and, still, the importance of the distinction 
between federalism and federation is not fully appreciated. As a consequence, the terms 
`federalism and federation' have been perceived as synonymous, and hence continue to 
be used interchangeably (Burgess, 1986: 16). 
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Early discourses on federalism were mainly based on the work of Kenneth C. Wheare, 
which implicitly used the terms federalism and federal government interchangeably for 
describing federalism, federation, and federal government. Wheare, in his book, `Federal 
Government', first published in 1946, claimed that for the government to be federal, it 
should have a federal principle, which he defined as `the method of dividing powers so 
that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, coordinate and 
independent' (Wheare: 1953: 11). In this definition, Wheare focuses on the method of 
dividing powers to determine whether or not the country is federal. In his view, `if the 
powers of the regional governments are specified and the residue is left to the general 
government' (Wheare, 1953: 12), the particular government is not federal. Therefore, `the 
question where the residue of power is to rest is an important question in framing a 
federal government' (Wheare (1953: 13). This interpretation of federalism caused much 
confusion, as Wheare viewed federalism in terms of the division of powers, in particular 
who should hold the residuary powers - general or regional government, - and how the 
federal government should be organised. In essence, Wheare's interpretation of 
federalism essentially described the characteristics of federal government, with particular 
reference to the United States Constitution. However, one important observation is the 
kind of relationship that should be established between the federal government and the 
constituent units in a federation. According to Wheare, the functions of government are 
divided in such a way that the relationship between the national legislature, which has 
authority over the whole federation, and those state legislatures, which have authority 
only within the constituent units, should not be the relationship between superior and 
subordinates, but of co-ordinate partners in the governmental process. In other words, no 
government level must be subordinate to the level above. 
Realising the fact that federalism is more than merely the division of powers, many 
scholars have attempted to redefine the term federalism, but the outcomes remained 
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unsatisfactory. Preston King commented that `the fact, however, that a few writers have 
been inclined to make this distinction between federalism and federation is in no way to 
suggest that most do - for most make no distinction at all' (King, 1982: 20). Livingston 
(1956), for instance, attempted to define federalism in sociological terms. He described 
federalism essentially as a phenomenon of social diversity and argued that the essence of 
federalism lies not in the constitution or institutional structure but in the society itself: 
`the essential nature of federalism is to be sought for, not in the shadings of legal and 
constitutional terminology, but in the forces - economic, social, political, cultural - that 
have made the outward forms of federalism necessary ... the essence of 
federalism lies not 
in the constitutional or institutional structure but in the society itself (Livingstone 1956: 
2). (Emphasis added). 
William H. Riker also defined federalism differently from previous writers. He saw 
federalism as a bargain between national leaders and officials of the constituent 
governments for the purpose of political enlargement3 due to advancement in 
technological transport that `makes it possible to rule a larger geographic area from one 
centre, to fill a treasury more abundantly, to maintain a larger bureaucracy and police, 
and, most important of all, to assemble a larger army' (Riker, 1964: 2) and as a result 
help one government `to enlarge its area of control' (Riker, 1964: 2). Finally, Riker 
concluded his interpretation of federalism as follows: 
`... I interpreted federalism as a bargain between prospective national leaders and 
officials of constituent government for the purpose of aggregating territory, the better to 
lay taxes and raise armies. This bargain can be defined quite precisely so that, when 
presented with an instance of a constitution, one can say whether or not it belongs to the 
class of federalisms. The rule for identification is: A constitution is federal if (1) two 
levels of government rule the same land and people (2) each level has at least one area of 
action in which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some guarantee (even though merely a 
statement in the constituent). of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere' 
(Riker, 1964: 11). (Emphasis added). 
Daniel Elazar also described federalism in terms of the characteristics of federal states, 
with reference to the United States Constitution. Federalism, according to Elazar, is the 
unification of political organisations to unite separate polities where power is distributed 
3 In his analysis, Riker (1964) employed two assumptions, namely, expansion condition and military 
conditions. In the final analysis he claimed that `the military and expansion conditions are necessary to 
the occurrence of federalism' (pp 48). Riker's interpretation, however, cannot be generalised to cover all 
federations, and hence, it can be challenged. 
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between general and the constituent units (Elazar, 1972), according to the self-rule and 
shared rule principles (Elazar, 1987). 4 However, he argues that federalism is more than 
an arrangement of government structures. He puts it as follows: 
`Federalism can be defined as the mode of political organisation that unites separate 
polities within an overarching political system by distributing power among general and 
constituent governments in a manner designed to protect the existence and authority of 
both. By requiring that basic policies be made and implemented through a process of 
negotiation that involves all polities concerned, federal systems enable all to share in the 
overall system's decision-making and executing process. In its simplest form, federalism 
means national unification through the maintenance of subnational systems. In a larger 
sense, however, federalism is more than an arrangement of governmental structures; it is 
a mode of political activity that requires the extension of certain kinds of cooperative 
relationships throughout any political system it animates' (Elazar, 1972: 2-3). (Emphasis 
added). 
But to A. H Birch, federalism is a concept that has no fixed meaning. The meaning 
depends on the approach used to define the term. In his view, federalism is `a political 
device, which is adopted, to further ends which are always partly and sometimes 
predominantly economic' (Birch 1961: 113). A prominent scholar of federalism and the 
comparative analysis of federalism, Ronald L. Watts, defined federalism as multi-tier 
government, which combines the principles of self-rule and shared rule that are based on 
the ability to accommodate socio-economic and political diversity. According to Watts, 
`Federalism is basically not a descriptive but a normative term and refers to advocacy of 
multi-tiered government combining elements of shared rule and regional self-rule. It is 
based on the presumed value and validity of combining unity and diversity and 
accommodating, preserving and promoting distinct identities within a larger political 
union. The essence of federalism as a normative principle is the perpetuation of both 
union and non-centralisation at the same time' (Watts (1999a: 6). (Emphasis added). 
To summarise the above discussion, terminological interpretations of federalism by most 
writers have been, by and large, confined to the debate surrounding the characteristics 
and the act of federation. Three conclusions can be drawn from the early literature on 
federalism: first, federalism has not been given a clear meaning - the meaning has been 
dependent upon the aims of the writers. Second, most of the definitions of federalism 
refer to unions of states / multi-levels of government and how powers are divided 
Self-rule means that the respective members of the federation govern its jurisdiction based on 
constitutional distribution of powers and functions, while shared rule means the sharing of powers 
between federal and state government to achieve the common goal of federation (Watts, 1999: 83). This 
concept was first introduced by Elazar (1987). 
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between them; and finally, for many years, scholars perceived the terms federalism and 
federation as synonymous and used them interchangeably. Burgess summed up the early 
discourses on federalism as: 
`this legacy presented the study of federation and federal government in essentially 
historical, constitutional and juridical terms. It was a very static interpretation of the 
subject, which understandably reflected the political science scholarship of the age' 
(Burgess, 2000a: 24). 
However, in 1982, more than forty years after Wheare, scholars reconceptualised the 
term federalism. These developments stem from advances made in the study of political 
science as well as the influence of other disciplines. According to Burgess, 
`studies of federation, federal political systems and federal government have progressed 
and expanded pari pasu with the overall advances made in political science itself. The 
so-called `behavioural revolution' in the post-war social sciences exposed the narrow, 
rigid and legalistic view of the subject and brought it under the intellectual influences of 
economics, sociology and psychology, resulting in much wider, more inclusive, scholarly 
ambit' (Burgess, 2000a: 24). 
Among them is Preston King, who defined federalism in a manner distinct from the 
previous writers. In his book, 'Federalism and Federation, published in 1982, Preston 
King espoused the new discourse on federalism and described federalism as a philosophy 
or ideology that brings socio-economic and political diversity into larger political union 
of federation. 5 To shore up King's argument, Burgess (1986) asserted that federalism is 
'unquestionably ideological in the sense that it is a prescriptive guide to action. It seeks to 
achieve federation' (Burgess, 1986: 14). He further emphasised, 
`federalism to mean the recommendation and (sometimes) the active promotion of 
support for federation. It is ideological in the sense that it can take the form of an overtly 
prescriptive guide to action, and it is philosophical to the extent that it is a normative 
judgement upon the ideal organisation of human relations and conduct' (Burgess, 2000a: 
26-27). 
King's and Burgess's arguments that federalism is an ideology can be traced back to the 
origin of the word `federal'. According to McCoy and Baker (1991) cited by Burgess 
(2000a: 6), the original word federal was derived from the Latin word foedus', which 
means `covenant'. According to S. Rufus Davis, the word foedus' is linguistically 
related to the 'foederal phenomenon of Rome and after' (Davis, 1978: 3). This has a 
See King (1982), especially Chapter 2. 
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similar meaning to faith and trust - the basis of a covenant. Covenant could mean a 
league, treaty, or compact. To Davis, 
`the idea of covenant betokens not merely a solemn pledge between two or more people 
to keep faith with each other, to honour an agreement; it involves the idea of 
cooperation, reciprocity, mutuality, and it implies the recognition of entities - whether it 
be persons, a people, or a divine being. Without this recognition there can be no 
covenant' (Davis, 1978: 3). (Emphasis added). 
Thus, the meaning of federal embodies the concept of a covenant. According to Burgess 
(2000a: 6), `a covenantal order is federal and a federal order is covenantal'. Thus, to a 
great extent, federalism is deep-rooted in the idea of covenantal theory; 6 `the concept of 
covenantal federalism embodies a set of normative principles which bind partners 
together in a moral contract or agreement of trust ... 
based upon mutual recognition, 
tolerance, respect, obligation and responsibility' (Burgess, 1999: 58), which form the 
moral basis of the federal spirit. The underlying principle of the federal spirit is federal 
trust or comity, or Bundestreue. It has two meanings: 
`first, it denotes the duty of all governments in the federation to take each other's 
interests into account in the exercise of their respective public responsibilities. And 
secondly, it refers to the totality of the federal relationships, the well being of the whole 
state' (Burgess 2000a. 17). (Emphasis added). 
Taking account of all of these, Burgess described the federal spirit in the following way: 
`faith, mutual trust, partnership, respect, friendship, loyalty, public duty, consent, 
consultation and cooperation resonate with the preconceptions and presumptions of what 
is at its core a moral discourse' (Burgess 2000a: 17). Thus, a federal system which is 
established as a result of the voluntary joining together of a number of previously 
independent states into a new and larger political system' should adopt the federal spirit 
in the conduct of federal-state relations. With the federal spirit, a genuine federal 
relationship could be established and maintained. 
6A comprehensive analysis of covenantal theory can be found in Burgess (1999: 56-62) and Davis (1978), 
especially Chapter 1. 
There was no single reason for federal creation in most federal countries. However, the most common 
reasons are: common threats / enemies, common markets, political, historical, and geographical linkages 
(see Birch, 1966). 
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Conversely, the word federalism adds the suffix `ism' to the root word of `federal'. This 
suffix has various uses and meanings8, such as (i) an action or its result (such as 
hypnotism, baptism); (ii) a condition or state of being (such as barbarism, despotism); 
(iii) a doctrine, theory, belief, or practice (such as stoicism, Platonism, liberalism, 
conservatism, communism); and (iv) a peculiarity of speech (such as a localism, or an 
Americanism). With regard to federalism, the third meaning, that is, to indicates a 
doctrine, theory, belief, or practice is more appropriate to be used as a basis to understand 
the core of federalism. Within these meanings, the words `theory and belief' are closer to 
covenantal theory. In covenantal theory, the partners are bound together in a moral 
contract or agreement of trust based on a common belief, and the relationships between 
partners are essentially federal (Burgess, 2000a; Burgess, 1999). The `liveliness' of this 
contract is based on the federal spirit. 9 Thus, with the combination of the covenantal 
concept as a basis of federal spirit and the suffix `ism' to the root word federal, the 
definition of `federalism' is now unambiguous. However, no theory of federalism or 
model of federalism has been found in the literature (Watts, 2002). 
In summary, for a federation to exist, its founders should possess the fundamental 
ideology of federalism. However, King argues that federalism does not necessarily end 
with the creation of a federation. According to him `although there may be federalism 
without federation, there can be no federation without some matching variety of 
federalism' (King, 1982: 76). Thus, from the political scientist's point of view, these 
definitions of federalism are more practical than those found in the early literature, which 
were based on the method of dividing the powers, that `reflected the political science 
scholarship of the age' (Burgess, 2000a: 24). Further, Burgess emphasised that: 
$ See Webster's Third New International Dictionary. Vol. 11,1986, Merriam - Webster, Inc. United States, pp 1198 
9 See Burgess (2000b) for detailed discussion of the federal spirit. 
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`whichever perspective of federalism is adopted - and each is both highly contentious 
and contestable - the concept is anchored in the belief that political authority should be 
organised, as far as possible, in a manner, which accurately reflects natural socio- 
economic diversities. This means that in practice, authority should be divided and power 
dispersed among and between different groups and organisations in society. But if we are 
to fully understand and appreciate its significance, federalism must be viewed through 
conceptual lenses, which are sensitized to different political cultures. Only when we 
consider its application to specific cultural and historical milieux can we begin to fill out 
the concept with particular meaning. Like federation, federalism is rooted in its context, 
and meaning derives from context. We must therefore locate the concept in its own 
distinct setting: historical, cultural, intellectual, social, economic, philosophical an 
ideological' (Burgess, 2000a: 27). 
In line with Burgess's (2000a: 24) reference to the `behavioural revolution' in social 
science in the post war years, the study of federalism grew beyond the boundaries of 
politics; notably into the field of economics. In the 1950s, economists began to show 
their interest in federalism after realising that some theories of public finance that had 
been developed in a unitary setting had only a limited application to federal systems of 
government, since the constituent units differ in their financial strength, level of 
economic development (due to differences in natural endowment), and more importantly 
the notion of the political aspects of federalism that neither level of government is 
subordinate to the other (Watts, 2002). The conventional study of public finance was 
developed based on the unitary setting of government as founded by Adam Smith (The 
Wealth of Nations, 1776). The same setting was also apparent in Keynes's well-known 
general theory (The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 1936). 
According to Musgrave, `the traditional approach to fiscal theory has been in the context 
of unitary government' (Musgrave, 1965: 1). However, as it had been realised that the 
theory of public finance had practical difficulties in settings other than that of unitary 
states, economists revisited the theory of public finance in the context of the federal 
setting of government. Since then, fiscal federalism10 has continuously developed in line 
with the movement towards greater fiscal decentralisation" of central governmental 
10 See Section 2.3 of this chapter. 
11 Bird and Vaillancourt (1998: 3) define fiscal decentralisation in relation to the degree of independent 
decision-making exercised at the local level. It involves deconcentration, (dispersion of responsibilities 
within a central government to regional branch offices), delegation (the situation in which local 
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functions in both federal and non-federal countries. Alas, the focus remains on the 
economic considerations, that is, equity and efficiency in the provision of public goods 
and services. 
Following this development, economists arrived at their very own set of definitions of 
federalism, based on Wheare's method of dividing powers. A definition of federalism 
that gained considerable influence was that of Wallace E Oates from his book `Fiscal 
Federalism' published in 1972. He offers an economic definition of federalism as: 
`Federal government: A public sector with both centralised and decentralised levels of 
decision-making in which choices made at each level concerning the provision of public 
services are determined largely by the demands for these services of the residents of (and 
perhaps who carry on activities in) the respective jurisdiction' Oates (1972: 17). 
(Emphasis added). 
Obviously, from the point of view of economists, federalism has a similar meaning to the 
term federal government, in which the decision-making process for the provision of 
public services is both centralised (at the federal government level) and decentralised (at 
the state governments level) taking into account local preferences for public services. 
Therefore, it was not surprising if Oates' economic definition of federalism was largely 
guided by Tiebout's local expenditure functions (Tiebout, 1956) and Musgrave's 
economic functions of government: the principles of stabilisation, allocation and 
redistribution, in a quest for efficiency and equity'2 in the provision of public goods and 
services (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1976; Musgrave, 1959), but not the federal spirit 
although he discussed the larger subject of federalism, that is, fiscal aspects involving 
federalism. This is because each discipline serves a different purpose. Henceforth, the 
government acts as an agent for the central government) and I or devolution (when the decision-making 
process and implementation of function is done at the local level). According to Osaghae (1990) 
decentralisation is `the dispersal of power from this centre to other centres of power, which may be 
functional or territorial units' (Osaghae, 1990.98). 
12 In the economic context, efficiency has to do with how much wealth can be generated given available 
resources, while equity concerns how that wealth is to be distributed in society. In other words, equity has to do with the distribution of resources based on the concepts of fairness and social justice. In theory, 
allocative efficiency is achieved when the market is at equilibrium level (price equals marginal cost), in 
that there is no way to reallocate the goods or services without hurting someone. Pareto defined 
allocative efficiency as a situation where no-one could be made better off without making someone else 
worse off. However, there is often a trade-off between economic efficiency and equity, as both involve 
value judgments. 
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economic debate on fiscal federalism leaned heavily upon the work of Oates. 13 Although 
Oates' definition of federalism is contrary to the interpretation of federalism offered by 
political scientists; little attempt was made by economists to rationalise the differences. 
Only recently, economists have begun to realise the importance of political structure and 
the system of government in the working of intergovernmental fiscal relations (Gramlich 
and Wood, 2000). 
Oates' definition of federalism is highly deficient because public sector fiscal operations 
involve not only the federal government but also state governments, local governments, 
statutory bodies, and non-financial public enterprises (NFPEs) as well as quasi public 
enterprises (1MF, 1983). While it is true that government finance is part of the public 
sector fiscal operation, to define federalism in the purely economic terms offered by 
Oates is singularly inappropriate. The economic definition of federalism should also be 
concerned with the fiscal operation of federal, state, and local governments, and the 
interaction between and among them. This should be the scope of the economic 
understanding of federalism. Hence, in economic terms, federalism could be 
appropriately defined as the fiscal conduct of the federal - state governments (and local 
government) based on self-rule plus shared rule principles in discharging the 
constitutionally entrenched fiscal responsibilities, to achieve the goal of federation. Fiscal 
conduct should be based on the spirit of federalism, that is, cooperation, partnership, 
respect, trust, participation and representation, as underlined by the covenantal theory, as 
well as based on the economic functions of government, that is, stabilisation, allocation 
and redistribution functions. 14 This should be the basis of fiscal federalism, which is then 
orchestrated with other aspects of federalism, in particular, the political system and socio- 
economic diversity, to achieve the ultimate common objective of federation. Therefore, 
13 See among others Bird and Vaillancourt (1998), Ter-Minassian (1997a), Ter-Minassian (1997b), Shah 
(1994), and King (1992). 
14 See footnote 19 page 53 of this chapter for explanations of stabilisation, distribution and allocation function. 
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fiscal federalism is not just an economic but a political process, in the quest for unity in 
diversity, for the promotion of a stable government. With unity, the goal of federating 
will be achieved and federalism will also survive and be preserved. Thus, the economic 
definition of federalism should not be strictly confined to economic considerations, but 
should also reflect the political science perspective of federalism. In this regard, the 
statement by Gramlich and Wood is worth noting: 
`Fiscal federalism has been an important topic for many years now. The usual analysis of 
fiscal federalism has considered various expenditures and taxes, asking which 
expenditure and tax programs should be carried out by what level of government. 
However, the more fundamental question regarding the shape of the nation, or 
federation, is t}picallynotasked' (Gramlich and Wood, 2000: 1). (Emphasis added). 
2.3 Fiscal federalism: The financial aspects of intergovernmental relations in the federal 
system 
The preceding discussion on interpretations of federalism and federation is a useful basis 
to understand the subject of this study, that is, fiscal federalism. By now it is clear that 
there appear differences in interpretation among economists with regard to the term 
`fiscal federalism'. Economists use it interchangeably with financial aspects of multi- 
level government in a non-federal system, as well as with fiscal decentralisation. These 
two terms - multi-level finance and fiscal decentralisation - are related to fiscal 
federalism but not synonymous. As fiscal federalism involves two disciplines, fiscal 
(economic / finance) and federalism (political science), the question is how the study of 
fiscal federalism fits into federalism and public finance. 
Public finance is a branch of economics and economics is the study of allocation of 
scarce resources. In particular, public finance is concerned with how the government 
raises revenue (through taxation policy), how it spends these revenues (through the 
budgetary operation), and how deficit is to be financed (through borrowing). In short, 
public finance is about government budgeting and fiscal policy. In a nutshell, the 
objective of public finance is to maximise the welfare of the people (tax payers) so that 
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taxes paid by people to the government are equal to benefits derived from goods and 
services provided by the government on the basis of efficiency and equity considerations. 
Theoretically, when taxes paid are equal to benefits received, the optimum of public 
finance is reached (Aronson, 1985). Therefore, the essence of public finance lies in the 
financial activities of governments and the public sector as a whole in the provision of 
public goods and services. It describes and analyses the expenditures of government and 
the techniques used by governments to finance these expenditures (taxation and debt 
financing). Public finance analysis helps to understand why certain services have to be 
supplied by the government, why governments have to rely on particular types of taxes, 
and why government have to embark on certain fiscal policy (either expansionary or 
contractionary). Economic theory provides insights into government budgeting, that is, 
the optimum and efficient use of limited resources (efficiency) to promote high growth 
with equity. Clearly, public finance involves all government financial activities, including 
the financial relation / arrangement between centre and regional / state government (and 
local government). The application of public finance in a federal system is referred to as 
the federal finance, which primarily concerns the fiscal arrangement between the federal 
and state governments in the federal system and how the governments deal with 
differences in federation, as constituent states differ in many respects, such as size, 
natural endowment, population, ethnicity, and economic development. '5 For economists, 
is The term `federal finance' was for the first time espoused by Adarkar in his book The Principles and 
Problems of Federal Finance, published in 1933 and refined by Bhargava (1953) and Scott (1964). (See 
also Shirras (1944: 222-243) and Hicks (1947: 224-226)). Although there was no literature found to 
show exactly when the term 'fiscal federalism' was first invented, most economists refer to Buchanan in 
his article 'Federalism and Fiscal Equity' published in 1950 and Richard Musgrave in his book The 
Theory ofPublic Finance: The Study in Public Economy published in 1959, which both discuss fiscal 
aspects of federalism. According to Musgrave, earlier discussion of public finance had been in terms of 
fiscal system involving one level of government and hence it became complicated when applied in a 
federal or multi-level financial system, as the state has its own fiscal functions. Subsequently, the subject 
of fiscal system in a federal or multi-level financial system, which economists refer to as 'fiscal 
federalism', attracted economists' interest. The term 'fiscal federalism' gained further popularity among 
economists notably after a first book on Fiscal Federalism by Wallace E Oates was published in 1972. 
Since then, the term 'federal finance' has been rarely used by economists or by political scientists. 
However, Bird and Chen posed the question, 'are 'federal finance' and 'fiscal federalism' just different 
names for the same thing? ' (Bird and Chen, 1996: 51). They found that the two are not the same, but 
surprisingly they defined fiscal federalism as a financial arrangement between states and local 
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therefore, fiscal federalism is a part of the wider issue of federal finance, which has a 
similar objective to public finance. 
The definition of federalism by economists originates from Musgrave, who defined 
federalism as multi-levels or multi-units of governments (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1976; 
Musgrave, 1965; Musgrave, 1959). This definition implies that every country is federal, 
since multi-units of government can be found in any type of government setting, not only 
in the federal system. Based on this definition, economists defined fiscal federalism as 
`the fiscal relations between hierarchically ordered units or multi-unit finance (the fiscal 
relations between coordinate units)' (Musgrave, 1965: 2). Shah (1994) also defined fiscal 
federalism similarly to Musgrave (1965), that is, `public finances of a state with more 
than one fiscal tier' (Shah, 1994: 5). Another prominent scholar on fiscal federalism, 
Richard M. Bird, interpreted fiscal federalism as `the analysis of the problem that give 
rise to, and arise from, the existence of more than one level of government within the 
same geographical area' (Bird, 1999: 151). Even more confusing, some economists 
defined fiscal federalism similarly to the decentralisation of fiscal functions - expenditure 
and taxation powers from the central to the constituent governments in order to find the 
most efficient ways of providing public goods and services. 16 This understanding of fiscal 
federalism has become the economists' `conventional wisdom' in the study of fiscal 
federalism and fiscal decentralisation. As we will discuss later, this definition is 
singularly inappropriate in the context of federalism / federation. Today, fiscal 
decentralisation has become a major economic agenda in most countries - federal and 
non-federal - and is actively pursued by both economists and policy-makers (Sphan, 
2000; Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998; Ter-Minassian, 1997). According to Sphan (2000), 
the theory of fiscal federalism argues in favour of the decentralised provision of public 
government, and federal finance as a financial arrangement between federal and state governments in a 
federal system (see also Bird, 1994). 
16 See Bird, et al., (2003); Bird, (1999); Sphan, (2000); Thöni, (1992); King, (1992); and Oates, (1972). 
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services, which would: firstly, increase efficiency because the constituent governments 
are closer to the people than national government and hence has an information 
advantage concerning their constituent's wants and preferences; and, secondly, 
population / labour mobility and competition among the constituent governments for 
delivery of public services will ensure the matching of citizens' preferences with 
governments' preferences. Thus, economists expect that decentralised government (as in 
federal countries) would be able to promote higher growth potential and efficiency in 
delivering public services. '7 
From an economic point of view, federalism and the structure of a federal system is the 
most suitable platform to carry out fiscal decentralisation (Shah, 1994). To some extent, 
the federal system itself is a form of decentralised government (Bird and Vaillancourt, 
1998). However, Osaghae (1990) argues that in a federal system, the division of power or 
assignment of fiscal function between levels of government cannot be considered as 
decentralisation of functions. This is because in a federal system `decentralisation is only 
partially right because the soul of federalism actually lies in non-centralisation' (Osaghae, 
1990: 98) and not decentralisation. Based on the federalism point of view, the state is not 
just the implementing agent of central government but it has own functions to perform. 
The states' functions in federation, as enshrined in the constitution, are a result of 
political bargaining at the time of federating. Thus, the powers that belong to the states 
are not the result of fiscal decentralisation process but of the states' exclusivity, being 
members in the federation. Any attempt to usurp states' functions as agreed at the time of 
federating cannot be made unilaterally; as such an attempt would be regarded as 
unconstitutional. Consent by all constituent units must be obtained, followed by any 
necessary constitutional amendments. In short, the powers or functions belonging to 
states are irrevocable, unlike in the unitary system. As demonstrated earlier, the division 
17 Some economists argue that fiscal decentralisation does more harm than good to the economy. See Tanzi 
(2001); Tanzi (1996); Ter-Minassian (1997); Prud' homme (1995) and Zhang andZou (1998). 
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of power in a federal state is a product of a constitutional compact (foedus) between the 
two levels of government. Thus, Osaghae (1990) asserted that `decentralisation can only 
be applied meaningfully to federalism in matters that belong to the central government' 
(Osaghae, 1990: 84). In other words, the federal government can only decentralise its 
powers / functions to the state, provided the state willingly accept those functions, as it 
affects the state's financial position. Similarly, if the centre decided to take state assigned 
functions, it could only be done through constitutional amendment, otherwise it would be 
regarded as a usurpation or encroachment by the central government on state affairs, 
which negates the principle of non-centralisation in federalism (Osaghae 1990). Finally, 
decentralisation with regard to federalism is best described in Osaghae's (1990) words: 
`In fact, decentralisation is best applied and understood in relation to federalism when its 
usage is restricted to the policy making and administrative aspects rather than the legal 
and constitutional aspects of federalism. The substance of federalism is captured by the 
concept of non-centralisation which best describes the legal and constitutional aspects of 
federalism. Therefore any attempt to divest federalism of the principle of non- 
centralisation by conceiving of it simply as a degree of decentralisation undermines its 
essence' (Osaghae, 1990: 85) (Emphasis added). 
Based on the above arguments, therefore, to regard fiscal federalism and fiscal 
decentralisation as synonymous, as many economists do, is singularly inappropriate. 
Although both fiscal federalism and fiscal decentralisation are concerned with how 
expenditure, revenue (tax) and borrowing powers are assigned to lower levels of 
government (based on the economic functions of government, that is, stabilisation, 
allocation and redistribution functions, as well as taking into account local preferences in 
the provision of public services), the underlying force of fiscal federalism is the federal 
spirit that binds together the constituent governments into a larger political union 
(federation), while the driving force of fiscal decentralisation is purely one of economic 
efficiency and equity in the provision of public goods and services (Bird and 
Vaillancourt, 1998). However, it is recognised that the division of powers between 
central government and the constituent governments in a federal system gives more room 
for fiscal decentralisation to grow further. Hence, it is not, surprising that economists 
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extended the scope of fiscal federalism to include non-federal systems. As such, from the 
economists' viewpoint, fiscal federalism is not confined to federal countries, but is also 
applicable to non-federal countries. Related to this, Oates says, 
`in economic terms, most if not all systems are federal. Aside from an absolute degree of 
centralisation of decision mating - which in practice is almost impossible to imagine - 
the public sectors of all countries would be federal, with distinctions being made in terms 
of differing degrees of centralisation' (Oates, 1972: 18). 
Although this statement is contentious, especially from a political science point of view, 
it has been received among economists as an appropriate interpretation of the economic 
definition of federalism (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998). Of particular importance, political 
scientists argue that what most economists such as Oates (1972) mean by the term fiscal 
federalism does not actually concern federalism. One critic of Oates' view is Beer (1977), 
who argues, `Oates is talking not about federalism but about the larger subject of multi- 
level government' (Beer, 1977: 22). He further asserts, `What economists and others 
actually talk about under the nominal heading of fiscal federalism is usually the broader 
and more interesting subject of the political economy of multi-level of government' 
(Beer, 1977: 23). Indeed, Beer's arguments are valid to a great extent. For instance, 
economists such as Inman, Rubinfield and Bird, observe that fiscal federalism is nothing 
more than the issue of rational choice, as the underlying assumption of fiscal federalism 
has similarities between public choice theory (Muller, 1992) and federalist theory 
(Ostrom, 1987). 18 
A review of literature on fiscal federalism suggests that the discussions on fiscal 
federalism have been largely dominated by the economists, simply because fiscal 
federalism involves fiscal matters, that is, the aspects of taxation and expenditure of the 
government, upon which fiscal arrangements between levels of government are based. 
Thus far, a literature review of fiscal federalism shows that little attempt has been made 
18 The basis of the rational choice theory is the notion of constrained choice. People are all motivated to 
seek the highest level of satisfaction given limited resources available to them compared with their 
unlimited wants (see Ostrom and Ostrom, 2004; Muller, 1992; Caporaso and Levine, 1992). 
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by political scientists to devise a comprehensive theory of fiscal federalism. As a result, 
fiscal federalism is handicapped when dealing with non-fiscal issues, due to the absence 
of the political aspects of federalism. In examining the application of fiscal federalism to 
public finance theory, economists merely look at the fiscal aspects. Hence, they overlook 
the importance of non-fiscal aspects of federalism, especially the federal spirit and 
political operation of federalism (Watts, 2003a; Watts, 2002). Raju Das asserts, 
`economic processes are everywhere political in that in order to operate they require 
political conditions, both at state and local levels. These processes are also political in 
that their inegalitarian and exploitative character leads to political struggles over the ways 
that the economic processes work and over their distributive outcomes. Similarly, the 
political conditions require, and are influenced by, economic conditions' (Raju Das; 
2001: 103). (Emphasis added). 
Therefore the incorporation of the political scientists' views in the development of a 
comprehensive theory of fiscal federalism is essential, as it involves the structure of the 
government as well as the political operation of federation. As such, it is relevant to 
discuss fiscal federalism not merely on the ground of economic expediency but also in 
terms of political aptness. In a nutshell, the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations 
should put the federal spirit at the apex. This should be the approach to the study of fiscal 
federalism. As Watts asserts, 
`This political significance places financial relations between central and constituent-unit 
governments at the heart of the process of intergovernmental relations... Thus, 
understanding intergovernmental financial relations require an understanding of the 
political context within which they occur' (Watts, 2003a: 2). (Emphasis added). 
Following political scientists' arguments, therefore, fiscal federalism is more than merely 
a system of fiscal arrangements between levels of government as argues by economists. It 
is more than the question of which level of government is best assigned with provision of 
public goods and services and what kind of tax should be assigned to each level of 
government to finance their assigned functions; it is a set of federal-state financial 
arrangements in a federal system designed from political bargaining at the time of 
federating based on a federal spirit, and therefore the design is constitutionally 
guaranteed, protected and cannot be changed unilaterally. More importantly, fiscal 
50 
federalism would ensure that the self-rule and shared rule principles of the federation are 
attained, respected and preserved. As noted in Chapter 1, fiscal federalism is a form of 
political process in search of unity in diversity, the ultimate aim of federation. Therefore, 
the understanding of federalism and its principles is essential in the design of 
intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in the federal system. However, until now, there 
appears to be no comprehensive theoretical and empirical treatment to federalism in the 
design of fiscal federalism even from economic perspective, let alone from a political 
economy point of view (Watts, 2002; Ter-Minassian, 1997; Inman and Rubenfeld, 1997; 
Oates, 1972). Inman and Rubenfeld, for instance, suggest that there should be a balance 
between states' representation in the federal government and the assignment of function 
between both levels of governments. If the objective is to strengthen democratic 
government, states' representation should be large enough. On the other hand, if the 
objective is to achieve a high degree of efficiency in the economy, more functions should 
be assigned to the federal government. Ideally, the design of fiscal federalism should aim 
at achieving both objectives - democratic government and a high degree of efficiency in 
the economy. However, the choice depends on the economic and political conditions 
specific to the particular federation. 
Poor design of intergovernmental fiscal relations will not only cause problems of fiscal 
imbalance between the centre and states, as well as among the states, but it will also raise 
problems of public governance and political implication. Of particular importance, the 
design of intergovernmental fiscal systems should promote good governance and 
accountability in the management of public resources at all levels of government (Ebel 
and Yilmaz, 1999). According to Oates (1972), the design of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations should answer the following questions: first, which level of government is best 
suited to provide a particular public service; second, what are the justifications and 
optimal arrangements in the design of intergovernmental grants; third, what general and 
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theoretical principles serve as guides in the design of a system of taxation under federal 
arrangement; fourth, how are economic federal systems actually organised and what 
cross-national similarities and differences exist in intergovernmental fiscal relations; and 
finally what are the dynamics of fiscal federalism, that is, what trends are present in the 
degree of fiscal centralisation or decentralisation over time. However, according to Bird 
and Vaillancourt (1998), intergovernmental fiscal arrangements seek to answer four key 
questions, that is, first, who does what (the question of expenditure assignment), second, 
who levies what taxes (the question of revenue assignment), third, how revenue- 
expenditure imbalance (vertical imbalance) is to be resolved, and finally, how differences 
between states (horizontal imbalance) are to be remedied. King (1992) added another 
question: how these arrangements can be tailored to suit the macroeconomic policies. 
These are the main issues in the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations in a federal 
system. Although there are no hard and fast rules in the design of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations, some guidance is found in the literature of public finance and political 
economy. All things being equal, services provided by lower levels of government are 
more likely to correspond to the demands of the majority of citizens than services 
provided by the higher level of government, due to the distance factor and the larger size 
of population (Tiebout, 1956; Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972). This is because lower levels 
of government will be better at perceiving, responding and delivering the utility functions 
of the citizens due to closeness to them, as compared to the federal government (Bryson 
and Cornia, 1999). 
According to Oates (1972: 17) `the problem of federalism is, however, quite different for 
an economist. In particular, the economist's central concerns are the allocation of 
resources and the distribution of income within an economic system'. The economic 
functions of government, according to Musgrave (1959), and Musgrave and Musgrave 
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(1976), are threefold19: macroeconomic stabilisation, income distribution and resource 
allocation. The stabilisation function is to assure the achievement of high employment 
and price stability, while the distribution function is to achieve an equitable distribution 
of income. The allocation function, on the other hand, is to ensure that resources (through 
annual budgetary allocation) are available and used efficiently, to avoid fiscal profligacy. 
In other words, the decisions about how much to spend on each service and how to 
finance these expenditures are the prime concerns of the allocation function. 
In the federal setting, the assignment of economic functions is more complicated than in 
the unitary state. This is because, according to Wheare, 
`The federal principle requires that the general and regional governments of a country 
should be independent each of the other within its sphere, shall be not subordinate one to 
another but coordinate with each other. Now if this principle is to operate not merely as a 
matter of strict law but also in practice, it follows that both general and regional 
governments must each have under its own independent control financial resources 
sufficient to perform its exclusive functions. Each must be financially co-ordinated with 
the other. ' (Wheare, 1953: 97) (Emphasis added). 
Besides the need to achieve the economic objectives, the division between the 
expenditure and revenue / taxation functions in a federal system involves constitutional 
issues, and to some extent is determined by political and historical factors specific to each 
particular federation. More importantly, appropriate assignment of functions will ensure 
the self-rule and shared rule principle are properly implemented by both levels of 
government. Based on the economic functions of government discussed above, the 
question is, which function is best suited to which level of government. Musgrave and 
Musgrave (1976) and Oates (1972) suggest that taxation and expenditure can be divided 
19 The stabilisation function refers to public policies that are designed to maintain full employment, 
stabilise prices, achieve a favourable balance of trade, and assure economic growth. Public sector taxes 
and expenditure decisions that influence these policies are referred to as fiscal policy. Generally, 
increasing spending and cutting taxes during economic downturns to increase domestic aggregate 
demand and cutting spending and raising taxes during economic upswings to reduce aggregate demand 
are the most appropriate policies. The redistribution function, on the other hand, refers to distribution of 
income fairly and equitably across the population. These policies normally range from cash transfers 
from rich to poor, subsidies and the like. Government uses its taxing and spending powers to redistribute 
resources from one group or community to another. Finally, allocation function refers to public policies 
that restore an efficient allocation of resources for use in the market. Under this function, the public 
sector normally acquires factor inputs (land, capital and labour) for the production of public goods and 
services. 
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or shared between levels of government according to whether or not it suits the 
stabilisation, distribution and allocation functions. Table 2.1 briefly shows which levels 
of government should undertake stabilisation, distribution and allocation functions. 
Musgrave and Musgrave (1976) strongly recommend that the stabilisation function 
should be assigned to the central government. Thus, any taxation and expenditure 
functions that could be used as stabilisation tools should be assigned to the centre. This is 
because lower levels of government cannot much affect macroeconomic conditions 
(McLure, 1999). Besides, the lower level of government, in most federations, usually has 
limited or even no borrowing power and monetary policy. This makes it difficult for the 
lower level of government to undertake fiscal expansionary or contractionary 
programmes when it is needed by the national economy. 
Table 2.1 
Economic Functions of Government 
Which level of government should undertake these functions? 
Functions Federal State Local 
Stabilisation Yes No 
Redistribution Yes Yes with administrative assistance 
Allocation Shared 
Source: Musgrave and Musgrave (1976) and Oates (1972) 
The stabilisation tool that is most commonly used to influence economic conditions is 
taxation policy, primarily through corporate tax and progressive personal income tax. 
This is because corporate tax fluctuates more than general economic conditions, while 
personal income tax has strong stabilising effects, especially if a progressive rate is used. 
As such, most literature on taxation suggests that these two taxes should be assigned to 
central government. Hence, taking this argument, it is impossible for the lower level of 
government to carry out the macroeconomic stabilisation in the economy. However, 
according to McLure (1999), this does not mean that state governments cannot levy taxes 
on the income of individuals. As found in the United States, state governments can and 
do levy taxes on the income of individuals within their respective jurisdiction apart from 
federal income tax (Watts, 1999a). 
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In addition to the stabilisation function, the redistribution function should also be 
assigned to the central government. This is because the lower level of government, which 
operates in its respective locality, is not capable of carrying out this function beyond its 
economic and political boundaries. The redistribution function aims to achieve an 
equitable distribution of income in the economy, notably through progressive taxation. 
However, according to McLure (1999), if the redistribution function is assigned to the 
lower level of government, progressive taxation intended to soak the rich may drive out 
capital and high-income individuals. If this occurs, taxation that appears progressive may 
actually be regressive. This is against the principle of redistribution and may not achieve 
the intended goals of income redistribution. From the point of view of federalism, the 
redistribution principle should reflect the federal spirit in that the state and its citizens 
should not be denied its right to benefit from the wealth of the nation. Hence, based on 
this argument, the redistribution function should properly be assigned to the federal 
government. 
However, Musgrave (1959) suggested that both levels of government should share the 
allocation function. This means that the design of fiscal arrangements, that is, the 
assignment of revenue (taxation) and expenditure, should allow the lower levels of 
government to undertake the allocation function (McLure, 1999; Bahl and Linn, 1994). 
By assigning the allocation function to the lower level of government, the constituent 
units will be able to match the revenue available and the demands of their constituency, 
which, in the long term, will increase efficiency, because lower levels of government 
have better information about their residents' needs than the central government. The 
constituent units are closest to voters / people and as such they are in the best position to 
read local preferences for public services and for various kinds of taxes and user charges 
to finance those services. According to Shah (1994), good design of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations can enhance fiscal accountability and transparency, and increase public 
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governance, that is, eliminate corrupt practices in the delivery of public services. Thus, 
the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations in a federal system should follow the 
assignment of economic functions of government as well as the federal spirit. This is 
important to avoid an adverse impact on macroeconomic stability and more importantly 
not to undermine the principle of federalism, in that neither level of government is 
subordinate to the other (Watts, 2002). Thus, according to Shah (1994: 9), `the 
assignment problem or the allocation of expenditure and tax function to various levels of 
governments is the most fundamental issue in federation'. 
2.3.1 Expenditure assignment 
The most important elements in intergovernmental fiscal relations are the division of 
function or expenditure assignment between levels of governments. Before assigning 
revenue function, types of expenditure should first be identified. Assigning expenditure 
function after revenue assignment is like putting the cart before the horse. According to 
Shah (1994: 9), `the literature on fiscal federalism argues that assigning responsibility for 
spending must precede assigning responsibility for taxation, because tax assignment is 
generally guided by spending requirement at different levels and cannot be determined in 
advance'. As such, from the government finance point of view, the division of functions 
takes precedence over the division of resources because the government needs to 
determine the amount to be spent on their functions first and then raise the funds 
necessary to finance the assigned functions (Ter-Minnasian 1997; Ahmad et al., 1997; 
Gandhi, 1995; Holzhausen 1974). 
Economists remain divided as to which level of government (central or state) will be 
responsible for which public services (Oates 1972). The answer is often the result of the 
historical, constitutional, social and political development of the particular country 
(Gandhi, 1995). However, there seems to be a consensus of opinion among politicians 
and economists that, as far as possible, functions should be divided according to the 
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principles of efficiency and equity. The problem of assigning expenditure functions arises 
not only in federations but also in unitary states. The way in which functions have 
actually been divided in various federations differs widely depending on such divergent 
factors (Watts, 1999a; Holzhausen, 1974) as traditional patterns of administration, 
political and socio-economic circumstances prevailing at the time of federating, and the 
relative bargaining powers of the parties to the federation. Table 2.2 shows the 
assignment of expenditure functions in selected federations. The division of functions of 
the particular federal country can determine the degree of centralisation or 
decentralisation of the federation. The more functions are assigned to the centre, the more 
centralised the federation (Malaysia) and the more functions are assigned to the states, the 
more decentralised the federation (Canada, the US, and Australia). 
Table 2.2 
The Distribution of Powers and Functions 
Canada United 
States 
Switzer 
land 
Australia Germany India Malaysia 
Finance and fiscal 
relations 
i. Taxation 
a. Customs /Excise F F/C F F F F/FS Fa 
b. Corporate FS C F C C F F 
c. Personal income FS C FS C C FS F 
d. Sales FS C F C C FS Fa 
ii. Debt and borrowing 
a. Public debt of 
federation 
F F F F F F F 
b. Foreign borrowing FS FS FS C FS F F 
c. Domestic borrowing FS FS FS C FS FS FS 
iii. Expenditure 
function 
a. Defence F FS F FS F F F 
b. Roads and bridges S FS FS FS C+ FS FS 
c. Railways FS FS F FS FC+ F Fa 
d. Air F F F FS F F F 
e. Telecommunications FS FS F C F F F 
f. Agriculture C S F Sc C+ SC SCa 
g. Education 
(primary/secondary) 
S S C+S S S CS Fa 
IL Health / hospitals SF SF S FS C+ S Fa 
i. Public 
health/sanitation 
S S C+ S C+ S FC 
j. Internal 
security/Police 
FS FS C SF C+S FS F 
Note: r' = federal power, S= state (provincial); C= concurrent power with federal paramountcy; C legislation; a= asymmetrical applications of powers 
Source: Adapted from Watts (1999a: 126) 
= federal 
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The theory of public finance suggests that economic efficiency and equity require that 
expenditure responsibilities be allocated between levels of government according to 
citizens' preferences and at the lowest possible resource cost (Aronson, 1985). Stauffer 
(1999), and Inman and Rubinfield (1998) suggest that the assignment of expenditure 
should be based on the principle of `subsidiarity'. 
`Subsidiarity is a principle of governance designed to give meaning to the divisions of 
power and responsibility between the central government and the constituent states in a 
federal system. The principle seeks to allocate responsibilities for policy formulation and 
implementation to the lowest level of government at which the objectives of that policy 
can be successfully achieved' (Inman and Rubinfield, 1998: 545). 
In the Preamble of the Treaty on the European Union (EU) it was stated that the 
signatories pledged `to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity'. This was then strengthened by the Article 
3b of the Treaty, which provided that: 
`The community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty 
and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within it exclusive 
competence, the community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member states and can therefore by reason of the scale or 
effects of the proposed action, be better achieve by the Community. Any action of the 
community shall no go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty' 
(Article 5/ ex Article 3b). (Emphasis added). 
Thus, taking the EU as an example, the distribution of functions is best made according 
to the principle of subsidiarity, as well as efficiency and equity considerations. Gandhi 
(1995) also supports the assignment of expenditure responsibilities according to 
efficiency and equity consideration. However, it can be attained only if the following 
conditions are met: first, public services that have localised benefit are assigned to state 
government (such as public policing, fire services, water and sanitation, urban transport 
and road network), while public expenditures whose benefits accrue widely and far 
beyond state jurisdiction (for example, provision of education at university level, 
financing the construction of major roads and highways, or specialised hospitals) are 
assigned to the federal governments. Second, public expenditures that can be quickly 
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accelerated or slowed down (for example, public works programmes) or which can 
automatically be adjusted according to the economic cycle (such as unemployment 
benefit and social safety net programmes) are assigned to the federal government, as the 
federal government has the fiscal capacity to accommodate economy fluctuations to 
stabilise the macroeconomic conditions. Third, public services whose overhead costs do 
not grow in line with economic expansion or which do not suffer from `diseconomies of 
scale' (for example, provision public order or maintenance of smaller roads and urban 
streets) are assigned to the state governments; and finally, expenditures which have large 
potential benefits to other regions (spillover effects) or other jurisdiction (for example 
environmental improvement/protection) are assigned to the federal government. 
Raimondo suggests that `the size of the benefit area of the public goods and services is 
very influential in determining whether the central or decentralised level of government is 
responsible for the particular service. However, the size of the benefit area is not the only 
consideration in determining the delegation of service responsibility' (Raimondo (1992: 
64). He further suggests considering other factors: economies of scale, fiscal equivalency, 
fiscal capacity, political accountability, and administrative capability. First, economies of 
scale which means that the benefit area should be large enough to take advantage of a 
lower average unit cost of provision of public services to gain benefit from economics of 
scale. With a large coverage area, public services can be mass-produced, which means a 
reduction in the average unit cost. Clearly, the best level of government to undertake this 
type of public services is the federal government. 
Second, fiscal equivalency which means that the benefit area of the public goods and 
services must coincide with the political boundary. Based on this consideration, the 
benefit from the public goods and services provided by one jurisdiction should be 
enjoyed only by the people of that particular jurisdiction. In other words, people from 
outside the jurisdiction should not gain benefit from the services provided by it. In this 
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case, there should be no free riders20 and spill-over effects in the provision of the public 
goods and services. 
Third, fiscal capacity which means that any constituent units that undertake the provision 
of public goods and services should have sufficient resources. This is to avoid the 
problem of fiscal imbalance and subsequently interstate disparities created by insufficient 
resources. Fourth, political accountability meaning that the government officials of the 
particular jurisdiction should be accountable to the residents for the quality and efficiency 
of the delivered goods and services. Finally, administrative capability which means that 
in order to ensure that the constituent units could take-up the functions efficiently with 
minimum disruptions the constituent units should have administrative capabilities 
(including technical and managerial know-how). 
As observed by Watts, there is a clear pattern showing that `the distribution of 
expenditure powers in each federation corresponds to the combined scope of the 
legislative and administrative responsibilities assigned to each levels of government 
within federation' (Watts 1999a: 44). The problem always arises when legislative and 
administrative responsibilities do not correspond. This suggests that expenditure 
functions in federal systems should correspond to the legislative responsibilities to avoid 
administrative and financial difficulties, in particular the problem of vertical imbalance, 
as in the case of German's fiscal federalism (Jeffery, 2003b; Watts and Hobson, 1997). 
Watts also noted that in most federations, if the constitution assigned substantial 
administration of federal legislation to the constituent governments, the constituent 
expenditure responsibilities are greater, as found in Switzerland, Austria, Germany, India 
and Malaysia. This is to ensure high degree of efficiency in the provision of public 
services and minimises bureaucratic red - tape. Watts further noticed that the federal 
20 In economic terms, free rider refers to those people that benefit from public services but evade paying 
taxes for the services they enjoy. 
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government's spending power is far-reaching, beyond its constitutionally stipulated 
functions (Watts, 1999c), notably in the area of the concurrent list, in order to pursue 
certain objectives that benefit all constituent governments. If this is the case, the federal 
encroachment on constituent governments' affairs is significant. 
Based on the above considerations, the general rule in assigning functions should be 
based on the benefit principle, with the maximum efficiency and equity possible, taking 
into account the economic function of the government and the federal spirit. If the benefit 
from the public services goes beyond one state and requires national coordination, 
provision of these public services should rest on the central or federal government. On 
the other hand, functions that are localised in nature / character and benefit specifically 
local people should be assigned to state governments. However, the problem arises in 
distinguishing which functions are regional and which are nation-wide in nature, due to 
the ambiguity of functions such as education and public health. Theorists suggest that, for 
efficiency purposes, a centralised policy is desirable (Ahmad et al., 1997) for those 
ambiguous functions. Besides, the size of the country matters in designing the 
expenditure functions (Ter-Minassian, 1998). In large countries like the United States, 
India, Canada and Australia, decentralisation of functions to lower levels of government 
is more appropriate than in small federations like Malaysia. 21 
In practice, there is no guaranteed best way of deciding which level of government 
should be responsible for a particular public service. It depends on the historical, political 
and economic development of the particular country. Expenditure assignment should be 
tailored to the objectives set up by the governments (Martinez, 1999; McLure, 1999) as 
well as the economic functions of government (Musgrave, 1959). This is the economic 
consideration in the assignment of expenditure functions between federal and state 
Abdul Rahim (2000) argued that fiscal decentralisation in Malaysia is a non-issue as the federal 
government has a strong commitment to the states' economic development. 
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governments. As discussed earlier, according to Musgrave, the economic purposes of 
government are to stabilise growth, redistribute income, and allocate fiscal resources. 
These functions `have long been the starting point for discussion of the division of fiscal 
powers and responsibilities among units of governments' (Bahl and Linn, 1994: 3). 
However in federal systems, expenditure assignment has been determined within the 
constitution as a result of a long bargaining process between the central and the 
constituent governments. Unfortunately, the framers of the constitution may not have 
foreseen the growing need for public services and the appropriateness of certain functions 
to the level of government. As a result, any change in the expenditure function between 
both levels of government to suit growing and changing needs will take a long time to be 
implemented, as it involves a long judicial process and constitutional amendment. In 
older federations, most expenditure functions have been increasingly reassigned to the 
constituent governments in line with the movement toward fiscal decentralisation (Bird et 
al., 2003; Bird and Vaillancourt 1998; Ter-Minassian 1997). 
However, there is an argument that fiscal decentralisation will not result in greater 
efficiency in the provision of public goods and services. This is because, generally, many 
state governments, notably in developing federations (such as Malaysia, India, Nigeria) 
are characterised by inefficient administrative capacity due to overstaffing, poor technical 
skills and training of employees, inability to formulate and implement effective spending 
programmes, and inability to fully exploit potential revenue sources. Thus, the theoretical 
efficiency gained from fiscal decentralisation can be significantly undermined in practice 
by structural and institutional constraints which reduce its absorptive capacity to 
undertake more functions. The level of public governance at the lower level of 
government is another constraint. Besides, public expenditure management systems 
(financial control, reporting and accounting, and evaluation) in most state governments 
are not yet properly developed and not transparent. Therefore, some literature, such as 
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that found in Prud'homme (1995), Tanzi (1996) and Ter-Minassian (1997), shows that 
fiscal decentralisation entails significant cost in terms of distributional equity and 
macroeconomic management. The specific design of intergovernmental fiscal relations as 
well as institutional arrangements between, within and amongst the two levels of 
government play a crucial role for the fiscal decentralisation process to take place. 
According to Prud'homme (1995), fiscal decentralisation can increase disparities, 
jeopardize stability and undermine efficiency (allocative efficiency, production 
efficiency, and corruption). In Germany, fiscal decentralisation has been opposed by 
weak Länder due to their limited fiscal capacity, as such fiscal decentralisation is 
politically unpopular. Therefore, as far as fiscal decentralisation is concerned, weak 
Länder are in favour of cooperative federalism, whereas strong Länder are in favour of 
competitive federalism through the promotion of fiscal decentralisation. For rich Länder, 
fiscal decentralisation means less contribution towards the cost of equalisation transfers 
(Adelberger, 2000). 
In summary, although economic theory offers limited guidance for assigning expenditure 
to different levels of government (Ahmad et al., 1997), assigning or reassigning 
expenditure should be guided by at least five economic considerations, on which 
economists and political scientists are in agreement. First, public services that benefit 
every citizen in the federation, such as national defence, and those which generate 
benefits from economies of scale, such as electricity generation and water supply, should 
be provided by the central government. Second, public services that benefit local citizens, 
such as maintenance of law and order, and fire services and for which different people 
can have different preferences (for example, local roads) should be provided by lower 
levels of government. Third, public services whose benefits spill over to jurisdictions 
other than those where they are actually provided (for example, public education and 
public health) should either be provided centrally or be subsidised by the central 
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government, depending on the estimated value of the spillover benefit. Fourth, 
assignment of expenditure functions should follow the assignment of legislative and 
administrative functions. Finally, as far as possible assignment of expenditure functions 
should match with the assignment of revenue (taxation) functions. 
2.3.2 Revenue assignment 
Revenue assignment is an important element in the design of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations after expenditure assignment (Ter-Minassian, 1997; Ahmad et al., 1997; Shah, 
1994). According to Shah, `once expenditure assignment has been agreed on, tax 
assignment and design of transfers become critical elements in matching expenditure 
needs with revenue means at various levels of government' (Shah, 1994: 18). Hence, in 
the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations, expenditure assignment should be 
followed by adequate revenue assignment. The biggest mistake in the design of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations, according to McLure and Martinez, is when `revenues 
were assigned to subnational governments and transfers put in place before it was 
decided what functional competencies would be transferred from the central government 
to subnational government' (McLure and Martinez, 2000: 2). 
The assignment of revenue sources involves tax arrangements, as taxes are the main 
source of government revenue to finance government operation. In practice, governments 
rely upon a wide variety of tax sources, which at the same time can promote equity and 
efficiency. The range of taxes includes taxes on the income of households (personal 
income tax, payroll tax), taxes on the income of firms (corporate income tax), taxes on 
property and wealth (local property tax), taxes on purchases by households and firms 
(generals sales tax, specific excise taxes), taxes on imports (tariffs), and taxes on bequests 
or inheritances. The question is: which level of government (central or constituent 
government) will have the right to levy, collect, and retain which categories of taxes and 
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what will the right methods of their collections and administration be? However, tax 
arrangements in the context of federal system are more complicated than the theory may 
suggest. They involve not only economic considerations (efficiency and equity criteria) 
but also historical, political, institutional and demographic characteristics and economic 
aspects of the particular federal country (Ebel and Yilmaz, 1999; Gandhi, 1995) and 
political considerations, and more often than not, the outcomes work against the theory of 
taxation (Gandhi, 1995). Consonant with the spirit of federalism and the principles of 
self-rule and shared rule, each constituent government should have enough revenue to 
discharge its constitutional responsibilities. This means some degree of tax autonomy 
should be granted to the constituent government. 
According to Shah (1994), tax assignment can be either dependent on the expenditure 
assignment or independent of expenditure assignment, as commonly practised in 
developing countries. If assignment of taxes is taken independently of expenditure 
assignment, the centralisation of tax administration is likely. In this situation, the federal 
government collects almost all taxes and in return redistributes part of the revenue to 
lower levels of government. However, `where the theoretical guidance of tax assignment 
is unclear, expenditure assignment can provide a powerful argument for assigning 
responsibility to the government with greatest need for more money' (Shah, 1994: 18). 
As discussed above, the assignment of tax is always influenced by the historical, 
constitutional, social and political developments of the particular federation. However, 
economists have come up with the broad principle of tax assignment in the design of 
intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. Musgrave and Musgrave (1976), and Musgrave 
(1983), for instance, suggest using the equity and efficiency criteria in tax assignment. 
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2.3.2.1 Efficiency criterion. 
According to this criterion, taxes should be assigned based on which level of government 
can collect and administer taxes at the minimum possible cost. In other words, 
assignment of taxes should be based on how efficiently and cost effectively tax can 
be 
administered. If the efficiency criterion is to be used as the guiding principle for tax 
assignment, then it has to be decided for each tax whether it would be handled more 
efficiently by the federal or by the state government. So, based on the efficiency 
rationale, the level of government that has the best information on a certain type of tax 
base would be the appropriate governmental level to be held responsible for the relevant 
tax. For example, in the case of corporate income tax, the federal government is most 
likely to have more accurate information (and a larger data base) on corporate income 
originating from domestic and foreign sources of income. For property taxes, on the other 
hand, the constituent governments are in the better position to assess property values. 
Based on these criteria, therefore, corporate income taxes would be best assigned to the 
federal government, and property taxes to the constituent governments. 
In addition, based on this rationale, the federal government can competently administer 
taxes with an interstate basis, such as customs duties, excise duties (because large 
interregional differentials in rates would lead to the problems of smuggling on state 
borders) as well as inheritance taxes. On the other hand, taxes having a local base, such 
as land tax; taxes on income from agricultural activities and mineral rights; licence, 
registration and entertainment fees; and estate duties in respect of land ownership, are 
likely to be administered more efficiently by the states. In general, capital taxes in one 
form or another may be suitable to be administered by the constituent governments. 
However, in some federations the constituent governments encounter enormous practical 
difficulties in collecting capital taxes. Consequently, the efficiency goal may not be 
achieved and hence assigning capital tax to federal administration may be more practical. 
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2.3.2.2 Equity criterion. 
The most important element of equity criterion is that tax bearing redistributive effects 
(such as income tax and wealth tax) should be assigned to the federal government. This is 
because the federal government is responsible for income redistribution across the 
federation, as the ability of the constituent governments is limited within their own 
boundaries, although in some federations the constituent governments do undertake a 
redistributive function (Bird, et al., 2003). Based on this argument, according to Shah, 
`progressive redistributive taxes, stabilisation instruments, and resource rent taxes are 
suitable for assignment to national government' (Shah (1994: 19). In addition, according 
to this criterion, tax assignment should also be designed taking into account the 
expenditure responsibility or fiscal need of the constituent units. In other words, revenue 
must match the expenditure needs of the constituent governments having the 
responsibility for such public services. 
Based on the above criteria, Shah (1994) suggests that the major tax instruments that are 
suitable to be assigned to various levels of government are as shown in Table 2.3. 
Briefly, Shah (1994) provides guidelines for tax assignment in the design of 
intergovernmental fiscal arrangement, that is, progressive taxes for redistributive 
purposes, taxes suitable for economic stabilisation purposes, taxes on mobile factors of 
production and unequal tax bases between states should be assigned to federal 
government. On the other hand, residence-based taxes, such as excises, and taxes on 
completely immobile factors (such as land tax and property tax) should be levied by the 
states. However, all levels of government can levy benefit taxes and user charges 
appropriately. The most important thing in tax assignment between the differing levels of 
government is that no state can tax the subjects of another state, as this would violate the 
efficiency criterion in tax assignment. In designing tax assignment, in practice, there is 
always likely to exist a `concurrent' zone of taxes, when tax jurisdictions overlap. Items 
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which are difficult to characterise as falling exclusively into either the federal or state 
category are taxes which have bases extending beyond the boundaries of the individual 
states, such as tax on motor vehicles. Shah (1994) suggests for motor vehicle tax, state 
responsibility is desirable, as it has the capacity to administer this tax efficiently since 
information on motor vehicles are locally available. 
Table 2.3 
Conceptual Basis of Tax Assignment 
Type of tax Determination of Collection 
and 
Comments 
Base Rate administration 
Customs F F F International trade taxes 
Corporate income F F F Mobile factor, stabilisation tool 
Resources taxes 
Resource rent (profit, 
income) tax 
F F F Highly unequally distributed tax 
bases 
Royalties, fees, charges S, L S, L S, L Benefit taxes/charges for state/local 
services 
Conservation charges S, L S, L S, L To preserve local environment 
Personal income F F, S, L F Redistributive, mobile factor, 
stabilisation tool 
Wealth taxes (capital, wealth, 
wealth transfers, 
inheritances, and bequests 
F F, S F Redistributive 
Payroll F, S F, S F, S Benefit charge (e. g. Social security 
coverage) 
Multistage sales taxes (VAT) F F F Border tax adjustment possible 
under federal assignment: potential 
stabilisation 
Single stage sales taxes 
(manufacturer, wholesale, retail 
Option A S S, L S ,L Iii compliance cost Option B F S F Harmonized, lower compliance cost 
Sin taxes 
Excises on alcohol and 
tobacco 
F, S F, S F, S Health care a shared responsibility 
Betting, gambling, lotteries, 
race tracks 
S, L S, L S, L State and local responsibility 
Taxation on `bad' 
Carbon F F F To combat nationwide pollution 
BTU taxes F, S, L F, S, L F, S, L Pollution impact may be national, 
regional or local 
Motor fuels F, S, L F, S, L F, S, L Tolls on federal/provincial/local 
road 
Effluent charges F, S, L F, S, L F, S, L To deal with interstate or local 
pollution issues 
Congestion toll F, S, L F, S, L F, S, L Tolls on federal /provincial/local 
roads 
Parkin fees L L L To control local congestion 
Motor Vehicle S S S State responsibility 
taxes S S S Benefit tax 
Excises S, L S, L S, L Residence-based taxes 
Property S L L Immobile factor - benefit tax Land S L L Immobile factor - benefit tax 
ivote: r is recterat, 6 is State, L is Local. 
Source: Shah (1994) 
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However, according to Bhargava (1953), when overlapping of tax jurisdiction exists, it 
may be desirable to have the federal administration collect it and to assign all or part of 
the proceeds to the states under tax revenue sharing22 arrangement (Ahmad and Craig, 
1997; Shah, 1994). Economically, it would be unwise to leave the problem open to both 
levels of government, as this may lead to duplication and unnecessary conflict in tax 
collection and administration. This is because, as discussed above, the assignment of 
resources must ensure that no state can tax the subjects of another state, a situation which 
would create unhealthy tax competition. According to Adelberger (2001), the present 
trend of fiscal federalism is towards competitive federalism as against cooperative 
federalism, that is, each constituent units set its own taxation and other fiscal policy, 
which finally creates strong tax competition among constituent units, as evident in the 
US, Canada, and Australia. However in centralised federations, such as in Germany, 
cooperative federalism is more evident. In Malaysia, fiscal federalism is neither 
cooperative federalism nor competitive federalism. Goodspeed (1998) also argues that 
heavy tax competition would result in inefficient tax administration and may cause 
unnecessary distortion to the economy. 
In practice, according to Gandhi (1995), it is difficult to meet both efficiency and equity 
criteria in the assignment of taxes between the differing levels of government due to the 
following reasons. First, any taxes that could easily be shifted or exported to consumers 
of other jurisdiction (for example, natural resources tax, sales tax or excise duty, import 
and export duties at the ports, airports or border areas, taxes on tourism) were assigned to 
state governments, would cause detrimental effect to the economy as state government 
would pitch those taxes at excessively high levels. Second, for taxes whose 
administration required detailed information (for example, property tax and land tax) 
22 See pages 85-89 for discussion on tax revenue sharing as a part of fiscal adjustment. Briefly, tax revenue 
sharing means that two or more levels of government levy rates on a common basis, in which the rate 
base is determined by federal government with state government levying a supplementary rate while 
collection is made by the federal government 
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were assigned to central governments, such taxes would be poorly administered and 
easily evaded, as the cost of their collection could be undesirably high. Therefore, this 
type of taxes should be assigned to a state government. Third, for taxes that are 
redistributive in character (such as progressive personal income tax, progressive wealth 
tax, or progressive inheritance tax) were not levied by the central government, the overall 
equity objective of the tax system could be seriously jeopardised. Fourth, if taxes that 
have large built-in elasticity whose revenues grow automatically in boom periods and 
decline in recessionary periods (such as personal income tax, enterprise profits tax, sales 
tax, or value-added tax), were not assigned to the central government, the ability of the 
government to undertake macroeconomic stabilisation would be impossible. 
Whatever basis is used in assigning taxes to each level of government, it should support 
the desired goals of the economy, that is, economic growth with equity and overall 
macroeconomic stability. In other words, tax policies should not have an adverse effect 
on economic stability, but instead should promote strong economic growth. More 
importantly, taxes should be assigned to each level of government according to their 
capacity to administer the particular tax, to avoid the possibility of tax evasion. As such, 
source-based taxes should be allocated to the centre while states should be assigned 
residence-based taxes such as consumption taxes. In actual fact, the division of resources 
in the existing federations does not follow any particular pattern and has usually been the 
outcome of some political compromise. What may suit one federation need not always 
suit another. In developing countries, the question of the division of resources should be 
viewed in the light of the problem of efficiency in tax administration (the need for 
simplicity and uniformity in tax administration as well as well-trained personnel) and the 
prevention of large-scale tax evasion. In the absence of this, centralisation of tax 
administration and collection are likely. 
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The most important finding of the foregoing discussion of division of tax responsibility 
or revenue assignment in federal systems according to economic considerations is the 
adoption of the efficiency and equity criteria in determining which level of government 
should be responsible for which types of taxes. As with expenditure assignment, revenue 
assignment should coincide with economic functions of government, that is, stabilisation, 
redistribution and allocation (see Table 2.1). However, other considerations affecting the 
wider interest of the national economy should also be taken into account, such as 
suitability of fiscal policy, overall economic development policy and political feasibility, 
with a view to achieving a greater measure of social justice and equity throughout the 
federation. As such, the efficiency and equity criteria should not be the exclusive guiding 
principles in determining the division of resources between federal and state 
governments. 
Finally, for the sake of efficient tax administration and as long as not contrary to the 
economic functions of government, a centralisation of tax collection is most likely. 
However, if this is the case, state governments are unlikely to have enough revenue to 
discharge their constitutionally assigned responsibilities and duties. As a result, it is 
found that the central governments in most federations have more funds than functions, 
while the states have more functions than funds, notably in developing federations (such 
as Nigeria, Malaysia and India). The imbalance between functions and resources, or the 
issue of non-correspondence, thus poses the question of financial adjustment. Indeed, the 
issue of fiscal imbalance is a common feature of all federations. In most developing 
federations, even in developed federations such as the United States, Canada, Australia 
and Germany, the issue of non-correspondence is crucial. This can cause 
intergovernmental conflicts, thatnecessitate financial adjustments and subsequently the 
design of appropriate intergovernmental fiscäl'transfers. This is the price that the federal 
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government have to pay for not having sufficient revenue sources assigned to the 
constituent governments. 
2.3.3 Intergovernmental transfers 
In a realm of intergovernmental fiscal relations, intergovernmental transfers are important 
instruments in mitigating states' financial hardship arising from lopsided revenue- 
expenditure assignments. As discussed above, the design of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations requires sufficient revenue assignment (taxes) to the constituent governments to 
finance its assigned functions. However, in practice, it is impossible to match revenue 
and expenditure responsibilities between the two levels of government. This is due to the 
fact that in a federal system the central government has more functions to perform, and so 
requires more taxing power compared with the state governments, which have limited 
revenue-raising power compared to their functions. To Courchene, `in virtually all federal 
systems, the central government has, de facto if no de jure, access to revenues in excess 
of its expenditure responsibilities' (Courchene, 1998: 10). As a result of this arrangement, 
imbalance between resources and functions (non-correspondence), commonly known as 
fiscal imbalance (vertical and horizontal imbalance), is likely in most federations (Watts, 
2001; Shah, 1994). Hence, this gives rise to the problem of fiscal adjustment. The 
appropriate way to overcome this imbalance is to design a proper transfers system based 
on the need-revenue gap so that transfers given as of right to states meet any revenue- 
expenditure mismatch (Bradbury, et al., 1984). However, fiscal adjustment to undo this 
imbalance requires strong political commitment within the spirit of federalism especially 
on the part of the federal government, which poses significant revenue yielding taxes. 
The absence of the spirit of federalism in the design of fiscal adjustment would cause 
intergovernmental conflicts and subsequently could result in political instability. Hence, 
one way to see whether the federation is adopting a true federal spirit is to look at how 
fiscal imbalance is resolved. 
72 
There are at least three methods of fiscal adjustment to remedy this imbalance: first, by 
reassignment of revenue sources to the constituent governments; second, by changes in 
tax components and third, by way of intergovernmental transfers, that is, transfers from 
the federal government to the constituent governments (Holzhausen, 1974). Watts (2001) 
also suggests that fiscal imbalances could be corrected through; first, reallocating or 
reassignment of revenue sources; second, by reallocating or reassignment of expenditure 
functions, and third, by fiscal decentralisation and any imbalances arises to be corrected 
by federal transfers. However, the most practical method of fiscal adjustment, as found 
from the literature, is by means of intergovernmental transfers. Hence, the design of 
intergovernmental transfers is crucial in the design of fiscal federalism after expenditure 
and revenue assignments. In general terms, transfers refer to a number of kinds of public 
financing instruments; including grants, shared taxes, subsidies and subventions (Bahl, 
2000a). They may be intended to address a wide variety of different issues (see below for 
rationale for intergovernmental transfers). Some are set out in the constitution, while 
others are based on legislation. 
Improper design of an intergovernmental transfers system (failure to eliminate the 
revenue-expenditure gap) undoubtedly gives rise to financial constraint and, as a result, 
other sources of financing, such as through borrowing, are needed. However, borrowing 
by state governments may cause macroeconomic instability if improperly designed. 
Borrowing by state governments will be discussed later in this chapter. Thus, 
intergovernmental transfers are the cornerstones of constituent government financing in 
every federation. This is the real challenge of fiscal federalism of every federation, in 
particular to what extent the spirit of federalism is adhered to. According to Bahl and 
Linn (1994), and Bahl (2000b), transfers are a compromise in that lower levels of 
government allow the centre (by virtue of constitution) to hold control over the public 
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financing system while they offer a way to channel funds into the budgets of the lower 
levels of government. According to Bahl and Linn, 
`Grants are a compromise solution in the debate over the division of revenue raising 
authority and expenditure responsibility. They permit national governments to retain the 
authority to tax productive resource bases, but guarantee state and local governments a 
flow of revenues' (Bahl and Linn, 1994: 6). 
Intergovernmental transfers are dynamic in that they follow changes in economic 
conditions and structural changes such as movement toward greater decentralisation 
(Watts, 2001). Keneath C. Wheare argues that, `There is and can be no final solution to 
the allocation of financial resources in a federal system. There can only be adjustments 
and reallocations in light of changing conditions' (Wheare, 1953: 123). Therefore, they 
should not be looked upon as a static kind of arrangement. The design of 
intergovernmental transfers differs from federation to federation. Hence, the design of 
intergovernmental transfers cannot be uniform, although they may adopt the same 
principle (Courchene, 1998). However, still `no optimal grant structure exists. What is a 
good feature of a particular type of grant depends on whether one takes a local 
(constituent government) or national government view, and on which objectives the 
government wants to achieve' (Bahl and Linn, 1994: 16). 
In summary, with the assignment of significant revenue-yielding taxes (productive tax) to 
the centre, while at the same time increasing the constituent governments' responsibility 
for provision of public services compared with their limited revenue raising capacity, 
transfers of federal funds are inevitable. It is the right of state governments to obtain 
necessary financial assistance from the federal funds and, therefore, it is against the 
federal spirit to deny the states' right to access federal funds. Indeed, federal transfers are 
regarded as political as well as economic contracts, in which when the constituent units 
call for financial assistance the federal government should provide them adequately. In 
other words, `he who pays the piper calls the tune'. Therefore, it is the political and 
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economic responsibility of the federal government to carry out any necessary fiscal 
adjustment to remedy fiscal imbalance in the federation. In most federations, this can be 
achieved through intergovernmental fiscal institution, such as the Finance Commission 
(India), the Commonwealth Grant Commission (Australia) and the National Finance 
Council (Malaysia). These institutions provide a place for federal and state government to 
arbitrate for any intergovernmental fiscal disputes. 
2.3.3.1 Rationale for intergovernmental transfers 
There are four rationales for intergovernmental transfers: the federal rationale, the 
citizenship rationale, the economic efficiency rationale and the equity rationale 
(Courchene, 1998: 11; Boothe, 1998: 6). The design of intergovernmental transfers may 
be based on one of this rationale or combinations of these rationales. 
2.3.3.1.1 The federal rationale 
According to this rationale, if the federal principle and federal spirit is to be effective and 
continue to flourish, then the constituent governments must have sufficient revenue to 
exercise the powers assigned to them under the constitution in line with self-rule and 
shared rule principle. In other words, each level of government in a federation should 
have the requisite financial means and financial security to discharge their constitutional 
responsibilities, especially in the provision of at least a minimum standard of public 
services for their citizens. According to Boothe (1998: 6) and Ma (1997), in the presence 
of vertical fiscal imbalance, that is, when tax revenue and spending do not match, and 
when central government collects more revenue than it spends while the constituent 
governments collects less revenue than it spends, transfers are needed and inevitable. 
This is because in most federations, the central government retains the major tax bases, 
leaving insufficient fiscal resources to state governments to finance their expenditure 
needs (Ma, 1997). The question is how much of the available resources should be given 
to state governments and how these resources are to be divided among the constituent 
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units in the federation. One popular suggestion is to make transfers based on fiscal needs. 
This is because the needs of citizens for public services increase with economic progress, 
resulting in large financing requirements by the constituent governments. This gap must 
be filled either by giving states more revenue raising powers (assignment or reassignment 
of taxes) or by revenue transfers from the central government (grants), to maintain states' 
interest in a federation. Therefore, the final objective of federal transfers is always 
political. 
As noted, a federation is characterised by its diversity, such as differences in endowment 
of natural resources, demographical factor, and level of economic development. 
Therefore, some states may have access to national resources or other tax bases that are 
not available to others. Some states have higher income levels than other jurisdictions. 
Conversely, some states may have extraordinary expenditure needs due to demographic 
factors such as high level of poverty, high number of old and young age groups, and 
other uncontrollable factors. As a result, a fiscal gap, measured by the differences 
between fiscal capacity and fiscal need, becomes a common feature in federation. These 
differences in fiscal capacities result in horizontal fiscal imbalance and therefore should 
be addressed by federal transfers. Hence, states without sufficient resources to reach the 
minimum level of services should receive federal funds in the form of transfers. 
According to Scott, under the state's right `the majority is not usually free to encourage 
the concentration of income, wealth or privilege in one region. All citizens are to a 
greater or lesser extent constitutionally aware of the need to be fair to all regions' (1964: 
248) and thus, it is the right of every state to have a fair share of the national fortune. 
2.3.3.1.2 The citizenship rationale 
The citizenship rationale suggests that the citizens of a federation have the right to benefit 
from publicly provided social and economic services, regardless of where they live, 
because the central government has the obligation to provide and to maintain a minimum 
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standard of public services in all constituent units. In other words, federal transfer, 
according to the citizenship rationale, is based on the moral obligation of the federal 
government to treat citizens fairly. This rationale serves both economic as well as 
political purposes, so as to strengthen the sense of nationhood and belonging among the 
citizens as well the constituent units in a federation. Hence, to ensure that residents have 
fair access to public services, adequate resources should be provided to states due to 
fiscal differences. In contrast to the federal rationale, this rationale implies that transfers 
should be conditional (Courchene, 1998; Boothe, 1998). 
2.3.3.1.3 The economic efficiency rationale 
Intergovernmental transfers can serve to alleviate economic efficiency problems in a 
federation due to the mobility of factors of production (labour and capital). The mobility 
of labour could be influenced by net fiscal benefit, that is, the difference between the 
value of public services received and taxes paid. If a state has large net fiscal benefits 
because of a substantial endowment of natural resources or locational factor or other 
advantages, people may be induced to move there to capture those benefits, as well as to 
take advantage of better job opportunities. This may cause detrimental effects on the 
have-not states in the long run as the policies of one state can have effects on the other 
state. Thus, the distribution of labour and capital in the federations is distorted and the 
national economy runs less efficiently if remedial action through federal transfers is not 
taken by the federal government (Boothe, 1998: 7). 
The second efficiency rational for transfers is due to spillover effects or externalities, 
which originate from the operations of one constituent government on other constituent 
governments. Spillover effects arise if a particular constituent government in the 
federation does not take into account the effects of its policies on other jurisdictions 
(Shah, 1994; Ma, 1997: Ter-Minassian, 1997; Ahmad and Craig, 1997; Boothe, 1998). 
Spillover effects can be positive or negative. An example of a negative spillover effect is 
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air pollution that affects one jurisdiction as a result of the economic activities of a 
neighbouring jurisdiction. Due to insufficient resources, there is a need for federal 
transfer to the `offending' jurisdiction to invest in air pollution preventions and control. 
2.3.3.1.4 The equity rationale 
The equity rationale is closely related to the citizenship rationale. Unlike citizenship 
rationale, the focus of the equity rationale is on individuals rather than on governments' 
ability to provide comparable basic public services (Boothe, 1998). Since the constituent 
governments have fiscal authority only within their own boundaries and their fiscal 
capacity varies from one state to another, it is the duty of the federal government to 
ensure equity is achieved across the federation. In doing so, there is a need to examine 
whether each of the constituent governments has the fiscal capacity to deliver an 
equivalent level of public services to their citizens and which level of government should 
have primary responsibility for income distribution. However, the term `equity' in 
intergovernmental finance is often politically contentious (Ahmad and Craig, 1997) and 
has different interpretations. States may interpret equity differently from the federal 
government, which could cause conflicts. 
Based on the above discussion, federal transfers would serve as a means of financial 
adjustment with the objective of putting the fiscal position of the federal and state 
governments on an equal footing in line with their expenditure functions. In addition, 
federal transfers also help states to provide at least a minimum standard of public services 
by making-up shortfall in their fiscal needs and undoing any cost disadvantages in 
providing public services due to factors beyond their control. This is because states' 
fiscal capacity varies from one state to another, due to differences in their state of socio- 
economic development and natural resources endowments. 
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2.3.3.2 Types of intergovernmental transfers 
Intergovernmental transfers, that is, payment from federal to state governments, can take 
two forms: grants system and tax / revenue sharing. 23 As discussed above, both are 
designed to remedy the shortcoming in revenue and expenditure assignment to enable 
state governments to discharge constitutionally assigned functions. 
2.3.3.2.1 Grants systems 
There are a number of grants available from the federal to the constituent governments. 
Each type of grant is designed for a specific purpose, to meet intended objectives. Within 
the grants system, there are two types of grants that may be used by the federal 
government to remedy fiscal imbalance. 
a. Conditional grants 
Conditional grants refer to specific purpose grants or categorical grants. Conditional 
grants enable the federal government to exercise a measure of control over the direction 
of state expenditure. Under conditional grants, the government specifies the purpose for 
which the state government can use the funds. This type of grant is often used to address 
issues that are highly important to the centre but normally are considered less so by the 
state governments. Examples are projects which have inter-regional spill-over effects. 
Within conditional grants, there are three types of grants. The first is matching open- 
ended grants, which means that for each unit of money given by the federal government 
to support a particular activity or projects, the state government must also expend a 
certain sum. For example, if a grant requires a state government to spend a certain 
percentage on education, the central government will contribute a percentage agreed 
upon. With matching open-ended grants, the cost to the federal government ultimately 
depends upon the state government fiscal operation. If the state government decides to 
73 See Ter-Minassian (1997); Ahmad and Craig (1997); Ma (1997); Shah (1994); Bahl and Linn (1994); 
Bahl (2000a). 
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increase expenditure, then the federal government's contributions will be large and if it 
decides to reduce expenditure, the contributions will be small (Ma, 1997). 
The second type of conditional grant is matching close-ended grants designed for specific 
purposes, in which a ceiling is put on the cost borne by the federal government. In other 
words, the federal government may specify some maximum amount that it willing to 
contribute. In most federation, matching close-ended grants are preferred by the federal 
government due to concerns over financial implication on their budgetary allocation. The 
third type is non-matching grants, in which the federal government offers a fixed sum of 
money to the state governments, with the condition that it will be spent on specified 
public goods or services. However, the state government is not required to match the 
contribution made by the federal government. 
In the case of conditional grants, the choice of whether to impose a matching requirement 
or not depends upon the purpose of the grant. The disadvantage of the matching 
requirement is due to the fact that the state governments may be required to redirect the 
resources to projects or investments considered a priority by the federal government but 
not so by the states (Ma, 1997). As a result, matching requirements may put greater 
financial constraints on poorer state governments compared with the richer state 
governments in the utilization of federal grants. Thus, matching provisions could 
discriminate against poor states, in that wealthier states that have ability to raise their own 
revenue would gain greater advantage from such grants, as rich states could more easily 
meet the matching requirement than poor states For this reason, graduating matching 
provisions inversely with the relative wealth of states may reduce the degree of 
discrimination in designing such grants. On the other hand, open-ended grants may affect 
the federal government budgetary position and macroeconomic management compared 
with close-ended grants (Ter-Minassian, 1997), especially when the state government 
increases its expenditures, which requires greater contribution from the federal allocation. 
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However, there is an advantage of the matching requirement, in that it could promote 
prudent fiscal management, as states are required to make a contribution before payments 
can be taken of federal assistance. 
b. Unconditional grants 
As the name suggests, the federal government places no restrictions on the use of funds 
by state governments. Thus, unconditional grants are designed to enhance the degree of 
states' autonomy. This type of grant is also called lump-sum grants or general-purpose 
grants. This means that state governments can use the grants to finance the operations at 
their disposal (Ter-Minassian, 1997; Ahmad and Craig, 1997; Raimondo, 1992). The 
purpose of unconditional grants is primarily to address vertical imbalance, although they 
can also be used to address horizontal fiscal imbalances among state governments to 
ensure the provision of a minimum / reasonable level of public services. According to 
Sphan, `if there is a vertical fiscal imbalance between local fiscal capacity on the one 
hand, and outlay responsibilities to lower tiers of government on the other, the gap is 
typically bridged through financial transfers in the form of unconditional revenue grants 
or through revenue sharing with the central authority' (Sphan, 2000: 8). Unconditional 
grants to address horizontal fiscal imbalance are generally designed in the form of 
equalisation grants. An equalisation grant is a transfer made from the federal government 
to the state governments, as practised in Canada, Australia and Germany. In Australia 
and Canada, 24 equalisation transfers are made by the federal government to lower levels 
of government, while in Germany, equalisation transfers are unique in the sense that 
equalisation transfers are made from Länder with above-average fiscal capacities to 
Länder with below-average fiscal capacities. In some other countries, equalisation is in 
fiscal 24 In Canada, equalisation programme was first implemented in 1957 upon the recommendation of 
the Rowell-Sirois Commission of 1941. Successive governments have stated that the purpose of 
equalisation is to make it possible for all provinces to provide reasonably comparable levels of public 
services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation. A commitment to a federal programme with this 
goal is set out in the Canadian Constitution. 
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the form of general revenue sharing. According to Shah (1994: 30), `an equalisation 
programme can foster a greater sense of participation in a federation of member states 
and therefore is often viewed as the glue that holds a federation together'. Thus, from the 
point of view of federalism, equalisation is most suitable to foster national integration in 
federation and, from the economic point of view, it can promote horizontal equity and 
efficiency. 
To summarise, the difference between these two types of grant is that unconditional 
grants are not tied to any particular objective, whereas conditional grants are tied to 
specific expenditures to be incurred by the recipient states. With conditional grants, the 
federal government, as grantor, retains the right to ensure that the funds are actually used 
for the purpose for which they were allocated. Both unconditional and conditional grants 
have their particular merits and can be used for specific purposes. The former allow the 
recipient states complete freedom in allocating funds to finance their expenditures, while 
the latter usually represent extraordinary income and are made in support of certain 
current state services. Generally, matching or conditional grants are preferred by the 
federal government to non-matching or unconditional grants, since they can encourage 
local tax effort, discourage wasteful spending, and at the same time will ensure that grant 
objectives will be achieved, while close-ended grants are preferred than open-ended 
grants since close-ended grants can help the federal government to control its budget. 
However, for the purpose of the adjustment of fiscal imbalance, unconditional grants are 
more desirable, although conditional or specific grants have also been used for this 
purpose. In practice, the choice between conditional and unconditional grants will depend 
on the importance of the principle of financial responsibility and accountability in that the 
federal government who raise revenue control over the direction of expenditure to 
achieve intended national economic objective (Watts, 1999a). Generally, however, very 
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strict financial responsibility is not apposite as federation progresses and the role of fiscal 
policy expands. 
Conversely, where fiscal adjustments involve large financial implication there is a strong 
reason for the federal government to take some form of control over the way in which the 
funds are spent. For this reason, conditional grants are preferred by the federal 
government, in line with the principles of financial responsibility and accountability. 
However, from the state governments' point of view, conditional grants may undermine 
their fiscal autonomy, especially when their revenue is very much dependent on federal 
transfers. Thus, a combination of both conditional and unconditional grants is more 
preferable in the design of fiscal adjustment. As a general guideline, where services are of 
national interest and importance, but are assigned to states, conditional grants would be 
more suitable. However, for services that have localised benefit, conditional grants could 
constitute central interference into state fiscal affairs, especially if meticulous monitoring 
is required to ensure conditions are met. This conflict over the type of grants is the nature 
of the political aspect of federalism and constitutes one of the central problems of public 
finance. However, the final decision on which grants are suitable, conditional or 
unconditional depends on the objective of the grant and the particular issues to be 
addressed. 
A study by Watts (1999a) shows that most federal transfers (more than 50%) were made 
in the form of conditional grants, as shown in Table 2.4. The dominance of conditional 
transfers can be explained by the financial responsibility and accountability principle in 
the conduct of government finance (Watts, 1999a; Holzhausen, 1974). Based on this 
principle, the federal government `that has the nasty task of raising the funds by taxation 
should, in the interests of accountability to the tax payers, control and set the conditions 
for the use of these funds by the state governments' (Watts, 1999a: 49). 
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Table 2.4 
Conditional Transfers as a Percentage of Federal Transfers 
1996 
United States 100 
Switzerland 73.1 
Malaysia 67.9 
Germany 64.5 
Australia 53.0 
Canada2 43.6 
India 38.0 
Note: `Include Canadian Health and Social Transfers (CHST) 
2 Tliese figures are for 1995. 
Source: Adopted from Watts (1999c: 156) 
However, the design of intergovernmental transfers has its limitations and constraints, 
depending on the nature of the particular federation itself. Hence, one design of transfers 
might not be workable for another federation (Courchene, 1998: 5). Thus, the design of 
intergovernmental transfers should take into account the history and background of the 
particular federation (such as the structure of the economy and politics) and to some 
extent it very much depends on the political bargain between the levels of government. 
Regardless of the type of grant, economists suggest that at least five principles must be 
adhered to in designing a grants system. First, grants must make a measurable 
contribution to a clearly defined objective. Second, grants must be inversely related to the 
recipient government's fiscal capacity and directly related to its fiscal needs. The fiscal 
capacity and fiscal needs of each recipient government must be estimated with a clear, 
quantifiable, and transparent formula. In other words, the grant must be able to link with 
the expenditure and revenue raising power. Third, grants must be transparent and stable - 
the formula should be announced so that each constituent government is able to forecast 
the amount (together with their own revenue) they may receive in order to prepare their 
annual budget estimate. In addition, the formula should be stable to allow long term 
planning and, more importantly, the disbursements of grant should be stable and not 
subject to political wrangling. Fourth, grants should be, able to provide incentives for 
states to improvise tax collection efforts and encourage prudent spending. Finally, the 
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system should able to accommodate the preferences of local citizens regarding the public 
services to be provided by their constituent governments. 
2.3.3.2.2 Tax base and revenue sharing 
The second types of intergovernmental transfers are in the form of tax base and revenue 
sharing mechanisms. By this mechanism, arrangements can be made either by tax base 
sharing or by pooling of taxes collected and then sharing them between the federal and 
the state governments (Ahmad and Craig, 1997; Shah, 1994). The advantage of tax 
revenue sharing is that each state government can benefit from tax collected from its 
jurisdiction and subsequently can enhance tax collections efforts. This benefit is not 
assured under a grants system, as discussed above. Tax revenue sharing could also 
promote good governance in that it increases accountability in the public decision- 
making process since resources derived from this arrangement are considered as the 
states' own revenue. 
Tax base and revenue sharing can be used to address a variety of objectives in the design 
of intergovernmental fiscal arrangement. According to Shah, 
`Tax base and revenue sharing mechanisms are customarily used to address fiscal 
imbalance or mismatched revenues means and expenditure needs arising form 
constitutional assignment of taxes and expenditures to different levels of government 
[vertical imbalances]... they often address multiple objectives, such as bridging fiscal 
gap, promoting fiscal equalisation and regional development, and stimulating tax effort at 
lower levels' (Shah, 1994: 23). 
Generally, tax sharing or revenue sharing arrangements are made on a derivation basis, 
while some countries adopt formula-based systems. However there are criticisms about 
the inherent danger of tax / revenue sharing based on the derivation principle (Bahl and 
Linn, 1994). This is because the derivation principle can have a counter-equalizing effect 
or antithesis of distributive objective to overcome inequality as there is tendency to 
promote and exacerbate invidious interstate disparities by rewarding states not on the 
basis of any superior productive or revenue mobilisation effort but on the basis of 
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geographical advantage. This could undermine the national economic and political 
integration of the federation. As a result, it is doubtful that nationwide redistributive and 
macroeconomic reforms can be implemented. Thus, the practical alternative to the 
derivation principle is revenue sharing based on a revenue-pooling arrangement (Bahl, 
2000a; Ahmad and Craig, 1997; Bahl and Linn, 1994). Under a tax-sharing arrangement, 
tax collection is made by the federal government for efficiency purposes (Shah, 1994) but 
both levels of government levy rates on a common basis, in which the base rate is 
determined by the federal government, and the state government levying a supplementary 
rate on it. By this arrangement, the proceeds are shared with the particular state 
government based on a derivation basis (point of tax collection). In other words, a portion 
ofXspecific tax may accrue to the federal government and the residual (1004) accrue to 
the state government from which taxes are collected. `Tax base sharing is quite common 
in industrial countries and almost nonexistent in developing countries' (Shah, 1994: 23). 
Under the second approach, pooling tax revenues, the central government collects all 
taxes, which are paid into a special pool, and then shared with state governments based 
on a formula agreed by both levels of government. In other words, the federal 
government will retain X percentage of the pool and the balance will be allocated to the 
constituent government based on either a derivation basis (from where taxes are 
collected) or a variety of indicators, as practised in Brazil, India and Nigeria where 
indicators such as population, per capita income, school enrolments, indexes for 
backwardness, remoteness, and minimum expenditure responsibilities are used. In some 
other countries, such as Malaysia, the arrangement is simple: it is, based on derivation or 
point of collection. 
The design of intergovernmental transfers hence suggests using a combination of the 
above methods, the grants system and tax / revenue sharing arrangements. Bahl and Linn 
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(1994) and Bahl (2000a) suggest that transfers can be designed25 based on two 
approaches: (a) the method of determining the size of total fund to be distributed / 
transferred to the constituent units, and (b) the method to be used for the distribution of 
the fund. These approaches provide a taxonomy of the grant systems (see Table 2.5), that 
is, a combination of two types of transfers as discussed above (combination of grants 
system and tax / revenue sharing arrangements). There are three methods of determining 
the size of total fund (see row 1 of Table 2.5), namely (a) by a specified share of the 
federal government tax revenue, (b) on an ad hoc basis such as through annual budget, 
and (c) by reimbursement on approved expenditure. On the other hand, the distribution of 
funds could be done in four ways (see column 1 of Table 2.5) which are (a) on a 
derivation basis, that-is, based on the origin of collection of the tax, (b) by a specific 
formula agreed by both levels of government, (c) on an ad hoc basis, and (d) by way of 
reimbursement on approved expenditure incurred by constituent units. Thus, based on the 
suggestions of Bahl and Linn (1994) and Bahl (2000a), there are eight types of transfer as 
illustrated in columns 2,3 and 4 of Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5 
The Design of Intergovernmental Transfers 
Methods of allocating Method of determining the total divisible pool 
the divisible pool Specified share of Ad hoc Reimbursement of 
among eligible units national or state decision approved expenditures 
government tax 
Origin of collection of A 
tax 
Formula B F _ Total or partial 
reimbursement of costs C G K 
Ad hoc D H _ 
ource: Bahl and Linn (1994: 
Types A, B, C, and D (see column 2) are types of grants given to the constituent 
governments from a fund pooled from tax revenue collected from the constituent 
governments and then distributed to the constituent governments based on the origin of 
25 For a detailed discussion see Bahl and Linn (1994) pp 6-16. 
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the tax collection (type A), a formula (type B), projects (type C) or on an ad hoc basis 
(type D). Type A is a type of transfer based on tax / revenue sharing arrangements and as 
such it is unconditional or closed-ended in nature. The federal government may collect a 
portion of tax revenue from constituent units and then distribute to the constituent 
governments based on the origin of the tax collection. With this type of grant, the 
constituent government is allowed to keep a specified share of what is collected within its 
boundaries. Types B and D are also unconditional but type C may be conditional. The 
way funds are distributed to the constituent units is based on an agreed formula (for 
example based on population and area) (type B) or on an ad hoc basis (type D). Both 
types of grants are common in most federal countries. The type C method suggests the 
distribution of tax revenue on the basis of project costs. For example, a fixed percentage 
of national tax revenue may be distributed among state governments on the basis of the 
approved cost of public projects. 
On the other hand, types F, G, and H (see column 3) are given to the constituent 
governments based on funds pooled by the federal government on an ad hoc basis and 
distributed to the constituent governments based on a formula (type F), based on projects 
(type G) or on an ad hoc basis (type H). The type H method is completely centralised, 
with the central government making all decisions about which (constituent governments) 
should get the money and how much is to be given to each recipient government. Type G 
would be conditional, but types F and H could be for general purposes or unconditional. 
Finally, type K (see column 4) is a grant given to the constituent governments from the 
federal government's annual budget allocation for reimbursement of approved 
expenditure. Under this method, the distribution is subject to certain conditions such as 
type of projects or expenditure approved by the federal government. However, this 
method is always subject to political wrangling (some projects that are economically 
viable are not necessarily politically viable, and vice versa). Projects that are eligible for 
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such grants may be in the national interest, but not important from the point of view of 
the constituent units. This is why this type of grant is highly politically contentious. 
The foregoing discussion on the design of intergovernmental transfers provides three 
policy choices in the design of a grant system to remedy fiscal imbalance: first, each 
fiscal imbalance could be corrected by separate policy measures. For instance, vertical 
imbalance could be resolved by tax revenue sharing or a grant system, while horizontal 
imbalances could be resolved by federal transfers or transfers from a higher fiscal 
capacity state government ('have' state) to a lower fiscal capacity state government 
(equalisation grants), as practised in Germany. Second, by the implementation of an 
integrated system of equalisation grants by which the vertical and horizontal imbalances 
could be dealt with simultaneously, as implemented in Australia and Canada; and third, 
to correct only a horizontal imbalance using the grant system (both conditional and 
unconditional grants), as well as tax sharing / revenue arrangements. By doing so, in the 
long term each constituent government will be able to raise its fiscal capacity and 
subsequently will undo vertical imbalance. 
2.3.4 Borrowing 
Borrowing is one source of financing for government operations. Borrowing could be 
sourced either domestically or externally. External sources include the international 
capital market, bilateral sources (from foreign government borrowing) or multilateral 
sources (from international lending institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank). Domestic borrowing is mainly from bank and non-bank 
sources such as from investible funds (such as life insurance and pension fund) or the 
domestic capital market. 
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From the literature, there is no uniformity of opinion on whether borrowing should rest 
with the central government alone or be assigned to the constituent governments. In some 
federal countries, only the central government can borrow to finance its operations and 
consequently lend to state governments to finance its development projects. This is 
mainly to ensure that the national and public debt level remains at prudent levels. Indeed, 
constituent governments' borrowing can have a large effect on macroeconomic stability. 
According to McLure (1999) if the constituent governments have borrowing power, the 
result is commonly irresponsible fiscal behaviour that could threaten macroeconomic 
stability. This is a primary concern of the central government as far as state borrowing is 
concerned, especially if borrowing is made from foreign sources with federal 
governmental guarantee. To reduce this possible moral hazard (the assumption by capital 
markets that states' borrowing is ultimately backed by the federal government) from 
states' borrowing, the World Bank (1999) suggests using tax bases and unconditional 
grants as collateral that can be pledged against their borrowing. This would provide direct 
fiscal backing instead of loans being implicitly backed by the central government, as 
traditionally practised in most developing countries. `Having their own fiscal base is 
therefore an important prerequisite for subnational governments' access to finance and 
for limiting moral hazard problems' (World Bank, 1999: 3). 
Literature review shows that borrowing power should rest with the central government 
for three main reasons (King, 1984; Oates, 1972). First, for counter cycle measures and 
stabilisation purposes. Central government is usually in a stronger position to raise loans 
from internal and external sources than the constituent governments, due to the fact that 
central government has a higher credit standing arising from its greater financial capacity, 
compared to that of the constituent governments. In a federal system, the purpose of debt 
financing by the central government differs from the state government's. Debt financing 
by the central government helps to influence the aggregate demand to stabilize the 
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economy, level of employment and price stability. If the purpose is to stimulate spending, 
deficit financing is desirable. This policy is primarily appropriate as a counter cyclical 
measure, especially during a recession or economic downturn. Thus, the aim of debt 
financing is to control the level of aggregate demand in the economy for stabilisation 
purposes. However, debt financing by constituent governments plays a different role 
from that of central government. This is because a counter cyclical measure is the central 
government fiscal function. The constituent governments' borrowing is mainly to finance 
the provision of public goods and services in accordance with local preferences. In view 
of this reason, borrowing power should be exclusively assigned to central government. 
Second, borrowing power should rest with the central government for the standardisation 
of national development policy purposes. In federations where economic development 
policy is centralised, the central government's expenditure is undoubtedly large. This is 
because the central government needs to provide development allocations across the 
federation. In most cases, it is the central government itself that undertakes the provision 
of public goods and services throughout the federation (although some functions are 
constitutionally assigned to respective federating units). Consequently, large financing is 
required by the central government to implement nationwide development programmes. 
Two possible ways to finance these functions are through tax revenue or debt financing. 
If the financing from taxes is not possible, the only option is through borrowing from 
banks and the capital market (although in some countries drawing from reserves is 
possible). Based on this view, the central government should be granted borrowing power 
to have recourse to domestic and external sources and hence the constituent governments 
will be directly benefited from the central government borrowing through national 
development policy. However by doing so, the central government enforces further 
centralisation through centralised development policy. 
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Third, borrowing power should rest with the central government for the purpose of 
national debt policy and prudent debt management. As discussed above, state 
governments' borrowing can cause a destabilising effect on macroeconomic stability if 
borrowing is at the disposal of state governments. This is the primary concern of the 
central government with regard to constituent governments' borrowing. Therefore, debt 
policy should be coordinated in view of the fact that large-scale government borrowing 
(by both central and constituent governments) will have an impact on the money and 
capital market as well as a possible adverse influence of extensive public borrowing on 
capital formation in the private sector, due to crowding out effects. Public debt 
management is an important aspect of macroeconomic management, especially in 
relation to anti-cyclical policy. For this reason, government borrowing policy should be 
designed in line with both fiscal and monetary polices, as well as prevailing 
macroeconomic conditions. For the sake of prudent debt management, only central 
government should be granted borrowing powers. However, where borrowing power is 
extended to the constituent governments, it should be coordinated and monitored at 
central level to limit and restrict excessive borrowing, so as to avoid a destabilising effect 
on the macroeconomic level. 
Based on the above justifications, borrowing should be assigned to the central 
government, since loan coordination is necessary for integrated national development 
programme and economic stability. Thus, based on this argument, the federal dominance 
over borrowing powers appears logical. However, if the constituent governments are 
granted borrowing powers, they should be limited, monitored and controlled. This is 
mainly to avoid contingent liabilities on the part of the central government and to 
minimise the likelihood of central government bailout (Ter-Minassian and Craig, 1997), 
especially if borrowing by the constituent government is guaranteed by the federal 
government. Excessive and unrestricted borrowing by the constituent governments may 
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cause debt-servicing problems, especially when their fiscal capacity is limited. In some 
countries, such as Malaysia, the central government may deduct debt service from the 
federal grants if the constituent governments fail to service its debt. Doing so may 
discourage the constituent governments from making excessive borrowing out of their 
fiscal capacity and minimise the likelihood of contingent liability on the part of the 
central government (Dellinger and Webb, 1999). There are instances (in federal and non- 
federal states) where the central government has had to bail out constituent governments 
for excessive borrowing, such as in Colombia (which bailed out Bogota in 1991 and 
Medellin in the late 1990s) and in Brazil, as well as in Mexico in the early 1990s 
(Dellinger and Webb, 1999). `The debt crises of state governments in Brazil, the 
inflationary impact of states financing in Argentina, and city-level bankruptcies in the 
United States have often been used to illustrate the possible macroeconomic implications 
of decentralising borrowing powers' (World Bank, 1999: 1). Thus, according to the 
World Bank (1999), the core of the argument for not granting borrowing power to the 
constituent government is related to the issue of moral hazard, that is, access to financial 
markets by state governments may create unplanned fiscal liabilities for central 
government. 
However, some economists favour constituent governments having equal access to 
borrowing to finance part, if not all, of their development projects. However, the question 
remains whether the constituent governments should be allowed to borrow from external 
sources or only from domestic sources. For the constituent governments, borrowing from 
domestic sources, especially from the banking system, to finance their development 
projects are legitimate (Gandhi 1995), provided their borrowings are not excessive, as it 
has a crowding out effect on the private sector's access to finance. However, borrowing 
from the banking system should be limited to ensure the constituent governments 
finances do not become a major cause of macroeconomic instability and inflationary 
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pressure in the economy. Borrowing from the central bank should be prohibited; 
otherwise, the central government will lose its control over the country's monetary 
policy. However, borrowing from the capital market should be encouraged, as it could 
help to develop the domestic capital market (both primary and secondary), provided the 
funds are raised at the market interest rate without any implicit or explicit government 
subsidy. 
According to the World Bank (1999), there are three primary reasons why states' access 
to financial markets is encouraged. The first is for the purpose of financing capital 
expenditure. State governments often have responsibility for long life public investments 
that are lumpy in nature. Since state governments have limited sources of revenue, 
financing of such capital investment through increases in current taxes would be 
insufficient. As such, financing of long term investment through borrowing is considered 
appropriate. Furthermore, because the benefits of long-term public investments often last 
for several decades, equity considerations would suggest that future generations should 
participate in the financing of such projects. Second, access to financial markets can 
provide alternative sources of financing when a deficit is incurred in any fiscal year. 
Third, access to financial markets may foster state governments' political accountability 
and good governance, as markets may signal which state governments have poor 
financial performance. 
However, it is of particular importance that the proceeds from borrowing by a state 
government should not be used to finance current spending (or finance current account 
deficit26) as this is against the principle of intergenerational equity effects of borrowing. 
Financing current spending by borrowing is socially and politically unfair, because future 
generations are subjected to repayment of loans (in the form of tax burden), when they 
26 Current account deficit occurs %%hen the total revenue collected is lower than current expenditure 
incurred in any fiscal year. 
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have not benefited from that public spending. At the same time, interest payments and 
loan repayments will reduce future spending. However some writers such as King (1984) 
argue that borrowing could also be used to finance current spending provided the 
repayment and debt servicing is to be made by property tax. This is, however, an 
unpopular view, as property tax is very volatile and subject to economic conditions. Thus 
economists' consensus on this issue is that borrowing should be used only to finance 
long-term public investments, as the benefit generated from the investment stretches 
across generations (Prud'homme and Shah, 2002; World Bank, 1999; Konrad, 1995; 
Oates, 1972). 
According to Oates (1972) the conventional view is that the constituent governments 
should issue bonds to finance capital projects, provided the capital project is a long-term 
investment which has benefits spread over the years. Hence, both the present and future 
residents will benefit from such a project. Concomitantly, present and future residents 
should share the costs of the project, including the repayment of the debt. Based on the 
benefit principle of taxation, that taxes should be apportioned among people in relation to 
the benefits they receive from publicly provided goods and services (Aronson, 1985), 
debt financing through bond issuance is apposite. This means that through bond 
financing, repayments for capital projects can be spread over future years according to 
the life-span of the project, in tandem with the stream of future benefits. This is why 
Oates (1972) suggests that state governments should have access to funds to finance the 
construction of long-term public investment projects. According to the World Bank 
(1999) and King (1984), this conforms to the theory of intergenerational equity effects, 
which suggests that long-term public investments that produce benefit across generations 
could be financed by debt financing. 
However, in most countries, debt financing by state governments is almost impossible, 
due to legal or constitutional constraints, poor credit rating as well as limited revenue 
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sources. As a result, the ability of state governments to increase public investment is 
relatively low. Oates (1972: 161) argues, `those states that for one reasons or another 
have not placed much reliance on debt finance have exhibited relatively low levels of 
public investment ... 
it appears that debt finance along with taxation should be an 
integral part of local operations'. Thus, if state governments are not granted borrowing 
powers, the state governments should benefit equally from the federal government's 
borrowing (Holzhausen, 1974) to enable them to finance their public investment. 
For constituent governments that face hard budget constraints, that is, those that are given 
fiscal autonomy but are required to balance their budgets without recourse to any 
assistance from the central government (Bahl, 2000a), these state governments must find 
other sources of financing, which potentially include contractual borrowing from 
domestic or foreign banks, or the issue of domestic or foreign bonds (Dillinger and 
Webb, 1999). Although hard budget constraint is universally accepted as essential to 
ensure proper fiscal behaviour (Dillinger and Webb, 1999), borrowing by state 
governments, especially through bonds, to finance capital investment should be allowed, 
subject to the state's financial capacity (Bahl, 2000b). The rationale, as discussed above, 
is that capital investments are long-lived assets and as such should be financed through 
bonds whose maturity approximately matches the asset's life. 
However, it is necessary for the central government to put a proper regulatory framework 
in place (Bahl, 2000b). In line with this view, the World Bank (1999) and Ter-Minassian 
and Craig (1997) suggest a mechanism of control to be adhered to by the constituent 
governments, that is, reliance on market discipline, reliance on legally binding rules and 
direct control by central government. Of these, central government direct control is 
widely practised. This could be done in many ways, such as by setting annual limits on 
the overall debt of individual state governments; by review and authorisation of 
individual borrowing operations; and I or the centralisation of all government borrowing 
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and in turn on-lend to state governments for approved projects. There are advantages in 
the direct control approach, especially if borrowing is raised from external sources. First, 
for macroeconomic management purposes, as macroeconomic policies are the 
responsibilities of central government (through the central bank). Second, to obtain better 
terms and conditions on borrowing due to a well coordinated approach of borrowing. 
Third, to avoid contagion effects of poor state governments' rating on other state 
governments. Finally, the requirement of a central government to guarantee states' 
borrowing (central government to bear responsibility for states' foreign debt). 
Among federal countries that impose direct control on states' borrowing are India and 
Malaysia. In India, the constitution states that only central government can borrow 
abroad while state governments' borrowing requires approval from the centre. Approval 
is not granted if they have outstanding indebtedness to the federal government (Rao and 
Chelliah, 1996). In Malaysia, the constitution totally prohibits state government 
borrowing from external sources, while borrowing from domestic commercial bank 
requires the approval of the federal treasury (see Chapter 3). 
However, in other federal countries, machinery for the coordination of the federal and 
state public debt does not exist, as in the United States, Canada and Switzerland, where 
the states may borrow freely within their financial capacity. In the United States, there 
are, however, certain restrictions imposed on state borrowing, not by the federal 
government but from the states' legislation. Most of the new federations have solved the 
problem of coordination by some sort of federal dominance, which is often enlarged by 
constitutional power given to the federal government to make loans to the states. The 
successful Australian solution to the problem of borrowing, as well as public debt 
coordination, deserves special attention. 'Under 'the Australian system, both the 
Commonwealth and the states' borrowing are coordinated by an independent Loan 
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Council, composed of representatives of both orders of government. The Loan Council27 
in Australia provides the forum for both negotiation on the borrowing requirement and 
debt limits for individual states and the monitoring of compliance with such limits. The 
Council also promotes effective market discipline on state government borrowing by 
facilitating the collection and dissemination of timely information on developments in 
state governments' finances. Holzhausen (1974: 98) suggests there should be a central 
authority to ensure that the central and the constituent governments' borrowing 
(domestics and foreign) remain within prudential levels. The central authority should be 
an independent body, composed of representatives of the central and the constituent 
governments. This is a best practice, as it can enhance cooperation between federal and 
state governments so that the growth of public debt can be monitored within prudential 
level. In Australia, the Loan Council is responsible for coordinating borrowing by both 
central and the constituent governments. Finally, the statement by Ter-Minassian and 
Craig is worth noting, 
`the growth of subnational public debt is frequently a symptom of an inappropriate 
design of intergovernmental fiscal relations in the country in question, involving, for 
example, large vertical or horizontal imbalances or a system of intergovernmental 
transfers lacking transparent criteria and conducive to ad hoc bargaining or ex-post gap 
filling' (Ter-Minassian and Craig, 1997: 156). 
2.4 Conclusion 
The literature on fiscal federalism and intergovernmental fiscal relations has been 
expanding rapidly in recent years, in line with a growing worldwide trend toward fiscal 
decentralisation, advancement of the economic theory of public finance as well as 
growing demand for lower levels of government participation in the provision of public 
27 For a detailed coverage of the Australian Loan Council, see Saunders (1990) and also Jay (1977). The 
Australian Loan Council was established in 1927 under the Financial Agreement between the 
Commonwealth and the States and continued in existence under the Financial Agreement between the 
Commonwealth, States and Territories which became effective in 1995. The Australian Loan Council is 
a Commonwealth-State Ministerial Council which co-ordinates public sector borrowings under 
voluntarily agreed arrangements. It comprises the Commonwealth Treasurer as Chairman and his 
counterparts from the States and Territories, and usually meets in conjunction with the annual Premiers' Conference. Commonwealth-State cooperation in this area derives from a common interest in ensuring 
that overall public sector borrowing in Australia is consistent with sound macroeconomic policy and that borrowings by each government are consistent with a sustainable fiscal strategy. 
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services. The literature review of fiscal federalism (intergovernmental fiscal 
arrangements within the federal system) discussed in this chapter encompasses both the 
economic and political perspectives. A consideration of these perspectives is of major 
importance, due to the fact that fiscal federalism should not be looked at solely from an 
economic viewpoint, but also from a federalism perspective, in particular the federal 
spirit. Thus, fiscal federalism is an ongoing political process of mitigating fiscal conflicts 
involving federations. The final objective of fiscal federalism is to achieve the aim of 
federation, that is, unity in diversity, based on a self-rule and share ruled basis. 
To summarise: this chapter has investigated the various aspects of federalism and its 
relations to fiscal federalism and the theory of public finance, in an attempt to establish a 
link between federalism and fiscal federalism. The most important findings of the 
discussion are: first, there is no concrete theory of federalism and fiscal federalism that is 
universally applicable for every federation. Second, in the design of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations, expenditure should be assigned to the constituent governments based on 
the benefit area and subsidiarity principle, and revenue sources (taxes and non-taxes) 
should be assigned accordingly, taking into account the three economic functions of 
government, that is, macroeconomic stabilisation, income redistribution and resources 
allocation. Of significant importance, the assignments of both revenue and expenditure 
functions to the state governments should correspond between administrative and 
legislative responsibilities to avoid financial difficulties. However, in practice, it is 
impossible to make a perfect match between expenditure and revenue, which raises the 
question of the appropriate design of intergovernmental fiscal transfers, as well as of 
borrowing powers. 
Third, the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations should also promote transparency 
and accountability at each level of government, in order to ensure a high degree of 
governance in the public sector. The literature on fiscal federalism also suggests 
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enforcing hard-budget constraints on the financial operation of the state of governments, 
to avoid macroeconomic instability, especially when deficit financing is obtained from 
excessive borrowing. However, politically, this would be hotly contested, as states would 
lose their fiscal autonomy and it would cause a strain in federal-state relations. 
Fourth, of paramount importance, the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations should 
take into account the federal spirit, which is the underlying force of the federation's 
creation. Incorporating the federal spirit into the design of fiscal federalism would 
certainly promote unity in diversity, as this is the ultimate objective of federating. 
Unfortunately, the existing literature shows that the intergovernmental fiscal relations in 
the federal system is predominantly geared towards economic efficiency and equity, due 
to a lack of understanding of the concept of federalism. As such, the economists' 
approach to the study of fiscal federalism is indeed akin to the fiscal arrangement of the 
multi-level government and fiscal decentralisation. The next chapter will examine and 
analyse the application of the theory of fiscal federalism as discussed in this chapter, in 
relation to fiscal federalism in Malaysia. 
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Chapter 3 
The Federal Idea and the Design of 
Fiscal Federalism in Malaysia 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, the terminological interpretation of federalism and fiscal federalism was 
discussed, as well as the theory of intergovernmental fiscal relations in the context of 
federalism and federal finance. This chapter will trace how fiscal federalism in Malaysia 
was designed and to what extent it relates to the concept of federalism and the theory of 
fiscal federalism. By so doing, it will then be possible to comment on the character of 
fiscal federalism in Malaysia and to answer the research question posed in this study. 
Hence, it is of fundamental importance to consider first, political developments leading to 
the establishment of the federation, secondly, how the fiscal arrangements were designed, 
that is, what functions reside in the central government and what functions should be 
given to state governments, and finally how fiscal adjustment was considered to remedy 
fiscal problems arising from this arrangement. 
3.2 The idea of the federal system in retrospect 
The first idea of a federal system in Malaysia was closely related to the history of British 
colonialism. The British colonial history of Malaysia began when Captain Francis Light, 
acting for the British East India Company, obtained Penang from the Sultan of Kedah in 
1786, in return for protection against Siamese aggression. ' This event is important, as it 
was the turning point in `modern '2 Malaysian history. From Penang, the British sphere of 
influence expanded to other Malay states when in 1819 the British gained Singapore. In 
1824 the British obtained Malacca from the Dutch in return for the British surrender of its 
However, Kedah failed to receive any military protection and in 1821 Siam conquered Kedah, which it 
ruled until 1842. See Bedlington (1978). 
2 The term `modern' is use to differentiate the early history of Malaya, especially the history of Malacca 
when was a commercial port in the region during the Malacca: Sultanate (1400-1511). In 1511, the 
Portuguese gained Malacca and thus controlled the spice and tin trade in the region until 1641 when the 
Dutch overthrew the Portuguese. See Emerson (1964). 
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interest in Bencoolen (Bangkahulu), Sumatra, Indonesia, to the Dutch by the Anglo- 
Dutch treaty of 1824. Bencoolen had proved a most unsatisfactory and expensive station 
from which to oversee British interest in the regions. So the British sought a more 
suitable station in the region as the new base (Milne and Mauzy, 1980). The British 
interest in the Malay states was essentially motivated by British growing interest in trade, 
especially spice and tin. During this period, the British maintained a policy of non- 
intervention in local affairs, but, as will be discussed shortly, they later changed this 
policy for fear that local political developments might put British interests in the Straits 
Settlements (Penang, Malacca, and Singapore) at risk. 
As the British successfully controlled the Strait Settlements and their trade grew, their 
sphere of influence expanded to other Malay states, namely Perak, Selangor, Negeri 
Sembilan and Pahang, due to the demand for rubber and tin. Before that, the British had 
shown little interest in the other Malay states' internal affairs, as they did not impinge on 
British trade interests. However, as demand for rubber and tin increased following the 
Industrial Revolution in Europe in the second half of the 18th century, and in fear that the 
internal affairs of the Malay states' might affect British interests in these commodities, 
the British began to take an interest in other Malay states' affairs, 3 especially in the 
middle of the 19th century. Perak was the first Malay state outside the Straits Settlements 
to attract British interest, prompted partly by political turbulence in Perak and also due to 
its large tin deposits. In 1874, the British interest became a reality when the Pangkor 
Treaty was signed between the British and the Sultan of Perak. According to Bedlington, 
the Treaty of Pangkor 1874 `became the political instrument that served as a model for 
British intervention and control in other Malay states' (Bedlington, 1978: 33). This treaty 
marked the beginning of British colonial rule in all the Malay states outside the Straits 
3 Internal affairs in the Malay states could affect the British interest in tin mining, as in the case of Perak, 
where heavy fighting between Malay chiefs and violent conflict between rival Chinese secret societies 
over tin mining disrupted the supply of tin. Apart from this, brigandage activities in the Straits of 
Malacca also affected the British interest. For further discussion on this, see Khoo Kay-Kim (1972), 
especially Chapter 8. 
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Settlements: Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang, leading to the formation of 
the Federated Malay States4 (FMS) by the Treaty of Federation 1895. The FMS was 
headed by the Resident General, who would be accredited to his Court, and whose advice 
had to be asked and acted upon regarding all questions other than those touching Malay 
religion (Islam) and custom. Later, in 1911, this position was replaced by that of the 
Chief Secretary. The resident system was initially designed primarily as a means of 
bringing law and order to the Malay states (Means, 1976). 
The Treaty of Federation 1895 marked the beginning of the federal tradition in the 
history of Malaysia. Nevertheless, it is difficult to recognise the FMS as a proper federal 
form of government, because of its centralised administrative structure. The treaty did not 
define the respective functions of the federal and state governments. As such there was 
no division of powers between `central government' and state governments. Indeed, there 
was not even a formal central or federal government except the federal authority and 
Federal Council. The federal authority (which undertook the role of the federal 
government) was not assigned a legislative function: law was drafted by a Federal 
Officer, the Legal Adviser, and passed by the respective State Council. In terms of 
centre-state financial relations, states had limited power in both revenue raising power 
and spending power until decentralisation took place in 1927 (Yeo, 1982; Ghosh, 1977; 
Braddell, 1931). Expenditure was undertaken by the centre and mainly concentrated on 
infrastructure developments designed primarily to assist the expansion of the rubber and 
tin industries, to accommodate the British interest in these commodities. However, the 
socio-economic well being of the people in the states was disregarded (Emerson, 1964). 
There was no constitution except for the Treaty. 5 Thus, the FMS was not a proper federal 
4 See Emerson (1964) especially Chapter IV, for detailed discussion on the Federated Malay States (FMS). 
The treaty is simple, consisting of only five articles. See Appendix i of this thesis for the full text of the 
Treaty of Federation of 1895. 
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system of government6 in the accepted sense of a federal system as discussed in Chapter 
2. Indeed, the FMS only intended to put the four states under a single administration for 
the sake of uniformity and to impose law and order primarily to safeguard the British 
interest in Malay states. 
Therefore the first idea of a federal system in Malaya was not intended to unite the Malay 
states into larger political union for their future self-government but merely represented 
the British intention to control the Malay states in order to safeguard their business 
interests. According to Yeo (1982: 292) `the British officials never had in mind a real 
federation with a rigid division of powers between the centre and the states' during the 
formation of the FMS. Despite these limitations, the importance of the FMS is that the 
idea of a federal form of government already existed, long before a formal federal form 
of government was introduced in 1948.7 As Hickling argues, 
`apart from the administrative significance of the Treaty [thq Treaty of Federation 1895], 
its real importance in the constitutional history of Malaya lies in the idea of federation 
implicit in it: an idea which paved the away for the ultimate establishment of true federal 
government in Malaya' (Hickling, 1960: 4). 
In 1909, however, a step towards a proper federal system of government took place with 
the establishment of the Federal Council, located in Kuala Lumpur. 8 Legislative power 
was transferred from the state to the Council, although executive power remained with 
the states. The main task of the Federal Council was to make legislation for the FMS. 
With the inauguration of the Federal Council, any laws passed by the State Council 
would not be valid if they were inconsistent with the provisions of laws passed by the 
Federal Council. Although the State Councils existed, their function was limited to 
Islamic affairs and Malay culture, as other important functions were centralised. The 
members of the Federal Council comprised the Resident General, the British Residents 
6 See Section 2.2 of Chapter 2 for the interpretation of federalism and federation. 7 See Section 3.3.1 for a discussion of the Federation of Malaya 1948 g See `Agreement for the Constitution of a Federal Council, 1909'. This agreement was signed on the 20th 
October 1909 between the High Commissioner of the FMS (Sir John Anderson) and the Rulers of the 
FMS (Perak, Selangor, Pahang and Negeri Sembilan). 
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and Sultans of Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang, four unofficial members 
nominated by the Governor and one Malay representative. All members were appointed 
rather than elected. Legislation passed by the Council required the endorsement of the 
British Residents, but not the Sultans, which was a cause of discontent among them. As 
will be discuss shortly, the Sultans finally demanded the British authority to amend this 
arrangement, which resulted in a decentralisation of powers, including financial matters, 
to States' Councils. 
With the rapid development of the rubber and tin industries in the FMS, it became 
increasingly necessary for the Federal Council to undertake functions on an interstate 
basis and as a result there was a steady transfer of executive power from the states to the 
central authority, especially after 1909. In 1911 the post of Resident General was 
abolished and his functions were assumed by the Chief Secretary, mainly to reassure the 
Rulers who feared that administration was becoming too centralized, as the legislative 
powers of the states were diminished (Milne and Mauzy, 1980). In the early 1920s, due 
to over-centralisation of power, the Sultans called on the British authority to redefine 
federal -and state functions (Yeo, 1982; Ghosh, 1977). Subsequently an agreement was 
signed between the High Commissioner and the four Sultans of the FMS, by which the 
Federal Council was reconstituted and a number of federal departments were transferred 
back to the states under the 1927 decentralisation scheme (Yeo, 1982; Ghosh, 1977). 9 
The four Sultans were also withdrawn from active participation in the Federal Council 
and instead they met in an annual Durbar (Conference of Rulers). All legislation passed 
by the Federal Council now required the Sultans' assent. At the same time, the unofficial 
membership of the Federal Council was further enlarged. The legislative and financial 
authority of the Council was also outlined. Under the new arrangement, general policy 
was controlled by the High Commissioner, who retained the power to give advice 
This was the first decentralisation process in the FMS. For detailed discussion of the decentralisation 
process, see Yeo (1982) especially Part Two and Ghosh (1977) especially Chapter 7. 
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through the Residents. However, the states' financial matters remained under the control 
of the Federal Council. 10 Each year the Federal Council voted block grants to each of the 
states to meet their annual budget deficit. Despite the strict standing financial instructions 
and limited grants, the states were free to allocate the expenditure at their disposal. In 
summary, as a result of these reforms, the division of federal and states functions, which 
the Treaty of Federation 1895 had failed to make, were now defined, which resulted in 
the transfer of a number of departments to states and the abolition in 1935 of the post of 
Chief Secretary, to be replaced by a Federal Secretary. Accordingly, his statutory and 
administrative powers were transferred to states' control (for state matters), and to the 
High Commissioner for federal matters; meanwhile the State Councils were strengthened 
by broadening the basis of representation through the addition of further Chinese, 
European and Indian unofficial members. 
The effect of the new arrangement on the states was remarkable. The increased 
responsibilities of the State Councils helped to deal with the problem of local 
administration and at the same time stimulated initiative for the development of the idea 
of self-government. Concern for the welfare of the rural population, which was neglected 
under the old arrangements of the Treaty of Federation 1895, now increased. Although 
the British government established State Legislative and Executive Councils, their 
members were appointed rather than popularly elected (similar to the Executive Council 
and Legislative Council at federal level), and these councils were never given power to 
be more than advisory bodies to the government. These new arrangements continued 
until World War II broke out. 
10 No progress was made under the Financial Devolution Scheme (the Poutney Financial Scheme) to return 
financial autonomy to the states. The Financial Devolution Scheme failed to vest the State Councils with 
any real financial authority since the Federal Council exercised ultimate financial control over states' 
expenditure. The Scheme failed because the Federal Council wished to ensure the financial stability of 
the FMS `since the existing State Council members almost entirely lacked experience in handling financial matters' (Yeo, 1982: 305). 
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Meanwhile, outside the FMS, the British attempted to expand their sphere of influence to 
other states: Johor, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu, which were administratively 
isolated from the rest of the Malay states, known as the Unfederated Malay States 
(UMS). However, all of these states (Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu and Johor) 
were under separate administration, unlike the Federated Malay States (FMS). The 
British interest in these states was prompted partly by a wish to prevent further 
penetration by Siam (Thailand) and to suppress piracy, which threatened British interests. 
All these states (except Johor) were under Siam's protection" until 1909, when an 
Anglo-Siamese treaty was signed, by which Siam transferred the protection, right and 
suzerainty of these states to Britain. Subsequently, a series of treaties12 were signed 
between the British government and the respective Sultans of these states, by which 
British advisers were appointed to each state. 
As for Johor, a British adviser was accepted only in 1914, although British influence had 
been established by a Treaty of 1885 in which the Sultan of Johor ceded the control of the 
state's foreign affairs to the British. However, in 1914 an Agreement was concluded with 
the Sultan of Johor under which a British officer was appointed as General Adviser 
(Braddell, 1931) and hence, with this agreement, all Malay states were now under the 
British influence. Although the UMS accepted British advisers, `each of these five states 
operated more or less independently of the others: they worked together only when they 
sensed an impending assault from Kuala Lumpur on their semi-autonomous status' 
(Bedlington, 1978: 34) and as such `the UMS retained greater autonomy, a more 
traditional political system and less British intervention' (Means, 1976: 42). Even today, 
the former UMS states still keep their own state service, different from the former FMS 
states (Shafruddin, 1987; Zakaria Ahmad, 1987a). These Malay states' political division 
Siam's influence on these states was implicitly acknowledged by the British through the Anglo-Siamese 
Treaty 1826 (see Bedlington, 1978). The British decision to make advances to the states of northern 
Malaya was partly prompted by the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904, as a result of which the British 
no longer feared a France counter-move in or against Siam. See Milne and Maury (1980). 12 The treaty with Kelantan and Terengganu was signed in 1910, Kedah in 1923 and Perlis in 1930. 
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continued until World War II broke out, when the Japanese evicted the British and 
occupied all the Malay states (1942-1945). 
3.3 The federal form of government: The failure of the Malayan Union and the 
second attempt at federal creation 
The Japanese occupation of Malaya planted the seeds of nationalism among the Malays, 
especially among the young generation and inspired a new political movement aimed at 
gaining independence. This was also partly influenced by the independence movement in 
other parts of the Southeast Asia region, especially in Indonesia. 13 `The Japanese 
conquest of Malaya failed in disgrace. But by fatally wounding the British imperial lion, 
it had shown the people of Malaya a vision of self-determination, self-government, and 
independence from all outside tutelage, whether British or Japanese' (Simandjuntak, 
1969: 14). After the Japanese withdrawal from Malaya in 1945, the British returned to 
Malaya to fill the power vacuum in the administration of the Malay states. Due to a fear 
that the communists would control Malaya, 14 the British Military Administration (BMA) 
was immediately installed as a temporary administration until a proper form of civilian 
government could be established. As the BMA was only an interim measure, the Colonial 
Office planned for a future Malaya by integrating all the Malay states (FMS, UMS and 
Straits Settlements) `under one centralised and unified government' (Macdonald, 1948: 
6) as a step towards self-government. According to this plan, the Malay Sultans were 
required to transfer their powers to the British Crown. Eventually, through the British 
representative - Sir Harold MacMichael'5- the `consent' of Malay Rulers was obtained 
13 The Japanese occupation in Malaya lasted for only three and half years, from 1942 to 1945, until the 
Japanese surrendered to the Allied Forces. See Percival (1949) and Kratoska (1995) for an account of the 
Japanese occupation in Malaya. 
14 The communist movement in Malaya during and after the Japanese occupation was represented by the 
Malaya Communist Party (MCP) which gained support primarily from the Chinese through the Chinese- 
led guerilla organization MPAJA (Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army). See Oong Hak Ching (2000) 
for discussion on the communist movement mn Malaya after the Japanese occupation. 15 See MacMichael, (1946). 
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through the 1945 agreement. 16 In this agreement, the Malay Rulers surrendered their 
powers to His Majesty, as stipulated in the agreement: `His Highness the Sultan agrees 
that His Majesty shall have full power and jurisdiction within the states'. 17 This clause is 
significant, as it became the central theme of the Malayan Union created in 1946. 
However, the British attempt to integrate the Malay states gave rise to strong opposition18 
from Malay nationalists, which grew rapidly after the British Parliament accepted the 
proposal to form the Malayan Union in early 1946. Strong Malay opposition stemmed 
first from the fact that the powers of the Malay Rulers would be lost in the larger body of 
the union within which the states were to be merged (and subsequently the individuality 
and identity of states would be lost), and secondly, due to the citizenship issue, in which 
under the proposed Malayan Union, citizenship was open to all inhabitants in Malaya by 
reason of birth or by naturalisation (for those who had resided for ten out of fifteen years 
preceding 15 February 1942). The citizenship issue effectively created conflicts between 
communities, as Malays feared they would lose ketuanan ('sovereignty') to other ethnic 
groups in their own motherland because non-Malays would out-number the Malays 
(Macdonald, 1948: 7). 19 
During British colonial period, a large number of immigrants from China and India were 
brought in to Malaya to work in the tin mines and rubber plantations. This situation 
created a plural society in Malaya and in the long term caused socio-economic and 
political fears to grow among Malays over non-Malay political dominance, as the number 
of foreign labourers far outstripped that of the Malay population. As Macdonald (1948) 
16 See Malaya (1945). Agreement with Johor was signed on 20th October, Selangor on 24th October, Pahan 
on 2a November, Negeri Sembilan on 14th November, Perak on 22nd November, Kedah on 2n 
December, Perlis on 4th December, Kelantan on 17th December and Terengganu on 21' December 1945. 17 See Malaya (1945) Clause 1. 
18 By March 1946, the anti Malayan Union reached its peak. For the first time all Malay organisations 
gathered in Kuala Lumpur to attend the Pan-Malayan Malay Congress, primarily to plan for more 
coordinated opposition against the Malayan Union. Among other proposals of this congress was the formation of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). See Amoroso (199S). Finally UMNO 
was born on 11th May 1946. Further detailed discussion on the history of UMNO can be found in Ahmad Fawzi (1992). 
19 Malcolm Macdonald was a Governor-General of the British in Southeast Asia. 
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notes, the Malays were concerned that the non-Malays were temporary immigrants 
whose first loyalty continued to be to their own countries. 20 Ratnam (1967) concurs with 
this statement when he says that `it is sufficient to say that most Chinese and Indians who 
came to Malaya during the first three decades of the twentieth century ... were 
little more 
than "birds of passage", who left once they had made their money' (Ratnam, 1967: 6). 
The loyalty of Chinese and Indians towards Malaya was dubious, which prompted Malay 
resistance over the equal citizenship status proposed by the Malayan Union. According to 
Oong, 
`the Malayan Union proposals... were favourable and beneficial to many of the Chinese. 
However, the proposals had not aroused sufficient interest among the Chinese. Some 
supported the principle of equality for all citizens but were sceptical about choosing to 
become Malayan Union citizens, as they were still proud to maintain their status as 
Chinese nationals' (Oong, 2000: 105). 21 
At the same time, the Sultans claimed that they had not been consulted on the idea of 
Union and were not given enough time to study the proposal. Furthermore, the Sultans 
were under threat of being replaced by rulers more loyal to the British government (as 
some Sultans during the Japanese occupation, for one reason or another, were accused of 
collaborating with Japanese), leaving the Sultans with no choice but to sign the treaty. 22 
With this treaty, the powers of the Malay Rulers came to an end: their powers were 
conferred on the British government, leaving the Sultans with matters relating only to 
Islamic affairs and cultures. Thus, with the Union, the Malay Rulers and the Malays felt 
very deprived. Although there were State Councils, they could only make laws on Islamic 
affairs or any subjects assigned by the Union upon approval of the Governor General. A 
Statement by Rees-William in the House of Commons described the feeling of Malays 
and British ex-Malayan Civil Servants towards the colonial Malayan Union project - 
20 In 1947, the total population of Malaya was 4.908 million; of which Malays comprised 49.8%, Chinese 
38.4%, Indian 10.0% and others (mainly European) 1.8%.. See Table 1.1 of Chapter 1. 21 Further discussion on the Chinese reaction towards the Malayan Union can be found in Oong (2000), 
especially Chapter 4. 
22 Indeed, the Malay Rulers were forced to agree to the terms and conditions of the Malayan Union. The 
British used `shotgun signature' (Milne, 1967: 29) to obtain the signature of the Malay Sultans. 
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`there was no consultation; there was no investigation; there was no Royal Commission; 
there was no parliamentary mission'. 23 
Despite strong objections towards the Malayan Union from Malay nationalists, on 1" 
April 1946 the Malayan Union was inaugurated. Thus, the union comprising the former 
FMS, UMS, and Straits Settlements states of Penang and Malacca became a reality, the 
first time that all eleven Malay states had been brought together under one 
administration. Singapore remained a separate Crown Colony, 24 `since it was considered 
that it required separate treatment in view of the fact it was considered to be a centre of 
entrepot trade with economic and social interests distinct from those of mainland Malaya' 
(Hickling, 1960: 7). But this decision was not to `preclude or prejudice in any way the 
fusion of Singapore and the Malayan Union in a wider Union at a later date should it be 
considered that such a course were desirable'. 25 Although the Union was thus officially 
established, Malay opposition continued. Macdonald (1948: 7) describes the situation as 
`tense and dangerous and, indeed, might easily have led to acts of bloodshed' especially 
towards the middle of 1946. 
With continued strong Malay opposition towards the Malayan Union, headed by the 
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the Malayan Union was finally abolished 
in 1948 and replaced by the Federation of Malaya. Thus the unitary form of government 
in Malaya was attempted through the Malayan Union experiment but failed due to the 
strong opposition of Malays on the ground of the citizenship arrangement, as well as the 
fear of losing the Malay Rulers' powers to the British. Clearly, the Federation of Malaya 
of 1948 and 1957 was not established to accommodate states' socio-economic diversity. 
73 Rees-Williams' (Lord Ogmore) statements in the'' British House of Commons, cited from Simandjuntak (1969: 44). Rees-Williams was among ex-Malayan Civil Servants (together with Gammans, Winstedt, Swettenham) who opposed the idea of Malayan Union. 24 Due to British economic interest in Singapore, coupled with the predominantly Chinese population which 
gave racial imbalance against Malays in the Malay states, the British decided to exclude Singapore from 
the proposed Malayan Union. Singapore received internal self-rule in 1959. 25 Malaya (1946b: 3). 
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As the interest of the people and states was towards future political survival rather than 
defending states' interest in the new Union, it is not surprising if the financial 
arrangements between the centre and all state governments did not attract much attention 
from states. As a result, the form of early federation in Malaysia was symmetrical in 
character. 
3.3.1 The first stage of federation: The Federation of Malaya (1948) 
The Federation of Malaya was formed on I" February 1948 following the signing of the 
Federation of Malaya Agreement, 194826 between the British government and the Malay 
Rulers of the nine states of the former FMS and UMS together with two Straits 
Settlements - Penang and Malacca. The Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948 contained 
provisions similar to the Malayan Union treaty of 1946, but it was significant to the 
Malays because it protected their future through the citizenship policy and recognised the 
individuality of the states. In practice, however, the Federation of Malaya Agreement 
1948 reflected the overall theme of the establishment of the federation, that is, the 
establishment of `a strong central government"' and less attention was paid to the second 
theme, that `the individuality of each of the Malay States and of the Settlements should 
be clearly expressed and maintained'. 28 
This agreement is of great importance in the history of federalism in Malaysia because 
the present federal system evolved from it. With this agreement, a truly federal system of 
government became a reality after the first federal idea in 1895 and the Malayan Union in 
1946. According to Hickling (1960: 10), this agreement was in fact `a formal federal 
constitution'. However, the Federation of Malaya 1948 did not guarantee the autonomy 
of the states, as the federal government had complete legislative powers, except in 
26 See Malaya (1948). 
27 See Malaya (1946a) and Malaya (1947). 
28 See Malaya (1957a), Chapter II, page 7. 
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matters related to Islam and Malay customs. Although a formal constitution had yet to be 
established, the agreement spelled out most of the division of powers and functions 
between the federal (under federal list) and state governments (under state list). However, 
there was still some dissatisfaction over financial arrangements. 29 Although there was a 
sharing of powers between the federal and state governments, most of the powers were 
vested in the federal authority. The federal government had both legislative and executive 
responsibility over states' subjects, if the federal government felt it necessary. Therefore, 
what emerged from the Federal Agreement 1948 was a heavily centralized federation 
which was almost unitary in character with strong centripetal forces. As shall be seen 
later in the chapter, the Federation of Malaysia 1963 (and its predecessor the independent 
Federation of Malaya 1957) evolved from the arrangement set out in the Federation of 
Malaya Agreement 1948. 
Unlike the former FMS, the 1948 Federal Agreement recognised the formation of federal 
government, comprising the Federal Executive Council and the Federal Legislative 
Council. However the power of the federal government was concentrated in the hands of 
the High Commissioner, 30 who was not politically responsible to the people but to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies in London. He was given full executive authority for 
the running of the federal government, aided by a Federal Executive Council over which 
he presided. Although the High Commissioner was required to consult the council on all 
matters involving the exercise of his power (except where the public interest would 
sustain material prejudice or matters that were less important or too urgent), the High 
Commissioner could make the ultimate decision alone and did not have to give any 
reason for his decisions. The High Commissioner also appointed all the members of the 
29 States' resentment over the problems of financial arrangements between the federal and state 
governments as provided in the Federal Agreement was prompted by the formation of a special 
committee to revive this arrangement. See further discussion on this issue in Section 3.5.1.2 of this 
chapter. 
30 See Malaya (1948), Part III. 
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Executive Council, which comprised official (Chief Secretary, Attorney General and 
Financial Secretary) and unofficial members. 
The High Commissioner also presided over the Legislative Council which comprised 76 
appointed members: fifteen ex officio members, namely, the High Commissioner (as a 
presiding officer), the Chief Secretary, the Attorney General, the Financial Secretary, the 
nine presidents of State Councils, and two representatives of the Straits Settlement 
Councils; eleven official members appointed by the High Commissioner; and fifty 
unofficial members that represented various communities and economic interests. 
Looking at the composition of both the Executive and Legislative Councils, the 
responsibility for the administration of the government rested entirely with the ex officio 
and official members who were appointed by the High Commissioner and, as such, it was 
not surprising if they were bound to act in accordance with the High Commissioner's 
directives. Looking at the composition of the Legislative Council, clearly state 
governments were not sufficiently represented (only eleven representatives out of 
seventy-six) to safeguard their interest in accordance with the federal spirit. 
3.3.2 The Federation of Malaya (1957) 
The successful creation of the Federation of Malaya 1948 inspired the movement towards 
self-government and subsequently Malayan independence from the British. Towards this 
end, for the first time in 1951, the members system" was introduced in the Legislative 
Council in order to give more political responsibility to the Malayans, in preparation for 
complete self-government. This was in line with the aim of the Federal Agreement, that 
`progress should be made toward eventual self-government, and... as soon as 
circumstances and local conditions will permit, legislation should be introduced for the 
31 The members system was proposed in April 1950 and subsequently approved by the Legislative Council 
in January 1951 and came into effect in March 1951. See Council Paper No. 49/1950, Federation of 
Malaya. 
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election of members to the several legislatures to be established pursuant to this 
Agreement. X32 
Subsequently in 1955, for the first time, members of the Legislative Council were 
elected. The Alliance coalition party33 won a landslide victory, taking 51 out of 52 seats 
contested for the Legislative Council. Tunku Abdul Rahman, the party president of the 
United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) and the leader of the Alliance coalition 
party was appointed as Chief Minister and subsequently formed a cabinet. In 1956, a 
Constitutional Conference was held in London, whereby a decision was made that self- 
government and independence within the Commonwealth should be granted to Malaya 
by August 1957. Subsequently, a Constitutional Commission was formed to draw up a 
draft constitution. 34 With the `strong central government' theme, the federal structure 
displayed extremely unitary characteristics. Indeed, the Federation of Malaya 1957 is best 
regarded as a unitary system with federal elements. The Federation of Malaya, according 
to Carnell (1961: 58) `was the outcome of the British system of ruling through the 
Sultans of protected Malay states, and response to the problems posed by the survival of 
nine monarchies. In 1946 the mystique of monarchy was so strong among local British 
officials and Malaya nationalists as to rule out any possibility of the formal apparatus of a 
unitary state'. 
It is also noteworthy that no Malayan was invited to be a member of the Constitutional 
Commission. Even the prospective members of the federation were not directly invited to 
determine their rights, interests and future in the federation, as most elements of the 
32 See Malaya (1948), page 2. 
33 The Alliance party (Parti Perikatan) was formed in 1955 consisting UMNO, MCA and MIC. 
34 This Commission consisted of Lord Reid (Lord of Appeal in Ordinary) as Chairman, Sir Ivor Jennings 
(Master of Trinity Hall, Cambridge), Sir William McKell (a former Governor-General of Australia), Mr. 
B. Malik (a former Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court, India) and Justice Abdul Hamid of the 
Pakistan High Court. The Commission worked according to the following terms of reference (a) the 
establishment of a strong central government with some autonomy in the states, (b) safeguarding the 
position and prestige of the Rulers, (c) providing for a constitutional head of state, (d) creating a common 
nationality, and (d) safeguarding the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of other 
communities. See Malaya (1957c), page: 6. 
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constitution were imposed by the British (as indicated in the terms of reference) in 
consultation with the Alliance coalition party, rather than openly negotiated by all 
prospective members of the federation. In other words, the state governments were not 
directly involved in the drawing up of the Constitution. As a result, the Constitution was 
not the result of an agreement of the member states but predominantly reflected the 
Alliance political elites' communal bargaining. As stated in Chapter 2, Wheare (1953) 
argues that a federation is established by a few previously independent states; however, 
his argument is not convincing in the case of the Federation of Malaya 1948, or the new 
Federation of Malaya 1957, as the states were not yet independent and hence were 
subject to the British terms of reference in designing the form and kind of the future 
constitution for their colonised states, based on the prevailing situation at the time of 
federating. Hence, the states were powerless (legally and constitutionally) to fight their 
interest during the formation of the federation. The Malayan inhabitants were invited 
only `to comment and to accept' the draft of the Federal Constitution prepared by the 
Constitutional Commission. 
The Reid Commission Report, which contains the draft constitution for an independent 
Malaya, 35 was largely derived from the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948. 
However, significant modifications were made especially with regard to federal 
citizenship, Malays' special privilege, Malay as a national language, education and the 
position of Islam as the official religion of the federation. The Reid Commission 
Constitutional Report was finally accepted by the British government after it had 
`undergone changes both of substance and of form'36 with regard to citizenship, Malay 
privileges, the position of Malay Rulers and religious matters. This was largely aimed at 
accommodating multiethnic diversity in the quest for unity within a larger body of 
35 The framers of the Federal Constitution drew on the constitutional experience of a munber of other 
countries. However, it closely followed the Indian Constitution. 'Both directly and derivatively, the Constitutions of Great Britain and the United States have influenced that of Malaysia' (Groves: 1964: 
22). 
36 For fuller discussion see Malaya (1957a), Malaya (1957b), and Malaya (1957c). 
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association. Finally, the Federation of Malaya gained independence on 31" August 1957 
and the new Constitution came into force, 37 thereby ending the division of powers / 
functions between the federal and state governments under the Federation of Malay 1948. 
3.3.3 The second stage of federation: The Federation of Malaysia (1963) 
After independence in 1957 and the successful operation of the first stage of federalism, 
an attempt was made in the early sixties to recast the idea of a larger federation by 
including Singapore, Sabah (formerly North Borneo), Sarawak and Brunei to form the 
Federation of Malaysia. The idea of the Federation of Malaysia already existed long 
before Malaya became independent in 1957 (Macdonald, 1948), but was renewed in 1961 
by Tunku Abdul Rahman, then the first Prime Minister of Malaya, who envisaged that 
Singapore, Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak should be merged together in one larger union. 38 
These states, however, had different political, economic, social and racial backgrounds, 
and were not closely related to the original members of the Federation of Malaya 1948. 
What these states had in common was that they were not yet independent, that is, they 
were still under British protection. Singapore had been a British Crown Colony since 
1826, and Brunei had been a British protectorate since 1888, while North Borneo (Sabah) 
and Sarawak, had been British protectorates since 1946.39 In 1962, an enquiry was 
conducted to solicit the opinion of the people in Sabah and Sarawak, as to whether or not 
37 The financial provision in the Constitution, however, only came into force on 1' January 1958 since the 
government fiscal year ended on 31 December. 
38 See Tunku Abdul Rahman `An address given to the foreign correspondents association of the South-East 
Asia on 27th May 1961'. See Malaysia (1963c). 
39 The status of Sabah (then North Borneo) and Sarawak was quite different. Until the Second World War, 
Sarawak belonged to Rajah Charles Brooke or the White Rajah (the Brooke family) who governed 
Sarawak for almost fifty years, while Sabah was administered by a British trading company (the East 
India Company) from 1761 when the Company concluded a treaty with the Sultan of Sulu in return for 
protection from Spanish encroachment. However, after the Second World War, the Colonial Office took 
over responsibility for both territories. For further discussion on the early history of Sabah and Sarawak, 
see Bedlington (1978). 
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they were in favour of joining Malaysia. The findings of the Commission indicated that 
the people of both North Borneo and Sarawak favoured the formation of Malaysia. 40 
Among these states, Singapore was more economically advanced, wealthy and developed 
than the states of Sabah and Sarawak. The main ethnic components of Singapore's 
population were similar to those of Malaya - Malay, Chinese and Indian, but, unlike 
Malaya, Singapore was overwhelmingly Chinese, and due to the small size of its ethnic 
communities, racial conflicts were not such a serious issue as in Malaya. However, the 
inclusion of Singapore into the Federation of Malaya was viewed by Malayan political 
leaders with scepticism, for fear of Chinese political dominance, as the number of 
Chinese would exceed the Malay population. Malaya and Singapore are geographically 
linked and historically both had experienced British control and influence for a long time. 
Singapore's economy to a large extent depended on the Malayan hinterland. On the other 
hand, Sabah and Sarawak are geographically separated from peninsular Malaysia by the 
South China Sea (see map of Malaysia). Hence, it was doubtful whether federalism could 
survive over such a distance. Both states had been taken over as British colonies in 1946. 
The population composition of both states was less clear, unlike the neat plural divide of 
Peninsular Malaya and Singapore. In Sabah and Sarawak, the critical lines of cleavage 
were firstly, between the non-Muslim and Muslim indigenous communities and secondly, 
between the indigenous and non-indigenous communities. However, on a positive note, 
the inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak into the Federation of Malaya would balance out the 
number of Chinese. As for Brunei, it was also a Malay state, which had been a British 
protectorate since 1888, but was economically wealthy due to oil production. 
40 See Malaya (1962b). A Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Cobbold visited North Borneo and 
Sarawak between February and April 1962. This Committee comprised representatives from the British 
government (8), the Malayan government (20) the North Borneo government. (18) and the Sarawak 
government (29). The Commission was unanimously agreed that a Federation of Malaysia was in the 
best interests of North Borneo and Sarawak and that constitutional arrangement should be made. 
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The Malaysia proposal received mixed reactions, in particular from the Philippines and 
Indonesia. The Philippines had renewed its claim over Sabah4' as part of their suzerainty, 
while Indonesia claimed that people of North Borneo (Sabah) and Sarawak were not 
given enough opportunity to determine their future. Indonesia eventually launched 
military confrontation against Malaya. 42 Despite those threats, the Federation of Malaysia 
was finally inaugurated on 16th September 1963 to include Sabah, Sarawak and 
Singapore. The original Federal Constitution 1957 was amended to accommodate the 
new members in the Federation of Malaysia. With the establishment of Malaysia, a 
proper federal system of government was created, in which the constituent units, that is, 
Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore (while within the Federation of Malaysia (1963-1965)) 
were more autonomous than their counterparts in peninsular Malaysia, which were 
almost unitary in character. 
3.4 The structure of government 
The inauguration of the 1957 Federal Constitution on 31st August 1957 marked the 
beginning of a bicameral parliamentary system in Malaya. The Federal Constitution 
clearly divided the authority of the federal government into legislative, judicial and 
executive43 as well as the division of powers" between the federal and state 
governments. However, as will be seen later in this section, the design of the federal 
system in Malaysia has made the federal government superior to the states, especially 
with regard to constitutional amendments. 
3.4.1 The legislative branch 
The Parliament of Malaysia is a federal legislature modelled on the British Parliament, 
which is responsible for federal laws. The parliament comprises the Houses of 
41 See Malaysia (1963c). 
42 See Means (1963). 
43 The judicial branch will not be discussed here. See Abdul Aziz Bari (2003), Lee (1995) and Hickling 
(1991) for discussion on the judicial system in Malaysia. 
44 See Section 3.5 of this chapter. 
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Representatives4S (Lower House or Dewan Rak)., at) and the Senate (the Upper House or 
Dewan Negara). Thus, the Federation of Malaysia is a bicameral parliament. The Yang 
di Pertuan Agong or the King heads the Parliament, and as such is the supreme head of 
the Federation of Malaysia. 46 In the exercise of his functions, under the Federal 
Constitution or federal law, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall act in accordance with the 
advice of the cabinet or of a minister acting under the general authority of the cabinet. 47 
Nevertheless, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may act on his discretion48 on the following 
matters: the appointment of a Prime Minister; the withholding of consent to a request for 
the dissolution of Parliament; and the requisition of a meeting of the Conference of 
Rulers concerned solely with the privilege, position, honours and the dignities of Their 
Royal Highnesses, and any action at such a meeting. 
Article 44 of the Federal Constitution stipulates that: `The legislative authority of the 
Federation shall be vested in a Parliament, which shall consist of the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong and the two Majlis (Houses of Parliament) to be known as Dewan Negara 
(Senate) and Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives)'. The Dewan Rakyat is a 
democratic chamber that has 219 members (as at the I I'h Parliamentary Session) who are 
elected representatives of the people from their respective states. 49 Elections are held at 
least once every five years. The last election was held in March 2004 and the next 
as The House of Representatives is a successor to the Federal Council formed in 1909 and is a legislative 
body for the Federated Malay States (FMS). See discussion on the FMS in Section 3.2 of this chapter. '6 See Article 32 and Article 38 of the Federal Constitution. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall be elected by 
the Conference of Rulers; the Conference of Rulers comprises all the state Rulers and its prime duty is to 
elect the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and his deputy. However, the Governors (Yang di-Pcrtua Negeri) that 
Rule the non-Sultanate states assume no role in the election at the conference. The Conference must be 
consulted on the appointment of judges, the Attorney General, the Election Commission and the Public 
Services Commission. Concurrence must also be obtained from the Conference of Rulers on matters 
relating to the alteration of state boundaries, the extension to the federation as a whole, Muslim religious 
affairs, amendments to the constitution, the special position of the Malays and natives of Sabah and 
Sarawak and also the rights, prerogatives and privileges of the Rulers themselves. Thus this body acted 
like a `third chamber' in the Malayan (and Malaysian) legislature structure, whereby certain matters 
(Islamic Affairs, Malay privileges, and alteration of state boundaries) require the concurrence of the 
Conference of Rulers. 
47 See Article 40(1) of the Federal Constitution. 
48 See Article 40(2) of the Federal Constitution. 
49 See Article 46 of the Federal Constitution. 
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election is not due until 2008. Thus far, eleven general elections have been conducted 
50 since independence in 1957. 
Table: 3.1 
State Representation in Dewan Rabat 
States Representatives Population Size of state 
1999 2004 (2000) 
('000) 
(Sq. KM) 
Perlis 3 3 204 795 
Kedah 15 15 1,650 9,425 
Penang 11 13 1,313 1,031 
Perak 23 24 2,051 21,005 
Selangor 17 22 4,189 7,960 
Ne eri Sembilan 7 8 860 6,644 
Malacca 5 6 636 1,652 
Johor 20 26 2,741 18,987 
Pahang 11 14 1,289 35,965 
Teren u 8 8 899 12,955 
Kelantan 14 14 1,313 15,024 
Sabah 20 25 2,603 73,619 
Sarawak 28 28 2,072 124,450 
Kuala Lumpur* 10 11 1,379 243 
Labuan* 1 1 76 92 
Putra a* - 1 na na 
Total 193 219 23,275 329,847 
Note *: Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and Putrajaya are Federal Territory, not state. 
Source: Malaysian Parliament, Election Commission, and Department of Statistics, Malaysia. 
Initially, before Malaysia was established, the first parliament of 1959 had 104 members 
which increased to 159 in 1964 following the formation of Malaysia on 16th September 
1963. However, the number was reduced to 144 in 1974 following the departure of 
Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965. The number continued to expand 
until it reached 219 at the last general election (21" March 2004), including 13 members 
from the Federal Territory; Kuala Lumpur (11), Labuan (1) and newly formed Federal 
Territory of Putrajaya (1). The present distribution of the representatives is shown in 
Table 3.1. At first glance it shows that states' representation in the Dewan Rakyat is 
based on the size of population rather than the size of the states. In practice, however, it is 
a result of hard political bargaining (Rachagan, 1987). 
50 The first general election for the independent members of the Federation of Malaya was held in 1959. 
See Part VIII (Elections) of the Federal Constitution for the conduct of elections in Malaysia. 
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Each elected member of the House represents a political party. As such, their allegiance 
is to the political party they represent and not really to the state where they obtained the 
parliamentary seat. This can cause serious problems if a state is led by a different party 
from the centre, as experienced by Kelantan, Terengganu and Sabah. As such, the 
members of the House are not truly able to defend the states' interest if they belong to a 
different party. 51 This is reflected in the way the members of the House vote on bills, and 
on other matters in the House, where party discipline is very strict. All members of 
parliament act in parliament according to the policy of the party. In other words, they 
must argue or debate on certain issues according to the wishes of the party to which they 
belong; otherwise disciplinary action can be taken against them by the party concerned. 52 
Although this practice is quite common in some other parliamentary systems, the 
Malaysian system is relatively `worse as freedom of expression, including the press, 
virtually does not exist' (Abdul Aziz Bari, 2003: 94). Further, Abdul Aziz Bari 
commented, 
`In this country, parliamentarians seem to have given importance and priority to the 
survival of the party rather than to make government answerable to its actions and 
inactions. On the government side parliament is used to further political ambition rather 
than to further the interests of the constituencies' (Abdul Aziz Ban, 2003: 94). 
On the other hand, the Senate or Dewan Negara has 69 members 53 of whom 40 members 
are nominated by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, 26 members are elected by State 
Legislative Assemblies, (two members from each state), two members representing the 
Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur and one member representing the Federal Territory of 
Labuan. Currently, only 62 members are appointed: 24 from the State Legislative 
51 See Chapter 6 for the discussion on the political system and the effect on federal-state relations. 52 For instance, in June 1996, Sabah Gerakan's pro-tem committee chairman Kong Hong Ming was 
expelled from the party for not supporting the Sabah BN sponsored Sabah Forestry Enactment 
(Amendment) Bill, aimed at reducing the administrative power of the Chief Minister. In the same year, 
another Sabah BN assemblymen Jahid Jahim was also expelled for voting against the State 
Government's Bill to amend the Forest Enactment in the State Legislative Assembly. On 22°d November 
2002, Abdullah Badawi, the Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy BN chairman, said two Penang 
assemblymen faced possible expulsion from the BN for refusing to vote against a motion tabled by an 
opposition member to postpone the construction of proposed RM1.02 billion Penang Outer Ring Road at 
the State Legislative Assembly. 
53 See Article 45 (1) of the Federal Constitution. 
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Assemblies and 38 by the King (see Table 3.2). However, the number is subject to 
change: the number of members to be elected for each state can be increased to three, 
provided they are elected by the direct vote of the electors of that state; and the number of 
members to be appointed can be reduced or abolished altogether. 54 
Table: 3.2 
}1 State Representation in Dewan Negara (Senate 
(Total 62 members) 
Indirectly elected from the State 
Legislative As embly* 
Appointed by the King 
From: From: 
Perlis 2 UMNO 18 
Kedah 0 MCA 2 
Penang 2 MIC 4 
Perak 2 SNAP 1 
Selangor 2 PPP 1 
Negeri Sembilan 2 SAPP 1 
Malacca 2 AKAR I 
Johor 2 SUPP 1 
Pahang 2 Minority 6 
Teren anu 2 Kuala Lumpur" 2 
Kelantan 2 Labuan** I 
Sabah 2 
Sarawak 2 
Total 24 Total 38 
Note: 
'Position as at the 10th Parliamentary Session 
* All elected members from states are from UMNO except 6 from MCA, 4 from PAS, 2 
from PBB, one from GRM and one UPKO. All these parties are component of Barisan 
Nasional, except PAS 
**Kuala Lumpur and Labuan are Federal Territory, not state. 
Source: Malaysian Parliament and Election Commission, Malaysia. 
Senators hold office for three years but they are not affected by any dissolution of 
Parliament. They are not allowed to hold office for more than two terms, either 
consecutively or otherwise. Appointments made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong are based 
on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. These members are selected from citizens 
of the Federation aged not less than thirty years old55 and shall be persons who `have 
rendered distinguished public service or have achieved distinction in the professions, 
commerce, industry, agriculture, cultural activities or social service or are representative 
54 See Article 45 (4) of the Federal Constitution 
55 See Article 47(a) of the Federal Constitution 
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of racial minorities or capable of representing the interest of aborigines. ' 
56 As the 
selection of Senators is influenced by the Prime Minister, most of them are affiliated to 
the ruling party, or at least politically neutral (see Table 3.2). As can be seen, Senators 
appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong are largely members of the BN coalition 
parties, especially from the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), Malaysian 
Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). Some Senators are 
individuals who were defeated in the general election but selected due to their 
`distinguished' contribution / achievement within the party. Thus, the Senate is nothing 
more then a club of exiled politicians (Milne, 1967). By and large, they are no more than 
`political nominees' or a result of the `patronage system' of the ruling party. According to 
the report by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), `In Malaysia, the weakness of the 
second house was manifested in its ability to oversee the executive. Oversight functions 
are not discouraged by the rule, but by the ruling party, which defines politics as a 
derivative of consensuses' (NDI, 1996: 5). Thus, the role of the senate as a guardian of 
states' interest in the federation was seriously undermined as, in practice, senators work 
not according to the states they seek to represent, but according to the party to which they 
belong (NDI, 1996; Nik Abdul Rashid, 1979). However this practice is not only confined 
to Malaysia but occurs in most federal countries. 57 
While the federal parliament adopted a bicameral legislature, at the state level there is a 
unicameral legislature called the State Legislative Assembly or Dewan Undangan 
Negeri. As for the Federal Parliament, members of a State Legislative Assembly face 
elections at least once in every five years. The Federal Constitution stipulates that each 
State Legislative Assembly shall consist of a given number of elected members and the 
number shall be the same as the number of federal parliamentary constituencies or a 
56 See Article 45 (2) of the Federal Constitution 
57 The practices of some federal countries with regard to the appointment of senators are as follows: by 
direct election (the US, Switzerland and Australia), by indirect election by state legislative (Malaysia (for 
26 members) and India), by federal appointment (Canada and Malaysia for another 43 members). For 
further discussion see Watts (1999a) page 92-95. 
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multiple of the number of federal parliamentary constituencies. 
58 The states' cabinet 
ministers, called the Executive Council or Exco, are headed by the Menteri Besar 
(Chief 
Minister), and are responsible to the State Legislative Assembly. The powers of the State 
Legislative Assembly are limited to the subjects under the State Lists or Concurrent List. 
3.4.2 The executive branch 
The executive branch of the government is responsible to the Parliament. Though vested 
in the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, the executive authority (the power to govern) is actually 
exercised by the Cabinet of Ministers, which is headed by the Prime Minister. 
59 Hence, 
the cabinet is the highest policy-making body in the country and responsible to the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong. Article 43 of the Constitution states that the members of the cabinet 
(ministers) are appointed from among Members of Parliament by the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong on the advice of the Prime Minister, and are collectively responsible for all 
cabinet decisions. The Prime Minister has always been appointed from the Barisan 
Nasional (the National Front -a coalition of parties) and in particular from the UMNO, 
the dominant party in the Barisan Nasional. 60 
3.4.3 Federal bias: Debate about federal supremacy 
Consistent with the concept of federalism, there is a division of powers between the 
federal and state governments. 61 However the power of the federal government is 
paramount, especially with regard to constitutional amendments. Investigation of the 
articles in the Federal Constitution shows that the federal government, through the 
Parliament, could encroach into the legislative jurisdiction of the state governments for 
certain reasons. Thus, it is doubtful whether the second theme of the establishment of the 
federation, `states and settlements enjoying a measure of autonomy', was really 
58 See Article 117 and Thirteen Schedule of the Federal Constitution 
59 See Article 39 of the Federal Constitution 
60 See Chapter 6 for discussion on the Malaysian political system. 
61 See Section 3.5 of this chapter. 
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embedded in the constitution. In the federal system, the two levels of government are 
unlikely to dictate each other's decisions or encroach into their competencies, but they do 
seek to affect them through the process of influence, persuasion and bargaining; the 
fundamental consideration for the federal ethos. Circumstances in which, in Malaysia, 
the federal government is allowed to encroach on state competencies, which make federal 
government supreme, are as follows: 
First, for the consistency of law, the federal parliament can override a state law if the 
state law is inconsistent with federal law. Article 75 of the Federal Constitution stipulated 
that `If any state law is inconsistent with a federal law, the federal law shall prevail and 
the state law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void'. This article is of 
paramount importance in the event of a conflict between state and federal government, 
especially with regard to matters in the Concurrent List (such as social welfare, public 
health and veterinary services). With this article, the federal government may interfere in 
state legislation on any matter. This is an unwarranted violation of the federal principle, 
as states become subordinate to the federal government. 
Second, for the purpose of uniformity, the federal government may also encroach into 
states' competencies (as enumerated in the State List), by virtue of Article 76(1) of the 
Federal Constitution in which parliament can pass a law for any of the following 
purposes: (a) for the purpose of implementing any treaty, agreement or convention 
between the federation and any country, or any decision of an international organisation 
of which the federation is a member - except regarding Islamic law, Malay customs or 
any matters of native law or custom in the states of Sabah and Sarawak, (b) for the 
purpose of promoting the uniförmity, of laws of two or more states, and (c) if requested 
by the Legislative Assembly of any states. 'The'-position of the federal government was 
further enhanced by Article 76(4) of the Federal Constitution which provides that the 
parliament may `for the purpose only of ensuring uniformity of law and policy, make 
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laws with respect to land tenure, the relations of landlord and tenant, registration of titles 
and deeds relating to land, transfer of land, mortgages, leases and charges in respect of 
land, easements and other rights and interests in land, compulsory acquisition of land, 
rating and valuation of land, and local government. ' With this article, the federal 
principle will be seriously undermined if the federal government wishes to trespass on 
any matters of state competence. However, the states of Sabah and Sarawak are not 
bound by this provision (Article 95D). 62 The states of Sabah and Sarawak have special 
status regarding policies concerning land and local government, 63 as is stipulated in 
Article 95E(2): these states `shall not be required to follow the policy formulated by the 
National Land Council or by the National Council for Local Government'. However, 
with regard to the National Land Council (NLC) the concurrence of the Yang di-Pertua 
Negeri is required and the concurrence of the state Legislative Assembly is needed with 
regard to the National Council for Local Government (NCLG). 
Third, for the national development purposes, the Federal Constitution also invests the 
federal government with the power to undertake national development policy on a 
nationwide basis (Article 92). With this provision, the power of the state legislatures is 
further abridged and state autonomy further diminished. For instance, the federal 
government can acquire state land on the pretext of national development purposes / 
national interest. Under the Federal Constitution, land falls under the State List. However 
Article 83 (to be read together with Article 92(1)) gives the central government the right 
to acquire state land for national development and projects in the name of national 
interest without the concurrence of the respective state legislatures. The establishment of 
the national councils under the Constitution, namely, the NFC, NLC and NCLG can 
advise on matters of national developments, to facilitate centre-state coordination and 
62 Article 76(1)(b) and 76(4) should be read with Article 95D which give special position to the states of 
Sabah and Sarawak as compared with their counterparts in peninsular Malaysia. 
63 See Article 95E(2) of the Federal Constitution 
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reduce potential conflicts. However, these councils are not impartial as the members are 
appointed by the centre. Virtually, states could only enjoy the spirit of these articles by 
the will of the centre. This would cause political tensions between the centre and state, 
especially in the case of a state led by an opposition party because it is possible that the 
federal government might exercise Articles 83 and 92(1) on the pretext of the national 
interest. To ensure states' interests are protected, therefore, before the federal government 
can initiate any development / investment within state competence, proper examination 
by an expert and impartial body must be concluded. 
Fourth, for the purpose of public order and emergency, the Federal Constitution confers 
on the federal government the power to declare an emergency for the sake of maintaining 
security and public order in the federation. In the event of a serious threat to the security 
or public order, Articles 149 and 150 of the Federal Constitution empower the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong to proclaim a state of emergency if he is satisfied that the federation or 
any of its parts are threatened and to extend the effect of this declaration to any matter 
within the legislative authority of a state. The most significant provision is Article 150(8), 
by which the action of the Federal Government in regard to a proclamation of emergency 
`shall be final and conclusive and shall not be challenged or called in question in any 
court and any ground' and `no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain or determine any 
application, question or proceeding, in whatever form, on any ground' (Article 
150(8)(a)). During the emergency, the executive authority of the federal government is 
`extended to any matter within the legislative authority of a state and to the giving of 
directions to the government of a state or to any officer or authority thereof' (Article 
150(4)). Apart from `this, the Parliament may `make laws with respects to any matters' 
(Article 150(4) except `any matter of Islamic law or the custom of the Malays, or with 
respect to any matter of native law or customs in the state of Sabah or Sarawak' (Article 
150(6A). Indeed, the role of the federal government during an emergency is similar to 
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that of a unitary government and cannot be challenged. The danger of this article is the 
`possibility of abuse of power' by the federal government to meet its own political 
interest and to safeguard its political supremacy. For instance, in 1977 the federal 
government suspended the operation of the state government of Kelantan and declared a 
state of emergency following a political crisis that paralysed the PAS-led government 
(Shafruddin, 1987). Another example is the proclamation of emergency in Sarawak in 
1966 to deal with the constitutional crisis following the appointment of the Chief 
Minister (Lee, 1995). 
Fifth, power of the states with regard to constitutional amendment is extremely limited as 
the Constitution is silent on the role of the states in the amendment process apart from the 
states of Sabah and Sarawak64 (Article 161E). Consequently, the states (except Sabah and 
Sarawak) do not have a veto to protect themselves against any undesirable constitutional 
amendments. The Constitution may be amended by `the federal law' (Article 159) 
through the following means: by acts which require a simple majority; or by acts which 
require a two-thirds majority in each House of Parliament: or by acts which need the 
consent of the Conference of Rulers as well as the support of a two thirds majority in 
each House of Parliament; or by acts requiring a two-thirds majority in each House of 
Parliament and also the concurrence of the Yang di-Pertua Negeri of the state concerned; 
or by an ordinance promulgated by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong during an emergency, as 
stipulated in Article 150(2B) of the Federal Constitution. This is another asymmetrical 
characteristic of the Malaysian federation, in which states receive different treatment 
within the federation. Thus, looking at the constitutional amendment process, Malaysia is 
`non-federal' as state approval is not required to make amendment successful. 
Simandjuntak commented that, 
64 This is the result of political bargaining during the federation process when finally both states were able 
to secure a number of safeguards. See Malaya (1962a). 
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`the very character of the federal government demands some form of participation of the 
unit governments in the alteration of the supreme law of the land. [However] Malaya's 
[Malaysia] decision to leave this important task entirely in the hands of the central 
government amounts to a denial of the fact that the constitution is a contractual agreement 
between the states and the federation' (Simandjuntak, 1969: 287) [Emphasis added]. 
With regard to constitutional amendments, two observations can be made. First, the role 
of the states in the constitutional amendment process is insignificant, and as a result most 
of the constitutional amendments have been made in favour of the federal government. 
This is because the federal government interpreted and reinterpreted the Constitution in 
its own favour. Second, the role of states in the constitutional amendment process is not 
symmetrical; only the states of Sabah and Sarawak enjoy some degree of safeguard 
against unwelcome constitutional amendment. The only symmetry is in respect of matters 
relating to the Malay language (Article 152), Malay special rights (Article 153) and the 
special position of the Rulers (Article 38), over which the federal government does not 
have complete control. Article 159(5) of the Federal Constitution stipulates that laws on 
these subjects cannot be passed without the consent of the conference of Rulers. 
However, for the states of Sabah and Sarawak, a two-thirds majority in the legislative 
chamber and the concurrence of the Yang di-Pertua Negeri are required (Article 161E(2)) 
in relation to any amendment with regard to the rights of citizenship, the jurisdiction of 
the High Court of Sabah and Sarawak and the appointment, removal and suspension of 
judges, the legislative competence of state legislatures, the religion and language of the 
state and the special treatment of the native tribes, and the allocation of seats in the House 
of Representatives. Article 161E(4) also requires the approval of the government 
concerned for any legislation regulating immigration into both the states of Sabah and 
Sarawak. 
3.5 The design of intergovernmental fiscal relations and its changing faces 
The `design' of intergovernmental fiscal relations in Malaysia is very closely related to 
the design of the federal system. It evolved gradually from the first idea of a federal 
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system in the late nineteenth century to a proper form of federal government in 1948- 
1957 and subsequently with the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. In 
fact, it is difficult to separate the design of fiscal arrangements from the political 
developments leading to the formation of the federation. Thus, it is not surprising that the 
design of intergovernmental fiscal relations has been very much influenced and shaped 
by political developments in Malaysia, as discussed earlier in this chapter. The analysis 
of the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations in Malaya / Malaysian fiscal 
federalism will therefore be studied in three phases: first, during the pre-independence of 
the Federation of Malaya (1948-1957), second, the period of post-independence of the 
Federation of Malaya (1957-1963), and third, during the Federation of Malaysia (since 
1963). 
3.5.1 Financial arrangements during pre-independence of the Federation of Malaya 
(1948-1957) 
The financial arrangements between the federal and state governments during the 
creation of the Federation of Malaya 1948 and also during the independent Federation of 
Malaya 1957 were not deliberately discussed compared with other aspects, especially 
social and political aspects, most notably language, religion, citizenship, Malays' right 
and the position of Malay Rulers. `In fact at the time of federating the states showed little 
or no interest in economic or financial matters' (Holzhausen, 1974: 113). Investigation of 
records of public opinion on constitutional proposals for the Federation of Malaya 1948 
indicate the lack of interest shown by states with regard to financial arrangements 
between the two levels of government. The Constitutional Proposals report revealed that 
there was no serious discussion of federal-state financial matters. 65 This situation 
reflected the desire of the British authority to create a strong central government for the 
Federation of Malaya; consequently, the fiscal arrangements did not really reflect the 
65 See Malaya (1946a), Malaya (1947), Malaya (1957c), Malaya (1962a), and Malaya (1963b). 
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desire of the states to have more independent fiscal power. There was no financial 
committee to study the federal-states financial arrangements of the Federation of Malaya 
in 1948. Only the Financial Secretary was responsible to answer any financial issues put 
forward by the public to the Working Committee. 66 With regard to revenue assignment, 
as the record indicates, only two issues were raised, namely, excise duties and the 
treatment of financial surpluses. 67 This indicates that the working committee, the state 
representatives as well as the public at large (including the political parties) did not have 
a serious interest in federal-state financial matters. 
Similarly, with regard to expenditure, there was no objection from the states to the 
division of responsibilities. The division of expenditure functions were made after the 
revenue assignment was determined. 68 This is against the basic tenet of fiscal federalism 
and public finance, which requires expenditure to be determined in advance of revenue 
assignment so that the assigned functions match with revenue sources (Ter-Minassian, 
1997). 69 Hence, based on this principle, expenditure functions should first be determined 
and then revenue sources assigned appropriately. Doing so would minimise the non- 
correspondence (right taxes for right expenditures) between expenditures and resources. 
However, in the design of Malaysian fiscal federalism, the opposite was the case. The 
upshot was that, during the course of the fiscal year, the states experience financial 
difficulties that require fiscal adjustment. However, the proposal was accepted by the 
states without much objection by all parties involved. Indeed, from the outset, the 
Constitutional framers had realised that this kind of financial arrangements would cause 
66 The members of the Working Committee were representing the Malayan Union Government (Mr. A. T 
Newboult (Chief Secretary), Mr. K. K O'Connor (Attorney General), Mr. W. D. Godsall (Financial 
Secretary), Dr. W. Linehan and Mr. A Williams, representing the Malay Rulers - Raja Kamaralzaman Raja Mansur (Perak), Dato Hamzah Abdullah (Selangor), Haji Muhammad Sheriff Osman (Kedah) and 
Dato Nik Ahmed Kamil Mahmud (Kelantan)), and representing UMNO (Dato Onn Jaafar and Dato 
Abdul Rahman Muhammad Yasin). See Malaya (1946a). 67 See Malaya (1946a), Chapter IV: Finance and Budgets (Paragraph 40) page 13. 68 See Malaya (1946a), Chapter IV: Finance and Budgets (Paragraph 41) page 13. 69 See also Section 3.5.1.1 of this chapter. 
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financial hardship to the state governments. Therefore the Working Committee suggested 
that federal block grants should be extended to the states. 70 
Likewise, the Consultative Committee received neither suggestions nor objections 
regarding the financial arrangements between the federal and state governments. It seems 
that all matters concerning the financial provisions in Part XI of the Federal Agreement, 
were not in the interests of the state governments, as is evident from the Consultative 
Committee report. 71 Investigation of the content of all letters, memoranda and oral 
presentations put forward to the Consultative Committee shows that the public as well as 
the respective states were only interested in five main issues: citizenship of the new 
Federation of Malaya, representation (in the Federal Legislative Council and Federal 
Executive Council), language, education and Malay privileges. As a result of this and the 
lack of interest in economics and finance, the financial arrangements were not properly 
designed, which resulted in states losing fiscal independence. 
However, unlike the Malayan Union of 1946, the financial arrangements between the 
Federal and state governments under the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948 were 
made explicit. In the preamble of the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948 it was 
proclaimed that the major purpose of the agreement was to form a federation `with strong 
central government'. Executive powers were divided between federal and states 
70 See Malaya (1946a), Chapter IV: Finance and Budgets (paragraph 43: Page 14). 
" See Malaya (1947). The Consultative Committee was tasked to solicit public opinion on Constitutional 
Proposals for Malaya under the following terms of reference: 
c. To invite the opinion of all interested individuals, communities and groups in Malaya on the 
Constitutional Proposals which have been published as a result of the consultation between the 
government and Malay representatives; 
d. To hold such public or private sessions as may be necessary to give the fullest opportunity of 
expressing their views, whether orally or in writing, in accordance with the undertaking given by 
His Majesty's Governments: 
C. To collate the views so expressed and to report their substance to the Governor of the Malayan 
Union for consideration in the Advisory Council with such and recommendations as the 
Committee may see fit. 
The Committee received a total of 81 letters, memoranda and oral presentation and also four 
communications. Of the 81 letters and memoranda, 31 were from individuals, 5 from groups, and 45 
from Associations. Some of these memoranda are from associations which are supported by a number of 
affiliated associations. 
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government in order to give weight to the second objective of the agreement, that `the 
individuality of each of the Malay States and of the Settlements should be clearly 
expressed and maintained'. 72 However, the `strong central government' theme of the 
agreement gave the federal government extensive powers of control over states' budgets 
and finances. Among other things, states were required to submit their revenue and 
expenditure estimates to the federal government and to obtain prior federal approval 
before introducing new heads of expenditure or certain new items of expenditure in the 
annual budget estimates. 73 
Furthermore, the High Commissioner had full power to make orders, binding upon the 
state governments, to enforce these provisions of the agreement. The states' annual 
budget estimates were also indirectly subjected to the approval of the Federal Legislature 
by the requirement that their budget estimates be revised if the amount applied for was 
less than the amount of allocation approved by the Federal Legislature. As will be 
discussed later, this caused annual wrangling in order to finalise states' budgets before 
they could be presented in the respective states councils. The Agreement further provided 
that `any balance of revenue in excess of expenditure in any Malay State or Settlement at 
the end of a financial year shall accrue to the federal government' (Article 122). With this 
clause, the federal government had complete control over the state governments' finance. 
3.5.1.1 Assignment of revenue and expenditure 
For the first time, proper fiscal arrangements were outlined in the Constitution when the 
Federation of Malaya was formed in 1948. The financial powers and responsibilities of 
the federal and state governments were regulated by the Federal Agreement. The Third 
Schedule of the Agreement defined sources of revenue to the states governments. These 
included certain excise duties; revenue from lands, mines and forests; licences, fees and 
72 See Malaya (1948). 
73 See Malaya (1948), Section 114. 
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charges for goods and services supplied or rendered by state departments (for example 
the water supply); revenues of local authorities (other than municipalities); and profits 
distributed by the Currency Commission (see Table 3.3). All revenues not specifically 
allocated to the states governments belonged to the federal government. These included 
the main sources of revenue: import and export duties and income tax (introduced for the 
first time in 1948). Hence, the federal government had strong revenue-raising powers as 
the most lucrative sources of revenue were assigned to the centre. There was considerable 
debate about whether excise and sales tax should be assigned to the federal or state 
governments, but the Financial Secretary considered that the imposition of different taxes 
on articles sold throughout Malaya would be unwise. 74 The Agreement also stipulated 
that only the federal government was empowered to borrow. 
On the expenditure side, under the Federal Agreement, education, medical, health, 
drainage, irrigation and new village services were assigned to the state governments. 
Land, agriculture, forestry and social services were also assigned to the state 
governments. The heads of expenditure to be met from states' revenue were set out in 
Part II of the Fourth Schedule of the Federal Agreement. The policy-making power 
which the states had, coupled with the system of lump sum grants, gave the state 
governments considerable power in determining levels of expenditure. However, as states 
were not fully `responsible' for finding sources to finance their expenditure due to their 
limited revenue-raising power, states found it difficult to finance growing public services 
needs without depending on the federal government for funds. Furthermore, states also 
were not given borrowing power. The result of this fiscal arrangement was that state 
revenue could not match state expenditure and hence provision was made in the Federal 
Agreement so that this deficit could be met from allocations of federal funds in the form 
of lump sum grants. As a result, federal grants formed nearly two-thirds of total revenue 
74 See Malaya (1946a), Chapter 1V `Finance and Budgets' page 13. 
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of states. In 1950, for instance, 55% of state revenue was in the form of federal grants 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 1955). The detailed 
assignment of revenue and expenditure was contained in the Part XI of the Third 
Schedule and Part 11 of the Fourth Schedule of the Federation of Malaya Agreement 
1948 (Article 112), respectively, as shown in Table 3.3. 
Based on the above fiscal arrangements, the state revenue showed little growth potential 
(such as land based revenue sources) while state expenditure showed high growth 
potential, in particular, expenditure on education and medical / health services. Indeed, 
the Agreement recognised the possibilities that the states' expenditure would exceed their 
revenue. Thus, in most financial years, the states' revenue sources were insufficient to 
meet total expenditure. The only source of financing available was through federal grants. 
The Federal Agreement provided for unconditional block grants (lump sum federal 
grants) to be made by the federal government to finance state expenditure. However, the 
Agreement was silent on this matter: it neither specified the amount of grants to be 
received by the state governments nor prescribed the method by which these grants were 
to be determined. More often than not, the amount of grants distributed to states for the 
current financial year was largely a result of annual political wrangling. In other words, 
these grants were apportioned on the basis of rule of thumb, rather than on stable, 
transparent and agreed principles. In practice, the amounts of grants received by the states 
are dependent upon the amount of grants received in the preceding year, but the federal 
government's financial performance weighed heavily in determining the total amount of 
grants. Thus, the design of the grants system did not follow the `theory of fiscal 
federalism' which suggests that grants should be stable, set according to transparent 
formulae and announced in advance. 75 
75 See Section 2.3.3 of Chapter 2. 
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Table 3.3 
Assignment of Expenditure Functions and Revenue 
to State Governments under the Federation of Malaya, 1948 
Expenditure Assignment Revenue Assignment 
(Fourth Schedule Part II (Third Schedule Part XI) 
Political pensions and compassionate Revenue from toddy shop 
allowances 
Ruler and Chiefs Revenue from lands, mines, and forests 
Agriculture (State and Settlement Revenue from licences other than those connected with mechanically 
services) propelled vehicles, electrical installations and registration of business 
Clerical Services (State and Entertainment duty 
Settlement Posts) 
District and Land Offices and Fees in courts other than federal courts 
Registrars of Titles 
Drainage and irrigation (Staff and Fees and receipts in respect of specific services rendered by 
Works in States and Settlements) Departments of state or settlements governments 
Education (State and Settlement Revenue of town boards, town councils, rural boards, local councils 
services) and similar local authorities, other than 
municipalities established under any Municipalities Ordinance 
those town boards, town councils, rural boards, local council, and 
similar local authorities which have power under any written law to 
retain their revenues and to control the spending thereof 
Fire Brigades Receipts in respects of water supplies including water rates 
Forests (State and Settlement Rents on state and settlement property 
services) 
Game Interest on state and settlement balances 
Government Gardens and Plantations Receipts from land sales and sales of state or settlement property 
Judicial (Subordinate Courts) Fines and forfeitures in courts other than federal courts 
Marine Share in the Malaya and British Borneo Currency Surplus Fund 
Receipts in respect of any education rate imposed under any written 
law, to the extent to which such rate, if expressed as a percentage of 
the value of any property as calculated in accordance with the 
provisions of such written law, exceeds a rate of 2% per annum 
Medical and health (State and 
Settlement services) 
Mines (State and Settlement services) 
Miscellaneous 
Public Works (Staff and Works in 
State and Settlement on State and 
Settlement services) 
Purchase of land for State and 
Settlement purposes 
Town Boards 
State and Settlement Treasuries 
Veterinary (State and Settlement 
services) 
Menteri Besar and State Secretaries; 
Settlement Secretariats 
Religious affairs and Courts 
Any other department constituted to 
be a State and Settlement Department 
Source: The Federation of Malaya Ageement, 1948 
Based on the expenditure and revenue assignment, as well as federal transfers to states, it 
was impossible for states to prepare their budget estimates until they knew exactly how 
much they would receive from federal grants. One way to overcome this problem was to 
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hold meetings at an official level with representatives of the state governments to decide 
an acceptable amount of grant before estimates were submitted to the Federal Finance 
Committee so that agreement could be reached on the amount of grant required by state 
governments and, subsequently, budgets could be planned by both levels of government. 
Only then did states submit their annual budget estimates to the Federal Finance 
Committee for further consideration and approval. If any supplementary allocation 
(additional financing requirement out of those budgeted) was required during the course 
of the year, an application could be submitted to the Council even if the Finance 
Committee did not recommend that they should be granted. However, if state 
governments required small additional funds, Section 115 (2)(c) of the Federal 
Agreement provided for this without having to request additional allocation of funds 
from the federal government. 
From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that the Federation of Malaya Agreement 
1948 did not provide for financial autonomy of the states, because in exchange for federal 
grants, the federal government was given extensive powers of control over states' 
budgets. State governments' annual budgets had to be submitted to the federal 
government for approval before they could be presented to their respective Councils of 
State for approval. The extensive control of states' financial matters were also shown by 
the requirement that any financial surplus incurred in the financial year must revert to the 
federal government. This provision led to fiscal imprudence, as the state governments 
attempted to use up all available funds each year. 
The design of the financial arrangements in Malaya therefore did not follow the federal 
spirit discussed in Chapter 2. States had little bargaining power, being more concerned 
with the future of Malays' political ' interests. ' Furthermore, the Malay states during the 
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federating process were not independent, they were still under British colonial rule. 76 
According to Cornell (1961: 59), `only free people can really debate the issue of 
federation on its merits'. As shall be discussed shortly, this arrangement created strong 
resentment among states, especially when their revenue was far from sufficient to finance 
the constitutional obligations assigned to them. When Malaya gained independence in 
1957, the financial arrangements was slightly improved following greater demand for 
more fiscal power resulting from the Raja Uda Committee Report (1955) and the IBRD 
Report (1955). As a result, the fiscal arrangements for independent Malaya in 1957 were 
more satisfactory than the financial arrangements of the Federation of Malaya in 1948. 
3.5.1.2 Weakness of the pre-independence financial arrangements 
Looking at the division of functions as set out in the Federal Agreement 1948, it can be 
seen that the system of financial relationships had many disadvantages and was 
unsatisfactory to both levels of government, especially to the state governments. The 
problem emerged when the state governments, which had no power to recourse to 
financing, had no control over their level of expenditures. This was because the states, 
which had executive authority and policy-making powers to determine the expenditure, 
were not fully `responsible' for finding sources of revenue to finance the expenditure. At 
the same time the federal government, which had exclusive power over sources of 
financing, set the policy on the level and priority of services to be undertaken by states, 
notably in education and, medical and health services. The fallout of this arrangement is 
that state revenue could not meet expenditure needs in any fiscal year and consequently 
conflict emerged. Although the arrangements were made to finance these expenditures 
through federal grants, the design of the grants system did not prescribe the formulae by 
which grants were to be determined and distributed. 
76 See also Fernando (2002) especially Chapter 3. 
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Several weaknesses were further noticed arising from this arrangement. First, the 
assignment of revenue and expenditure caused a wide fiscal gap (expenditure higher than 
resources available). However, from the states' point of view, a wider fiscal gap meant a 
stronger bargaining position for states to get a larger share of federal grants. Furthermore, 
due to the requirement that revenue surpluses be returned to the federal government, the 
state governments tended to use up their unspent balances at the end of each financial 
year on unnecessary projects. Such an arrangement certainly did not encourage financial 
prudence or efficient spending. 
Second, the grants system caused states to be financially complacent as it made them 
financially dependent on grants from the federal government. Thus, there was no 
incentive for states to exploit their own sources of revenue, as both politically and 
economically it was easier and more rewarding to concentrate their efforts on attempting 
to obtain a larger share of federal grants rather than on concentrating their efforts to 
improve tax collection to strengthen their own revenue performance. This is evident from 
the fact that about 55% of state revenue was contributed by federal grants and there were 
no changes in the state tax rate between 1948 and 1954. At the same time, arrears in 
revenue collection also increased. 77 
Third, the federal government faced difficulties in controlling state expenditure although 
federal transfers constituted about 55% of state revenues. Due to states' over-dependence 
on the federal government for funds, there should have been a greater degree of control 
over the direction of state expenditure financed by the federal grants. However, as the 
grants were unconditional block grants, the federal government had little control over the 
way grants were spent by the state. As such, the grants system discourages careful 
spending of scarce resources within'the public sector. The lump sum grants also did not 
77 See the IBRD (1955), especially page 162-166, 
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foster any sense of financial responsibility on the part of state governments. Moreover, 
because of the uncertainty of the future level of grants to be received, the system made it 
difficult for the states to formulate long-term development programmes. This is because 
the amount of the federal grant to be received by states each year would only be known 
after budget estimates had been approved. The same process would apply for the 
subsequent years. However, there was no guarantee that the same amount of grant would 
continue to be received in each fiscal year. Therefore, it was impossible for the states to 
embark on long-term projects, as long-term development planning requires a continuous 
flow of financial resources over a period of time. Furthermore, the conflict between 
federal interest (such as for economic services, a joint federal - states responsibility) and 
state interest (such as for community services, a state responsibility) made development 
planning more difficult and, more often than not, decisions were the result of acrimonious 
political bargaining rather than made on national economic grounds. 
3.5.2 Financial arrangements for the independence Federation of Malaya (1957) 
The 1954 financial revision was only in operation until the end of 1957, when the 
Federation of Malaya Constitution, 1957 for an independent Malaya came into effect, 
replacing the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948, There was no new set of 
financial arrangements for the independence Federation of Malaya 1957. Instead, the 
provisions governing federal-state financial relations for the independence of the 
Federation of Malaya in 1957, as set out in the Federal Constitution, was taken in every 
respect from the Federal Agreement 1948. During the period of 1948 - 1954, federal 
control over state finances was very extensive. During that period the revenue of the state 
consisted mainly of ad hoc allocations from the federal government, especially federal 
grants. 78 Moreover, any financial surpluses recorded in the current financial year had to 
be surrendered to the federal government.. Due to strong state resentment over the 
78 See IBRD (1955). 
141 
financial arrangements of 1948, a committee was set up in 1955, known as the Raja Uda 
Committee, to study the existing fiscal arrangements and finally to make 
recommendations on the new revenue allocation and expenditure to states 79 Although the 
Committee found that the existing arrangements had not proved satisfactory, the 
Committee failed to recommend new sources of revenue that accrued directly to states as 
of right so that states would not be subject to any action on the part of the federal 
government. The states had little incentive to take prudent fiscal management, since they 
had no guaranteed assurance as to how much grant they could expect in future years and 
their deficits had to be met by the federal government each year. There was disagreement 
about the way in which the deficits of the states were to be dealt with. If this deficit was 
continuously financed by the federal transfers, the state governments would have no 
79 
incentives to explore their revenue potential and to spend wisely. It was, furthermore, 
difficult for states to plan ahead without a firm assurance of their financial resources in 
the coming budget. 
Accordingly, the Committee endeavoured to evolve a grant, which would not be subject 
to the annual wrangle for funds from the federal government. Subsequently, the 
Committee suggested a new set of financial arrangements which gave more grants and 
allocation to states. These were: (i) capitation grant; (ii) allocation of petrol import duty; 
(iii) grants in respect of education, medical and drainage and irrigation services, and in 
the case of less developed states; (iv) development grants; and (v) special transitional 
grants. The recommendations of the committee were embodied in Part 111 of the Fifth 
See Malaya (1955). The Committee was composed of D. C. Watherston (Chief Secretary), A. D. Farrell 
(Acting Attorney-General), " E. Himsworth (Financial Secretary), Raja Uda Raja Muhammad (Selangor 
Chief Minister), Dato Panglima Bukit Gantang (Perak Chief Minister) Kamaruddin Haji Idris 
(Terengganu Chief Minister), Shamsuddin Nain (Negeri Sembilan Chief Minister), Abdul Razak Dato 
Hussain (Acting Pahang Chief Minister), Nik`Daud bin Nik Mat (State Secretary of Kelantan), Abdullah 
Sahat (State Secretary of Perlis), Ahmad Perang (State Financial Officer of Johor) and Mohamed Khir 
Haji Jaafar (State Financial Officer of Kedah) Other members were Nik Ahmad Kainil Nik Mahmood 
(Member of Local Government, Housing and Town Planning), H. S. Lee (Member for Transport), Ismail 
Dato Abdul Rahman (Member for Natural Resources) V. M. N ' Menon (Member for Posts and 
Telecommunications), Tunku Abdul Rahman Ibni Abdul Hamid Halim Shah, Yong Sjook Lin, Lim 
Chong Eu and Ee Yew Kim. 
142 
Schedule to the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948 and came into force on 1" 
January 1956. However, the recommendations could not be implemented because at the 
same time the new constitution was being drafted for the independent Malaya. 
Following the British decision to grant independence to Malaya, a Constitutional 
Commission was formed 8° and its report was published on 21st February 1957. A 
Working Part y81 was then formed to study the report put forwards by the Constitutional 
Commission (known as the Reid Report) 82 Among other matters, the Constitutional 
Commission Report reconsidered the federal - state fiscal arrangements of the Federation 
of Malaya 1948. In commenting on the 1948 financial arrangements, the Constitutional 
Commission Report recognised the fact that `they are not based on any consistent 
principle'. 83 For instance, capitation grants (introduced for the first time by the Raja Uda 
Committee in 1955) were calculated based on the number of persons over the age of 
nineteen in the states, based on the 1947 census. Further, the Constitutional Commission 
Report commented: `we do not know why no account was taken of children ... the 
amount of grant per head is determined each year by the Federation after consultation 
with states and no principles are laid down for its determination. The states hoped for a 
84 grant for 1956 of RM16 per head but the grant was fixed at RM12 per head'. 
The Constitutional Commission Report also commented on how grants based on petrol 
import duty were designed and implemented in the first place. Initially, this grant was 
designed to help the state to maintain states' roads, as road maintenance was too costly to 
80 See Section 3.3.2 of this chapter 
81 The Working Party comprises: the High Commissioner, four representatives of Their Highness the 
Rulers, four representatives of the Government of the Federation, the Chief Secretary, and the Attorney 
General. See Malaya (1957a);, see also Fernando (2002) for further discussion on the Working Party's 
role in the making of the Independence Constitution, 1957. 
82 The most important change introduced by the Working Party on the Reid Commission's report was that 
states would be entitled to receive grants and other sources of revenue as of right. The grants and other 
sources of revenue allocated to states in this way were capitation grants, state road grants, and the 
proceeds from certain taxes and other sources of revenue specified in Part III of the Tenth Schedule in 
the Constitution. In addition the states were to receive under'Article 110(3) of the Constitution, not less 
than 10% of the export duty on tin produced in the states. 83 See Malaya (1957c), paragraph 129. 
84 See Malaya (1957c), paragraph 132. 
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be financed by state governments alone, due to their limited revenue. As a result, it was 
decided that the amount of petrol sold in each state would be the basis for this grant. This 
was because `the amount of petrol sold in a state was supposed to bear some relation to 
the mileage of roads in the state. 85 However, the Report found that `there is no close 
relation between the cost to the state of maintaining its roads and the amount of petrol 
sold in the state. '86 As an alternative, a new form of grant called the State Road Grant 
was introduced with the aim of helping state governments to maintain state roads. 
Table 3.4 
The Division of Powers and Responsibilities 
Federal Government 
(List I) 
State governments 
(List II and IIA) 
Concurrent List 
(List III and IIIA) 
External affairs List II 
Applicable to all state 
List III 
Applicable to all state 
Defence Islamic affairs Social welfare 
Internal security Land matters Scholarship 
Civil and criminal law and 
procedure and administration of 
justice 
Agriculture and forestry Wild life and national park 
Federal citizenship and 
naturalization 
Local governments 
administrations 
Veterinary services 
Government machinery Services of local character Town and country planning 
Finance State work and water Public health, sanitation and 
prevention of deccases 
Trade and commerce and 
industry 
Machinery of state 
governments 
Drainage and irrigation 
Shipping, navigation and 
fisheries 
List II A 
Supplement to Sabah and 
Sarawak 
Fire safety 
Communications and transport Native law and custom Culture and sits 
Federal works and power Incorporation of authorities 
and other bodies 
Housing 
Survey, inquires and research Ports and harbours (other 
than federal) 
List III A 
Supplement to Sabah and 
Sarawak 
Education Railway for Sabah) Family law - marriage, divorce 
Medicine and health Adulteration of foodstuffs 
Labour and social security Shipping (under 15 tons) 
Tourism Electricity 
Agriculture and forestry 
Medicine and health 
Charities 
Source: The Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution. 
In all, the Constitutional Commission Report recognised the extensive federal control 
over states finance and that every year 'there'were disputes (both economic and political) 
85 See Malaya (1957c), paragraph 132. 
86 See Malaya (1957c), paragraph 133. 
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between the federal and the state governments regarding to the amount of grants to be 
paid to the states. Thus, the Constitutional Commission Report recommended some 
improvement of the 1948 financial arrangements for the independence of Malaya 1957. 
The Ninth Schedule and Tenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution 1957 indicated the 
kind of fiscal federalism to be adopted in Malaysia. Both Schedules demarcated the line 
of responsibility between the federal and state governments. Under the Ninth Schedule, 
there were three lists: Lists I, II, and III (see Table 3.4). List I spelled out the 
responsibilities assigned to the federal governments. List II outlined the state 
governments' responsibilities and List III was the concurrent list, which contained the 
items which were joint responsibilities of the federal and state governments. The Tenth 
Schedule, on the other hand, outlined the grants and revenue assignment to the state 
governments. Parts I, Part II and Part IV of this Schedule were about the federal grants to 
state governments (capitation grant, state road grant, and special grants to states of Sabah 
and Sarawak, respectively), while Part III and Part V were exclusively about revenue 
assignment to state governments and additional sources of revenue assigned to states of 
Sabah and Sarawak, respectively. With the new financial arrangements, the states 
responsibilities were reduced but still did not eliminate state budgetary problems. As a 
result, grants were still an important feature of federal - state financial relations. There 
was also provision for a Statutory Reserve Fund (SRF) from which grants could be made 
for purposes of development and to meet current account deficits incurred by states. 
To summarise, the financial arrangements for the Federation of Malaya 1957 were in fact 
only a slight improvement over the former financial arrangements stipulated in the 
Federal Agreement of 1948. Indeed, during the drafting of the Federal Agreement of 
1948 and the Federal Constitution 'of 1957, the state governments demanded more 
revenue sources but were refused by the Working Party, as the Working Party was more 
comfortable on other non-financial issues, in particular, citizenship, Malay right, Malay 
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language and representation in the Legislative Council. 87 Consequently, the independent 
states' revenue remained limited, local in nature, and more difficult and expensive to 
administer and to collect than federal revenue, which was more productive and elastic. 
However, one of the striking features of the 1957 financial arrangement was its provision 
for setting up an intergovernmental fiscal institution to foster federal-state relations with 
regard to fiscal arrangements. This institution is called the National Finance Council 
(NFC), an advisory body to the federal and state governments. As briefly discussed in 
Chapter 1, the NFC was a high-level intergovernmental consultative body on financial 
matters aimed to ensure no open clashes between both levels of government. Matters 
specifically mentioned as requiring consideration of the NFC were revenue and grants to 
states, financial procedure and loans. However, this body was not impartial, as members 
of the NFC represented the political hierarchy and decisions made were not binding on 
the federal government. 88 
3.5.2.1 Expenditure assignment 
The division of powers, functions and responsibilities (legislative and executive) between 
the federal and state governments was stipulated in the Ninth Schedule of the Federal 
Constitution, as shown in Table 3.4. Efficiency seems have been the guiding principle in 
the division of these functions. Chapter 2 demonstrated that, according to the principle of 
efficiency, functions of an international character and those concerning the nation as a 
whole, should fall under the jurisdiction of the federal government, while those of a more 
regional nature should normally fall under the competence of the states 89 In this sense, 
the division of function between both levels of government did follow the efficiency 
principle as recommended by the theory of intergovernmental fiscal relations discussed in 
Chapter 2. Thus, functions of national and international interest fell within the purview of 
87 See Malaya (1947). See also Fernando (2002). 88 See Chapter 7 for further discussion on the National Finance Council. 89 See Section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2. 
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the federal government, while those of regional interest were left to state governments 
(see Table 3.4). 
The Ninth Schedule stipulated that the federal government be responsible for the 
following areas: external affairs, defence, internal security, civil and criminal laws, 
citizenship, finance (currency, taxes, foreign exchange), education, health, trade and 
industry, communication, federal works, power / energy and social services. When the 
Constitutional Commission drafted the Constitution proposal, they realised that states 
would remain heavily dependent on grants unless the functional responsibilities of the 
two levels of government were rearranged. It considered that legislative and executive 
power should correspond. To achieve this objective, the commission recommended `that 
educational, medical and health services should become federal subjects and, as a result, 
grants to the states for this services will cease, and expenditure on these services will no 
longer be made by the states'. 90 Hence, financial arrangements for the Federation of 
Malaya 1957 showed the transfer of education and medical and health services to federal 
responsibility. 
The rearrangement of these functions into the Federal List was to ensure uniformity and 
efficiency in the provision of these services, which had previously been the cause of a 
large proportion of federal allocation to states and created much annual political 
wrangling. As the education, medical and health services became federal responsibilities, 
the state governments would be responsible only for matters related to Muslim laws, 
land, forestry and agriculture, local government, services of a local character (markets, 
cinemas), state public works and water supply, and the administrative machinery of state 
governments, leaving the states weaker than the former Federation of Malaya, 1948. 
However, both federal and state governments- would have joint responsibilities in areas 
such as scholarships, town and country planning, protection of wildlife, drainage and 
90 See Malaya (1957c), paragraph 138. 
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irrigation, as indicated in the Concurrent List. However, the federal government had 
absolute power in matters concerning the subjects of the Concurrent List in that the 
federal government can overrule state governments (Article 74). 
Looking at the division of functions, almost every significant function was assigned to 
the centre. The Constitution's financial provisions had indeed made the Federation of 
Malaya one of the strongest central governments from the financial point of view. To 
make the federal government further dominant, federal law could override state law in 
matters listed in the States List as well as the Concurrent List. 91 Thus, the federal 
government could encroach into states' legislation in matters such as land, agriculture 
and veterinary, local government and social welfare, on the pretext of the national interest 
and for the uniformity of policy throughout the federation. 92 
Consequently, Article 74 put further pressure on states' fiscal affairs, which could be 
twisted by strong central fiscal powers. Politically, however, it is important to the centre 
to remain in a position to direct states to comply with the federal order. In the final 
analysis, any state leaders that opposed the federal government could be put under severe 
financial pressure (Yusoff, 1998). However, despite strong centripetal forces, the states 
did not object to federal encroachment into their territorial function, for one reason: the 
same political party controlled the centre and the states (except after the 1999 election 
when two states - Kelantan and Terengganu - fell to the opposition). 93 Furthermore, the 
9' See Article 74 of the Federal Constitution also Section 3.4.3 of this Chapter 
92 This is especially evident in the case of land matters, which are under the state . However, the 
federal 
authority, through the National Land Council (see Article 91 of the Federal Constitution), is responsible 
for formulating a common policy for the sake of coordination. A similar trend is also evident in the case 
of local government, for which the Federal Government formulated and coordinated a policy through the 
National Council for Local Government (see Article 95A of the Federal Constitution). The National 
Land Code also provides Federal Government with the power to acquire state land for public purposes. 
Other matters such as agriculture and forestry have also become federal matters. The privatisation policy 
of the Federal Government also causes states to lose their control over subjects that constitutionally 
belong to the states, as is evident in the case of water supply and sewerage. The water crisis in the mid 
1990s indicated that a more organised and coordinated policy was required to manage water services, 
which led the way to further centralisation of this resource. This is shown in the establishment of the 
National Water Council, a committee formed under the auspices of the Federal Works ministry, to be 
responsible for managing water resources, which fall under the State List. 93 See Chapter 6 for the discussion of the political party and its impact on centre-states relations. 
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states lacked the competence to undertake and manage their functions, due to revenue 
constraints. This was the result of the historical background when the Federation of 
Malaya was formed in 1948, whereby states were only interested in Malay political 
survival (for fear of non-Malay political dominance) rather than striving for states' 
interest in economic and financial matters in the federation. 94 
3.5.2.2 Revenue assignment 
Under the Federal Constitution of 1957, state governments still retained their independent 
sources of revenue as it appeared in the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948 
95 
Investigation of the records and documents shows that an attempt was made by the states 
during the drafting of the 1957 Constitution for an independent Malaya to obtain more 
revenue sources in which taxing powers should follow the legislative list and, further, the 
states should receive, as of right, 25% of customs import duties and excise. 96 However, it 
was opposed by the Alliance Working Party and, instead, the Alliance Working Party 
proposed more grants to be given to the states. As a result, the Constitutional 
Commission opposed any extension of state tax powers on the ground that such a move 
would `be wasteful in causing duplication of staff and would hamper the conduct of 
business on a national scale and retard the development of unity of the nation'. 97 
Based on this argument, the Constitutional Commission found it essential to assign to the 
federal government adequate financial powers commensurate with their role to undertake 
nationwide fiscal policy, notably stabilisation, allocation and redistribution functions. 
From the economic point of view, this arrangement was not construed as a violation of 
the principle of efficiency, since nationwide interest requires a nationwide policy, such as 
fiscal policy, which is better handled at the centre. Clearly, the division of revenue 
94 See Section 3.3 for the discussion on the formation of the Federation of Malaya 1948. 
9s The Raja Uda Committee 1955 did not recommend new revenue sources for the states, as no other 
sources of revenue were suitable to be assigned to states. See Section 3.5.3 of this chapter. 
96 See also Fernando (2002). 
97 See Malaya (1957c), paragraph 139. 
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sources between the two levels of government was guided by efficiency considerations. 
Moreover, the arrangement ensured efficiency in tax administration, uniformity in the tax 
legislation, and avoidance of duplication and overlapping of functions. However, the 
financial arrangements of the independent Federation of Malaya 1957 caused over- 
dependence of state governments on federal funds, which was politically unwise 
considering the nature of the political system in Malaysia. 
Table 3.5 
Revenue Assignment to State Governments 
Sources of Revenue 
1 Revenue from toddy shop 
2 Revenue from lands, mines an d forest 
3 Revenue from licences other than those connected with mechanically propelled vehicles, electrical 
installations and registration of businesses 
4 Entertainment duties 
5 Fees in courts other than federal courts 
6 Fees and receipts in respects of specific services rendered by departments of the state governments 
7 Revenue of town boards, town councils, rural boards, local councils and similar local authorities 
other than: 
- municipalities established under any Municipal Ordinance; 
- those town boards, town councils, rural boards, local councils and similar local authorities which have 
power under written law to retain their revenue and control the spending thereof. 
8 Receipts in respect of water supplies, including water rates 
9 Rents on state property 
10 Interest on state balances 
11 Receipts from land sales and sales of state property 
12 Fine and forfeitures in courts other than federal courts 
13 Zakat, fitrah and Baitulmal and similar Islamic religious revenue 
14 Treasure trove 
Source: Part III of the Tenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution 
Part III of the Tenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution specified sources of revenue 
allocated to the states. These are proceeds from taxes, fees and other sources of revenues, 
as long as they were levied or raised within the state (see Table 3.5). However by virtue 
of Article 110(2), the Parliament could from time to time by law substitute the states 
sources of revenue specified in Part III of the Tenth Schedule with any other sources of 
revenue, except revenue from lands, rents on state property, interest on state balances, 
receipts from land sales and sales of property and revenue from Islamic religious 
(Zakat) 98 In addition, the states were to receive, under Article 110(3) of the Constitution, 
not less than 10% of the export duty on tin produced in the states. The Commission 
98 Thus far, unfortunately, none of the provisions of this article have been implemented to strengthen the 
states' revenue sources, despite the states' attempt to get more revenue through the NFC. See further 
discussion on this matter in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
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considered that the federal government could best collect export duties but states should 
have a share of export duty on tin, as tin mining involved the permanent removal of 
valuable assets from a state. This is in line with the principle of derivation, which 
suggests part of the proceeds from the export duty on tin and other minerals should be 
given back to the producing states. Further, the allocation, by giving a state a direct 
financial interest in the production of tin, would provide an incentive to promote the 
development of tin mining. However, most of the sources of revenue assigned to states 
were still less productive, difficult to administer, trivial and non-elastic to economic 
growth, as can be seen from Table 3.5. 
Sources of revenue other than those listed in Table 3.5 belonged to the federal 
government. Clearly the federal government had substantive and exclusive control over 
the most lucrative, elastic and productive sources of revenue, namely, direct tax (income 
tax, company tax) and indirect tax (sales tax, custom and excise duties), whereas state 
governments were left with the less productive and less lucrative revenue sources. 
Clearly, these sources of revenue did not make much difference from the revenue 
arrangement of the former Federation of Malaya 1948 (see Table 3.3). Although most 
taxes were centrally collected, the state governments still benefited from the proceeds by 
virtue of federal transfers. Nevertheless, the federal transfers were not properly designed, 
as will be demonstrated in the following section and also in Chapter 4, in the sense that 
they were not intended to negate the non-correspondence problems facing state 
governments' finance amid persistent states' financial difficulties. With extensive federal 
revenue sources, undoubtedly the federal spending powers are paramount. The strong 
federal spending powers were further enhanced by the Federal Constitution' and the 
National Finance Council10° which empower the federal government to extend it 
jurisdiction over states' functions and the states are under obligation to the centre. As 
9 Sec Federal Constitution: Article 74(1), Article 75, Article 76(1), Article 76A, Article 80, Article 82 (a), 
Article 83, Article 85, Article 86, Article 94, and Article 109(3). '°° See Federal Constitution: Article 108 (4)(e) 
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Article 81 states, `The executive authority of every state shall be so exercised: (a) as to 
ensure compliance with any federal law applying to that state; and (b) as not to impede or 
prejudice the exercise of the executive authority of the federation. ' 
3.5.2.3 Fiscal adjustment: Federal grants and transfers 
Fiscal adjustment, apart from revenue and expenditure assignment, is a crucial part in the 
design of federal-states fiscal relations, intended to undo any non-correspondence 
between revenue and expenditure arising from inappropriate revenue assignment 
compared with their functions. Federal transfers, as a means of fiscal adjustment, thus 
seek to reallocate revenue from the federal funds to state government so as to achieve the 
maximum satisfaction of all levels of government without undermining the financial 
stability of the federal government. Politically, fiscal adjustment is necessary to ensure 
that the benefits to small and poor constituent units are sufficient to maintain their 
interest in federation. As discussed above, the Constitutional Commission did not favour 
assigning additional sources of revenue to the state governments. Hence, for the national 
economic interest, the most lucrative and elastic revenue sources and taxing powers were 
assigned to the federal government, giving the federal government strong revenue raising 
powers. Therefore, the transfer of funds from federal to state level is necessary to ensure 
that unity in diversity is achieved. The Federal Constitution provided financial assistance 
to the state governments in the form of various federal transfers. Basically, federal 
transfers can be classified into five broad categories. '0' First, the constitutional grants - 
those grants stated in the Article 109 of the Federal Constitution, that is, Capitation 
Grants (Article 109(1)(a)) intended to enable state governments to meet differences 
between revenue and recurring expenditure, State Road Grant (109(1)(b)) to assist state 
to maintain state road and two grants provided under the State Reserve Fund, a grant to 
help states having deficit in their current account, and grants to raise the level of 
101 See Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 for a detailed analysis of the grants system in Malaysia. 
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economic development in the states. Second, the revenue / tax sharing arrangement - 
those taxes shared by the federal and state governments based on the derivative principle, 
that is, the origin of revenue / tax collection. These include export duties on commodity 
(tin, iron and other mineral), as stated in Article 110 (3) of the Federal Constitution. 
States that produce these minerals for export are entitled to 10% of the proceeds. Another 
form of revenue sharing assignment is Revenue Growth Grants, which state that if there 
is an increase in the federal government revenue, state governments are entitled to a 
portion, based on a certain formula. Third, special payments, for compensation and grants 
to local governments. Fourth, administrative payments designed to help the state 
government to finance operating expenditure. There are two types of payment under this 
category, 50: 50 grants as stated in the Article 82 for maintenance of function under 
concurrent list (see List III of the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution) and 5% 
grants for Federal Government projects in states. Fifth, other forms of transfers / 
payments - these include the federal government sponsored projects in states through 
various government agencies. 
However, out of these transfers, only Capitation Grants, State Road Grant and grants 
provided under the State Reserve Fund were considered as actual forms of fiscal 
adjustment to remedy fiscal imbalances arising from the division revenue and 
expenditure functions provided for by the Federal Constitution. As a result, the states 
would continue to depend on the federal grants to finance their budgetary operation and 
the disbursement of grants was always subject to political strife, considering the 
centralising nature of political system in Malaysia, as experienced by states led by the 
opposition party. In Canada and Germany, the constitution specifically mentions the form 
and purpose of federal transfer to be employed, by equalisation, designed to equalise 
financial differences confronted by the state governments. In Canada, for instance, 
Section 36 (2) of the 1982 Constitution Act says, `Parliament and the Government of 
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Canada are committed to principle of making equalisation payments to ensure that 
provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels 
of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation' [Emphasis added]. In 
Malaysia, a similar provision is also set out in the Constitution; however, it is only 
applicable with regard to grant reviews for Sabah and Sarawak (but not applicable to the 
eleven states in the peninsula), as stated in Article 112D(2), 
`Any review under this Article shall take into account the financial position of the federal 
government, as well as the needs of the states or state concerned, but (subject to that) 
shall endeavour to ensure that the state revenue is adequate to meet the cost of state 
services as they exist at the time of the review, with such provision for their expansion as 
appears reasonable' [Emphasis added]. 
The theory of intergovernmental transfers 102 suggests that if assignment of revenue does 
not conform to the assignment of expenditure function, transfers from the higher level of 
government are essential to meet any financial imbalance and at the same time can 
promote redistribution of wealth, as well as incentives for states to delve into their own 
potential revenue sources. In addition, as the problem of financial imbalance grows over 
time, fiscal adjustments should provide a degree of flexibility and adaptability to 
accommodate those changes. 
3.5.2.4 Borrowing powers 
In the financial arrangements for the Federation of Malaya 1948,103 borrowing power was 
granted only to the Federal Government. However, as a further step towards fiscal 
autonomy, provision was made for states to contract loans. The Constitutional 
Commission Report 1957104 suggested that borrowing by state governments should be 
allowed as long as they did not `compete against each other' and that states borrowing 
should be `last in the queue', due to limited funds. However, the Report recognised that 
in future, states' borrowing would be necessary and `in view of the degree of future 
autonomy which we recommend for the states, there ought in addition to be more general 
102 See Section 2.3.3 of Chapter 2 
103 See Malaya (1948), Section 115, 
104 See Malaya (1957c), paragraph 146-147. 
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provisions authorising states to contract loan'. The Report also suggested that `the federal 
government would raise all loans, but only after considering the needs of the states as 
well as those of the federation as whole'. The recommendations of the Constitutional 
Commission were embodied in the Federal Constitution, which confers the federal 
government with absolute control over state governments' borrowing. States can only 
borrow from banks for a period of one year or less, provided prior approval is first 
obtained from the federal government. However, for borrowing for more than one year, 
states can only borrow from the Federal Government. Article 111(2) of the Federal 
Constitution says: 
`A state shall not borrow except under the authority of state law, and state law shall not 
authorise a state to borrow except from the Federation or, for a period not exceeding five 
years, from a bank or other financial source approved for that purpose by the federal 
government, and subject to such conditions as may be specified by the federal 
government'. 
However, when the states of Sabah and Sarawak joined the Federation of Malaya in 
1963, the special arrangement with regard to borrowing was extended to Sabah and 
Sarawak. For the states of Sabah and Sarawak, borrowing within the state under the state 
law is allowed as specified in Article 11213 of the Federal Constitution. According to 
Article 112B, `clause (2) of Article 111 shall not restrict the power of Sabah or Sarawak 
to borrow under the authority of state law within the state, if the borrowing has the 
approval of the Central Bank for the time being of the Federation'. As can be seen from 
both articles (Article 111(2) and Article 112(B), there are two different treatments with 
regard to borrowing powers between states in peninsular Malaysia and the states of Sabah 
and Sarawak, whereby the latter have more autonomy compared with the former. 
3.5.3 Financial arrangements for the Federation of Malaysia (1963) 
When the Federation of Malaysia was formed in 1963, the states of Sabah, Sarawak and 
Singapore demanded more bargaining power'°5 especially with regard to financial 
105 The special committee was established to study intergovernmental relations; one for states of Sabah and 
Sarawak and another one for Singapore. See Malaya (1962a) for financial arrangements for Sabah and 
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arrangements, which led to these states enjoying more fiscal autonomy than their 
counterparts in peninsular Malaysia. `Their wider powers and greater resources are 
largely the result of the special conditions prevailing at the time of their joining Malaysia 
and the fact that their socio-economic and financial interests were more strongly 
represented at that time' (Holzhausen, 1974: 128). This is because the new member states 
(Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore) realised the deficiencies of the existing financial 
arrangements of the Federation of Malaya and its consequences for states' fiscal 
autonomy. As a result, new provision was added in the 1957 Federal Constitution to 
accommodate the financial requirement of the new members of the federation. 106 The 
financial arrangements for Sabah and Sarawak was based on the `Malaysia Report of the 
Intergovernmental Committee 1962.107 This Committee was set up following Lord 
Cobbold's Report in 1962 which recommended the establishment of an 
intergovernmental committee to work out future constitutional arrangements, including 
safeguards for the special interests of North Borneo and Sarawak: `religious freedom, 
education, representation in the Federal Parliament, the position of the indigenous races, 
control of immigration, citizenship and the state constitution'. 108 The composition of this 
committee109 truly reflected the states' rights, expectations and their future in the 
federation, 11° unlike the eleven states in the Federation of Malaya (1948/1957) which did 
not have a bargaining position in the drafting of the Federal Constitution of 1957.111 This 
Sarawak. For financial arrangements with Singapore, see Malaya (1963c). However, no such committee 
was established to study the intergovernmental fiscal relations when the Federation of Malaya 1948 was 
formed. The eleven states members of the Federation of Malaya 1948 were considered as a single entity 
rather than as separate states. 
'°6Financial arrangements for Singapore will not be discussed. The thesis will only focus on financial 
arrangements for Sabah and for Sarawak 
107 See Malaya (1962a), Paragraph 24, page 13-20. 
1os See Malaya (1962a), page 1. 
109Lord Lansdowne, the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs was appointed as the Chairman of the 
Committee and Tun Abdul Razak, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, was 
appointed as the Deputy Chairman. Five sub-Committees were then set up: the Constitutional Sub- 
Committee, the Fiscal Sub-Committee, the Legal and Judicial Sub-Committee, and the Public Service 
Sub-Committee. See Malaya (1962a). 
110 See list of Twenty Points put forward by Sabah during the negotiation. The full list is attached in 
Appendix (iii). 
111 See Fernando (2002) for an account of the discussion of the making of the Federal Constitution. 
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bargaining power is essential to make membership of the federation worthwhile and 
encourage new states subsequently to remain in the federation (May, 1969). 
The difference between the financial arrangements for the Federation of Malaysia 1963 
and those for the Federation of Malaya 1957 lies in the special arrangements with regard 
to Sabah and Sarawak through the addition of Part IV and Part V into the Tenth Schedule 
(see Table 3.6). But the financial arrangements for members of states in the peninsula 
remained unchanged from those in the 1957 Federal Constitution. The unequal levels of 
economic development and endowments of natural resources of Sabah and Sarawak 
prompted these states to seek special financial treatment and greater fiscal powers as a 
precondition for entry into the federation. Thus, the most striking feature of the financial 
arrangements for the Federation of Malaysia 1963 was the special financial arrangements 
for Sabah and Sarawak, which both enjoy more fiscal autonomy than their counterparts in 
the peninsula (see Table 3.4,3.5 and Table 3.6). 
Table 3.6 
Grants and Revenue Assignment 
Part I Part II Part III Part IV Part V 
Capitation State Road Sources of Special Grants to Additional Sources of 
Grant Grant Revenue Assigned Sabah and Sarawak Revenue to Sabah and 
to states Sarawak 
Article 109 Article 109 Article 110 Article 112C Article 112D 
Capitation State road This provision is This provision only This provision only 
grants to be grants to be applicable to all applicable to states applicable to states of 
given to all given to all states. However of Sabah and Sabah and Sarawak on 
states based states for road Sabah and Sarawak. Sabah and top of sources of revenue 
on the number maintenance Sarawak received Sarawak will also in Part III, 
of population. purposes. additional revenue receive grants as in 
sources (see Part Part I and Part I1. 
Source: Tenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution 
Additional revenue allocations were given to Sabah and Sarawak to enable these states to 
develop to a level comparable with their counterparts in peninsular Malaysia (Article 
112D of the Federal Constitution). In the case of Sabah, the Federal Government 
undertook to pay Sabah's public debt. The reason was that on joining Malaysia, Sabah's 
development projects were financed by loans from the British government, thus the 
liability for repaying the loans fell upon the federal government. Both Sabah and 
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Sarawak also received proportionate amounts for social welfare purposes, and since 
Sabah retained jurisdiction over medical and health, it received a special allocation from 
the proceeds of customs revenue. As for Sarawak, the Federal Government provided 
special assistance (annual balancing grant and escalating grant) to enable it to upgrade its 
services. 
The assignment of expenditure and revenue to the states of Sabah and Sarawak is more 
favourable, reflecting their strong bargaining position when entering the Federation. As 
for expenditure, apart those functions listed in the List II, the states of Sabah and Sarawak 
have additional expenditure responsibilities as stated in List IIA, that of native law and 
custom, the powers to incorporate of authorities and other bodies, responsibility for ports, 
harbours and railways (see Table 3.4). In line with these extra responsibilities, additional 
revenue sources were assigned to these states. Apart from the sources of revenue listed in 
Part III, which is applicable to all states, the states of Sabah and Sarawak enjoy additional 
revenue sources as stipulated in Part V of the Tenth Schedule (see Table 3.6). These 
include: import duty and excise duty on petroleum products; export duty on timber and 
other forest produce; export duty on mineral up to 10% ad valorem. For the state of 
Sabah only, as long as medicine and health remains under the Concurrent List, the state 
of Sabah will receive 30% of all customs revenue (other than import duty and excise duty 
on petroleum products, export duty on timber and other forest produce, and export duty 
on mineral); fees and licences of road vehicles112; fees from registration of vehicles; state 
sales taxes; and fees and dues from ports and harbours (other than federal ports and 
harbours). 
Apart from the joint functions listed in List III, the states of Sabah and Sarawak have 
additional functions incorporated into the Concurrent List as stipulated in List IIIA (see 
Table 3.4; column 3), that is, family law "(marriage and divorce), adulteration of 
112 However, in 1974 this function was taken over by the federal government for the sake of uniformity. 
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foodstuffs, shipping (under 15 tons), maritime and estuarine fishing and fisheries, 
electricity, agriculture and forestry, medicine and health (except Sabah until 1970) and 
charity. As for medicine and health, the list was extended to include List 14 (a to d) of the 
Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution, covering hospitals, clinics and dispensaries; 
the medical profession; maternity and child welfare; lepers and leper institutions; lunacy 
and mental deficiency, including places for reception and treatment; poison and 
dangerous drugs; and intoxicating drugs and liquors; and manufacture and sale of drugs. 
These functions fall under the Federal List but have been extended to Sabah and 
Sarawak. 
The special financial treatment for Sabah and Sarawak also extended to the right to 
receive more grants from the federal government, as stipulated in the Article 112C and 
112D of the Federal Constitution. The underdeveloped nature of these states merited 
special grants from the federal government. 113 For Sarawak, the annual balancing grant 
and escalating grant were given to finance the state's deficit, representing the difference 
between revenue and its expenditure during the fiscal year. This grant was payable 
annually until the review in 1968 took place. Moreover, an escalating grant was made to 
the state to cover the annual increase in the current cost of state services. The purpose 
behind this grant was to enable Sarawak to develop its departments which, compared 
with their counterparts in peninsular Malaysia, were relatively less developed. The 
amount of the grant payable was fixed in advance, and the rate was based on the 
expenditure growth between 1959-1962. The amount of grant payable for the next five 
years after 1968 was subject to review between the federal and state governments. 
Sabah, on the other hand, did not receive any of these special grants. However, the state 
was given a special grant of `an amount equal in each year to two-fifth of the amount by 
which the net revenue derived by the Federation from Sabah exceeds the net revenue 
13 See Part IV of Tenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution. See also Malaya (1962a), Section 24 on 
`Financial Provision'. 
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which would have been so derived in the year 1963 if the Malaysia Act had been in 
operation in that year as in the year 1964 and the net revenue for the 1963 were 
calculated without regard to any alteration of any tax or fee made on or after Malaysia 
Day. 014 Of particular importance is that in any revision of grants, the states of Sabah and 
Sarawak were not subjected to Article 108 (4) in that these states did not have to consult 
the National Finance Council. '" Furthermore, as discussed above, the states of Sabah and 
Sarawak have more borrowing powers; they may borrow domestically under the 
authority of the state law, provided prior approval is obtained from the Central Bank. 
This exceptional power to borrow is not enjoyed by the states in peninsular Malaysia. 
On the whole, the financial arrangements for the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, 
especially with regard to new members in the federation, are regarded as more than 
generous. Most of the principles of federal finance, such as efficiency, derivation, 
national interest and needs, have been incorporated in the system of revenue allocation 
for these states; in particular, consideration has been given to the underdeveloped nature 
of these states so that they merited special treatment. The voice of these states during the 
federating process was properly heard and translated into a concrete agreement, the 
Malaysia Act 1963. It can be observed that revenues given to the states in peninsular 
Malaysia were also allocated to the new member states; however, additional revenue 
sources enjoyed by the new member states were not extended to older members of the 
federation. Similar arrangements can be observed for expenditure assignment, as well as 
the grants system. Thus, looking at the fiscal arrangements, the Federation of Malaysia is 
undoubtedly an asymmetrical federation. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The questions posed at the outset of this chapter concerned the application of the theory 
of fiscal federalism to the design of Malaysian fiscal federalism. From the foregoing 
t" See Part IV, Section 2(1), Tenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution. 
11-5 See Chapter 7 
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discussion, it appears that the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations evolved 
gradually from the first federal idea in the late 19a' century. It was seen that the first 
federal idea in Malaysia was not formed according to the federal principle, as there was 
no proper division of power and representation. Although a Federal Council was 
established, it did not function appropriately. The proper form of federal government was 
only created when the Malayan Union was abolished and replaced by the Federation of 
Malaya. The theme of the new federation was `the establishment of a strong central 
government'. This theme was reflected in the Federal Agreement, which meant the 
centralisation of function at the centre. The result is a highly centralised federation as it 
exists today. The division of power between the federal government and eleven state 
governments consisted of three lists, namely the Federal List, the State List and the 
Concurrent List. However, the residual powers are exclusively federal. 
The strong central power was notably reflected in a financial arrangement, as the kinds of 
functions assigned to the states were of secondary importance and the type of revenue 
sources assigned to states also limited, unproductive and difficult to manage and to 
collect. Even in the Concurrent List, the authority of the federal government was 
extensive, as the Parliament could make laws in areas of states' competence. To make the 
states' position worse, the Parliament could override any law made by the state 
legislature. Thus, the position of states in the Federation of Malaya was subordinate to 
the federal government, which is against the federal principle. This kind of arrangements 
is prone to political malpractice, especially if a state is ruled by a party different from that 
of the centre. 116 
However, when the Federation of Malaya was expanded, with the joining of Sabah and 
Sarawak with the Federation of Malaya to form the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, the 
position of the new member states was much better: they enjoyed more fiscal autonomy 
116 See Chapter 6 for the discussion on the Malaysian politics and fiscal federalism. 
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and the federal government could not encroach on those states' subjects without the 
concurrence of their respective Rulers or the State Legislative Assembly. This is because 
the new states had strong political bargaining power before entering the federation. In 
contrast, the eleven states in peninsular Malaysia, the original members of the Federation 
of Malaysia, had no strong bargaining power as these states were still under British 
colonial rule. Malaysian federalism did not evolve in the way it did in, say, the United 
States, Canada or Australia. It was a top down process of superimposing a strong central 
government theme on the existing states by the British colonial authority and later, after 
independence, continued by the federal government. Furthermore, the motive for 
adopting a federal structure in Malaya was primarily a communal and political one, 
notably the desire of the Malays to preserve their political supremacy over non-Malays, 
especially the Chinese. `In fact, the lack of interest of the Malay states in economic and 
financial matters resulted in a predominance of the federal government which is almost 
tantamount to the control exercised by the government of a unitary country' (Holzhausen, 
1974: 176). 
From the examination of the design of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements, it is 
evident that the fiscal arrangement in Malaysian fiscal federalism was not properly 
designed according to the principle of federalism or the theory of fiscal federalism. 
However, some elements in the Malaysian fiscal federalism do conform to the theory of 
fiscal federalism, namely, the efficiency principle in the division of power / function. In 
other words, those powers / functions that have benefit accrued throughout the federation 
are assigned to the centre, while those localised in nature are assigned to the state 
governments. Those functions that are important for macroeconomic purposes - 
stabilisation, allocation and redistribution - are assigned to the centre to ensure 
macroeconomic stability. Similarly, the division of revenue does not infringe the 
principle of efficiency and equity, in the sense that for the purpose of efficiency, taxes 
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that have nationwide effect, such as corporate tax and income tax, are best collected by 
the centre, which, at the same time can promote economic incentives. Nonetheless, there 
are some inconsistencies with the efficiency principle, where localised taxes such as 
property taxes, consumption taxes, excise taxes and vehicle taxes, are assigned to the 
centre. This has led to over centralisation of revenue sources resulting in financial 
difficulties for states, as evident in horizontal and vertical imbalances. The independent 
states' revenue remains limited, local in nature, more difficult and expensive to 
administer and to collect than federal revenues, which are more productive, lucrative and 
elastic. In other words, the federal government has complete fiscal power to determine 
the direction of the public sector, leaving state governments with matters of secondary 
importance. The result of this arrangement is that the centre has more revenue sources, 
coupled with exclusive borrowing powers, while states have more financial problems. 
Consequently, transfers of funds from the federal to state governments are necessary to 
purge states' financial difficulties and to maintain their interest in the federation. Alas, 
federal transfers were not properly designed to negate the state's financial non- 
correspondence. The next two chapters will show how the problem of fiscal imbalance 
was addressed by the federal government (Chapter 4) and what are the determinants used 
in the making of federal transfers to states (Chapter 5). In the light of centralising nature 
of the political system, it will be seen to what extent the federal spirit is followed in 
overcoming states' financial difficulties and how political hegemony actually influences 
the grant system. 
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Chapter 4 
Fiscal Imbalances and Adjustment Measures 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, the design of fiscal federalism in Malaysia was discussed and the division 
of power between the federal and state governments was also examined, in particular 
what powers belong to the federal government and what powers belong to the states. The 
bottom line of our discussion demonstrates that the powers of the federal government, 
both executive and legislative, are enormous as compared to the states. In this chapter, 
the problem of fiscal imbalances resulting from the inappropriate design of 
intergovernmental fiscal arrangements and how the federal government undertook the 
correctional measures to alleviate the problem will be discussed. From this analysis, it 
will be learnt whether adjustment measures were taken on the basis of financial I 
economic expediency, federal consciousness, or merely based on political viability. 
4.2 Analysis of fiscal imbalances 
As discussed in the foregoing chapters, the fundamental issue in intergovernmental fiscal 
relations in most federations is the question of fiscal imbalance arising from the 
constitutional division of powers. In Malaysia, the problem of fiscal imbalance originated 
from the fact that states' constitutional obligations are higher than their capacity to raise 
revenue. ' The limited revenue raising capacity of the state governments was the result of 
the division of taxation between the federal and state governments in which the former 
exclusively controls taxation powers. Two main issues have arisen as a result of this 
arrangement: first, the problem of `vertical imbalance' between the federal and state 
governments due to the difficulties of states' revenue-raising powers as compared with 
the federal government; and, second, the problem of horizontal imbalance among the 
See Abdul Rahim, 2000; Wilson, 1995; Noh, 1991; Ariff, 1991; Holzhausen, 1974. These writers also 
found that the problem of fiscal imbalance was due to limited revenue raising powers on the part of state 
governments. 
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state governments arising from differences in their fiscal capacities due to differences in 
the cost of fulfilling responsibilities and differences in their natural endowments. For this 
reason, fiscal adjustment by the federal government, which possesses exclusive taxation 
powers, is necessary to provide adequate financial resources for the state governments to 
discharge their constitutional obligations. The extent of fiscal imbalances between the 
federal and state governments (vertical imbalance) as well as among the states (horizontal 
imbalance) needs to be assessed before the necessary fiscal adjustments can be made to 
remedy the imbalances. However, before discussing in further detail the fiscal imbalances 
in Malaysia's fiscal federalism and its remedial measures, the root cause of the problem 
will be discussed, so that an accurate analysis of the fiscal adjustment undertaken by the 
federal government can be made. It will then be possible to analyse the shortcomings of 
the overall design of fiscal adjustment, and to draw some conclusions about the federal 
government's commitment to overcome the financial difficulties of the state 
governments. 
4.2.1 The root cause of fiscal imbalances 
The root cause of fiscal imbalance, that is, non-correspondence between revenue and 
expenditure, can be traced back to the time when the Federal Constitution was drafted. In 
doing so, the division of functions and resources (taxation) that were enumerated and 
entrenched in the Constitution will be revisited. From investigation conducted in Chapter 
3, it was observed that the framers of the Federal Constitution at the time of federating 
were not in a position to assign adequate revenue sources to the state governments that 
would match their needs in order to discharge the constitutional functions assigned to 
them. Consequently, fiscal adjustment (federal transfers) has always been of key 
importance to remedy fiscal imbalances in Malaysia. In order to trace the root cause of 
the problem of fiscal imbalance, analysis of both revenue and expenditure assignments 
and performance will be made. 
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4.2.1.1 Revenue side analysis 
The economic functions of government are basically three, namely, stabilisation, 
allocation and distribution (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1976). The federal government has 
capacity, powers and resources to carry out these functions efficiently as a result of the 
centralisation of the most productive sources of revenue. The design of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations (assignment of fiscal function), as discussed in Chapter 
3, is such that the Malaysian federation is heavily centralised, leaving the state 
governments to play a secondary role, that is, as the federal government's agent 
(principle - agent relationship), complementing federal programmes and maintaining 
public facilities. This can be seen in the way taxation and expenditure functions2 were 
assigned by the Federal Constitution to each level of government. The most productive, 
buoyant and elastic tax sources, namely income tax (individual and company tax) and 
import and exercise duties, belong to the federal government, as can be seen from Table 
4.3, whereas the states are left with unproductive taxes, which by and large are difficult to 
administer and collect (see Table 4.4). The federal government arguments is that the 
centralisation of revenue at the centre could conceivably eliminate the accumulation and 
concentration of wealth in one particular state and thereby reduce economic disparities 
between states, thus promoting a regional economic balance. However, this vindication is 
weak to justify the centralisation of fiscal power, as fiscal imbalance has persisted since 
the creation of the federation. 3 As a result of the centralisation of the most productive 
sources of revenue, the federal government revenue has grown remarkably4 compared to 
that of state governments, as seen in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 (This trend can also be seen 
from Figure 4.1. ). In 1970, the federal government collected 79.1% of the total federal 
and state government revenue and increased to 86.3% in 2000, while the state 
2 See Chapter 3. 
3 See Ariff (1991) and MOEF (1993) 
As discussed in Chapter 2, most of states' revenue sources, such as land-based taxes, are not GDP elastic. 
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governments collected 20.9% in 1970, and further declined to 13.7% in 2000. This 
indicates the extent of vertical fiscal imbalance. 
Table 4.1 
Federal and State Governments' Revenue: A Comparison 
(KM million) 
Federal Government State Governments 
Year 
Revenue' % Change Revenue % Change % 
(iv) of (ii) 
(i) (ii) (ill) (iv) (V) (Vi) 
1970 2,400 636 26.5 
1975 5,117 113.2 1,152 81.1 22.5 
1980 13,926 172.2 2,996 160.1 21.5 
1985 21,115 51.6 4,172 39.3 19.6 
1990 29,521 39.8 6,634 59.0 22.5 
1995 50,954 72.6 7,809 17.7 15.3 
2000 61,864 15.2 9,796 25.4 15.8 
Note: ' Include all sources of revenue (tax, nontax, and non-revenue receipts) 
2 Consolidated state governments revenue, includes grants received from the federal 
government 
Source: Public Account Report and state governments' financial report: various issues. 
Table 4.2 
Federal and State Governments' 
Revenue and Expenditure Comparison 
Total revenue % of total) Total expenditu re % of total) 
Federal State Federal State 
1970 79.1 20.9 80.6 19.4 
1975 81.6 18.4 81.4 18.6 
1980 82.3 17.7 83.9 16.1 
1985 83.5 16.5 84.0 16.0 
1990 81.7 18.3 82.6 17.4 
1995 86.7 13.3 86.5 13.5 
2000 86.3 13.7 88.8 11.2 
Source: Calculated based on data from Economic Report, Ministry of Finance (various issues) 
In 1970, the federal government revenue amounted to RM 2,400 million; it increased to 
RM 13,926 million in 1980 and subsequently to RM 29,521 million in 1990. In 2000, the 
federal government revenue amounted to RM 61,864 million. In terms of cumulative 
percentage change from 1971 to 2000, the federal government revenue recorded a strong 
growth of 17.6 %. The significant increase of the federal government revenue was due to 
its great advantages in revenue collection, due to the assignment of the most productive 
and elastic sources of revenue to the federal government (see Table 4.3 for details of the 
federal government revenue composition) coupled with an efficient tax collection system. 
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On the other hand, over the same period (1971 to 2000), the consolidated revenue of the 
thirteen state governments increased by 13.2 %. In 1970, the state governments' revenue, 
including federal transfers, amounted to RM 636 million or 26.5 % of the total federal 
government revenue and increased to RM 9,796 million in 2000 or 15.8 % of the total 
federal government revenue (see column (vi) of Table 4.1). Clearly, the state 
governments revenue as a percentage of the federal government revenue is reducing 
gradually, reflecting difficulties on the part of the state governments in raising revenue, 
even during periods of remarkable economic growth, let alone during economic 
recession. In 2000, for instance, the elasticity of the federal government revenue to GDP 
was 1.0 while the states' own sources of revenue had elasticity to GDP of only 0.02. This 
phenomenon causes the problem of vertical imbalance between the federal and state 
governments, where on the one hand the federal government has strong revenue raising 
capacity and on the other hand the state governments have limited and less productive 
sources of revenue (see Table 4.3 for details of the state governments' revenue 
composition). This problem is further exacerbated by the poor tax collection machinery 
on the part of the state governments. 
Figure 4.1 
Federal and State Governments Revenue 
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Table 4.3 
Components of Federal Government Revenue 
(RM million) 
Components 1990 % share 1995 % share 2000 % share 
Tax revenue 21,244 72.0 41,671 81.8 47,173 76.3 
Direct tax 10,402 35.2 22,699 44.5 29,156 47.1 
Companies income tax 4,497 15.2 11,707 23.0 13,905 22.5 
Petroleum income tax 2,644 9.0 2,185 4.3 6,010 9.7 
Individual income tax 2,506 8.5 6,203 12.2 7,015 11.3 
Stamp duties 645 2.2 2,192 4.3 1,799 2.9 
Others 110 0.4 412 0.8 428 0.7 
Indirect tax 10,842 36.7 18,972 37.2 18,017 29.1 
Export duties 1,970 6.7 853 1.7 1,032 1.7 
Import duties 3,420 11.6 5,622 11.0 3,599 5.8 
Excise duties 2,266 7.7 5,280 10.4 3,803 6.1 
Sales tax 2,442 8.3 4,869 9.6 5,968 9.6 
Service tax 121 0.4 1,016 2.0 1,701 2.7 
Others 623 2.1 1,332 2.6 1,914 3.1 
Non-tax revenue 6,946 23.5 8,469 16.6 14,093 22.8 
Licences and permits 1,255 4.3 2,516 4.9 3,785 6.1 
Petroleum royalties 627 2.1 710 1.4 1,763 2.8 
Interest and returns on 
investment 
4,613 15.6 4,381 8.6 7,383 11.9 
Others 451 1.5 862 1.7 1,161 1.9 
Non-revenue receipts 1,331 4.5 814 1.6 599 1.0 
Total Revenue 29,521 50,954 61 864 
% GDP 27.9 30.6 29.6 
Source: Economic Report, Ministry of Finance (various issues). 
Table 4.3 clearly shows that sources of the federal government revenue are enormous, 
and that more than 70 % comes from tax revenue (1990: 72 %, 1995: 81.8 % and 2000: 
76.3 %). Within tax revenue, direct tax, mainly income tax (company, individual and 
1 
petroleum) contributed the largest amount. In 1990, direct tax contributed 49 % to the 
total tax revenue and increased to 54.5 % in 1995 and 61.9 % in 2000. Indirect tax, 
mainly customs and excise duties also contributed significant amounts to the total federal 
government revenue. The federal government also received a large amount of non-tax 
revenue, notably from licences and permits, petroleum royalties as well as interest and 
returns on investment. In total, the federal government revenue accounted for more than 
one third of the GDP (1990: 27.9 %; 1995: 30.6 %; 2000: 29.6 %). 
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Table 4.4 
Components of Consolidated State Government Revenue' 
(RM million) 
Components 1990 % share 1995 % share 2000 % share 
Tax revenue 865 13.1 1,434 18.4 1,159 11.8 
Direct tax 801 12.1 694 8.9 1,002 10.2 
Land-based tax 580 8.7 687 8.8 972 9.9 
Others 221 3.3 6 0.1 30 0.3 
Indirect tax 64 1.0 741 9.5 157 1.6 
Entertainment tax 24 0.4 35 0.4 31 0.3 
Others 40 0.6 706 9.0 126 1.3 
Non-tax revenue 4,155 62.6 4,564 58.4 5,312 54.2 
License, permit and fees 103 1.6 188 2.4 233 2.4 
Royalties 2,156 32.5 2,254 28.9 2,469 25.2 
Fees 254 3.8 223 2.9 165 1.7 
Sales of assets / land 
premium 
413 6.2 954 12.2 1,634 16.7 
Interest and return from 
investment 
729 11.0 552 7.1 582 5.9 
Others 500 7.5 394 5.0 229 2.3 
Non-revenue receipts 1,614 24.3 1,811 23.2 3,325 33.9 
Total Revenue 6,634 7,809 9,796 
% GDP 6.3 7.4 4.7 
Note: 'Data for 1995 and 2000 are unadjusted - include trust funds, receipt from the Development 
Fund and Water Supply Fund 
Source: State governments' financial statement (various years). 
On the other hand, the consolidated state governments' revenue accounted for only 6.3 % 
of the GDP in 1990: 7.4 % in 1995: and 4.7 % in 2000, due mainly to the limited revenue 
base, comprising tax revenue and non-tax revenue. Tax revenue is made up of direct tax, 
mainly generated from land-based taxes and indirect tax (mainly from entertainment tax), 
while non-tax revenue comprises assorted licences, fees, royalties payments and returns 
on investment. As can be seen from Table 4.4, the state governments' revenue largely 
came from non-tax revenue, which accounted for 62.6 % of the total states revenue in 
1990,58.4 % in 1995 and 54.2 % in 2000. Non-tax revenue was largely generated from 
land premium and royalties payments from petroleum and forestry. However, royalties 
payments are exclusively 'enjoyed only by the producing states, that is, Terengganu, 
Pahang, Sabah and Sarawak. For Terengganu, before the decision by the federal 
government to desist petroleum royalties payments, petroleum royalties made up 63 % of 
Terengganu's total own sources of revenue in 1995. For Sabah and Sarawak, which 
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continue to enjoy petroleum royalties, revenue from this source contributed almost 4.8 % 
and 10.6 % of their total own sources of revenue in 1995, respectively. As for royalties 
from forestry, Sabah, Sarawak and Pahang are the largest recipients of this source of 
revenue, which made up 34.9 %, 40.9 % and 13.5 % of the total own sources of revenue, 
respectively, in 1995. 
Tax revenue, on the other hand, contributed only 13.1 % of the total states revenue in 
1990,18.4 % in 1995 and 11.8 % in 2000. Within tax revenue, direct tax collection 
contributed the largest proportion of the total state governments' revenue: 12.1 % in 
1990,8.9 % in 1995, and 10.2 % in 2000. Direct tax was mainly generated from land- 
based tax, which accounted for 8.7 % of the total tax revenue in 1990,8.8 % in 1995, and 
9.9 % in 2000. Collection from indirect tax, mainly made up of entertainment tax was 
relatively insignificant. Moreover, not all state governments enjoyed entertainment tax, as 
in the case of less developed states of Kelantan, Terengganu, Perlis and Kedah. 
From this survey, it is acknowledged that revenue assignments were heavily centralised 
(see Table 4.2). Revenue sources of the federal government, as provided in the Federal 
Constitution, are enormous, while the state governments' revenue sources are limited and 
benefit little from the GDP growth. The state governments' own sources of revenue 
comprise mainly tax revenue (land based taxes) and non-tax revenue (fees and licences), 
accounting for 75.7 %, 76.8 %, and 66 % of the total revenue in 1990,1995 and 2000, 
respectively, while the remainder consist of federal transfers and federal reimbursement. 
However, analysis at the individual state level discloses the reverse position, in which 
federal transfers make up more than 70 % of their total revenue (notably for the states of 
Kelantan, Terengganu, Perlis, Kedah and Malacca). Within tax revenue, revenue from 
land-based taxation was significant, (see Table 4.4). Hence, it is likely that those states 
(especially Perlis and Malacca) with a limited land-base will find it much harder to raise 
revenue and, hence, find it difficult to finance their expenditures. Thus, the state 
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governments have to turn on federal transfers to finance their deficits. On the other hand, 
those states with enormous natural endowments, notably petroleum and timber 
(Terengganu - oil, Sabah - oil and timber, Sarawak - oil and timber, and Pahang - 
timber) have a comparatively strong revenue base. 
4.2.1.2 Expenditure side analysis 
In terms of expenditure, most functions were also centralised even functions that are 
localised in nature, such as local policing and fire services. This indicates the degree of 
centralisation and states' fiscal autonomy in Malaysia (see Table 4.2). Besides, the 
tendency toward centripetal forces in most of the federal government policies also strong 
to the present day, as can be seen from the privatisation policies adopted by the federal 
government since 1983.5 For the sake of efficiency, functions that are constitutionally 
assigned to the states have now been privatised, such as water supply, sewerage and 
refuse disposal, through the federal government privatisation policies. 6 Apart from 
privatisation policies, centripetal forces are also strong through federal sponsored projects 
in the states, such as in land-related development projects. Indeed, the importance of the 
state fiscal functions has declined gradually, leaving the states with functions of 
secondary importance, such as maintenance of federal projects. Shafruddin described the 
centralisation of powers and functions, saying that `crucially the centre's political leaders 
believe that they are the custodians of the national interest' (Shafruddin, 1988: 25). Thus, 
it is difficult to gauge whether Malaysia is an authentic federation; instead, perhaps it can 
5 The latest trend in most federal countries is towards centrifugal forces following the decentralisation 
policies. See Birds and Vailancourt (1998). 
6 The privatisation programme is part of the federal government policy of private sector driven economy. 
Under this programme, government departments, corporations, or entities, which are viable but poorly 
managed, will be privatised, either through Built-Operate-Transfer, Bill and Transfer, or Sale of 
Share/Equity. As the management (and supervisory role) of the privatised entities are undertaken by the 
federal government, indirectly, this programme'is a kind of centralisation instrument to usurp state 
functions. In the final analysis, state governments are losing its authority to federal government over 
those privatised state functions, as can be seen in case of sewerages and refuse collections. Today, water 
and water related services which fall under states' competence, are also in the process of centralisation 
through the National Water Council. 
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be best described as a unitary state with institutional scaffolding of a federal structure. 
The growing trend of centralisation of the state functions resulted in states losing their 
`autonomy', and hence, becoming subordinated to the centre. According to Hadenan 
(1985: 196) `the success of development planning in Malaysia can be attributed to the 
fact that state governments remain subordinate and dependent on federal authority over 
the years'. This underlines the minimal role of the state governments in the federation. 
As a result of the centralisation of expenditure functions, the share of the federal 
government expenditure to the GDP, as an indicator of the leverage of the public sector 
in steering the economy towards its desired fiscal objective, was considerably large, as 
can be seen from Table 4.5. In contrast, the state governments' expenditures were 
relatively small. This clearly indicates the limited extent of the state governments' role in 
the specific public sector as well as in the general mainstream economy. 
Table 4.5 
Federal and State Governments' Expenditure': A Comparison 
Public sector' 
Expenditure 
Federal Government 
nditurc 
State Governments 
Expenditure 
Annual 
average 
(RM million) 
(RM 
million) 
% 
GDP 
% 
(ii) of 
(i) 
(RM 
million) 
% 
GDP 
% 
(v) of 
(i) 
% 
(v) of 
(ii) 
(i) (ii) (iii) (Iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (Viii) 
1981-1985 34,134 24,561 35.3 72.0 3,308 4.8 9.7 13.5 
1986-1990 40,684 24,311 25.9 59.8 5,487 5.9 13.5 22.6 
1991-1995 66,109 36,279 20.7 54.9 6,612 3.8 10.0 18.2 
1996-2000 96,120 54,221 18.8 56.4 8,415 2.9 8.8 15.5 
Note: 'Data from consolidated public sector account. 
2 Comprises Operating and development expenditure of the federal government, state governments, 
local governments, statutory bodies and non-financial public enterprises (NFPEs) 
Source: Public Account Report and state governments' financial report: various issues. 
Table 4.5 shows that the federal government's participation in the economy was 
significant. Based upon its annual average share to the GDP, the share of the federal 
government expenditure in 1981-1985 was conspicuous at 35.3 % of the GDP. However, 
following the federal government's policy of a private sector driven economy and 
privatisation policy in the mid 1980s, as well as financial constraints facing the federal 
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government as a result of the global economic slowdown during the mid-1980s and the 
1997 financial crisis, the share of the federal government expenditure to GDP declined to 
25.9 % during 1986-1990, and further declined to 20.7% and 18.8% during 1991-1995 
and 1996-2000, respectively. 
Although the share to the GDP is declining, the federal government expenditure in the 
public sector remains significant; it accounted for more than 50 % of the total public 
sector expenditure between 1980-2000. For the period 1980-1985, for instance, the 
average total share of the federal government expenditure to the total public sector 
expenditure was extremely high at 72 % (see Table 4.5), due to increased demand on 
public infrastructure, especially transportation and other public services (education and 
health), and housing. The high share of the federal government was also due to the fiscal 
expansionary policy needed for economic recovery following the mid-1980s global 
economic recession. However, as economic recovery was under way, the federal 
government expenditure as a percentage of the total public sector expenditure declined: 
from 72 % during the period 1980-1985 to 59.8 % and 54.9 % for the period 1986-1990 
and 1991-1995, respectively. Nevertheless, federal government expenditure increased 
again during 1996-2000 following the severe financial crisis that hit the Malaysian 
economy in mid-1997. As the federal government adopted a fiscal expansionary policy to 
expedite the economic recovery, its share of expenditure to the total public sector 
expenditure increased to 56.4 %, during 1996 to 2000. As such, deficit budgeting by the 
federal government was purposely planned to meet a specific objective, especially as a 
counter cyclical measure in response to the economic downturn. 
On the other hand, as clearly seen from Table 4.5, the total share of the state 
governments' expenditure to GDP is small: constituting only 4.8 % of the GDP during 
1981-1985 or 9.7 % of the total public sector expenditure. This share was by no means 
sufficient to have a significant influence on the economy. Unlike the federal government, 
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the state governments' expenditure is required to meet a minimum standard of public 
services at the state level. Its share to the GDP further declined to only 2.9 % of the GDP 
or 8.8 % of the total public sector expenditure during 1996-2000. This clearly indicates 
the limited extent of the state governments' role in the economy. The relatively small 
share of the state governments' expenditure to the GDP rules out any significant 
stabilisation function of the state governments and, hence, state governments' 
expenditures had no capacity to support the federal government fiscal policy. In most of 
the year, the state government expenditure recorded only around 10% of the total public 
sector expenditure as compared to the federal government, which recorded more than 
50% of the total public sector expenditure (see Table 4.6). 
Table 4.6 
Public Sector Revenue and Expenditure' 
(RM million) 2 
1995 1997 1999 2000 
Revenue 62,272 100 81,528 (100) 70,323 100 73,785 100 
Federal 
Government 50,954 (81.8) 
" 
-65,736 (80.6) 58,675 (83.4) 62,228 (84.3) 
State Government 6,799 (10.9) 8,389 (10.3) 6,166 8.8 7,369 (10.0) 
Local Government 2,294 3.6) 4,193 (5.2 2,762 3.9 2,819 (3.8 
Statutory bodies 2,225 3.7 3,210 3.9 2 720(3.9) 1 369 (1.9) 
Expenditure 71,195 (100) 91,876 100 102,646 100 119,919 100 
Federal 
Government 41,764 (58.7) 51,407 (56.0) 57,242 (55.8) 67,692 (56.4) 
State Government 7,398 (10.4) 8,770 (9.5) 8,027 7.8 10,745 (9.0) 
Local Govemment 2,865_(4.0)_ 4,442 (4.8) 3,835 (3.7 3,604(3.0) 
Statutory bodies 5,538 (7.8) 5,916 6.4) 7,290 7.1 8,936 7.5 
NFPEs 13,630 (19.1) 21,341 23.3 26,252 (25.6) 28,942 24.1 
Note: ' Consolidated public sector account (exclude intergovernmental transfers and trust funds) 
2 Figure in parentheses is percentage of total. 
3 Non-Financial Public Enterprises 
Source: Economic Report, Ministry of Finance (various issues) 
The federal government commitment to undertake the distribution function on a 
nationwide basis (to uplift the socio-economic status such as through poverty eradication 
programmes) contributed to a high percentage of federal expenditure, as it has exclusive 
control over fiscal policies, as taxation and expenditure are centralised (see Table 4.2). 
Therefore, federal controls over the major taxes are justified' primarily to' ensure a more 
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equitable distribution of wealth amongst the states. It is for this reason that the main 
taxing powers were assigned to the federal government with anticipation that in return the 
federal government could perform the distribution / redistribution function. 
Table 4.7 
State Governments' Development Expenditure 
(% of total state expenditure) 
State 1990 1995 2000 
Perlis 32.0 41.1 43.2 
Kedah 44.3 75.4 45.2 
Penang 323 365 48.5 
Perak 332 50.4 29.6 
Selangor 82.7 44.1 42.9 
Negeri Sembilan 36.2 42.2 61.7 
Malacca 54.9 35.4 34.1 
Johor 26.5 30.7 33.2 
Pahang 41.1 432 41.9 
Terengganu 38.8 44.0 31.5 
Kelantan 35.5 28.6 23.3 
Sabah 38.4 36.7 23.3 
Sarawak 64.6 68.8 74.1 
Source: Financial Statement (respective state governments) 
Table 4.7 shows the percentage of the development expenditure of the individual states in 
relation to the total expenditure. In general, depending upon the stage of development, 
the state governments individually spent from around 23 % to 62 % of their total 
expenditure for development purposes in 2000, with the exception of Sarawak, which 
spent more than 74 % of their total expenditure for development purposes. The state 
governments' development expenditures were mainly aimed at providing a range of 
public services that would help to raise the minimum standard of living. These include 
expenditure on agriculture and rural development (including drainage and irrigation), 
public utilities, transport, housing and trade and industry, which are regarded as 
complementing the federal government's efforts in providing such services. Given the 
insufficient resources at their disposal, there is a doubt about the states' comparative 
advantage in delivering these social and welfare services that suit the diverse preferences 
and needs of local residents, which would be their expected role in view of their greater 
proximity to the residents. According to Oates (1972), the provision of public services 
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that has localised benefit should be performed by lower tiers of government, with 
sufficient resources assigned to them. However, this is not the case for Malaysian fiscal 
federalism, as public services that have localised benefit, such as fire services and local 
policing, are assigned to the centre to fit the strong central government theme. 
Table 4.8 
Federal Government Financial Position 
(RM million) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Revenue 2,400 5,117 13,926 21,115 29,521 50,954 61,864 
Tax sources 1,840 4,256 12,160 16,700 21P244 41,671 47,173 
Direct tax 685 1,990 5,495 9,259, 10,402 22,699 29,156 
Indirect t 1,155 2,266 6,665 7,441 10,842 18,972 18,017 
Non-tax sources 529 792 1,675 3,975 6,946 8,469 14,093 
Others 31 265 306 440 1331 814 599 
Operating expenditure 2,163 4,900 10,292 18,766 25,026 36,573 56,547 
Current account 237 217 3,634 2,349 4,495 14,381 5,317 
Gross Development 
expenditure 
725 2,151 7,470 7,142 10,689 14,051 27,942 
Less loan recoveries 13 33 132 386 2,757 1 531 2 910 
Net development 
expenditures 
712 2,118 7,338 6,756 7,932 12,520 25,032 
Overall balance -475 -1,901 -3,704 -4,407 -3,437 1,861 -19,750 Note: Includes income tax (individual, company and petroleum) and stamp duties 2 Includes import, export and excise duties, sales tax, service tax 3 Includes licences and permits, petroleum royalties, interest and returns on investment. 
+ indicates surplus position and - indicates deficit position 
Source: Economic Report, Ministry of Finance (various issues) 
Table 4.8 shows the financial position of the federal government. It shows that the federal 
government recorded financial deficits in most years. This trend can also be clearly seen 
from Figure 4.2. However, most of the deficits that occurred, as discussed above, were 
primarily due to planned deficit budgeting following a fiscal expansionary programme 
for stabilisation, allocation and distribution purposes, in response to prevailing economic 
difficulties or to meet specific development objectives. To undertake this function, apart 
from its productive revenue sources, the federal government has been assigned borrowing 
powers by the Constitution to resort to domestic and external borrowing to finance the 
budgetary deficits. On the other hand, the' state governments' financial deficits were 
merely due to scarcity of resources (due to limited revenue raising powers) to finance 
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their constitutionally assigned functions, to meet the expenditure required to provide a 
minimum standard of public services at the state level. 
Figure 4.2 
Federal Government Revenue and Expenditure 
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Table 4.9 
Consolidated State Governments' Financial Position 
(RM million) 
Revenue 
Operating 
Development 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Revenue 636 1,152 2,996 4,172 6,718 8,261 9,796 
Own source 461 812 2,445 3,157 5,204 6,799 8,235 
Grants and reimbursement 175 340 551 1,015 1,514 1,462 1,620 
ratin expenditure 443 994 1,997 2,722 4,268 4,167 5,253 
Current account 193 158 999 1,450 2,450 4,094 4,602 
_Development 
expenditure' 250 607 1,395 2,142 3,057 4,003 5,348 
Less loan recoveries - - - - 399 531 265 
Net development expenditures 250 607 1,395 2,142 2,658 3,472 5,083 
Overall balance -57 -449 -396 -692 -208 622 -481 Note: ' Comprises the Development Fund and Water Supply Fund 
2+ indicates surplus position and - indicates deficit position 
Source: Financial Statements (respective state governments/various years). 
The fiscal gap, that is, the difference between the states' own sources of revenue and their 
need for resources expressed in terms of total expenditure, was large, averaging 33.5 % in 
1970. In 1980, the total gap was 27.9 %, and it increased to 29 % in 1990. In 2000, the 
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fiscal gap was further widened to 32.2 %. Table 4.9 displays the consolidated financial 
position of the state governments for the selected years- It clearly shows that the 
constitutional assignment of taxes and divisions of functions has resulted in persistent 
overall deficits in the state governments' finance. However, analysis of individual states' 
financial position shows different pictures, in that some states experienced twin deficits 
(current account and development account) in their account, as evident from the 
individual states' financial position for 2000 (see Table 4.10). Even for those states that 
recorded a current account surplus, the amount was not significant. This phenomenon 
persisted in most financial years, despite federal transfers. 7 
Table 4.10 
State Governments' Financial Position, 2000 
(RM million) 
Own O eratin Account Develop men t Account 
source 
revenue 
Operating Deficit (-) ! 
Surplus (+) 
Development 
(Net) 
Deficit 
Surplus (+) 
Perlis 30.2 59.7 -29.5 45.4 -74.9 
Kedah 2182 200.6 +17.6 165.6 -148 
Penang 171.9 1632 +8.7 1535 -144.8 
Perak 339.8 279.5 +603 1175 -57.2 
Selangor 1,348.7 1,022.3 +326.4 768.7 -442.3 
Negeri Sembilan 170.6 131.8 +38.8 212.4 -173.6 
Malacca 112.1 79.0 +33.1 40.9 -7.8 
Johor 305.3 432.1 -126.8 214.7 -341.5 
Pahang 321.1 310.5 +10.6 223.6 -213 
Terengganu 578.9 419.9 +159.0 193.4 -34.4 
Kelantan 132.2 161.0 -28.8 48.8 -77.6 
Sabah 1,197.6 1,095.3 +102.3 332.4 -230.1 
Sarawak 3,3079 898.5 +2,409.4 2,565.7 -156.3 
Source: Ministry of Finance and state financial statements 
The above analysis of the financial position of both levels of government shows two 
contrasting views: first, the federal government deficits were planned, as the federal 
government has access to borrowing and unlimited sources of revenue, and second, the 
state governments' deficits were due to non-correspondence between revenue and 
expenditure required for provision of a minimum standard of state public services. Unlike 
' See also analysis by Wilson (1996), Ariff (1991), and Abdullah (1978) 
179 
those of the federal government, states sources of revenue are limited and furthermore 
they have no access to other sources of financing (except borrowing from the federal 
government). 8 
In conclusion, the reasons behind the state governments' fiscal imbalances are that states' 
revenue-raising power is limited, the types of sources assigned to them are not 
productive, and to make things worse, most taxes are difficult to administer. Revenue 
from land-based taxes, for example, is extremely small; the rate is low and difficult to 
adjust and levying such taxes is politically harmful for local political leaders. These 
problems were exacerbated by lack of competence and expertise in managing and 
collecting these taxes, causing the state governments' revenue to remain undeveloped. 
According to Abdullah (1978), the tax collection machinery in the state governments is 
not well developed compared to the federal government, which is better staffed and has a 
more efficient tax collection system. Abdullah's comment still holds today, as up to now 
no institution has been established to provide training for the state governments' staff in 
matters relating to land tax administration and collection. As a result, the states' financial 
deficit has become a long-term phenomenon in the Malaysian federation. Efforts to 
remedy this problem therefore require measures for solving long-term problems in line 
with the spirit of federalism - not the ad hoc measures as in place today. On the other 
hand, the federal government's main tax collection machineries, that is, the Inland 
Revenue and Custom and Excise Department, are well staffed and developed. The 
corporatisation of the Department of Inland Revenue in 1993 and the establishment of its 
own training institute were geared towards improving efficiency in tax administration and 
collection. Similarly, the Custom and Excise Department has its own training institute to 
provide training for its staff in order to increase efficiency in tax collection. 
8 See Chapter 3 for discussion on state governments' borrowing. 
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4.2.2 Vertical imbalance 
Vertical imbalance is not a strange phenomenon in federal countries; indeed it is `an 
inescapable phenomenon in a federation' (Ariff, 1991: 207). In Malaysia, as discussed 
above, the problem of vertical imbalance or fiscal gap occurred between the two levels of 
government, that is `between the federal government and state governments taken as a 
whole' (Holzhausen, 1974: 70), due to the fact that the most productive, dynamic and 
flexible tax sources are centralised at the federal level, leaving the state governments with 
limited and less productive sources of revenue. As a consequence, there appeared a 
mismatch between strong centre revenue-raising power and growing state governments' 
spending but limited sources of finance. This is the result of constitutional arrangements 
at the time of federating. Furthermore, the state governments' revenue sources do not 
have a strong link to the major economic activities, as compared with the federal 
government revenue. Consequently, the state governments benefited little from economic 
growth. Hence, the issue is to what extent the state governments are able to finance their 
expenditures, given their limited revenue sources, increasing public needs and escalating 
costs of provision and maintenance of public services. In light of these drawbacks, fiscal 
adjustment is inevitable so that the state governments will have enough resources to 
finance the functions constitutionally assigned to them. The vertical imbalance can be 
gauged in terms of the percentage of the states' own source revenue over total 
expenditure (see Table 4.11). This will indicate the extent of the fiscal gap between the 
states' own source revenue and their expenditure needs. 
Table 4.11 shows the extent of vertical imbalance between 1980-2000, as measured by 
the fiscal gap. The largest fiscal gap was recorded in 1983, that is, 44.8% of the total own 
source revenue (as own source revenue could only finance 55.2% of the total 
expenditure), and the smallest gap was in 1996, that is 12.3% of the total own source 
revenue (as own source revenue could finance up to 87.7% of total expenditures) (see 
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column (vi) and (vii) of Table 4.11). On average, total consolidated own source revenue 
only represent 73.6% of the total states' revenue. The highest share of own source 
revenue was in 1996, that is, 84.2% and the lowest share was 71.4% recorded in 1986. 
This indicates the financial capability of the state governments taken as a whole to 
finance the functions / expenditures (both operating and development expenditure) 
assigned to them. Thus, federal transfers are of paramount importance to fill this gap in 
return for giving their tax powers to the centre at the time of federating. This is a 
`political contract' that should be honoured by any federal government. 
Table 4.11 
State Governments: Vertical Imbalance 
(RM million) 
Total 
revenue' 
Own 
source 
revenue 
Total 
expenditure3 
% (iii) 
of (ii) 
% (iii) 
of (iv) 
(%) 
Financing 
Gap () 
(before 
transfer) 
(%) 
Financing 
Gap () 
(After 
transfer) 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
1980 2,996 2,445 3,392 81.6 72.1 -27.9 -11.7 
1981 3,125 2,489 4,454 79.6 55.9 -44.1 -29.8 
1982 3,907 3,064 4,651 78.4 65.9 -34.1 -16.0 
1983 4,025 2,997 5,426 74.5 55.2 -44.8 -25.8 
1984 4,506 3,279 5,153 72.8 63.6 -36.4 -12.6 
1985 4,172 3,157 4,864 75.7 64.9 -35.1 -14.2 
1986 4,428 3,162 4,771 71.4 66.3 -33.7 -7.2 
1987 4,702 3,680 4,500 78.3 81.8 -18.2 +4.5 
1988 5,350 4,307 5,850 80.5 73.6 -26.4 -8.5 
1989 5,630 4,346 6,216 77.2 69.9 -30.1 -9.4 
1990 6,718 5,204 7,325 77.5 71.0 -29.0 -8.3 
1991 6,236 4,859 7,799 77.9 62.3 -37.7 -20.0 
1992 6,695 5,403 7,308 80.7 73.9 -26.1 -8.4 
1993 7,361 5,994 7,309 81.4 82.0 -18.0 +0.7 
1994 7,964 6,449 7,704 81.0 83.7 -16.3 +3.4 
1995 8,261 6,799 8,170 82.3 83.2 -16.8 +1.1 
1996 9,526 8,006 9,131 84.0 87.7 -12.3 +4.3 
1997 9,968 8,389 9,688 84.2 86.6 -13.4 +2.9 
1998 8,591 6,838 9,411 79.6 72.7 -27.3 -8.7 1999 8,228 6,421 8,856 78.0 72.5 -27.5 -7.1 
2000 9,796 8,235 10,336 84.1 79.7 -20.3 -5.2 
Note: 'Own source revenue plus federal transfers and federal reimbursement 2 Includes tax and non-tax revenue (minus federal transfers) 
3 Includes operating and development expenditure 
Source: Financial statements (respective state governments): (adjusted taking into account 
intergovernmental transfers and various trust funds) 
However, in most years, federal transfers are still far from enough to fill the fiscal gap 
(see also Wilson (1995) and Wilson (1996)). As can be seen from Table 4.11 above, 
between 1980-2000, on average, the total state revenue (own sources of revenue plus 
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federal transfers) could finance up to 92.9% of total expenditures. In other words, even 
with transfers, the state governments still need additional resources to fill this gap. This 
indicates that federal transfers failed to bring financial relief to the state governments. 
Surprisingly, in some years, total state revenue was more than enough to finance 
expenditure, while in others, states' expenditures were under-financed (see column (viii) 
of Table 4.11). As a consequence, in some years states expenditures were over-financed. 
This may be attributable to better state government revenue performance, as during these 
years national GDP growth was higher (1993: 9.9%, 1994: 9.2%, 1995: 9.8%, 1996: 10% 
and 1997: 7.3%), while at the same time the federal transfers remained significant. As a 
result, the state governments taken as a whole registered higher revenue than required to 
finance their expenditures. 9 While this is financially favourable for the states, as they 
could build up their reserves, on the other hand, this resulted in states' poor budget 
planning, due to difficulty in predicting the amounts of forthcoming grants. This is in line 
with the finding from the study made by Ariff (1991: 208) that `the years of under- 
financing of state governments consolidated budget deficits are interspersed by years of 
over-financing, which permitted the state governments to build up their reserves'. 10 This 
demonstrates that there is no built-in mechanism in the design of federal transfers. 
Nevertheless, analysis using consolidated states data fails to demonstrate the real problem 
of vertical imbalance. Hence, analysis using individual states data is required to examine 
the real picture of vertical imbalance. For instance, in 1990, the states of Penang, 
Selangor, Johor, Kelantan and Sarawak (which, except Kelantan, are the most developed 
states in the federation) recorded higher own source revenue than required to finance 
their expenditure needs (see Table 4.13) while less developed states remained under- 
financed. With federal transfers, these states had more than enough resources, and so 
9 This also may be due to intention of the respective states to embark on surplus budgeting after a long 
period in deficit budgeting. However, according to Treasury officials, the federal government policy is 
that state governments should undertake a balanced budget. 
10 The study by Ariff (1991) was made using data from 1965-1987. 
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were able to build-up their reserves. At the same time, these states also received loans 
from the federal government. Hence, according to Ariff (1991: 209) `it would appear that 
the basis of grants allocation collectively does not yield a distribution pattern'. Wilson 
(1995: 4) confirms that `there is less direct attention to... equity in per capita revenue 
across states although some grants partly address this issue'. This finding suggests that 
the practice of fiscal adjustment did not contain a built-in mechanism to suit the changing 
revenue and expenditure pattern of the state governments. An earlier study by 
Holzhausen (1974)11 suggests that the problem of vertical imbalance requires immediate 
remedial action by the federal government to iron out the persistent problem of non- 
correspondence. This argument appears sound, as the problem of non-correspondence 
was a serious matter during the early years of the federation, which generated federal- 
states conflicts. 12 However, as remedial measures were taken by the federal government 
in the course of time, the problem of vertical imbalance became less severe. Hence, the 
prevailing problem of intergovernmental fiscal relations at the present time is more 
related to the issue of remedying horizontal imbalance rather than vertical imbalance. 
4.2.3 Horizontal imbalance 
Horizontal imbalance occurs due to `interstate disparity in the revenue raising capacity of 
state governments and consequently to the differences in the ability of states to fulfil their 
constitutional obligations' (Ariff, 1991: 209). Based on this argument, the extent of 
horizontal imbalance can be measured using the revenue performance of each of the 
states compared with their financing requirement. As discussed earlier, not all states have 
the same level of economic development, due to differences in their resources (natural 
resources, notably petroleum, tin ore, iron and timber). Some states which are well 
endowed with productive natural resources are more developed and prosperous, while 
" In the analysis, Holzhausen (1974: 128-133) used data from 1964-65, that is, after the establishment of 
the Federation of Malaysia. 
12 For instance, see Chapter 3 for discussion of the weaknesses of financial arrangements for the Federation 
of Malaya 1948. 
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others are less developed due to scarcity of resources. This is because well-endowed 
states can collect higher revenues, due to their broader revenue base, while those states 
with limited resources find it difficult to raise their revenue at the margin. In other words, 
some states have a comparative advantage because they have access to revenue sources 
from favourable endowment of natural resources that others do not. 
Table 4.12 
State Governments' GDP and Own Sources of Revenue 
States 
Average annual GDP Growth 
(%) 
States Own Sources of Revenue 
(RM million) 
1971- 
1980 
1981- 
1990 
1991- 
1999 
1971- 
1999 
1990 1995 2000 
Perlis n. a 5.0 6.7 5.8 12.1 25.2 30.2 
Kedah 52 4.8 7.7 5.8 138.2 151,6 218.2 
Penang 10.7 4.5 6.9 7.4 106.6 160.9 171.9 
Perak 2.4 4.0 6.1 4.1 179.2 254.3 339.8 
Selangor 2.8 7.4 7.0 5.7 423 1002.3 1,348.7 
Negeri Sembilan 43 6.8 7.0 6.1 106.3 191.5 170.6 
Malacca 7.0 5.7 7.2 6.6 42.0 132.1 112.1 
Johor 6.9 7.7 7.5 7.2 785.9 287.8 305.3 
Pahang 7.4 5.5 6.1 6.4 153.8 318.3 321.1 
Terengganu 14.8 9.6 7.1 10.6 438.1 548.7 578.9 
Kelantan 7.3 5.7 4.9 6.0 92.1 133.4 132.2 
Sabah 10.1 6.9 4.1 7.1 1370.8 1505.5 1,197.6 
Sarawak 7.9 7.0 5.6 6.9 1355.9 2087.4 3,307.9 
Note: na = not available as GDP for Perlis only available beginning 1980 
Source: Malaysia Five Year Plan (various issues) and Ministry of Finance Economic Report. 
As can be seen from Table 4.12, despite recorded strong GDP growth, states such as 
Terengganu, Kelantan, Kedah, Perlis, Negeri Sembilan and Malacca, collected low own 
sources of revenue. This is because, as noted above, states' own sources of revenue have 
no direct relation to the national GDP and, hence, did not benefit from a higher GDP 
growth. This is noticeable as in the case of Terengganu. Although, it registered a higher 
GDP growth (1971-1999: average 10.6%) the state government revenue remained low, as 
higher GDP was largely contributed by the, petroleum industry, which did not 
significantly generate revenue to the state government (except for petroleum royalties) 
but to the federal government through centralised income tax, petroleum tax and 
company tax collection. Thus, higher GDP growth does not bring higher revenue to the 
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state governments. As such, the states own sources of revenue have little growth potential 
as compared with the federal government revenue. Furthermore, those states that have 
ample natural resources (although nowadays natural resources such as tin ore and iron are 
no longer produced), such as the states of Selangor, Johor, and Perak, have become 
industrialised and subsequently their revenue sources are more broad based. For instance, 
the value of property and land premium in these states is higher and they contribute 
significantly to their revenue compared with non-industrialised states. Moreover, states 
like Sabah and Sarawak enjoy special privileges in custom and excise duties, as these 
sources of revenue belong to the states under the Constitution. On the other hand, those 
states without natural resources, such as states of Kedah, Perlis, and Kelantan, are less 
developed and continue to be left behind, as most of their economic activities are 
agriculture-based, which by and large still under developed. Thus, it is not surprising if 
these states have a limited revenue-base and subsequently find it difficult to raise 
revenue. 
Table 4.13 highlights the fiscal gap for each of the thirteen states. It is evident that 
revenue differs between states. Some states have more revenue than is required to finance 
their expenditures. In 1990, for instance, most states, except Johor, had more 
expenditures than revenue, as their own source revenue was not enough to finance their 
expenditure. In 1995, only state of Perak had more own source revenue than their 
expenditure needs. Even with federal transfers, most states remained find it difficult to 
finance their expenditure, as federal transfers still unable to fill up the revenue- 
expenditure gap. As discussed above, this disparity was attributable to their differences in 
revenue-raising capacity due to favourable endowment of natural resources (petroleum, 
timber and other mineral), which provide guaranteed revenue inflow to the states (in the 
form of royalties or tax-sharing). 
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Table 4.13 
Horizontal Imbalance: Fiscal Gap 
(RM million) 
State Total revenue' Own source 
revenue 
Total expenditure2 
% of own 
source 
revenue to 
total 
expenditure 
% of total 
revenue to total 
expenditure 
1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995 
Perlis 60.9 70.9 12.1 25.2 61.7 97.4 19.6 25.9 98.7 72.8 
Kedah 233.9 269.9 138.2 151.6 262.0 343.1 52.7 44.2 89.3 78.7 
Penang 144.1 212.0 106.6 160.9 125.9 215.9 84.7 74.5 114.5 98.2 
Perak 261.5 385.0 179.2 254.3 286.8 232.3 62.5 109.5 91.2 165.7 
Selangor 826.4 1173.8 423.0 1002.3 486.8 1,169.5 86.9 85.7 169.8 100.4 
Negeri 
Sembilan 
141.2 242.6 106.3 191.5 154.4 288.6 68.8 66.4 91.5 84.1 
Malacca 79.3 169.4 42.0 132.1 93.7 145.5 44.8 90.8 84.6 116.4 
Johor 851.5 394.0 785.9 287.8 597.1 335.2 131.6 85.9 142.6 117.5 
Pahang 206.4 398.8 153.8 318.3 289.9 469.1 53.1 67.9 71.2 85.0 
Terengganu 478.5 627.4 438.1 548.7 524.1 676.7 83.6 81.1 91.3 92.7 
Kelantan 177.2 214.7 92.1 133.4 153.5 209.2 60.0 63.8 115.4 102.6 
Sabah 1526.2 1719.3 1370.8 1505.5 2,082.5 1,667.9 65.8 90.3 73.3 113.1 
Sarawak 1453.7 2224.5 1355.9 2087.4 2,206.6 2,319.6 61.4 90.0 118.6 95.9 
Note: 'Own source revenue plus federal transfer and federal reimbursement 
2Include gross operating expenditure, gross development expenditure and loan recoveries 
Source: Financial statements (respective state governments). 
On the basis of Table 4.14, it is clearly shown that revenue per capita before transfers in 
1995 differed widely between the state governments: between 37.1% and 305% of the 
average own source revenue per capita. Even after transfers, the differences in revenue 
per capita were still large, that is, between 45.2% and 268.4%. 13 The state of Sabah, with 
268.4% of the average revenue per capita after transfer, had over four times as much per 
capita spent by the states of Johor, Pahang, Kelantan, Penang or Perak The table also 
demonstrates that states with higher revenue per capita before transfers continued to 
receive high per capita transfers. This is evident as in the case of Sabah, Sarawak, 
Terengganu and Selangor (except Terengganu, these states are among the most developed 
states) with higher revenue per capita (before transfers), had per capita transfers of more 
than 80% of the national average. Thus, it can be concluded that, first, revenue per capita 
(before and after transfers) differs widely among states, and second, higher per capita 
This result is also confirmed by an earlier study made by Wilson and Sulaiman using 1992 data. They 
found that revenue per capita varied from 30% to 326% of national average (see Wilson and Sulaiman, 
1996: 153) 
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states received high transfers per capita, and vice versa. In the short term, this situation 
caused differences in the ability of states to fulfil the constitutional obligations assigned 
to them. In the long run, these differences cause problems of both equity and efficiency. 
Although efforts have been taken to rationalise the differences, `lack of success in 
reducing inequality has been the case since independence' (Shafruddin, 1987: 94). 
Table 4.14 
State Governments' Revenue Per Capita, 1995 
Revenue per capita 
After transfers 
Revenue per capita 
Before transfers 
Federal transfers 
Per capita 
RM % of 
average 
RM % of 
average 
RM % of 
average 
Perlis 567.2 121.1 344.9 88.8 222.3 277.9 
Kedah 261.2 55.8 181.6 46.8 79.6 99.3 
Penang 220.9 47.2 178.0 45.9 42.9 53.5 
Perak 243.4 52.0 181.7 46.8 61.7 76.9 
Selangor 505.8 108.0 441.4 113.7 64.5 80.4 
Ne eri Sembilan 377.6 80.6 311.9 80.3 65.7 81.9 
Malacca 359.7 76.8 294.8 75.9 64.9 80.9 
Johor 211.6 45.2 166.7 42.9 44.9 56.0 
Pahang 213.8 45.6 144.1 37.1 69.7 86.9 
Teren anu 787.7 168.2 699.4 180.2 87.7 109.4 
Kelantan 219.4 46.8 159.1 41.0 60.3 75.2 
Sabah 864.4 184.5 759.3 195.6 105.1 131.0 
Sarawak 1,257.1 268.4 1,184.1 305.0 73.0 91.0 
Average 468.4 388.2 80.2 
Source: Calculated from data collected from the Economic Report, Ministry of Finance. 
The existing fiscal adjustment has done little to remedy large differences in per capita 
state revenues, perhaps because the federal government has allocated a substantial 
amount for the federal sponsored projects in states through annual budgetary allocation. 
This partly explains why the federal transfers are not large when compared to the total 
federal government revenue, that is, about 2.6% of total federal government revenue in 
1995. Therefore, federal transfers were not designed to alleviate revenue per capita 
disparity between states. From the standpoint of federal equity, this is unjust, as it makes 
states `survive' at the mercy of the centre, which could lead to serious economic and 
political wrangling especially for those states ruled by a political party at odds with the 
BN. 
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The foregoing analysis of fiscal imbalance (vertical and horizontal) confirms that the 
problem of vertical imbalance or fiscal gap, that is, the difference between the states' own 
sources of revenue and their financing requirements for expenditure, existed following 
unfavourable assignment of revenue sources to the state governments. The average 
amounts of fiscal gap were as much as 25% of the financial needs, expressed in total 
expenditure terms. This suggests that the average amount of transfers from the federal 
government should at least be enough to fill this gap. On the other hand, horizontal 
imbalance resulting from huge tax differences among the states brings about considerable 
difference in the fiscal performance of the states, which causes different levels of 
economic and social development among them. These differences were largely due to 
their different aggregate tax capacities and mainly originated from differences in the level 
of industrialization and exploitable natural resources, especially revenue derived from 
forest and mining (including petroleum and gas). States that have experienced high 
industrialization (formerly tin / iron producing states - Selangor, Perak, Johor and 
Pahang) have a broader revenue base compared to less industrialised states, which 
continue to depend on land-based taxes, as their main own sources of revenue. As a 
result, horizontal imbalance gives rise to the complex question of equity, which requires 
interstate fiscal adjustments by the federal government, such as through fiscal 
equalisation programme. Regional disparities in the federation should not be allowed to 
persist because of their corrosive effects on the socio-economic development and 
political implications on the federation. 
4.3 Fiscal adjustments: An analysis 
The aim of fiscal adjustment is primarily to ensure that state governments have sufficient 
resources to finance their assigned functions under the Constitution and, secondly, to 
equalise interstate fiscal disparities following significant differences in the states' fiscal 
capacity. As discussed in Chapter 2 the literature of fiscal federalism shows various types 
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and purposes of grants designed to remedy fiscal imbalance. The most common practice 
available to effect intergovernmental fiscal adjustments is through the combination of tax 
/revenue sharing and federal grants (Ter-Minassian, 1997). In Malaysia, as in other 
federal countries, the mechanism for fiscal adjustment was made through a combination 
of tax-sharing arrangements and various types of conditional and unconditional grants 
depending on the objective of the grants. However, the implementation of fiscal 
adjustment in Malaysian fiscal federalism has not specified whether the purpose was to 
remedy vertical imbalance or horizontal imbalance. As can be seen, most of the transfers 
were made to remedy vertical imbalance, that is, non-correspondence between revenue 
and expenditure, although some of the transfers also seem to be attempts to rectify 
horizontal disparities. Perhaps it is the authority's belief that once vertical imbalances are 
addressed that, this will by itself reduce horizontal imbalance. As noted in Chapter 3, 
federal transfers can be grouped into five categories: first, the constitutional grants - 
comprising the Capitation Grant, the State Road Grant, and grants under the State 
Reserve Fund; second, revenue / tax sharing arrangements -- comprising the Revenue 
Growth Grant and revenue sharing from export duties on commodity (tin, iron and other 
mineral); third, special payments - comprising payments for compensation, and grants to 
local governments; fourth, administrative payments -- these payments are designed to 
help state governments to finance their operating expenditure; and finally, other forms of 
transfers / payments - these include federal government-sponsored projects in states 
through various government agencies. Apart from these transfers, there is a fund called 
the Contingency Fund created under Article 103 and 109(5) to provide advance payments 
to the states to meet urgent and unforeseen needs which are not budgeted for under 
annual budgetary allocation. However, this fund is not regarded as a fiscal adjustment 
instrument, as it is only intended to provide advances to the states should they require 
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funds urgently for unforeseen needs (expanses due to natural disaster such as floods) and, 
as such, the states are required to pay them back. 
These are the instruments of fiscal adjustment used by the federal government to remedy 
fiscal imbalances arising from the design of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in 
Malaysia. However, as will be discussed shortly, not all of these grants are real transfers 
as defined by the theory of intergovernmental transfers discussed in Chapter 2. 
4.3.1 Constitutional Grants 
4.3.1.1 Capitation Grants 
This is an outright unconditional grant provided by the federal government under Article 
109(1)(a) of the Federal Constitution to all state governments based on the number of 
population in each state. This is the only unconditional lump-sump grant for fiscal 
adjustment. As such the state governments are free14 to spend this grant but it is mostly to 
be spent on operating expenditure in the current financial year. 
The formula for deriving this grant is equitable in the sense that the amount of grant is 
equated with the number of people residing in a particular state, on a sliding scale. If the 
number of people residing in a rich state is high, than the amount received is large, and 
vice versa. Before 1976 this grant was based on the last population census, as follows: 
On the first 50,000 - $15 per person 
On the next 20,000 - $10 per person 
On Balance -$4 per person 
The Federal Constitution provides that Parliament may vary the rate of the Capitation 
Grants from time to time by law. However, only the federal government can make 
proposals to make changes in the rate of the Capitation Grants, with prior consultation of 
the National Finance Council. As stated in Article 109 (2), the rate of this grant can be 
14 Although it is unconditional, the state governments are subjected to current financial procedure and 
auditing. This is to ensure that the state governments do not misuse the grant. See Article 106 of the 
Federal Constitution. 
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revised upward or downward from time to time with the approval of Parliament. 
However, if downward revision is made, the changed rate will be not less than 90 % of 
the amount paid in the previous year. This provision was primarily designed to give an 
assurance of a source of revenue as a guaranteed minimum payment to the states, to 
enable them to plan their expenditure and probably also to prevent the federal 
government from making drastic cuts. In line with this Article, this grant has undergone a 
series of revisions to take into account the latest population estimates of the states. Thus 
the rate was revised in 1976 to be as follows: 15 
On the 1" 100,000 people - RM20.0 per person 
On the next 150,000 - RM10.0 per person 
On the next 250,000 - RM6.0 per person 
On balance - RM3.0 per person 
Again in 1992, the rate was revised as follows: 16 
On the 1" 50,000 people - RM60.0 per person 
On the next 500,000 - RM8.50 per person 
On the next 500,000 - RM 9.0 per person 
On balance - RM 9.50 per person 
In 2001, the rate was again revised, taking into account consumer and producer prices 
indexes. The new rate is as follows: 
On the 1'' 100,000 people - RM72.0 per person 
On the next 500,000 - RM10.20 per person 
On the next 500,000 - RM 10.80 per person 
On balance - RM 11.40 per person 
As can be seen, the Capitation Grant is made on a population basis and is on a sliding 
scale, intended to favour the less populous states. This may be due to the assumption that 
a less populated state would not have sufficient taxpayers to support its current 
expenditure commitments. Thus, the Capitation Grant was designed partly to fulfil the 
objective of financing public services in low-revenue and less populated states. This grant 
is paid in two payments: in January and June each year. 
is Capitation Grant Act, 1977 
i6 Capitation Grant Act, 1993 
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Table 4.15 
Capitation Grants' 
(RM million) 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Perlis 2.2 (2.9) 2.6 (3.0) 2.8 (3.2) 4.3 (2.2) 4.5 (2.0) 
Kedah 6.4 (8.4) 7.1 (8.1 7.4(8. ) 15.6 7.9 17.5 7.6 
Penang 5.8 (7.7) 6.7 (7.6) 7.0 (7.8) 12.9 (6.5) 14.0 (6.1) 
Perak 8.2 (10.8) 9.3 (10.6) 9.7 (10.8) 21.1 (10.7) 22.8 (10.0) 
Selangor 8.4 (11.1) 9.0 (10.2) 10.0 (11.2) 27.2 (13.7) 32.3 (14.1) 
Negeri Sembilan 4.9(6.4) 5.4(6.1) 0.5(0.6) 9.2(4.6) 10.0 4.4 
Malacca 4.4 (5.8) 5.0 (5.7) 5.1 (5.7) 7.3 (3.7) 7.9 (3.4) 
Johor 7.3 (9.7) 9.0 (10.3) 9.7 (10.9) 23.8 (12.0) 27.9 (12.2) 
Pahang 5.0 (6.6) 6.5 (7.4) 7.3 (8.1) 12.6 (6.4) 14.2 (6.2) 
Terengganu 5.8 (7.7) 5.4 (6.2) 5.8 (6.5) 10.2(5.2) 11.5(5.0) 
Kelantan 5.6(7.3) 6.6(7.5) 7.0(7.9) 14.0(7.1) 16.4(7.2) 
Sabah 5.5 (7.2) 7.2 (8.2) 8.1 (9.1) 20.9 (10.5) 28.3 12.4) 
Sarawak 6.4 (8.5) 8.0 (9.1) 8.8(9.9) 19.3 (9.7) 21.6(9.4) 
Total 75.9 (100) 87.6 (100) - 89.2 (100) 198.4 (100) 228.8 (100) 
% of total transfers 20.6 9.9 7.2 15.2 14.1 
Note: ' Figures in parenthesis represent share to total 
Source: Budget Division, Ministry of Finance, and state financial statement. 
Table 4.15 shows the distribution of the Capitation Grants paid to state governments. In 
1980, the total Capitation Grants paid to the state governments amounted to RM75.9 
million and then increased to RM87.6 million, RM89.2 million, RM198.4 million and 
RM228.8 million in 1985,1990,1995 and 2000, respectively. For some states, the 
Capitation Grant contributed more than 10% of the total states' own sources of revenue 
(1990: Perlis (23%), and Malacca (12%)). Although the amount paid to the states in 
absolute terms increased, its share to the total federal government transfers is low and 
getting smaller (1990: 20.6%; 1985: 9.9%, 1990: 7.2%: 1995: 15.2%; and 2000: 14.1%) 
(see Table 4.15), despite an increase in total population. Annoyingly, the disbursement of 
this grant to the states that are not politically affiliated with the centre (Kelantan and 
Terengganu) was always belated. Until the end of December 2003, for instance, the state 
of Terengganu still did not receive the second payment of this grant despite strong 
reminder from the state. '7 
17 Information obtained from the Chief Minister of Terengganu statement in Harakah, See 
http: //www. hamkahdaily. nettar icle. php? sid=5265, accessed on 1 January 2004. 
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However, the Capitation Grant has not really been able to bring about states' financial 
improvement, for either remedial of vertical or horizontal imbalance, mainly due to the 
fact that the states differ considerably in their level of economic development, their 
natural resources, population density, per capita income, level of public services, and 
regional price levels. As discussed above, the Capitation Grant fails to take into account 
the states' actual `need' for financial assistance, as it is not sufficient to link transfers 
merely with the population. Thus, grants based on population alone are insufficient to 
determine the financial need of the states. As shall be discussed shortly, other types of 
grants are also ad hoc in nature, such as grants from the State Reserve Fund. Rightfully, 
differences in the level of development, geographical differences, divergences in the 
urban/rural distribution of the populations, should be taken into account as well. For this 
grant to be effective as a main instrument for fiscal adjustment, firstly, all these 
differences may be reflected using per capita income as a main basis of calculation to 
determine the entitlement of each state. Secondly, the Capitation Grant should be able to 
act as a balancing grant and, as such, the basis for the Capitation Grants should be more 
broad-based, taking into account the revenue needs of the states, as well as other socio- 
economic indicators of the states. 
4.3.1.2 State Road Grant 
The State Road Grant is another type of statutory grant. A state road is defined under the 
Federal Constitution as `any public road other than a federal road, and other road other 
than a federal road to which the public has access'. 18 This grant was introduced to replace 
the pre-independence `petrol duty grant' 19 as recommended by the Reid Commission, 
since the sale of petroleum is not related to the maintenance of state roads. As the name 
suggests, this grant is conditional, in that it can only be used for road maintenance 
is See Part II (5) of Tenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution. 
19 This grant was used before independence 1957 in the Federation of Malaya. Under this grant, states were 
entitled to 30% of the federal proceeds from the import duty on petrol, in proportion to the tax collected from each state, based on derivation basis. As a result, the richer states get more than poorer states. 
194 
purposes, where `the maintenance of states roads means the preservation, upkeep, and 
restoration of states roads, roadside furniture, bridges, viaducts or culverts forming part 
thereof or connected therewith as nearly as possible in their original condition as 
constructed or as subsequently improved'. 20 The purpose of the grant was specified in 
detail in the Constitution and this means states are not allowed to use any part of it for 
any other purpose. To some extent, this grant is a type of reimbursement of what the state 
governments have spent on maintaining the state roads, and it is not intended to serve as a 
financial adjustment purpose. 
The mechanism for computing the grant is based on the average cost of maintaining 
standard and sub-standard roads in each state. This is a fair measure, as local factors are 
taken into consideration. For this purpose, a committee of officials has been established 
to determine the average cost of maintaining state roads in each state, including roads in 
municipal areas. The committee will then submit the estimated average cost of road 
maintenance to the National Finance Council for approval and to be used as a rate 
suitable for the State Road Grant. Before 1981, the amount of grant was obtained by 
multiplying the average cost of road maintenance (national average) per mile by the total 
length of state roads registered in the last two financial years. As will be discussed 
shortly, this method of calculation caused annual wrangling between the federal and state 
governments. Hence, after 1981, this formula was amended so that the amount of road 
grant is obtained by multiplying average cost of maintenance of state roads (state 
average) per mile by the total length of state roads registered in the last financial year. 
With this amendment, abnormal factors such as maintenance of roads due to road damage 
by flood during the monsoon season, especially in states prone to flooding, such as 
Kelantan, Pahang, Johor and Terengganu, are now taken into consideration. Table 4.16 
10 See Part 11 (3)(a) of Tenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution 
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shows the distribution of the State Road Grant. Since 1991, this grant has been paid 
monthly. 
Table 4.16 
State Road Grants' 
(RM million) 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Perlis 1.200 (1.3) 2.203 (1.3) 3.832 (1.1) 4.533 (1.0) 5.450 (0.8) 
Kedah 7.698 (8.2) 13.489 (8.0) 27.257 (7.5) 29.127 (6.2) 43.736 (6.5) 
Penang 4.080-(4.3)_ 7.827 (4.7) 16.939(4.6) 18.514 (3.9) 22.536 (3.4) 
Perak 10.544 (11.2) 17.268(10.3) 34.172(9.3) 46.748(9.9) 57.648(8.6) 
Selangor 9.184(9.8) 16.260 (9.7) 64.120(17.5) 80.232(17.0) 106.332 (15.9) 
Negeri Sembilan 4.788 (5.1) 7.286 (4.3) 16.879(4.6) 13.684(2.9) 26.247(3.9) 
Malacca 2.893(3.1) 5.062 (3.0) 12.628(3.5) 12.607(2.7) 17.063(2.6) 
Johor 8.103 (8.6) 13.487 (8.0) 26.265(7.2) 37.474(8.0) 61.018(9.1) 
Pahang 5.304(5.6) 6.482 (5.9) 19.452(5.3) 30.221(6.4) 45.713(6.8) 
Terengganu 4.085 (4.3) 7.187 (4.3) 13.553(3.7) 28.546(6.1) 39.115(5.9) 
Kelantan 3.213 (3.4) 5.700 (3.4) 13.324(3.6) 12.385(2.6) 22.560(3.4) 
Sabah 19.561 (20.8) 37.734 (22.5) 85.013(23.2) 108.854(23.1) 138.503(20.7) 
Sarawak 13.457 (14.3) 24.380 (14.5) 32.560(8.9) 48.082(10.2) 82.551(12.4) 
Total 94.112 (100) 167.807(100) 365.994 (100) 471.008(100) 668.473(100) 
Note: ` Figures in parenthesis represent share to total 
Source: Budget Division, Ministry of Finance, and state financial statement 
The distribution of this grant has always been an issue, due to delay in payment, as a 
result of difficulty in obtaining the actual mileage data. As a result, some states receive 
more than their actual entitlement while others receive less. In most cases, the adjustment 
process takes a long time after receiving a complaint from the Auditor General Office. In 
1981, all thirteen states were overpaid, by a total of RM106 million, due to changes in the 
basic state road average, and the National Finance Council only rectified the matter in 
1996. In order to recover this amount, the federal government made an adjustment 
through deduction of grants received in 1997-1999. From 1977 to 1985, the state of 
Sarawak was underpaid by a total of RM33 million and the federal government only paid 
these arrears in three payments from 1997 to 1999. Investigation of the documents shows 
that this problem emerged as a result of the method of payment employed. Before the 
confirmation of the states' entitlement, the states received provisional grant and actual 
grants were only be paid when actual state road mileage was finalised. However, the 
determination of the actual state road mileage was always an issue, as the mileage claims 
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by the states were differed from the mileage shown in federal records and there was also 
double counting of certain roads. As a result, overpayment and underpayment are 
inevitable and rectification of this problem is time consuming, typically taking more than 
five years to solve. This makes states' budgetary planning difficult. 
4.3.1.3 State Reserve Fund 
The State Reserve Fund is in fact an extension of the repealed Special Development 
Grants21 introduced in 1956. This fund was established under Article 109(6) of the 
Federal Constitution. This Article says `the Federation may from time to time, after 
consultation with the National Finance Council, make grants out of the State Reserve 
Fund to any state for the purpose of development or generally to supplement its revenue'. 
The objective of the State Reserve Fund is to assist states, which run into financial 
difficulties due to limited revenue raising capacity and increase in annual budget. Hence, 
prior to 1983, the State Reserve Fund was used only to assist state governments that 
faced deficits in the operating accounts. However, after 1983, this fund was extended to 
finance22 state development projects. Thus, this fund is now used for two purposes; first, 
grants to help states having deficits in their operating account, and second, grants to help 
states uplift the level of economic development, infrastructure and standard of living (see 
below). Beginning in 2001, the total amount of grant allocated for this fund was 
increased to RM21 1.1 million, of which RM170 million is allocated for grants based on 
the level of economic development, infrastructure and standard of living and the 
remainder is allocated to help alleviate deficits in their operating account. Table 4.17 
shows the disbursement of the grants provided for under the State Reserve Fund. 
21 Special Development Grants was first introduced in 1956 following the recommendation of the Raja Uda 
Committee on the proposed new financial arrangements for the Federation of Malaya 1948. See section 
3.5.1.3 of Chapter 3 for discussion on this grant. 
22 See the minutes of the National Finance Council meeting on 12 Mac 1983. 
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Table 4.17 
State Reserve Funds) 
(RM million) 
198 0 1 985 1990 1995 2000 
a b a b a b a b a b 
Perlis 2.3 - - 6.8 11.5 12.4 - 13.6 - 16.3 
(17.0) (7.4) (42.3) (12.6) (10.9) (9.6) 
Kedah - - - 12.7 9.0 15.0 - 22.0 - 22.0 
(13.9) (33.0) (15.2) (17.7) (13.0) 
Penang - - 4.8 - 4.8 - 0.000 - 8.7 
(5.2) (4.9) (0.00) (5.1) 
Perak - - - 6.2 - 5.4 - 13.8 - 13.8 
(6.8) (5.5) (11.1) (8.1) 
Selangor - - - 1.0 - 0.8 - 5.2 - 6.1 
(1.1) (0.8) (4.2) (3.6) 
Negeri - - - 3.6 - 3.6 - 7.0 - 7.0 Sembilan (3.9) (3.7) (5.7) (4.1) 
Malacca - - - 6.3 - 6.3 - 0.000 - 9.8 
(6.8) (6.4) (0.00) (5.8) 
Johor - - - 4.5 - 4.5 - 10.6 - 10.6 
(4.9) (4.5) (8.5) (6.2) 
Pahang - 4.4 - 4.5 - 9.6 9.6 
(4.9) (4.5) (7.7) 5.6 
Terengganu - - - 4.7 - 4,7 - 9.3 - 9.3 
(5.1) (4.7) (7.5) (5.5) 
Kelantan 11.4 - - 19.1 6.7 19.1 13.6 2.3 26.0 
83.0 (20.8) (24.7) (19.4) 100.0 (1.9) 15.3 
Sabah - - - 6.5 - 6.5 - 13.2 13.2 
(7.1) (6.6) (10.6) (7.8) 
Sarawak - - - 11.0 - 11.0 - 17.6 17.6 
(12.0) (11.2) (14.2) 10.3 
Total 13.7 - - 91.5 27.2 98.4 13.6 124.2 - 170.0 (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 1 1 (100.0) 
Note: Figures in parenthesis represent share to total 
`Grant for states having deficit in its operating account b Grant based on the level of economic development, infrastructure and standard of living 
Source: Calculated from state governments financial statements and Federal Treasury allocation budget 
(various years). 
i. Grants for States having deficit in their operating account. 
This grant is in the form of conditional grants, which is designed to assist states having 
difficulties in financing their operating expenditure. Thus, the proceeds are used to cover 
shortfalls in the operating expenditure. However, this grant is only available after 
investigation on the state governments' accounts is made by a committee of the National 
Finance Council. This committee comprises a representative from the Federal Treasury, 
representatives from two states that do not have financial difficulties and a representative 
from the Accountant General Office. The committee was given the task to scrutinize the 
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claimant state governments from their receipts and payments made. 23 The deficit is then 
determined by obtaining the difference between total receipts and payments made. To 
determine the amount of grants, this deficit needs to be adjusted, taking into account 
revenue arrears and advance payments received from the State Contingency Fund. The 
receipts side, includes all receipts from the ordinary revenue sources, revenue from the 
Water Supply Fund, and all federal transfers for operating purposes, but excludes all 
receipts from the federal government loan, receipts from part two of the Revenue Growth 
Grant (based on the numbers of population - see below), receipts from the State Reserve 
Fund and loan repayments received from the Water Supply Fund. The payments side 
includes all amounts spent on operating and capital expenditure from the revenue 
account, less amounts transferred to the Development Fund and other Trust Fund, all 
loans received and investment made from the revenue account, loan repayment, and 
federal reimbursement. In practice, the payment of this grant can only be made two years 
after the end of the financial year, that is, after investigation by the committee established 
by the National Finance Council is completed. 
Clearly, this grant was merely an attempt to overcome temporary imbalances in the 
accounts of applicant states and was not intended to provide a permanent source of 
income to the state governments. In other words, this grant is made on an ad hoc basis, to 
assist states having temporary difficulties in meeting their current expenditures. As such, 
it cannot be regarded as an instrument of fiscal adjustment. Furthermore, due to the long 
process involved before the claimant states could receive payment, it is difficult for the 
state governments to carry out budgetary planning. This grant is indeed a kind of federal 
reimbursement, especially if the claimant state governments have to finance their current 
deficits through advance payment from the State Contingency Fund. 
' This information was obtained during interview with officials from the Budget Division, Treasury. 
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ii. Grants based on the level of economic development, infrastructure and standard of 
living. 
This is also a form of conditional grant in that it is given to the states only for approved 
development projects. From the outset, this grant was aimed at bringing about higher 
socio-economic development of the states. This grant was first introduced in 1983 and 
given to those states that had a low level of economic development, so that they would be 
financially capable to undertake development projects, in line with the government policy 
of balanced regional socio-economic development. 24 An initial annual allocation of 
RM100 million was provided for this grant. 25 Subsequently, in 1993, the annual 
allocation of this grant was increased by RM70 million, to become RM170 million. 26 
This grant has the feature of an equalisation grant in the sense that only less developed 
states are entitled to this grant. The rationale behind this grant is to assist the state 
governments, particularly those states that are less developed, to implement development 
projects to enable them to achieve a faster rate of growth. As such, the less developed 
states received significant amounts of this grant (see column `b' of Table 4.17). A total of 
seventeen indicators are used to allocate these funds among state governments. These 
include, among others, the level of economic development, the development of 
infrastructure (water and electricity supply, roads) and other socio-economic indicators 
(level of poverty, rate of illiteracy, rate of infant mortality, and ratio of doctors to 
population). Projects that are eligible for this grant includes: roads and bridges other than 
projects financed by the Ministry of Rural Development or by the existing federal 
government allocations, water supply and rural electricity other than projects financed by 
the Ministry of Rural Development or by the existing federal government allocations, 
agriculture projects (flood mitigation, agriculture centre), building (mosques and 
24 Regional balance economic growth is one of the government long-term plans to eliminate economic 
disparity. See the Outline Perspective Plan 1(OPP1) and Outline Perspective Plan 2 (OPP2). 
25 See minutes of the National Finance Council Meeting on 12 Mac 1983. 
26 See minutes of the National Finance Council Meeting on 27 February 1993. 
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religious schools), and local government projects other than those financed by the 
allocation of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. 
The federal government will ensure that this grant is not duplicated with other grants. As 
such, guidelines are imposed on development projects 27carried out by the state 
governments to qualify for this grant. However, before allocation can be made to the 
respective state governments, an application has to be made to the Treasury (Ministry of 
Finance). A special committee composed of officials from the Treasury, Economic 
Planning Unit and Implementation and Coordination Unit (Prime Minister's 
Department), and Ministry of Rural Development will then study the viability of the 
projects. Only projects approved by this Committee are entitled to a grant. 
4.3.2 Revenue / tax sharing arrangements 
4.3.2.1 Revenue Growth Grant 
This grant is a combination of conditional grant and unconditional grants, which are 
given to the state governments on the principle of revenue sharing between the federal 
and state governments. This grant was first introduced in 1977 by virtue of the Revenue 
Growth Grants Act (1977). This act stipulated the purpose of this grants, that is, 
`The grants made to state under section 4 shall be utilised to generally supplement its 
revenue and the grants made to a state under section 4A shall be utilised for any or all of 
the following specific development purposes: water supply, public housing, industrial 
estate development, minor works and such other developments as may be determined 
from time to time by the National Finance Council established under Article 108 of the 
Federal Constitution'. 
The Revenue Growth Grant is given to the state governments only if there is an increase 
in the federal government revenue. As such, no payment has been made in 1987,1988 
and 1999, as there was no increase in the federal government revenues. As a large portion 
of the federal government revenue is from tax sources, this grant is very much dependent 
on federal tax revenue collection. The rationale for introduction of this grant was because 
27 See minutes of the National Finance Council Meeting on 27 February 1993. 
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the federal government benefits most from investments undertaken by the states, but in 
return the states may have no way of capturing significant return from their investment, 
such as investments on the development of industrial zone and national park. Investment 
in these projects greatly advantages the federal government, as revenue derived from 
such investments belongs to the federal government in the form of company tax, income 
tax, service tax and sales tax. However, this grant does not guarantee a stable flow of 
income to the states, as it depends on increases in the federal government revenue. As 
such, a grant dependent on the share of federal taxes collected in each state would be 
preferable. Amounts of grants distributed are shown in Table 4.18. 
When this grant was first introduced, the maximum allocation made by the federal 
government was RM 50 million per year. It increased to RM 100 million per year in 1980 
and subsequently to RM 150 million per year in 1990,28 to be distributed to all state 
governments. The formula is as follows: 
i. The first RM 25 million is equally distributed to all state governments. 
ii. The next RM 25 million is distributed based on the states population, as follows: 
On the first 500,000 people =2 shares/person 
On the following 500,000 people =1 share/person 
On balance ='h share/person 
Thus the allotment of each. state will be: 
State share x RM 25 million 
Total share 
iii. The remaining of RM 100 million will be shared based on per capita GDP of each 
state in comparison to the national per capita GDP. States that registered lower 
per capita GDP than the national per capita GDP will be eligible for this grant. 
zs See minute of the National Finance Council Meeting on 12 Mac 1983. 
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Table 4.18 
Revenue Growth Grants' 
(RM million) 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Perlis 2.323 (4.6) 8.187 (5.4) 15.844 (10.6) 17.868 (11.9) 16.590 (11.1) 
Kedah 4.298 (8.6 27.490 (18.3) 28.675 (19.1) 20.195 (13.5) 17.169 (11.4) 
Penn 3.998 (8.0) 4.021 (2.7) 3.885 (2.6) 3.803 (2.5) 3.744 2.5) 
Perak 4.848 9,7 9.608 6.4 13.490 (9.0) 12.669 (8.4) 9.976 6.7 
Selangor 4.348 (8.7) 4.389 (2.9) 4.536 (3.0) 4.695 (3.1) 4.748 (3.2) 
Ne eri Sembilan 3.498 (7.0) 3.413 (2.3) 7.933 (5.3) 9.797 (6.5) 7.019 (4.7) 
Malacca 3.248 (6.5) 11.503 (7.7) 10.654 (7.1) 6.794(4.5) 4.139 (2.8) 
Johor 4.598 (9.2) 5.662 (3.8) 8.813 (5.9) 6.535 (4.4) 4.898 (3.3) 
Pahang 3.573 7.1 3.798 2.5 13.282 (8.9) 12.633 (8.4) 12.115 (8.1) 
Terengganu 3.248 (6.5) 4.377 (2.9) 3.485 (2.6) 3.560 (2.4) 3.591 (2.4) 
Kelantan 3.873 (7.7) 33.209 (22.1) 27.340 (18.3) 20.195 (13.5) 31.134 (20.8) 
Sabah 3.798 (7.6) 9.180 (6.1) 4.119 (2.7) 17.968 (12.0) 22.680 (15.1) 
Sarawak 4.348 (8.7) 25.516 (17.0) 7.946 (5.3 13.084 (8.7) 12.196 (8.1) 
Total 50.00 (100.0) 150.353 100.0 150.00 (100.0) 150.00 (100.0) 150.00 100.0 
Note: ` Figures in parenthesis represent share to total 
Source: Budget Division, Ministry of Finance, and state financial statement 
As can be seen from Table 4.18, the states of Perlis, Kelantan, Kedah and Terengganu, 
which are less developed compared to the rest of the members of the federation, received 
the bulk of the grant. This is because the formula for calculating the eligibility of each 
state takes into consideration not only the population but also the per capita GDP of the 
states. Therefore, by taking the per capita GDP into consideration, this grant is more 
equitable than the Capitation Grant because the poorer states, in particular Perlis, Kedah 
and Kelantan, received more grant than rich states (see Table 4.18). The state of Perlis, 
which has the lowest income, received RM17.9 million or 12% of the total Revenue 
Growth Grant in 1995. Indeed the Revenue Growth Grant `is a reaction to the general 
issue of whether states properly share in the benefits of development expenditure' 
(Wilson, 1995: 3). It enables the states to undertake development expenditure from which 
they have no way of capturing any return. Before the implementation of this grant, states 
argued that they had no incentive and could not afford to undertake infrastructure 
investments, because of their narrow tax revenue base. However, this grant has strings 
attached, in that the first RM50 million can only be used for operating purposes, while 
the remaining RM150 million that go to the states with below average GDP per capita 
can only be used for approved development projects (namely water supply, public 
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housing, industrial estate development, minor works and such other development) as may 
be determined from time to time by the National Finance Council. Furthermore, the 
amount of grants received by the states is not stable, in that states only receive a grant 
when there is an increase in the federal government revenue, which constantly fluctuates, 
which makes state planning more difficult. 
4.3.2.2 Export duty of tin ore 
Under the Article 110(3) of the Federal Constitution, the states that produce tin ore are 
entitled to receive 10% of the total tax on export of tin ore. This is a form of tax sharing 
based on derivation. However, this payment has not been made since 1986, due to 
cessation of tin mining operations following depletion of deposits. Alas, no new 
arrangement has been made to replace revenue losses from this source of revenue. 
Table 4.19 
Export Duty of Tin Orel 
(RM million) 
1980 1985 19862 
Perlis 0.078 (0.15) 0.006 (0.18) 0.008 (0.22) 
Kedah 0.377 (0.72) 0.020 (0.61) 0.022 (0.59) 
Penan - - - 
Perak 30.815 (58.71) 2.008 (61.6) 2.121 (57.29) 
Selangor 17.415 (33.18) 0.907 (27.8) 1.189 (32,12) 
Negeri Sembilan 0.355 (0.68) 0.020 (0.61) 0.028 0.76) 
Malacca 0.244 (0.46) 0.003 (0.09) 0.001 (0.03 
Johor 0.771 (1.47) 0.074 (2.27) 0.092 (2.49) 
Pahang 2.039 (3.88) 0.179 (5.49) 0.201(5 . 43 Terengganu 0.394 (0.75) 0.041 (1.26) 0.040 1.08 
Kelantan - - - 
Sabah - - - 
Sarawak - - - 
Total 52.487(100.0) 3.258 (100.0) 3.702 100.0 
Note: Figures in parenthesis represent share to total 
2 The last year this payments was made was in 1986 due to depleted in tin deposit 
Source: Budget Division, Ministry of Finance, and state financial statement 
4.3.2.3 Export duty on iron ore 
This is another form of tax sharing arrangement based on derivation. The payment under 
this arrangement is made to the states producing iron ore, by virtue of the Assignment of 
revenue (Export Duty on Iron Ore) Act, 1962, which stipulates that 10% of revenue from 
export duty from iron ore is to be assigned to the respective states producing the ore. 
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Only Johor, Kedah, and Perak are entitled to this payment but the amount received was 
minimal, as the output of the tin ore was low. Since 1987, no payment has been made, as 
no iron ore was produced by the states. 
4.3.3 Special payments 
4.3.3.1 Payment to Sabah and Sarawak 
This grant is given to the states of Sabah and Sarawak under Articles 112C (1) (a) (see 
Part IV of Tenth Schedule) and to Selangor (see below) through a special agreement. 
However the purpose of the payment is different between the states of Sabah and 
Sarawak, and Selangor. For Sabah and Sarawak, the objective of this grant is to enable 
these two newer states in the federation to upgrade their services to be on a par with the 
other states in Peninsular Malaysia. Under this arrangement, Sarawak received RM5.8 
million each year from 1964-1968 and an escalating grant30 amounting to RM3.5 
million (1964), RM11.5 (1965), RM16 million (1966), and RM21 million (1967). 
However this grant was revised in 1969, after which the amount received by Sarawak 
was RM12 million (1969), RM12.9 million (1970), RM13.9 million (1971), RM14.9 
million (1972), and RM16 million (1973). Since 1973 up to now, no revision has been 
made; as a result, the amount received has been fixed at RM16 million. 
On the other hand, Sabah had received a grant of an amount of two fifths of the amount 
by which net revenue received by the federal government from Sabah exceeds the net 
revenue received by the federal government from Sabah in 196331 Based on this formula, 
Sabah received RM5 million (1965), RM8.2 million (1966), RM13.3 million (1967), and 
RM1I million (1968). However after 1 January 1969, the amount of this grant was 
revised as follows: RM20 million (1969), RM21.5 million (1970), RM23.1 million 
(1971), RM24.8 million (1972), and RM26.7 million (1973). 
29 See Section 1(i) Part IV of the Tenth Schedule. 
30 See Section 1(2) Part IV of the Tenth Schedule. 
31 See Subsection I of Section 2 of Part IV of the Tenth Schedule 
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This grant may be changed or substituted, with the consent of both the federal and state 
governments concerned. However the federal government is not required to consult the 
National Finance Council32 as in the case of variations of the Capitation Grant, and any 
agreement to this effect is made binding by assent of the Yang Di pertuan Agong. In other 
words, the federal government cannot make changes unilaterally without consulting the 
state governments concerned and hence there appeared a form of negotiation for the 
financial betterment of these states. Article 112D of the Federal Constitution provides 
detailed procedures to be followed to alter the conditions of the above grants, as 
experienced in the case of the abolition of import duty and excise duty on petroleum 
products, 33 which were constitutionally assigned to the states of Sabah and Sarawak. 
4.3.3.2 Payment to Selangor 
A special grant to Selangor is made in perpetuity as a form of compensation for the loss 
of revenue to the state of Selangor following the formation in 1972 of the Federal 
Territory of Kuala Lumpur, the capital city of Malaysia, which was once territory 
belonging to the state of Selangor. The amount of the grants agreed upon is RM18.3 
million, which is equivalent to the revenue collected by the Selangor from the Federal 
Territory in 1974. 
4.3.4 Administrative payments 
4.3.4.1 Payment for the administration of functions under the concurrent list 
Based on Article 82 of the Federal Constitution, the National Finance Council has agreed 
to finance 50% of the cost for administration of functions under the concurrent list: social 
welfare, veterinary services and drainage and irrigation, beginning in 1987.34 In other 
words, the state governments are only required to finance the remaining 50% of the cost 
32 See Article 112D(7) of the Federal Constitution. 
33 See Chapter 7 
34 See minutes of National Finance Council meeting on 18 February 1987. 
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of the administration of these functions (see column `a' of Table 4.20). This payment was 
made to reduce the financial burden on the state governments in the administration of 
functions specified under the concurrent list of the Federal Constitution . 
35 However, only 
three out of the nine functions in the concurrent list are eligible for this payment, that is, 
social welfare, veterinary services and drainage and irrigation. This is because most of 
the functions other than social welfare, veterinary services and drainage and irrigation 
have been taken over by the federal government. This is further evidence of growing 
centripetal forces in the Malaysian Federation. 
Table 4.20 
Administrative payments' 
(RM million) 
1980 1985 1990 1995 20 00 
a b a b a b a b a b 
Perlis 0.80 - - - - 2.24 2.01 3.42 5.60 4.12 
(8.1) (1.8) (4.4) (2.1) . 4) (7 (2.3) Kedah 0.05 7.48 0.98 6.36 2.60 8.58 2.30 9.19 
(0.5) (48.7) (4.5) (5.2) (5.7) (5.4) (3.0) (5.1) 
Penang 0.78 - 0.66 - 0.30 4.48 3.63 5.45 2.77 5.80 
(7.9) (4.3) (1.4) (3.7) (8.0) (3.4) (3.6) (3.2) 
Perak 2.37 - - - 1.06 16.97 6.73 20.21 9.58 23.10 
(23.9) (5.0) (14.0) (14.8) (12.7) (12.6) (12.8) 
Selangor 2.63 - 0.40 - 0.64 11.35 6.90 16.28 5.91 21.57 
(26.5) (2.6) (3.0) (9.3) (15.1) (10.2) (7.8) (11.9) 
Negeri 0.06 - 0.32 - 1.52 3.58 5.03 4.59 4.67 5.32 
Sembilan (0.6) (2.1) (7.0) (2.9) (11.0) (2.9) (6.1) (2.9) 
Malacca 0.44 - - - 0.08 2.32 2.67 2.95 1.07 2.67 
(4.5) (0.4) (1.9) (5.9) (1.9) (1.4) (1.5) 
Johor 1.00 - 1.63 - 0.87 14.01 4.24 18.15 6.53 20.79 
(10.1) (10.6) (4.0) (11.5) (9.3) (11.4) (8.6) 11.5) 
Pahang - - - - 1.91 5.26 2.96 8.33 1.69 7.92 
(8.8) (4.3) (6.5) (5.2) (2.2) (4.4) 
Terengganu 0.92 - 0.57 - 0.66 11.72 2.81 16.51 7.71 17.93 
(9.3) (3.7) (3.1) (9.6) (6.2) (10.4) (10.1) (9.9 
Kelantan 0.86 - 3.85 6.46 3.24 8.38 4.59 9.59 
(8.7) (17.8) (5.3) (7.1) (5.3) (6.0) (5.3) 
Sabah - - - - 3.94 21.03 2.76 23.42 10.32 27.84 
(18.2) (17.3) (6.1) (14.7) (13.6) (15.4) 
Sarawak - - 4.32 - 5.80 15.73 - 23.07 13.25 25.16 
(28.1) (26.8) (12.9) (14.5) (17.4) 13.9 
Total 9.92 - 15.34 - 21.63 121.49 45.57 159.32 76.00 181,00 
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0 
Note: Figures in parenthesis represent share to total 
Payment for the administration of functions under the concurrent list b Service charges for federal projects 
Source: Calculated from state governments financial statements and Federal Treasury budget 
allocation (various years). 
35 See List Three of the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution. See also section 3.5.2 of Chapter 3. 
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4.3.4.2 Service charges for federal projects 
Under Article 80(5) of the Federal Constitution, the federal government is obliged to 
make payment to the state governments for any federal projects implemented in the 
states. This Article says, `subject to any provisions of federal or state law, arrangements 
may be made between the Federation and a state for the performance of any functions by 
the authorities of the one on behalf of the authorities of the other and as such 
arrangements may provide for the making of payments in respects of any costs incurred 
under the arrangements'. In 1978, the National Finance Council decided that the state 
governments could claim a payment called `service charges' for the implementation of 
federal projects in the states 36 The payment is made based on the states' staff 
involvement in the projects. If the total staff of the state governments where the project is 
being implemented is 50% or more, then the state concerned is entitle to receive an 
amount equivalent to 5% of the total cost of the project. However, if the state staff 
involvement is less then 50%, the state can only claim from the federal government an 
amount equivalent to 2.5% of the total cost of the project. Column `b' of Table 4.20 
shows the disbursement of this payment to states. It clearly demonstrates that more 
advanced states received a significant portion of these payments. This indicates that 
projects were allocated to the more developed states rather than to the less developed 
states. However, payment is made only after the states' accounts have been audited by the 
Auditor General. If the state submits its accounts to the Auditor General late, then 
payment will be delayed sometimes up to two years. 
4.3.5 Other type of transfers and financial assistance to states 
Apart from the transfers discussed above, the federal government also provides annual 
allocations to the states through the Ministry of Rural Development and from the Prime 
36 See the minutes of the National Finance Council meeting on 28 January 1978. 
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Minister's Department. However, these allocations cannot be considered as real grants, 
but rather as federally sponsored projects. Among the projects under this category are 
construction of village roads, water and electricity supply in rural areas, village 
improvement projects and the provision of infrastructure for trade and industry. Looking 
at the nature of the federal sponsored projects, they seem to be intended to achieve 
balanced regional development and, subsequently, to eliminate horizontal imbalance 
among the state governments. However, they are not intended to finance projects / 
investments planned by the state governments under their annual budget. These projects 
should be carried out by the respective state governments, as they are closest to the local 
citizen. Moreover, these projects are trivial and not cost effective for the federal agency 
to undertake on the nationwide basis. In most cases, the selection and the place of the 
projects to be implemented is based on the political viability. 37 
Another government agency that is given some role in regional development is the 
Implementation Coordination Unit (ICU) of the Prime Minister's Department. This 
agency is given a yearly allocation for small projects (other than projects carried out by 
the Ministry of Rural Development) such as the construction and repair of stalls for small 
businesses throughout the country, particularly in the less developed areas. The purpose 
is to raise standards of living, especially for those who fall under the poverty line. 
Federal sponsored projects are also carried out by the federal government through 
regional development agencies, especially projects involving land development and new 
townships in specific areas (construction of roads, water and electricity supply and other 
basic amenities). The main purpose is to improve the income and standard of living of the 
people in general. Among these agencies are the Federal Land Development Authority 
37 Some federal sponsored projects are intended to serve for the survival of the centre political leader, 
especially if the selection and location of the projects involves political consideration in order to rally 
political support. 
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(FELDA), Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation (FELCRA), Pahang Tenggara 
Development Board (TENGGARA), Johor Tenggara Development Board (KEJORA), 
Central Terengganu Development Board (KETENGGAH), South Kelantan Development 
Board (KESEDAR), Smallholders' Rubber Industries Development Authority (RISDA), 
Kedah Regional Development Authority (KEDA), Penang Regional Development 
Authority (PERDA), and Jengka Regional Development Authority (JENGKA). 
From the foregoing discussion, the implementation of fiscal adjustment revealed two 
main weaknesses: 
1. Total federal transfers are very small as compared with total federal government 
revenue and not all grants are real grants intended to balance out state governments' 
accounts. Between 1980-2000, the average federal transfers were only 3.6% of the total 
federal government revenue. In 1980, total federal transfers amounted to RM369 million 
or 2.7% of the total federal government revenue, and increased to RM881 million in 
1985, equivalent to 4.2% of the total federal government revenue. In 1990, total transfers 
amounted to RM1,237 million or 4.2% of the total federal government revenue and 
increased to RM1,302 million in 1995 or 2.6% of the total federal government revenue. 
This trend shows very little change, as evident from the amount of transfers disbursed in 
2000, amounting to RM1,434 million or 2.6% of the total federal government revenue 
(see Table 4.21). 
As displayed in Table 4.21, federal transfers comprise various types, which are designed 
to meet different purposes. However, according to the definition of fiscal adjustment, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, not all of these transfers are considered as a real fiscal adjustment 
measures. Out of these transfers, only the Capitation Grant, the State Road Grant, the 
Revenue Growth Grant and the two grants from the State Reserve Fund, that is, the grant 
to assist states having current account deficits and grant based on the level of economic 
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development, are considered as a real fiscal adjustment instrument. Two other grants are 
in the form of revenue sharing, that is, export of tin ore and export of iron ore. However, 
no further payment is made due to cessation of the production. Hence, total transfers to 
the states are even smaller if taking into account only real grants as defined under the 
theory of fiscal federalism. 
Table 4.21 
Types and Amounts of Federal Transfers to State Governments 
(RM Million) 
Capitation 
Grants 
Road 
Grants 
Revenue 
Growth 
Grants 
Grant 
based 
on State 
revenue 
50: 50 5% Special 
transfers' 
Others' Total % of total 
Federal 
Government 
revenue 
1980 75.9 94.1 50.0 - - 6.9 61.0 81.3 3692 2.7 
1981 82.4 90.5 92.3 - - 6.9 61.0 41.7 374.8 2.4 
1982 81.6 271.4 97.7 - - 19.3 353.5 40.8 864.3 5.2 
1983 82.2 148.9 128.8 77.7 - 25.3 353.5 48.6 865.0 4.6 
1984 86.2 167.8 145.2 122.3 - 80.8 353.5 48.0 1003.8 4.8 
1985 87.6 167.8 150.3 91.5 - 15.4 353.5 14.4 880.5 4.2 
1986 89.1 414.5 146.8 94.8 - 6.3 353.5 30.6 1,135.6 5.8 
1987 89.1 214.0 - 95.6 100.5 9.2 353.5 22.5 884.4 4.9 
1988 90.0 260.3 - 99.1 102.7 13.9 353.5 13.9 933.4 4.2 
1989 94.7 250.2 150.2 99.7 109.1 12.1 353.5 55.9 1,125.4 4.5 
1990 89.2 366.0 150.0 98.4 121.5 21.6 353.5 36.7 1,236.9 2.5 
1991 95.5 357.9 147.1 108.3 125.4 34.4 358.9 56.9 1,284.4 3.8 
1992 95.5 387.0 150.0 97.3 167.6 36.4 61.0 64.4 1,0592 2.7 
1993 180.1 390.7 150.0 163.5 161.5 41.9 61.0 80.8 1,229.5 2.9 
1994 192.6 441.5 150.0 165.8 153.0 51.0 61.0 81.4 1,296.3 2.6 
1995 198.4 471.0 150.0 124.2 159.3 45.6 61.0 93.7 1,303.2 2.6 
1996 196.9 488.9 138.0 174.7 143.7 47.7 61.0 83.6 1,334.5 2.3 
1997 212.8 549.3 150.0 151.6 180.5 48.1 61.0 82.2 1,435.5 2.2 
1998 216.1 687.8 150.0 165.1 205.9 65.6 61.0 82.2 1,633.7 3.0 
1999 214.9 660.8 - 165.9 189.6 61.0 61.0 802 1,433.4 3.0 
2000 228.8 668.5 150.0 170.0 181.0 76.0 61.0 84.6 1,619.9 2.6 
Note: 'Only to Selangor (compensation for Federal Territory = RM18.3 million, annually), Sabah and 
Sarawak (compensation for joining federation, Sabah = RM 40.1 million and Sarawak = RM 16 
million, annually) 
s Include transfers from State Reserve Fund, commodity export grants (tin, iron and other minerals) 
Source: Budget Division, Ministry of Finance, and state financial statement. 
In 1990, for instance, the total amount of these grants were only RM731 million or 59.1% 
of all total transfers and payments (RM1,237 million) accorded to the states by the 
federal government, equivalent to 2.5% of the total federal government revenue (see 
Table 4.21 and Table 4.22). This is because some federal transfers are made up of 
compensation by the federal to state governments (as in the case of payments to Selangor, 
Sabah and Sarawak) and administrative payment due to shared responsibility (for federal 
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projects in states and payments for joint responsibility functions under the concurrent 
list). Thus, federal transfers do not really attempt to solve the financial imbalances faced 
by the state governments. This problem was further exacerbated by the political 
considerations in disbursement of grants and federal projects to the states. The 
disbursement of grants, notably to the states ruled by the opposition party, was carried 
out on the basis of political viability in that the federal funds would not be forthcoming in 
the normal way if the states were politically worlds apart from the centre. Therefore, this 
practice disadvantages states that are not politically affiliated with the centre. 
Table 4.22 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Adjustments - 
Amounts Received by State Governments in 1990 (RM Million 
States Constitutional 
Grant 
State Reserve 
Fund 
Revenuettax sharing Total 
CG RG CAD LEG RGG TXG IXG Share 
%) 
Perlis 2.8 3.8 11.5 12.4 15.8 - - 46.5 6.4 
Kedah 7.4 27.3 9.0 15.0 28.7 - - 87.3 11.9 
Penang 6.9 17.0 - 4.8 3.9 - - 32.5 4.5 
Perak 9.7 34.2 - 5.4 13.5 - - 62.7 8.6 
Selangor 10.0 64.1 - 0.8 4.5 - - 79.5 10.9 
Negeri 
Sembilan 
0.5 16.9 - 3.6 7.9 - - 28.9 4.0 
Malacca 5.1 12.6 - 6.3 10.4 - - 34.6 4.7 
Johor 9.7 26.3 - 4.5 8.8 - - 49.3 6.7 
Pahang 7.3 9.5 - 4.5 13.3 - - 44.4 6.1 
Teren u 5.8 13.6 - 4.7 3.5 - - 27.5 3.8 
Kelantan 7.0 13.3 6.7 19.1 27.3 - 73.5 10.1 
Sabah 8.1 85.0 - 6.5 4.2 - 103.8 14.2 
Sarawak 8.8 32.6 - 11.0 8.0 - 1- 60.3 8.3 
Total 89.2 366.0 27.2 98.4 150.0 - - 730.9 100.0 
Note: CG = Capitation Grants, RG = Road Grants; CAD = Current Account Deficits; LEG = Level of 
Economic Grants; RGG = Revenue Growth Grants; TXG = Export of Tin Ore; IXG = Export of Iron Ore 
Source: Budget Division, Ministry of Finance, and state financial statement 
2. The practice of federal transfers does not bring equalizing effects to all state 
governments, as states with higher GDP receive higher federal grants than lower GDP 
states. Figure 4.3 shows that states with higher GDP continue to receive higher federal 
grants than lower GDP states. In 1990, for instance, seven higher GDP states, namely, 
Selangor, Perak, Johor, Penang, Sabah, Sarawak and Terengganu received higher federal 
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transfers, compared with lower GDP states, namely, Perlis, Malacca, Negeri Sembilan, 
Kelantan, Kedah and Pahang. Thus, the current practice of federal transfers does not 
constitute a mechanism that irons out fiscal imbalances among the states. This finding 
suggests that richer states continue to enjoy higher federal transfers, which in the long 
term may cause detrimental effects on the regional economic development. The fall out is 
that the rich states become richer and poor states become poorer. Consequently, this 
phenomenon induces a high degree of mobility of resources (labour and capital) to the 
richer states 38 To make matters worse, there was lack of political will to undertake 
transfer reform that would have an equalising effect on all state governments in the 
federation despite flexibility provided by the Federal Constitution. 
Figure 4.3 
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38 This phenomenon will cause socio-economic problems (housing, crime, urban poverty) in the richer 
states such as Selangor, Johor and Penang. This, in turn, requires the Federal Government involvement to 
overcome urban problems and, as a result, more federal allocation needs to be channelled to these states. This situation creates somewhat of a cycle, i. e. richer states continue getting federal allocation due to this 
problem and further attract internal migration. As a result, poorer states remain poor. 
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The above weaknesses further exacerbated by the ineffective role of the National Finance 
Council (NFC) as an institution of intergovernmental fiscal relations to make fiscal 
adjustments, as the decisions made by the Council are indirectly politically influenced. 
This is not surprising, as the members of the Council are largely from the ruling party and 
therefore it is difficult for the NFC to be impartial. We will discuss in greater detail the 
deficiency of the NFC in Chapter 7 of the thesis. To be effective, this Council should be 
impartial to ensure equity, consistency and continuity working of the whole system of 
fiscal federalism- In this case, the Finance Commission of India and the Commonwealth 
Grant Commission of Australia are two good examples of institutions of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations that work better than the NFC in Malaysia. This is 
because the members of these institutions are appointed from among professionals 
familiar with the various aspects of intergovernmental fiscal relations. As a result, 
political influence on decisions is minimised. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This comprehensive survey demonstrates severe shortcomings in the design of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations in Malaysia, as hypothesised in this research, in 
particular due to the division of functions and revenue assignments, which clearly favour 
the federal government. The upshot of this general deficiency is persistent fiscal 
imbalance. The assignment of favourable revenue sources to the federal government, 
coupled with its exclusive access to sources of borrowing (domestic and external) are 
justifiable from the point of view of economic considerations; for stabilisation, allocation 
and distribution functions. However, the state governments were assigned less productive 
sources in conformity with the constitutional functions accorded to them. With limited 
sources of revenue and borrowing powers, the state governments face financial 
constraints in attempts to finance their functions. This situation has resulted in long-term 
fiscal imbalance, both vertical and horizontal, due to non-correspondence between 
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revenues collected and the responsibilities to be performed. Fiscal imbalances require 
fiscal adjustment, whether through federal transfers or reassignment of taxes. 
Although fiscal adjustments were undertaken, the design of fiscal adjustments made to 
remedy this problem is not effective in bringing financial relief to the state governments 
and hence has failed to have a equalising effect. Furthermore, total federal transfers are 
too small as compared to total federal government revenue, not all grants are real grants 
intended to overcome disparities between expenditure and revenue, and annoyingly the 
disbursements of grants were also delayed due to political unlikeness. To make matters 
worse, the grants system does not have a built in mechanism to respond to any economic 
changes. Hence, in the final analysis, the `have' states receive higher amounts of grants 
than `have not' states, and higher GDP states receive higher grants. In the long term, if 
this trend continues, rich states will get richer, while poor ones get poorer. However, the 
most affected are those states ruled by the opposition party, as they are not supporting 
their `master' at the federal level. This is a subtle and systematic way of winning the 
political competition. For this reason, the development of an effective transfers system to 
strengthen states' fiscal position is desirable. Moreover, the role of the National Finance 
Council as an institution to foster intergovernmental fiscal relations is less effective, as 
by and large, the decisions are indirectly politically influenced, they are not binding on 
the federal government. Finally, only the federal government can initiate changes on 
fiscal matters concerning states' finance, as the federal government is the `care taker' of 
the state governments. Clearly, the state governments are subordinated by the action of 
the federal government. 
Fiscal adjustment, which includes both the adjustment of horizontal and vertical 
imbalances, was mostly effected by means of grants and tax-sharing arrangements. 
However, most grants are made conditionally, to enable the federal government to 
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exercise control over the extent and quality of state services and over state development 
expenditures. While conditional grants are desirable in the interest of nation-wide 
uniformity and equality, as well as to ensure that the federal government's financial 
responsibility is adhered to as far as possible, they could be used by the centre to put 
political pressure on states that are ruled by a different political party from the centre. 
Furthermore, conditional grants limit the financial freedom of the state governments to 
spend resources according to local preferences. This practice of intergovernmental 
transfers makes state governments supplicants for financial assistance from the federal 
government. As such, this type of fiscal adjustment can be best described as a `carrot and 
stick' system, which bears the risk of political malpractice. In the next chapter, the 
determinants of federal transfers to states and their significance to the state governments 
finance will be analysed. 
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Chapter 5 
Fiscal Adjustment: 
Determinants of Federal Transfer and Their Significance 
for State Governments Finance 
5.1 Introduction 
Fiscal adjustment is the cornerstone in the design of intergovernmental fiscal 
arrangements to accommodate the mismatch between revenue and expenditure. It is the 
manifestation of inappropriate or uneven assignment of revenue sources between levels 
of government. However, fiscal adjustment in Malaysia's fiscal federalism was not 
designed to negate states' fiscal deficiencies resulting from such assignment of functions. 
Analyses on the theory of fiscal adjustment, and the design and practice of fiscal 
adjustment in Malaysia in the previous chapters, reveal that the most practical way to 
remedy fiscal imbalances is through intergovernmental transfers, notably through grants 
from the federal to state governments. While this approach to fiscal adjustment is 
financially pivotal to meet national economic objectives, politically, since the federal 
government could attach any condition to the receipt of such grants, they are potentially a 
way of exerting political elements to strengthen the hegemony of the centre (see Chapter 
6). This is one of the reasons why the federal government in the past was reluctant to 
assign some degree of financial autonomy to the states, in guise of efficiency and equity 
considerations. 
Analysis of fiscal adjustment in Chapter 4 revealed that the amount of federal transfers to 
the states was too small as compared to the total federal government revenue, and the 
`have' states have continuously received higher grants than the `have not' states. Hence, 
the practice of federal transfers has actually failed to bring about an equalising effect. A 
question can now be asked: what are the determining factors in the making of these 
transfers? Having discussed the problem of fiscal imbalances and the importance of 
217 
financial adjustment to remedy fiscal imbalances in the preceding chapters, in this 
chapter, the focus of analysis will be: first, the determinants of federal transfers, and 
second, the significance of federal transfers to the state governments' finance. The aim of 
this analysis is to examine whether or not significant factors such as the revenues and 
expenditures of both federal and state governments, national Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), size of population and political factors have any significant impact on the making 
of the grants system. 
5.2 Theoretical framework 
The literature suggests that fiscal imbalances faced by the constituent government need to 
be remedied by way of federal transfers. Considerable research using regression analysis 
has been conducted to examine the effect of intergovernmental transfers on fiscal 
decisions at the lower levels of government (Pommerehne (1977), Gramlich (1977), 
Grossman (1994), Rao and Singh (2000), Dasgupta, Dhillon and Duta (2001), and 
Khemani (2002)). These analyses explore the significance of variable federal revenue, 
federal expenditure, gross national product, population, states' revenue and expenditure 
in making grants to states. 
The main conclusion from these investigations is that transfers have a strong influence on 
both the level and composition of spending by recipient governments, which further 
highlights the importance of the design of intergovernmental transfers to the lower level 
of government. These analyses also revealed that matching grants promote spending 
better than non-matching grants, consistent with the positive theory of grant, which 
anticipates that grants could stimulate more spending. These empirical findings suggest 
the importance of intergovernmental grants in determining the level and mix of public 
goods and services that could be delivered by lower levels of government. Interestingly, 
the studies by Rao and Singh (2000), Dasgupta, Dhillon and Duta (2001), and Khemani 
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(2002) used the variable of different political parties at the federal and state levels in 
India, to examine whether or not political affiliation influences the grant system and 
stimulate states' spending. Their analyses show that transfers to states were to some 
extent influenced by states' political affiliation with the centre, with states closely 
affiliated to the centre receiving more grants. According to Grossman (1994), based on 
his study using the United States data, grants are assumed to rally support for ruling 
political party and other interest groups, and therefore political affiliation has contributed 
to an increase in amounts of grants to states. A study by Rogers and Rogers (2000) on the 
trend of states expenditure in the United States also indicates that political competition 
has an effect on the size of expenditure by states, in that states that politically affiliated 
with the centre registered higher expenditures. 
In the case of Malaysia, federal transfers depend on several factors. The most significant 
factor is the federal government revenue. This is because the federal government has 
been assigned lucrative revenue sources, while the states' independent sources of revenue 
are limited, not productive and difficult to collect and administer. Hence, the federal 
government finds it easier to raise revenue than the state governments. In this situation, 
transfer of funds to the states in the form of grants is inevitable. Although most transfers 
are constitutionally enumerated, it was found neither objective nor formula of grants are 
spelled out. Instead, grants are determined by the federal government through the 
National Finance Council. In theory, federal transfers should depend on the federal 
government finance, in particular, their revenue performance and expenditure pattern. 
Apart from this, the states' fiscal needs are also a significant variable in determining the 
amounts of federal transfers. GDP is another variable that affects federal transfers to the 
states. This means that when GDP is high, states' economic activities should 
correspondingly be high; thus, states would require more financial assistance, as their 
revenue-raising power is limited. Another variable that influences the decision on the 
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amounts of transfers is the size of the states population. Growing population means 
increasing government expenditures. This is evident as can be seen from increasing 
demand for public goods and services, resulting in high financial requirement (Chapter 
4). As states' financial capacity is limited, population factors should be taken into 
account in the design of the transfers system. 
Based on this framework, the following propositions were developed to be verified using 
multiple regression model. 
i. As the federal government has been assigned exclusive revenue sources, higher 
federal revenue should be extended to the states in the form of grants. 
ii. Federal transfers should take into consideration the difficulties of the states in 
raising revenue, growing fiscal needs, increasing population, and the state's 
overall financial position, as a fiscal gap continues to exist, even with federal 
transfers. 
iii. The growth in GDP does not influence the decisions in making transfers to the 
states. 
iv. The disbursements of federal transfers to the states are subject to the states' 
political affiliation with the centre. If the states' ruling party is not affiliated with 
the centre, the grants will not come in the normal way. 
5.3 The Model 
The model used in the analysis is based on the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
model (see Gujarati, 1995). This model explains that the relationship between dependent 
and independent variables should be linear. The OLS regression is an appropriate 
statistical technique used to explain the movements of one variable (the dependent 
variable) as a function of movements of a set of other variables (independent variables). 
Gujarati, a prominent econometrician, asserts `the method of least squares has some very 
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attractive statistical properties that have made it one of the most very attractive statistical 
regression analysis' (Gujarati, 1995: 52) and regression is `one of the most widely used 
techniques in the analysis of data' to explain the relationship of variables (Bryman and 
Cramer, 1997: 190). The OLS regression model is also an accepted technique for 
regression analysis of time series data (Gujarati, 1995: 23). However, as this investigation 
is particularly concerned with the relationship of variables, the use of the OLS regression 
model in this analysis is not intended for predicting or forecasting what should be the 
amount of grant to be received by the state governments. 
The basis of the OLS regression model is expressed in the following regression equation: 
Y=a+ßX [i] 
where Y is the dependent variable and X is the independent variable or explanatory 
variable. a and ß are parameters of the model. a is the intercept and represents 
geometrically the value of Y where the regression line crosses the horizontal Y axis. In 
other words, a represents the value of Y when the independent variable X is equal to zero 
or is assumed to be held constant, or in the absence of an independent variable X. ß, on 
the other hand, is a slope of coefficient. This slope means that the rate of change in values 
of the independent variable X (explanatory) affects values of the dependent variable Y. 
For the OLS regression model to be valid and significant in examining the relationship 
between variables, the relationship between the dependent variable and independent 
variables should be linear. In other words, the OLS model requires a causal relationship 
between the dependent variable and independent variables. This presupposition is 
significant to see whether or not the model is useful and reliable. Linearity can be seen 
from the value of R (correlation coefficient) derived from the multiple regression. R 
measures the proportion or percentage of the total relationship of dependent variable 
explained by the regression model. However, in practice, the value R2 (coefficient of 
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determination) is a more meaningful property of multiple regression to gauge the extent 
of the relationship between the dependent variable and a set of independent variables 
(Gujarati, 1995: 5; Berry and Feldman, 1985: 10; Bryman and Cramer, 1997: 172-173). 
The value of R2 lies between 0 and 1. If the value of R2 is positive and close to one, it 
indicates that the variables (dependent and independent) are positively related, that is, 
when one variable increases the other variable increases in the same direction and vice 
versa. On the other hand, if R2 = 0, the model does not explain any of the variation in Y 
and hence the regression model is not reliable (Gujarati, 1995; Bryman and Cramer, 
1997). In other words, the closeness of R2 to one indicates how well the data used in the 
regression actually fit the regression line and hence indicates the degree of relationship 
between dependent and independent variables. However, the significance of the model 
also depends on the standardised regression coefficient beta (ß). 
In carrying out the investigation to examine the relationship between dependent variable 
and a set of independent variables, a multiple regression equation was developed based 
on the simple regression equation [i ]. Using multiple regression, all independent 
variables are entered into the model at once. By doing so, it is possible to determine how 
strong are the relationships of each of independent variables regressed jointly, and 
subsequently help us to analyse which of the independent variables are more significant. 
Based on the theoretical framework discussed above, two models (Model 1 and Model 2) 
have been used for this purpose. 
In Model 1, the assumption is that federal transfer to the state governments is a function 
of the federal government revenue, expenditure, states' own sources of revenue, states' 
expenditure, states' financial position, gross domestic product, size of population, and 
states' political affiliation with the centre. This function can be summarised in the 
following equation: 
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1nTft-2 =a+ ß1lnXlt + ß21nX2t + 
ß31nX3t + ß41nX4t + 
ý ß5M5t+ ß6116t+ ß7X7t+ ß8X8t ..... 
Where: 
[ii ] 
lnTf _2 = log 
federal transfers - two years lagged effect 
lnXlt = log federal government revenue (FGREV) (from all sources of revenue 
- tax revenue, non-tax revenue and non-revenue receipts, classification 
used by the Ministry of Finance, Malaysia) 
1nX2t = log federal government expenditure (FGEXP) (operating expenditure 
and development expenditure combined) 
lnX3t = log state government own source revenue (STREV) 
lnXat = log state government expenditure (STEXP) 
lnX5t - log GDP (current) 
1nX6t = log population OPVAR) 
X7t = Dummy variables of state governments financial position (STFINPOS) 
(0 = deficit / 1= surplus) 
X8t = Dummy variable of political affiliation variables (POLVAR) (0 = non- 
affiliated / 1= affiliated) 
This model will be used to test the propositions developed in this study (see above) to 
examine the determinants of federal transfers. The dependent variable of this model is 
federal transfer (with two years lagged effect), as the disbursement of grants is subject to 
changing indicators, which normally take almost two years to be audited and 
implemented, such as two types of grants under the State Reserve Fund (Grants for states 
having deficit in their operating account, and Grants based on the level of economic 
development), State Road Grant, Revenue Growth Grant, and Service Charges for federal 
projects in states. Therefore, transfers that are supposed to be received in the current 
fiscal year, actually arrive two years later. In other words, the amount of transfers 
received by the states in the current fiscal year actually takes into account changing 
indicators and events that occurred in the last two financial years. The two years lag 
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effect is due to the time taken to internalise the changing indicators used in the design of 
grants, as well as the long auditing process involved (see Chapter 4). 
For independent variables, a set of eight variables were selected, that is, the federal 
government revenue, federal government expenditure, state governments' revenue, state 
governments' expenditure, national GDP, population, dummy states' financial position, 
and dummy variable of political affiliation. ' The data for these variables (except the 
dummy variable of political party) were obtained from secondary sources (see below). 
The dummy variable of political affiliation was selected due to the fact that the federal- 
state fiscal operations, in particular federal transfers, are influenced by the political 
operation of the federation. Dummy variables are variables that take values of either 0 or 
1, and are used to indicate the presence or absence of one or more qualitative 
characteristics. In other words, dummy variables quantify or measure qualitative 
variables that are not measurable but their presence in the model is considered as 
significant, such as states' financial position (deficit or surplus) and the political variable 
(affiliation or non-affiliation). The use of dummy variables enables other independent 
variables, that is, non-metric qualitative data, to be transformed into metric quantitative 
data in the regression. The coefficient of a dummy variable in a regression equation 
shows the average effect on the dependent variable when the dummy variable assumes 
the value 1. In sum, the regression equation [ii] hypothesised that federal transfers to the 
state governments (TI) are a function of federal government revenue (XI), federal 
government expenditure (X2), state governments' own source of revenue (X3), state 
governments expenditure (X4), national GDP (X5), size of population (X6), state 
governments' financial position (X7), and political variables (Xg). To meet to the purpose 
of this analysis, the degree of ' linear dependence of federal transfers (TI) on eight 
The purpose of taking the political dummy variable is to investigate whether or not the federal 
government transfers to state governments are associated with political affiliation. See Rao and Singh 
(2000), and Khemani (2002) for discussion on the significance of the dummy of political affiliation 
variable in the determination of federal transfers. 
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federal transfers that can be explained by linear dependence upon those eight independent 
variables operating jointly. 
For Model 2, the assumption is that the ability of the state governments to take up the 
constitutionally assigned functions is subject to the states' own sources of revenue and 
transfers from the federal government. The aim is to examine the significance of federal 
transfers to the state governments' finance. For this purpose, the state governments' 
expenditure was used as a dependent variable while the independent variables were state 
governments' own sources of revenue (XI), and federal transfers / grants (X2), as shown 
in equation [iii]. 
1nYt =a+ ßilnXlt + ß21nX2t [ iii ] 
Where: 
InYt = log state government expenditure (STEXP) 
InXtt = log state government own source revenue (STREV) 
InX2t = log federal government transfers (FGTF) 
5.4 The Data 
The data used in the regression analysis are based on the time series secondary data, 
which were obtained from the various government official documents and publications, 
namely, the Ministry of Finance's Economic Report, the State Financial Statements, the 
Five-Year Malaysian Plans and the Department of Statistics. These data were collected to 
cover the 31-year period of Malaysia's economic planning (1970 to 2000). 2 The year 
1970 is significant because the New Economic Policy (NEP) was implemented in that 
year following the 1969 racial crisis, which was the turning point in the direction of 
Malaysia's socio-economic policy. Using 31 years observation would help to analyse the 
2 Malaysian economic planning is implemented ' thröugh five-year plans, that is, First Malaysian Plan 
(1966-1970), Second Malaysian Plan (1971-1975), Third Malaysian Plan (1976-1980), Fourth Malaysian 
Plan (1981-1985), Fifth Malaysian Plan (1986-1990), Sixth Malaysian Plan (1991-1995), and Seven 
Malaysian Plan (1996-2000). From 2001 to 2005, the economic is progressing under the Eighth Malaysian 
Plan. 
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year following the 1969 racial crisis, which was the turning point in the direction of 
Malaysia's socio-economic policy. Using 31 years observation would help to analyse the 
actual pattern of the subject under study. The data on the federal government finance, that 
is, revenue, expenditure and federal transfers to the state government, were compiled 
from the Ministry of Finance's Annual Economic Report and the Accountant General 
Office. The data on gross domestic product (GDP) were also compiled from the Ministry 
of Finance's Annual Economic Report, while data on population were obtained from 
population census of the Department of Statistics, Malaysia. The state government data, 
namely, revenue, expenditure and financial position, were compiled from the individual 
state government financial statements and then transformed into consolidated form (See 
Appendix vi and Appendix vii). 
5.5 The results 
5.5.1 Model 1: The determinants of federal transfers 
The application of multiple regression analysis in Model 1 aimed at examining the main 
determinants of federal transfers to the states using the four propositions mentioned in 
section 5.2. Thus, the focus of the regression was to evaluate the strength of the 
dependence of federal transfers upon independent variables. The prerequisite conditions 
for this regression to be significant are that the relationship between dependent and set of 
independent variables should be linear and the value of R2 should be significantly 
different from zero. The result from this regression shows that the value of R2 is 0.986, 
which suggests that the variation in federal transfers was totally explained by the set of 
independent variables used in the regression jointly. Expressed differently, the value of 
R2 in this model indicates that the independent variables used in this model are valid, in 
that the relationship between dependent variable and independent variables is linear and 
the data used are normally distributed (see Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2). As such, the result 
from this model is statistically significant and reliable in investigating the relationships 
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between dependent variable and independent variables. Furthermore, the analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), which tests whether the two variables (dependent variable and a set 
of independent variables) have a linear relationship, indicates that the data used fits the 
model. The ANOVA result as presented in Table 5.1 shows that the F value is high and 
significant. Hence, the model is highly significant, indicating a linear relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables. 
Table 5.1 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Table' 
Model I Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 2.862 8 0.358 170.639 
. 
000 
Residual 0.042 20 0.002 
Total 2.903 28 
a Dependent Variable: log fgmlag2 
b Predictors: (Constant), natural log SGEXP, dummy state fin position, dummy political affiliation, 
natural log POP, natural log FGEXP, natural log SGREV, natural log FGREV, natural log GDP 
Source: SPSS output 
Figure 5.1 
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual 
Dependent Variable: Federal Transfers 
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0.00 
. 25 . 50 . 75 1.00 
Observed Cum Prob 
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Figure 5.2 
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The result of the regression Model 1 using regression equation [ii] is presented as 
follows: 
Table 5.2 
Result of Model 1 
(t statistic in parenthesis) 
... ý. .............. ý,........,..,..,......,.,. 
Variable 
1nTft_2 Federal transfers (lag 2) 
lnXlt Federal government revenue (FGREV) 
1nX2t Federal government expenditure (FGEXP) 
lnX3t State government own source revenue (STREV) 
inX4t State government expenditure (STEXP) 
lnXst GDP 
1nX6t Population (POPVAR) 
X7t Dummy variables of state governments 
financial position (STFINPOS) 
variables (POLVAR) 
Xst Dummy variable of political affiliation -0.458 
. ý. wý. w...,... ý..,.,,.. ý..,.,,. a,,, ý,,,,,,,,... ýý,. ý... ý,...,,,.., ý, ý,,., V,,..,.. , M,,. 
RZ=0.986 DW=2.32 
Coefficient 
1.166 
(3.959) 
0.488 
(1.001) 
0.304 
(1.175) 
0.709 
(2.844) 
-0.665 
(-2.440) 
-0.569 
(-1.116) 
0.330 
(0.967) 
-0.070 
(-1.923) 
(-6.620) 
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This result shows that the intercept (a) is 1.166, which means that if all independent 
variables are held constant, that is, assuming no influence by all independent variables, 
the total federal transfers to the state governments amount to 1.166. However, the 
presence of independent variables has different effects on federal transfers. Now, the 
effect of each independent variable on federal transfers will be examined, to see whether 
it could substantiate the propositions. Since all independent variables used in regression 
were measured in the same units (using natural log, except for the dummy variables), it is 
therefore able to determine the relative importance of each independent variable by 
looking at the standardised regression coefficient beta (ß) of each independent variable in 
equation [iii]. 
1. As the federal government has been assigned exclusive revenue sources, higher 
federal revenue should be extended to the states in the form of grants. 
This proposition is logical, due to the fact that the Federal Constitution assigned 
unlimited and productive revenue sources to the federal government (Chapter 3). As 
such, if considering the federal spirit in the design of transfers, then a `considerable' 
amount of grants (based on needs) should be extended to the states as part of political 
contract in the federation. However, as evident in this regression, the regression 
coefficient of the federal government revenue (FGREV=X1) did not strongly support the 
above proposition. The regression coefficient of FGREV is 0.488. However, the value of 
the t statistic is low, 1.001. In other words, theoretically, with every unit increase in the 
total federal government revenue, federal transfers would increase by only 0.49 units. 
Virtually, the variable FGREV is not a key determinant of federal transfers. This is 
evident, as the federal government did not consider their revenue performance as a main 
consideration in giving out grants to the states, as the average of the federal transfers 
received by the state governments over the period 1970-2000 was only 4% of the total 
federal government revenue (see Table 4.20 and earlier observation discussed in Chapter 
4). Hence, in terms of policy decision-making, the design of federal transfers should 
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consider the growth of the federal government revenue although some transfers, such as, 
the Revenue Growth Grant, have taken into account the federal government revenue 
performance (see Chapter 4). Similarly, the regression coefficient of the federal 
government expenditure (FGEXP=X2) has a low value, that is, 0.304, with an 
accompanying t statistic of 1.175. Statistically, this result suggests that the variable 
FGEXP also does not significantly influence the decision-making on federal transfers to 
the state governments. 
2. Federal transfers should take into consideration the difficulties of the states in 
raising revenue, growing fiscal needs, increasing population, and the state's 
overall financial position, as a fiscal gap continues to exist, even with federal 
transfers. 
This proposition suggests that federal transfers to the states should be able to close up the 
revenue-expenditure gap that results from the division of power and revenue assignment 
between the federal and state governments, growing expenditure, increasing population, 
and the overall state financial position. A proof of this proposition can be seen from the 
variables of the state governments' own source of revenue (STREV=X3), the state 
governments' expenditure (STEXP=X4), population (POPVAR=X6), and the states' 
financial position (STFINPOS=X7) used in the regression. 
The regression coefficient of the state governments' own source of revenue (STREV=X3) 
is 0.709 with an accompanying t statistic of 2.884, Statistically, this result implies that if 
the state governments' revenue increases by one unit, the total federal transfers to the 
states would increase by 0.709. Although this result may suggest that any increases in the 
state governments revenue will be followed by the substantial increase in federal 
transfers, but it still not help the states to ease difficulties to finance the expenditures, 
especially in times of economic downturn. This is because federal transfers increase in 
line with increases in the states' own sources of revenue. This demonstrates that there is 
no built-in mechanism in the design of federal transfers. Looking at the difficulty of the 
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states to raise revenue, there should be an inverse relationship between the two variables. 
In other words, when the states' own sources of revenue decline (due to the difficulty 
states have in raising revenue), federal transfers should be increased to counterweight the 
states' revenue-expenditures gap. This is why the current practice of federal transfers 
fails to eliminate financial discrepancies between the states, as a fiscal gap remains 
occurs even with federal transfers. 
To make matter worse, there is also statistical evidence that the federal transfers did not 
take into account the states fiscal needs. The regression coefficient of the state 
governments' expenditure (STEXP=X4) does not support the proposition that federal 
transfers actually take into consideration states' fiscal needs. The regression coefficient 
for the state governments' expenditure is -0.665 and statistically reliable as the t statistic 
is higher, at -2.440, which is significant at the 95% level of confidence. This shows that 
for every increase in the state governments' expenditure, the amount of federal transfers 
to the states is reduced significantly by 0.665. The inverse relationship between the state 
governments expenditure and federal transfers shows that the design of federal transfers 
does not consider the fiscal or financial needs of the state governments to finance their 
expenditure (see Table 4.11 of Chapter 4). Theoretically, when the states' fiscal needs 
increase, federal transfers should also increase correspondingly. Thus, in terms of policy 
implications, the federal government should look at the size of the state governments' 
expenditure in the design of federal transfers, recognising the fact that the state 
governments' revenue-raising powers are limited. 
The variable states' financial position (STFINPOS=X7) is also inversely related to federal 
transfers, as the regression coefficient for STFINPOS is - 0.070 (with at statistic of 
1.923). This finding tells us that there is statistical evidence that the design of federal 
transfers as a whole does not consider the states' overall financial position. This is in line 
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with the finding discussed in Chapter 4, which indicates that the existing grants system 
does not consider the states' overall financial position (except in the case of grant from 
the State Reserve Fund which was designed to help states having current account 
deficits). Hence, the overall design of transfers does not attempt to negate revenue- 
expenditure mismatch. Perhaps the main reason for this is that the federal government is 
determined to undertake nationwide development in all states in line with its role of `care 
taker' of the states. 
The regression coefficient of variable population (POPVAR=X6) also does not strongly 
support the above proposition. Increasing population should significantly contribute to 
higher grants to the states. Theoretically, increasing population means growing state 
expenditures for public services. However, the impact of the variable population 
(POPVAR=X6) is not statistically significant. This means with every increase in the size 
of population, the amounts of transfers increase but only slightly, as shown by the low 
regression coefficient of this variable (1i _ 0.330). This result implies that the variable 
population does not significantly influence the amount of transfers, as shown in the case 
of the Capitation Grant, and grant based on level of economic development provided 
under the State Reserve Fund (see Chapter 4). 
3. The growth in GDP does not influence the decisions in making transfers to the 
states 
It is noticeable that the states' expenditure pattern does not correspond to the national 
GDP. As discussed in Chapter 4, during periods of high national economic growth, the 
states' expenditure recorded lower growth as compared to the federal government's 
expenditure. One reason is that the federal government, with its extensive revenue 
sources, was responsible for most fiscal policy, especially the stabilisation function, 
while the states with limited revenue sources found it difficult to respond immediately to 
economic growth without relying on the federal government for funds. In other words, 
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whether the national GDP growth is higher or lower does not significantly stimulate the 
states to embark on higher investment projects. This is because the state governments' 
expenditures are mainly for the maintenance of public facilities. As such, it is not 
surprising that the state governments' finance, collectively, does not benefit much from 
growth in GDP. From the federal government point of view, therefore, there is no reason 
why federal transfers should be increased (when there is an increase in national GDP) 
since the state governments' expenditure bears little relationship with GDP. As a result, 
the state governments' own sources of revenue are not elastic to GDP growth compared 
to those of the federal government revenue. This is because the state governments' 
revenues mainly comprise land-based taxes and non-tax revenue (mainly royalties 
payment), which do not correspond to the growth in GDP (see discussion on the state 
government revenue in Chapter 4). 
As expected, the regression coefficient of the variable Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP=XS) is negative (ß =-0.569). Statistically this coefficient suggests that if GDP 
increases, the amount of federal transfers declines. Therefore, this result supports the 
above proposition that the growth in national GDP does not influence the decisions in 
making transfers to the states, as the coefficient of variable GDP is inversely related to 
the federal transfers. This means the GDP growth does not much contribute to the federal 
transfers, although some transfers take into account the variable GDP as one of the 
indicators in the design of grants, such as the grant based on level of economic 
development provided under the State Reserve Fund. Indeed, this finding supports the 
arguments that the state governments in Malaysia are not assigned or expected to 
undertake fiscal policy, as the spending behaviour of the state governments is not 
influenced by national GDP. However, the reliability of this coefficient is dubious, as the 
accompanying t statistic is not significant (-1.116). In terms of policy-making, 
consideration should be given to the importance of this variable in the design of transfers 
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4. The disbursements of federal transfers to the states are subject to the states' 
political affiliation with the centre. If the states ruling party is not politically 
affiliated with the centre, the grants will not come in the normal way. 
Initial analysis shows that the states' political affiliation with the centre political party 
determines the posture of the federal-state fiscal relations and therefore significantly 
influences the working of fiscal federalism. From empirical analyses in this chapter, it 
proves that the above proposition is statistically convincing. In other words, if states are 
not affiliated with the federal level politics, the conduct of fiscal federalism is difficult. 
The regression coefficient of the dummy variable of political affiliation (POLVAR) is 
significant (ß _-0.458) with a high value of the t statistics (6.620), and significant at the 
99% level of confidence. This result suggests that federal transfers (and wider aspects of 
fiscal federalism) are influenced by the degree of political affiliation of the states with the 
federal level politics. This is notably evident as the disbursements of federal transfers are 
not forthcoming smoothly to the states led by a political party different from that of the 
centre. This finding also supports the study by Yusoff (1998), which revealed that the 
federal government in some instances control the disbursement of transfers, especially in 
the states led by the opposition party. Although this result seem akin to other empirical 
findings obtained in other federations, in particular the US and India, 3 however, their case 
is not as bad as Malaysia's, in the sense that grants are not used to coerce and undermine 
the states' existence. This is due to strong federal and democratic culture in these states, 
which is an important element for federalism to flourish. 
5.5.2 Model 2: The significance of federal transfers 
The result of Model 2 suggests that, statistically, there is a significant relationship 
between the dependent variable (state governments' expenditure) and independent 
variables (state government's own sources of revenue, and federal transfers). This result 
also indicates that the relationship between the dependent variable and independent 
3 For instance, for India, see Dasgupta, Dhillon and Duta (2001), and for the US see Grossman (1994). 
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variables (state government's own sources of revenue, and federal transfers). This result 
also indicates that the relationship between the dependent variable and independent 
variables is linear, as the values of F statistics and R2 are high: 839.3 and 0.984 
respectively. The data used are normally distributed as depicted in Figure 5.3 and Figure 
5.4. 
Figure 5.3 
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual 
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The result of the multiple regressions in Model 2, using regression equation [iii], can be 
summarised as follows: 
Yt = 0.602 + 0.864X1+ 0.132X, a ......... 
[iv] 
(3.140) (9.263) (1.415) 
R2 = 0.984; Adjusted R2 = 0.982 
F= 839.3; F Sig. = 0.00 
DW= 1.465 
This result indicates that the intercept ((x) is 0.602, meaning that if all independent 
variables (states' own source of revenue and federal transfers) are held constant, the 
consolidated state governments' expenditure amounts to 0.602, with a significant t 
statistic (3.140). However, the independent variables (state governments' own sources of 
revenue and federal transfers), gave different values of coefficient beta (ß) to the 
regression equation. 
For the state governments' revenue (X1), the regression coefficients indicate a positive 
relationship with the state expenditure and states own sources of revenue, as indicated by 
the standardised coefficient beta (ß) at 0.864. This means that every increase in the state 
governments' own sources of revenue could stimulate an extra 0.864 units to the state 
governments' expenditure. Note that the t value for this variable is also significant at 
9.263, significant at the 95% level of confidence. This implies that the state governments' 
expenditure, taken as a whole, is significantly dependent on their revenue performance to 
finance their expenditure. 
On the other hand, the federal government transfers (X2), has a coefficient of 0.132. 
Theoretically, every one unit increase in the federal transfers would result in an increase 
of 0.132 units in the state governments' expenditure. However, the correlation between 
federal transfers and the states expenditure is not significant at the 95% level of 
confidence, as the value of the t statistic is low (1.415). This shows that the state 
governments do not significantly benefit from federal transfers. This result also suggests 
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that there was no `flypaper effect' from the federal transfers to states. According to the 
theory concerning the effect of grants, the flypaper effect is present when the grant 
received by the state `sticks where it hits'. 4 Theoretically, the flypaper effect suggests that 
grants should not only contribute to the increase in public spending but more importantly, 
grants should increase private income. This is because, with the federal grants, the states 
will reduce taxes imposed on its citizens to finance the expenditure needs, and as a result, 
private income should increase (as burden to pay taxes reduces). However, all empirical 
studies on the flypaper effect found in the literature show a consistent finding that grants 
boost public spending more than an equivalent increase in private income (Knight, 2000). 
Nevertheless, in the case of Malaysia's grants system, the flypaper effect is not present, 
due to the fact that the amount of grants is too small for the flypaper effect to take place, 
let alone to have an effect on private income. This is because the states have limited 
taxing power except in regard to taxes on land-based economic activities (see Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4). Thus, in terms of policy implications, federal transfers should be 
strengthened to ensure that the state governments are able to discharge their 
constitutional functions effectively. However, thus far, the grants received by the state 
government only represent a very small proportion of the federal government revenue, on 
average about 4% of the federal government revenue between 1970-1999, which is 
considered too small for the state governments, compared with the rate of increase in the 
federal government revenue during the same period. Although some types of grant were 
revised during this period (see discussion on types of grants in Chapter 4), much still 
needs to be done, especially due to the increase in the cost of provision and maintenance 
of public services and the rapid increase in the state expenditures as a result of growing 
urbanisation. 5 
See, for instance, Gramlich (1977); Oates (1994); Hines and Thaler (1995); and Bailey and Connolly 
(1998) for further discussion on the flypaper effect. 
See also MOFER (1992). 
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To summarise, the finding from Model 2 strongly suggests that the state governments' 
own sources of revenue and federal transfers have significant effects on the state 
governments' expenditure. However, the effect of federal transfers is less significant, as 
the amount of transfers is small. As such, the hypothesis that the state governments' 
expenditure is dependent on the state governments' revenue and federal government 
transfers (grants) cannot be rejected. Therefore, this result suggests a policy consideration 
for fiscal adjustment, in that reassignment of revenue resources needs to be considered in 
the future, since the state governments' expenditure is growing, as reflected in the 
increases in total expenditure as compared with their revenue. If measures are not taken 
to improve current revenue assignment, the state governments will continue to depend on 
the federal government for grants to finance most of their expenditures. This will 
seriously affect the federal government's budgetary position. However, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 7, reassignment of revenue sources is not possible at the present 
time, as the centre is reluctant to reassign / decentralise its taxing power, on the grounds 
that the federal government is committed to taking charge of the national economic 
development. Alternatively, restructuring the present transfers system is necessary to 
improve the state governments' financial position. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Fiscal imbalance requires remedy from the federal government, as most productive 
resources and revenue raising power are centralised. Thus, federal transfers are important 
sources of finance for the states to undo any fiscal discrepancies. Analysis of the federal 
and states' revenue in Chapter 4 indicates that the state governments' capability to 
undertake their constitutionally assigned functions is very strongly dependent on their 
own sources of revenue and transfers from the federal government. As the states' own 
sources of revenue are limited, federal transfers are essential. However, as evident, 
federal transfers are ineffective in bringing about fiscal equalising effects, and the 
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amounts of transfers are relatively small as compared to the amounts of revenue collected 
by the federal government. 
The foregoing empirical analyses support the proposition that the federal government 
having strong revenue-raising power should extend more funds to the states in the form 
of grants or expenditures. Regression analysis on the significance of federal transfers to 
the state governments' finance also supports the hypothesis that there is a strong 
relationship between the state governments' expenditure and state governments' own 
sources of revenue and federal transfers. As such, the reassignment of revenue sources 
and design of federal transfers should take into consideration the difficulties of the states 
in raising revenue, their growing fiscal needs, increasing population, and the state overall 
financial position, as a fiscal gap continues to exist even with federal transfers. At the 
same time, transfer system should takes into account the growth of national GDP, so that 
the states could participate in the mainstream economic development. By doing so, the 
states' revenue could benefit from GDP growth. More importantly, the disbursements of 
federal transfers should not be subject to the states political affiliation with the centre, as 
this would undermine the states' fiscal autonomy and the federal spirit. Based on this 
finding, the influence of political system on the working of fiscal federalism will be 
investigated in depth in Chapter 6 of the thesis. 
Although the federal government revenue performance is important in making decision 
on transfers, the amount of transfers is still far too low despite significant increases in the 
federal government revenue collection. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 4, federal 
transfers are not intended to eliminate financial non-correspondence or the states' fiscal 
discrepancies. Besides, not all transfers are made on stable formulae and there is no built- 
in corrective mechanism in the design of federal transfers, to keep pace with changing 
economic conditions. As Rao and Singh suggested, `a formula of intergovernmental 
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transfers should be equitable, simple, transparent, and perceived to be objective' (Rao 
and Singh, 2000: 11). Thus, the federal government should look into this problem in 
order to strengthen the state governments' finance. 
In light of those shortcomings, the federal government should have the courage to revise 
the existing transfers system and the assignment of revenue sources (tax and non-tax 
sources) to the state governments, insofar as there are no counter-effects on the 
stabilisation function of the federal government fiscal policy. Ideally, the review of the 
existing transfer system should devise a system of transfers that could encourage the 
states to explore their revenue potential, promote better public expenditure management, 
eliminate financial non-correspondence, and more importantly, it is pivotal to have built- 
in corrective mechanism in the design of grants system to respond to any economics 
circumstances. The reassignment of revenue requires strong political will, due to the 
centralised nature of the Malaysian politics. The reassignment of revenue would not only 
reduce economic disparities between the states resulting from the state governments' 
scarce resources, but more importantly, it would ensure that federalism is preserved and 
continues to flourish. 
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Chapter 6 
Fiscal Federalism and the Political System: 
The Maintenance of the Single Party System 
6.1 Introduction 
Federalism is dynamic, in the sense that it is continuously changing to accommodate new 
challenges due to political development and social change, and growing socio-economic 
needs such as the demand for better public services- Therefore, federal-state relations, 
especially fiscal arrangements, are not static, due to the influence of various interlocking 
socio-economic and political factors (Simeon, 2001; Chapman, 1993; Watts, 1999a). As 
the articles in the Constitution are the result of political bargaining at the time of 
federating, they only reflect a degree of satisfaction between all members of the 
federation at that point in time. However, this degree of satisfaction cannot be sustained 
in the long-term, as new sources of changes emerge as the federation evolves. Thus, the 
initial arrangement that is embedded in the Constitution may not be working 
satisfactorily after a period of time and therefore flexibility and adjustment to 
accommodate new developments in the federation are required to produce another new 
arrangement to satisfy all members in the federation and foster amicable federal-state 
relations aimed at preserving the federation. Chapter 3 provides an analysis of how 
Malaysian fiscal federalism was designed and what functions are assigned to which level 
of government. It clearly showed that the Constitution allocated more substantial powers 
to the federal than the state governments, consistent with the underlying theme of the 
federal creation of a `strong central government'. Hence one of the most important 
questions is to what extent the federal government, having substantive power, is willing 
to accommodate new developments in the federation to reinforce the legitimacy and 
stability of the federation, as it occurred in other federations, such as in Germany 
(Jeffery, 2003a; Jeffery 2003b), Canada (Vaillancourt and Rault, 2003; Shah, 1995; 
Banting, et al., 1994), Australia (Nicholas, 2003), and India (Bhattacharyya, 2001; Rao 
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and Singh, 2000). Logically, another question that follows is: does the practice of fiscal 
federalism adhere strictly to what is enumerated in the Constitution? As Alain Gagnon 
argues, federalism is not there to resolve all conflicts but to manage them and `the 
success of federal systems is not to be measured in terms of elimination of social 
conflicts but instead in their capacity to regulate and manage such conflicts' (Gagnon, 
1993: 18). Initial observations reveal that the government of the day has no capacity to 
regulate and manage conflicts according to the federal spirit, for political reasons, which 
turn out to be the major impediment to the proper working of fiscal federalism in 
Malaysia. This is the central theme of this chapter. In the discussions on Malaysian 
politics that follow, the intention is not to denounce Malaysian politics, but rather to 
identify those points that affect the working of fiscal federalism. 
6.2 Political system: The impact on federal - state relations and fiscal federalism 
The conduct of fiscal federalism in Malaysia is strongly influenced by the political 
system. In Malaysia, political ramifications have significant implications for the conduct 
of federal-state relations. For this reason, the study of fiscal federalism requires an 
understanding of government and politics: the political and the party systems that have 
been adopted and adapted. The political system is the set of rules that governs the 
externalisation of political parties to the mass public, while the party system is a set of 
interactions among political parties (Stockton, 2001). Hence, the working of the political 
system and the party system is determined by the actions of political parties that operate 
within the encompassing structure of a political system that affects the whole spectrum of 
federal-state relations. 
In Malaysia, both political system and party system are crucial to ensure that the federal 
spirit continues to flourish and to shape federal -state relations. However, the question is 
what type of political and party system is most suitable for the federal system of 
government. The answer depends on the cooperative relationship within their political 
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system and political understanding between the federal and states' political parties to 
preserve federalism, as well as the history, tradition and socio-economic framework of 
the particular federation. However, the most important aspect is the spirit of keeping the 
national interest, above the narrow political agenda of the parties. As will be seen shortly, 
state government-led opposition parties were not formally `recognised' by the ruling 
party as their political operation could threaten the majority of the ruling party in 
parliament, and as a result, federal-state relations became strained. States should not be 
treated with contempt or as enemies, but as partners, regardless of which party rules the 
centre or the states. Thus, the survival of a federation is very much dependent on the 
ability of each political party to preserve and maintain the federal spirit within the 
federation. In short, political repugnance and political coercion are inappropriate for a 
federation, as any federation must be based on cooperation, participation and 
understanding between all levels of government. 
As with most constitutions, the Malaysian Constitution is silent on the subject of political 
parties. The working of the Constitution can only be understood once knowledge of the 
political system and party politics is attained. The Federal Constitution only provides 
legal boundaries within which the constituent members in the federation work. ' As noted 
above, federal-state relations are shaped by the political operations of the ruling party. 
Therefore, the best guarantee of cordial federal-state relations lies in its political 
operations and how conflicts which arise are solved (Watts, 1994; Gagnon, 1993). The 
division of powers and functions between the federal and the state governments as 
enumerated in the Constitution only provide a guideline to avoid possible clashes 
between the two levels of government. Chapman commented that `reliance on a 
1 The Federal Constitution follows the pattern of the Indian Constitution in having three Lists: the Federal, 
State and Concurrent lists (see the Ninth Schedule). Residual powers are given to states (see Article 7 of 
the Federal Constitution). These Lists are extremely comprehensive, with almost no room for clashes 
between the two levels of government. However, from these Lists, the Federal Government has far more 
powers than the states. Moreover, the Federal Government enjoys special benefits over the Concurrent 
List if clashes occur between the two levels of government (See Article 74 of the Federal Constitution). 
Indeed, the content of the Constitution provides for the supremacy of the Federal government. 
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constitutionally defined structure alone cannot ensure stability in a federations' 
(Chapman, 1993: 72). Indeed, federal-state relations are multidimensional, as they 
involve legal and constitutional as well as economic, social, political and cultural forces, 
over which the political system presides. As such, political parties and party systems are 
crucial in shaping federal- state relations. 
The political system in Malaysia is characterised as: first, heavily based on communal 
cleavages, second, regionally (state) based, and third, dominated by the one party system. 
Almost all political parties in Malaysia reflect a communal bias. Milne (1967) noted that, 
`because of the communal nature of politics in Malaya [and Malaysia] all parties face 
the dilemma. If they do not try to appeal to a particular community or communities, they 
will lose support to parties which do make this type of appeal. It would seem that non- 
communal parties cannot hope to survive, while communal parties might have some 
difficulty in winning a majority' (Milne, 1967: 87). 
Due to this, consociational arrangements in the Malaysian political system are inevitable 
in that power-sharing between communally based political parties is entrenched. 2 In 
1974, a grand coalition of communally based political parties was formed, known as the 
Barisan Nasional (the National Front (BN)), the forerunner of the Alliance Party formed 
in 1952. Although there are other political parties formed on a non-communal basis, their 
support was less widespread compared to that of parties formed on the basis of 
communal divides. This is because each communally based party is fighting for its 
respective community's interests in the federation and therefore does not seek support 
from other communities. The three major components of the BN are the United Malays 
National Organisation (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the 
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). 3 As the names indicate, all these parties appealing to 
2 See Ismail (2003), Lijhpart (1977). 
3 UMNO was formed in 1946 by Onn Jaafar in Johor Bahru, primarily to organise Malay opposition to the 
Malayan Union. Malay political consciousness arose during the Japanese occupation of Malaya (1942- 
1943). `Although the Japanese Occupation was destructive and brought about hardship and misery to the 
people, it did awaken the political consciousness among the people which stimulated some desire for 
national independence. It acted as a catalyst for the emergence and development of nationalism in 
Malaya, especially Malays whose nationalism later became the basis of nationalism' (Sabaruddin, 1978: 
18). Further discussion on UMNO can be found in Ahmad Fawzi (1992). The Japanese occupation also 
witnessed the rising of Chinese and Indian politics, eventually resulting in the formation of the Malaysian 
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its own community - UMNO looking after the Malay interests, MCA for Chinese 
interests and MIC for Indian interests. Due to this reason, communal clashes will easily 
turn to political chaos. However, with the formation of the coalition party (the BN) 
communal interests are accommodated to minimise conflicts. But, even so, the coalition 
of communal parties is also not spared internal clashes of interest: 
`the strains and stress inside the Alliance are considerable. Each of the two main 
partners, the UMNO and MCA in particular, has to meet the competition of parties 
appealing to its own community, while trying to keep in step with its component 
partners. This may result in pressures which tend to disrupt the component party' (Milne, 
1967: 87). 
In most cases, the clashes arose between UMNO and MCA, especially with regard to the 
issues of language, education and Malays' rights, as can be seen over the issue of a 
proposal to use English language for Science and Mathematics subjects in schools, about 
which some quarters in MCA remain sceptical- However, the BN has been able to 
accommodate this political difference without any serious political instability. { In this 
regard, Michael Leifer (1973: 176) argued, 
`In the case of Malaysia, communal allegiance has dominated the character of the 
political system albeit in a context where no one race commands an absolute majority and 
where viable and effective government is possible only through some form of inter- 
communal accommodation. In such circumstances any political grouping which seeks 
through such accommodation, to command the middle ground of politics is vulnerable to 
challenge from parties which rest on an exclusively communal base'. 
The record of the BN as a coalition of communally based parties proves that the claim 
made by Michael Leifer is irrefutable. Since independence, the BN and its predecessor 
(the Alliance Party) have dominated the party system and have survived to the present 
day. According to Barraclough, `one of the most significant characteristics of BN (and its 
predecessor the Alliance Party) has been their ability under the leadership of UMNO to 
maintain a high degree of cohesion between their component parties' (Barraclough: 1985: 
33). As such, the BN has been able to maintain a majority in Parliament since 1957 and 
Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Association (MIC). In 1955, the Alliance swept 
the first general election, winning 51 of the 52 elected seats in the still colonial, partially appointed 
legislature. The Alliance ministers then proceeded to negotiate the terms by which peaceful 
independence was secured from the British on 31'` August 1957. 
a See Utusan Malaria, 23d August 2002, `Action against people turning English into a racial issue'. 
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has been able to bring the Malaysian economy up to its present level. In Malaysia, the 
parties' coalition does much good work and indeed buttresses political stability, shaping 
federal-state relations and the upholding the ability to maintain and preserve federalism 
and federation due to the domination of the BN led by UMNO. As such, the assurance of 
cordial federal-state relations is dependent on the quality and creativity of centre political 
leadership from UMNO, it being the largest component of the BN and the most 
influential in the government. 
Apart from communal cleavage, the political parties in Malaysia are also characterised as 
regionally / state-based. However, some political parties extend beyond state boundaries, 
as demonstrated by UMNO, which established a branch in Sabah in February 1991. The 
move by UMNO to expand its wing to Sabah was primarily to capture the state of Sabah 
from the Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) after the PBS was expelled from the BN and became 
the opposition party. The PBS won Sabah in the 1985 state election and subsequently in 
the 1990 state elections. 5 The strong support for the PBS was based on race and religious 
issues, the ceding of Labuan Island to the federal government, Filipino illegal 
immigrants, and the restoration of Sabah's rights over `twenty- points' (see Sabah 
twenty-points in Appendix iii). 
The multi party coalition, as demonstrated by the BN, has developed as an effective 
mechanism for the accommodation of Malaysia's communally diverse political elite, and, 
since independence, has never lost power, at least at the national level. 6 As explained 
above, the amicable federal-state relations since independence are to some extent the 
outcome of political cohesion / congruence at federal and state levels, that is, the 
S Note that PBS is a state opposition party which successfully won Sabah from the Parti Berjaya, the 
Barisan Nasional (BN) component parties, in the 1985 state election. In 1986 PBS joined the BN. 
However PBS was in the BN only fora short while; it was expelled from the BN in 1990. In 1994 
UMNO successfully won Sabah after defeating PBS. See Yusoff (1998) especially Chapter 5, Vejai 
(1998), Ongkili (1992), Puthucheary (1985). 
6 Except in the 1969 general election when Penang fell to the opposition party (Gerakan), Sabah (1985 and 
1990), Kelantan (1959,1990,1995,1999,2004), and Terengganu (1999), 
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dominance of the BN led by UMNO. However, conflict between the BN and state 
governments led by opposition parties has arisen, as is evident with Gerakan in Penang 
(1959-1964) (Gerakan is now a member of the BN); PAS in Kelantan (1959-1978,1990- 
present); PBS in Sabah (1985-1994) which was initially a member of the BN but 
withdrew from the coalition in the 1990 general election, resulting in strained and tense 
federal-state relations; and PAS in Terengganu (1999-2004). Although there are instances 
where conflicts emerged within the same political congruence, that is, between the 
federal and state governments, both controlled by UMNO, 7 conflicts within the same 
party are less severe and do not threaten federal-state relations as much as conflicts 
between different parties. 
Another factor that contributes to cordial federal-state relations is the strong central 
government power `bestowed' by the Constitution, which enables the federal government 
to dominate and control the states by various means of federal intervention in states' 
affairs. As noted above, the centralisation of executive power has enabled the centre to 
discipline state political leaders by various federal interventions (political, economic and 
financial) to keep the states tied to the centre. As noted by Chin (1997), there are three 
degrees of federal intervention - `mild intervention' (with the federal government 
typically co-opting local leaders); `mid-intervention' (with the federal authorities using a 
mixture of administrative pressures like the Internal Security Act (ISA)5 and financial 
rewards to lure opposition politicians to the BN); and finally `direct intervention', by the 
declaration of a state of emergency. Apart from these interventions, the use of the police 
7 
8 
For example, conflicts involving the UMNO dominated Pahang government and the UMNO dominated 
Federal government over the issue of the Endau-Rompin National Park, which finally witnessed the 
expulsion of the Pahang Menteri Besar. For further discussion on this issue, see Shafruddin (1987) 
especially Chapter 9. 
The Internal Security Act (ISA) was established in 1960 initially to enable detention without trial, for an 
indefinite time, of those involved in communist activities. However, with the end of the communist 
threat, the ISA was used to detain any `elements' of threat to the public order (including politicians, and 
now terrorists in the war against terrorism since September 11th, 2001) if the Government feels that their 
action may cause a threat to national security (see Rais Yatim, 1994). At present, there is a strong 
movement in Malaysia pressing the government to abolish this Act (see www. abolishisa. com) 
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force9 by the federal government in the name of `public law and order', as well as federal 
bureaucrats in states, 1° also contributes to the ability of the ruling party to control states' 
political behaviour. Indeed, the whole structure of government administration is tailored 
and geared towards the continued maintenance of a `strong central government'. All 
forms of federal intervention, coupled with the federal government's financial strength 
due to its exclusive control over revenue sources relative to state governments, are factors 
that give the federal government political advantages, enabling the centre to bring its 
political rivals to heel and subsequently maintain Malaysia's political stability. Yusoff 
(1998: 26) commented that: 
`national leaders [federal executive] were basically unwilling to accept the fact that the 
State was under the control of a party which was not an integral part of the ruling Barisan 
Nasional coalition. They thus sometimes behaved in a manner going beyond the bounds 
of federal principles by using whatever powers they had at their disposal to undermine a 
state government'. 
This political parochialism causes strains in federal-state relations, in particular in dealing 
with leaders of the opposition parties (Ongkili, 1992). 
If the arguments developed above are correct, then the conflict between the federal 
Government and the government of Terengganu over petroleum royalties payments, as 
will be discussed in the following section, may be partly due to the manifestation of the 
BN's, (in particular UMNO's), fear of the possible spread of PAS influence. As a result, 
`when a state was not viewed as being in line with the priorities of the federal ; leaders, 
clearly it risked becoming a target for financial sanction' (Yusoff, 1998: 233) and as 
such, `states under the control of parties not in agreement with the priorities of the central 
leadership have tended to develop much slower than states remaining loyal to the central 
ruling coalition' (Yusoff, 1998: 19). Thus, the strained relations involving the federal 
government and the state of Terengganu over the issue of petroleum royalties are the 
9 For a fuller discussion on the role of the Royal Malaysian Police in maintaining federal-states relations, 
see Zakaria Ahmad (1987b). 
10 See Shafruddin (1987) and Zakaria Ahmad (1987). 
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manifestation of the above two conflicting forces. This results in severe fiscal difficulties 
for states, a price to be paid for not obeying `the master'. Thus, if the opposition parties 
are weak, they will become the target of federal political leaders' allegations that the 
opposition parties do not have credibility to rule or to bring wealth to the states 
concerned. Such assertions would easily influence the hearts and minds of the people. 
As the largest component in the BN and most influential in the government, UMNO is of 
particular interest with regard to federal-state relations. According to Milne and Mauzy 
(1978: 217), `one must look within the coalitions to find the key to the dominant party 
system: the key is UMNO'. Of particular importance, the Prime Minister is selected from 
UMNO, although it is not written in the Constitution that this must be the case. 
Traditionally, the Prime Minister was also the president of the BN, the overarching title 
of the coalition party. The power of the Prime Minister is such that the Menteri Besar or 
Chief Minister of each BN controlled state has to be approved by him. Barraclough 
(1988: 9) claims, 
The Prime Minister from the UMNO has considerable powers within the Barisan 
Nasional, that is, he may veto the candidate for election proposed by any constituent 
party, is empowered to allocate seats between the various parties, and retains the right to 
nominate the Chief Minister or Mentcri Besar in any state controlled a component party'. 
The influence of the centre on the states was further enhanced by the role of the Central 
Executive Committee of the BN in selecting `suitable' candidates to stand for election for 
seats in the Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives) as well as at the State Legislative 
Assemblies. The power of the Central Executive Council of the BN also extends to the 
removal of the Menteri Besar in a state led by a component party. This factor, coupled 
with the high concentration of financial resources held by the BN at the centre, has made 
the candidates, especially those with little personal resources, dependent on the 
contributions from headquarters. According to Milne and Ratnam (1965: 193), `the 
parties in Malaysia are highly centralised in the sense that party discipline is strong.. . and 
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the selection of candidates [to stand for election] is subject to some central control'. As a 
result, communal allegiance is strong in the Malaysian political, system. Thus, all Menteri 
Besar and Chief Ministers from the BN are selected from candidates who have a good 
track record in the party, so that they will not create unwelcome disturbances for the 
leadership. In other words, they must show undivided loyalty to the party and, as a 
reward, if they lose their seat in the election, they may still enter Parliament as appointed 
members of the Second Chamber (Senate). As a result, political cohesion is strong in 
Malaysia. Hence, the power of allocating seats and election finances enables the national 
leaders to administer a system of rewards and punishments, according to whether a 
politician toes the line or not. Indeed the `carrot and stick' system may help a leader to 
identify candidates that are suitable for high rank in the government and reject those that 
may cause trouble to the party and government. 
The tension in federal-state relations is always motivated by the severe party competition 
to control state governments, in particular between the ruling coalition party, BN, and 
opposition parties. " This has been evident in every general election, where the 
incumbent ruling party has exerted the utmost effort to capture all the states. There are 
advantages to party competition. Among other advantages, party competition ensures the 
preservation of a democratic system of government. However, in Malaysia, as a 
prominent scholar in the field of Malaysian politics asserted, `democratic process were 
permitted only as long as they did not actually undermine the power of the ruling elite 
while they were quickly modified or abolished when elites interests were threatened' 
(Crouch, 1992: 21). As a consequence, federal political elites took whatever steps 
`considered necessary to ensure its continued control of the government' (Crouch, 1992: 
21), as seen in the case of the payment of petroleum royalties to the Terengganu 
" Except in the case of Singapore which, when it was part of Malaysia, attempted to control the Federal 
Government, which was against LJMNO policy, and finally resulted in Singapore being expelled from the 
Federation in 1965. 
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government. Therefore, party competition in Malaysia do not encourage a healthy 
political environment, because the incumbent ruling party uses `unscrupulous' 
12 means to 
overcome their opponents. This was evident during BN's attempt to win back Sabah from 
the PBS in the 1994 general election. With advanced election machinery at the national 
and state levels, as well as enormous funds and resources, BN easily overpowered PBS 
and recaptured Sabah (Chin, 1997). According to Kahin (1992) and Ongkili (1992), the 
strained relations between the federal government and Sabah during PBS's tenure (1985- 
1994) were due to the unwillingness of leaders at both levels of government to cooperate 
with one another. Thus, Sabah's state leaders sought to raise sensitive states' rights issues 
(see Sabah's Twenty Points in Appendix iii) in pursuit of their own political agendas, 
while the federal leaders were inclined to discriminate against state governments which 
were not willing to follow their dictates. 
According to Shamsul AB (1996), Mohamed Mustafa (1998) and Vejai (1998), this 
scenario took place because different political agendas were being pursued by federal and 
state political elites. 13 In particular, federal political elites14 promote the building of `a 
nation state' (negara bangsa), which is dedicated to the formation of a unitary state. 
Their view is that Malaysia should move towards one single state that is based on one 
'2'Unscrupulous means' includes money politics, media control, uses of government machinery, 
provocation, and denying `freedom to speak'. With regard to media control, an interview between A. Lin 
Neumann (Asia programme consultant of CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalist)) and Steven Gan (SG) a 
journalist from the Malaysiakini, conducted in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in November 2000, said. 
`CPJ: What's wrong with the Malaysian media? Why is it self-censored? I thought this was a 
democracy. 
SG: The mainstream media is either completely or directly owned by political parties in Malaysia, so 
in that sense there is very little room for editors to go beyond, in terms of criticizing the governing 
political parties in Malaysia. In that sense, that is what is wrong with the mainstream media. ' 
(http: //www. cpj. orglawards00/ganintcrview. html, and http: //www. malaysiakini. com) 
Other critical observations on this matter, as well as the executive supremacy of the executive power, can 
be found, for instance, from Crouch (1996), Crouch (1992), Jomo (1996), Gomez and Jomo (1997), 
Gomez (1990), Gomez (1991) and Rais Yatim (1995). 
13 Based on a discussion of Malaysian Nation-of-Intent concepts in relation to federalism with Professor 
Sahmsul A. B, Director of the Institute of the Malay World and Civilisation, National University of 
Malaysia. 
14 Political elites, according to Lapalombara (1974: 468) are composed of 'those persons who occupy 
formal government positions, and who are endowed with official authority to make political decisions'. 
`Persons' here refers to one particular group of politicians who run the government, enjoy governmental 
positions and take political decision. Political elites seek to remain in power so that they will continue to 
enjoy the privilege of being an elite. 
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culture, and one political belief. In other words, the whole idea of a unitary nation state 
promotes the renunciation of the constituent state government concept, and especially 
undermines states' rights which have been growing following escalating economic and 
political self-awareness. Thus, since independence, the Malaysian federation has 
witnessed a growing centripetal force aimed at strengthening federal political elites in 
pursuit of building a centralised nation state. Consequently, if the federal political agenda 
is challenged or under threat, the upshot is strained federal - state relations, in which all 
resources are directed to quell state opposition. This is evident in the federal- state 
relations with states controlled by the opposition party. For instance, when PBS won 
control in Sabah in 1984, the federal government launched open political confrontation 
with the Sabah government. Various instruments have been used to `overthrow' the PBS 
government. These include open political and economic attacks on PBS's credibility in 
leading Sabah. Vejai (1998: 143) identified political attacks by the federal government 
aimed at weakening the credibility of states' political elites. The federal government has 
also attempted to stop foreign investment to Sabah on the grounds that Sabah's political 
situation is not stable. Federal political elites, in alliance with some state politicians 
sympathetic to Kuala Lumpur, also accuse the PBS government of corruption and claim 
the misuse of public funds. Even the Chief Minister (Pairin Kitingan) has been accused of 
corruption by awarding contracts to a company owned by one of his relatives. Court 
action taken against him rendered his appointment as a member of the State Legislative 
Assembly null and void. However, the judge did not give the maximum sentence to him, 
which enables Pairin to continue to hold his post as Chief Minister. As expected, this 
angered federal political elites and especially the Prime Minister (Dr. Mahathir 
Mohamad), who criticised the court's decision and consequently introduced UMNO into 
Sabah to quash PBS from Sabah politics. As a result, during PBS15 government (1985- 
15 PBS was expelled from the BN in 1990 due to differences in their political goals. The federal political 
leaders claimed PBS to be Sabahans' champions by promoting its twenty-points. These federal political 
252 
1994), Sabah suffered political mayhem, which resulted in the state's financial 
difficulties. The federal government's intention was finally revealed by the Prime 
Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, in his speech to the people of Sabah during the Gaya 
Constituency by-election campaign on 11th October 2002. He revealed: 
`Of course, we give more attention (now) to Sabah because while Sabah was under the 
opposition party (PBS) Sabah did not get fair treatment or enough allocation for 
development. We need to expedite development process in Sabah. Indeed, PBS had 
realised that being an opposition nothing can be done'. 16 
What this implies is that when political hegemony is challenged by states, the states 
concerned will face severe political and economic isolation. The upshot of this situation 
is a growing anti federal sentiment among Sabahans. With the power to control the media 
and use of other federal agencies, the federal political elites put further pressure on state 
governments. The same strategy has been used in other states controlled by opposition 
parties, in Kelantan and Terengganu. Conversely, states ruled by the same political party 
as the centre have a political advantage, due to cordial political relations with the federal 
leaders, which makes it relatively easy for them to obtain financial assistance. However, 
states ruled by the opposition find it difficult to get assistance from the centre. As Pang 
Teck Wai argues `states (or state officials) which do not have good relations with the 
federal government (or federal officials) are likely to get less development funds' (Pang 
Teck Wai, 1992: 84-85). Hence, fiscal federalism only works well when `the same 
political parties have formed the government at the centre as well as in all the state 
governments' (Abdullah, 1978: 322). In other words, there will be strained relations and 
misunderstanding between the federal and the states if different political parties rule at 
federal and state levels, which will affect the working of fiscal federalism. Indeed, 
political hegemony controls the state governments. For instance, the federal government 
exercises some control over disbursement of grants and decisions concerning loans to the 
elites views as a serious threat and challenge to the federal government, in that it promoted anti-federal 
sentiment among Sabahans. However, after failing to control Sabah, PBS rejoined the BN in January 
2002. 
16 Utusan Malaysia 12d' October 2002. 
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states, as the Federal Constitution gives no guidance on when to disburse grants to states. 
Hence, if a state challenge the federal political elites, the state concerned will not get the 
benefit of federal aid, because it refuses to abide by the centre's political agenda of 
promoting the nation state concept. 
If the tension between parties runs high, especially when racial issues are involved, there 
is a threat to public order. In a plural society like Malaysia, almost every issue could turn 
into a racial one (Zakaria Ahmad, 1987b) which may be prejudicial to the national 
security interest. Consequently, under the rhetoric of public order and national unity, 
stern interventions from the centre are inevitable to ease the tension. In the past, the 
government intervened by conducting a national crackdown on the opposition party using 
popular acts - the Internal Security Act (ISA) -- or, if the situation deteriorated, the 
government may exercise17 its emergency power (Article 150 (1) which cannot be 
challenged in court (Article 150(8)). This may create political fear and a perception of 
oppression among the people and spawn the feeling of abhorrence towards the 
government. However, on a positive note, the action of the ruling coalition party can 
maintain political stability and, more importantly, maintain public law and order, since it 
is recognised that in a multi-racial community, political tension can lead to racial 
disharmony, which, if left unattended, could end in catastrophe, as experienced in the 13th 
May 1969 incident. Thus, one might question the authenticity of the government's ability 
to maintain `political stability', whether on genuine grounds of public law and order or 
purely on the ground of political threats to the incumbent ruling party's ascendancy. This 
is what described by Chin (1997) as `mid-intervention' and `direct-intervention' in state 
affairs. 
14 For instance, in 1967, an emergency was declared in Sarawak following political tension between federal 
and state government over the issue of the appointment of Sarawak's Chief Minister (see Shafruddin, 
1987). In 1978, an emergency was again declared in Kelantan over UNMO-PAS friction, which resulted 
in PAS's withdrawal from the coalition (see Muhammad Syukri, 1999). In 1987, a national crackdown 
on the opposition parties was carved out in Peninsular Malaysia to restore `public order' using the ISA. 
For further discussion on the ISA, see Rais Yatim (1994). See also Zakaria Ahmad (1982,1987a, 1987b) 
for the role of the police force in maintaining public order in Malaysia. 
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In summary, the working of fiscal federalism goes beyond matters of constitutional law. 
Although the function of each level of government is determined in the Constitution, the 
strength of federation and federalism is dependent upon the interactions of each level of 
government through institutional organisations, as well as the conduct of the political 
system and political parties; that is, to what extent they uphold the federal spirit and, most 
importantly, the Constitution. Hence, the nature of federal-state relations depends on 
which political party controls the federal and state governments. As Milne (1967) argues, 
`the best guarantee of happy federal-state relations does not lie in any constitutional 
provisions but rather in the harmonising influence of memberships of the same party' 
(Milne, 1967: 79). Therefore, what actually protects states in Malaysia is not their 
constitutional status per se, but their political legitimacy through the political affiliation 
with the governing elites at the centre. Consequently, when studying fiscal federalism, it 
is important to look at the conduct of the political system and the party systems in a 
federation. These components, individually and in their interactions, affect the whole 
spectrum of federal-state relations. 
With regard to Malaysian politics, there are three scenarios which affect the conduct of 
fiscal federalism: first, if the same political party controls the two levels of government, 
the working of fiscal federalism is relatively easy because there is no conflict of interest 
and less of an internal political power struggle. Any disputes over fiscal matters will be 
easily overcome within the party itself. In addition, if the socio-economic and cultural 
differences among the constituent governments in the federation are marginal and spread 
between members of the federation, politically insignificant, and financially dependent 
on the centre, it would be easier for both levels of government to reach an agreement. 
However, if this is the case, the tendency will be either (a) towards an expansion of 
central government policy-making, or (b) the spirit of national unity and co-operation 
255 
between units will be further enhanced. If the case (a) is prevalent, then there is a 
possibility of federal encroachment and intervention in the state competence, and states 
will be directed or subordinated to the centre. However, in most cases both forces (cases 
(a) and (b) above) are equally strong. This is where conflicts of interest between the 
federal and states, as well as between states, emerge, which needs a delicate balance of 
coalescing and conflicting forces (involving persuasion, influence, and bargaining 
process) between levels of government in the federation. 
Second, if different political parties control the two levels of government, the rivalry and 
competition between government ruling parties at federal and state levels will 
significantly influence the conduct of fiscal federalism, which may undermine the 
effectiveness of fiscal federalism. In addition, if the socio-economic and cultural 
differences among the constituent governments in the federation are significant, and 
concentrated in one state, but are politically strong, the tendency will be towards severe 
party competition. This is another source of conflict of interest, which needs a delicate 
solution within the spirit of federalism. 
The third scenario is single party dominance, as in the case of UMNO in the BN, which 
has control at both the federal and state levels. This enables the federal government to 
implement a development policy throughout the federation, whether or not within federal 
competence. Thus, the existence of a powerful federal government can be considered an 
advantage for planning and implementing socio-economic development throughout the 
federation. `The success of development planning in Malaysia can be attributed to the 
fact that state governments remain subordinate and dependent on the federal authority 
over the years' (Hadenan, 1985: 196). Single party dominance thus enables the centre to 
determine and control almost every sphere of federal-state relations. However, if different 
political parties control the two levels of government, the rivalry and competition 
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between the ruling parties at the federal level and the opposition parties at the state level 
significantly influences the conduct of fiscal federalism_ 
Alas, the federal spirit in solving federal-state conflicts is not always present, but depends 
on whether or not the states are politically affiliated to the centre. The three forces above 
explain the nature of the political system and their impact on the conduct of fiscal 
federalism in Malaysia, as well as overall federal-state relations. Thus, clearly, the 
Constitution provides only a legal `guideline' for federal-state relations; however, the 
working of this `guideline' is subject to the above forces. As a result, party competition is 
in practice severe, and, more often than not, the result is political antagonism towards 
federal political elites and the ruling party. Political antagonism could endanger 
federation, as federation qua federation is established in a spirit of cooperation, 
participation and understanding between all levels of government. Finally, the study by 
Yusoff (1998) on relations between the federal government and Kelantan led the 
opposition party (PAS) to suggest the following conclusion: 
`Firstly, the unwillingness of both parties to cooperate reflected primary competition for 
power at state level. The central government was reluctant to be cooperative for fear that 
this would simply bring advantages to the PAS in consolidating its position within 
Kelantan. Similarly, the state government was wary of cooperating with the central 
government for fear that its position in the state might be undermined by UMNO. 
Secondly, the reluctance of the central government to accept the people's right to choose 
a party other than the party that ruled at the centre (or a willing ally) was a reflection of 
an abiding insecurity of power at the centre- a fear that the seeds of autonomy vis-ä-vis 
the centre, once sewn, might take root and produce a vigorous growth that would spread 
to other states. It is because of this basic unwillingness that the central government 
punished the rakyat of Kelantan by shifting federal funds away from the centre' (Yusoff, 
1998: 234) 
The undesirable aspect of the financial dependence of states on the centre is that it has 
been used to maintain one party rule in the country. Through this mechanism, coupled 
with the centralisation of fiscal powers, the federal political elites can make state 
opposition parties fall into line with the centre. One of the arguments in favour of having 
a federal as opposed to a unitary form of government is that it enables an opposition party 
to build up its base at state level and, eventually, to win national support. However, this 
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practice does not work in Malaysia, as the federal political elites will turn down any 
attempt by any state based political party to be the champion of a state. For instance, the 
BN has campaigned against opposition parties in states on the grounds that if an 
opposition party were to win control of the state governments, the people in the states 
would suffer, as federal allocations / projects would not be forthcoming. 18 Even if they 
were forthcoming, they would be concentrated in selected areas where the ruling power 
had a stronghold. This was the strategy used by the BN to remain in control. This was 
accompanied by promises of huge projects from the federal government in the event of a 
BN victory, as proved when the BN successfully removed PBS from power in Sabah in 
1994. This argument was repeated during the campaigning for the general election in 
Kelantan in 1999 (the 10th general election), in an attempt to topple the PAS government. 
The new Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi also made similar promises in his campaign 
leading up to the 11th general election (held on 21St March 2004) to win back Terengganu 
from the PAS control, in which he said that 'the Barisan Nasional (BN), if returned to 
power in Terengganu, will bring about changes never seen before in the state'. 19 He gave 
further assurance to the people of Terengganu that Terengganu will become a developed 
and successful state if administered by the BN Government. Such assurances were also 
echoed by the Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak to allure people of Kelantan to vote 
for the BN in the I Ith general election when he said that `I am hopeful the Kelantanese 
will make a firm decision as the time had come for the state to be in the mainstream of 
national development, [and] when the BN back in power the Federal Government would 
be in a better position to implement all development projects planned for Kelantan '. 20 
The BN politicians also constantly remind the people of the difficulty which the central 
government has in cooperating with opposition state governments, and how this has 
is Prior to the 1999 Sabah state election, the centre had made a further allocation of RM50 million to Sabah 
constituencies for developmental purposes. When the BN won the election, another RM230 million was 
channelled to Sabah in the form of soft loans (see Andaya and Andaya, 2001; Yusof, 1998). 19 Utusan Malaysia, 190i March 2004, BN will bring changes never seen before inTerengganu - PM'. 20 Utusan Malaysia, 19'x' March 2004, ' Give us the mandate to build a new Kelantan - Najib'. ' 
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retarded development in the state. The result was as expected. In the 11th general election, 
the PAS government in Terengganu was toppled by the BN, while in Kelantan, although 
21 PAS still maintain its power, its influence is diminishing_ 
Another coercive practice is that the federal political elites recognise state governments 
led by opposition parties only on paper (as part of democratic process) but in practice do 
not really recognise them. From the outset (during the process of writing the 
independence Constitution of 1957), the Alliance Working Party (the forerunner of the 
BN) foresaw the practical difficulties if different parties controlled the federal and state 
governments, but there was no serious consideration given to figure out a kind of federal- 
state political structure that would be free from federal political manoeuvre (Fernando, 
2002). This was evident when the federal government set up its own federal 
administration in states ruled by the opposition party while at the same time the states 
also ran their own administrations, as can be seen in the case of the Federal Development 
Department (FDD) in Kelantan and Sabah (Saharudin, 1998). Although it was stated that 
the aim of the FDD was to bring development to states, as a matter of fact it was designed 
to undermine any opposition's capability to rule or to bring development to states, and so 
to give political leverage to the governing ruling party. `This is like having two 
governments running parallel in one state at one tune', said the one opposition party 
member (PAS) on the FDD. Politically, the federal government's move to establish the 
FDD was intended to prove to the people that the opposition could not be trusted to bring 
development to the country. Indirectly, it implied failure to recognise the opposition 
government, which had been selected by the people through the democratic election 
process. To further deprive, those states led by the opposition were not invited to the 
21 In the 11`1 general election held on 21st March 2004, the BN won 28 out of the 32 Tcrcngganu's State 
Legislative Assembly seats contested, and swept all parliamentary scats (eight). In Kelantan, the BN won 
21 out of 45 State Legislative Assembly seats, and won eight parliamentary seats out of 14 seats 
contested. 
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Council of Chief Ministers' Meeting (Majlis Mesyuarat Menteri Besar dan Ketua 
Menteri) presided over by the Prime Minister. This Council meets on a regular basis to 
iron out any difficulties in federal-state matters regarding socio-economic, financial, and 
security issues. Thus, the Council has become the exclusive club of the ruling party, 
instead of an instrument of executive / cooperative federalism, to foster cordial federal- 
state relations to benefit the citizens. 22 This is another impediment towards genuine 
federal relationship in Malaysia federalism. 
The rationale of having the FDD is to undertake and monitor development projects in 
states, with federal development allocations being channelled through this department, 
instead of to the state government, as is the normal practice. By so doing, the centre can 
plan, coordinate, supervise and evaluate federal development allocations `wisely' in 
states led by the opposition parties. This causes a conflict of interest between federal and 
state governments, especially with regard to the selection of projects to be implemented, 
as some projects may be considered a priority (economically and politically) to the 
federal government, but not to the state. There could also be conflicts over the location of 
the project to be implemented. Undoubtedly the establishment of the FDD was aimed at 
undermining the opposition's capability to bring development to the states. If the federal 
government were really sincere about monitoring the states' fiscal affairs, Article 95 of 
the Federal Constitution, which empowers the federal officer to `inspect any department 
or work of a state government', could have been exercised. By setting up the FDD 
22 In Canada, the First Minister's Conference (FMC) and the Annual Premiers' Conference (APC) are 
presided over by the Prime Minister and attended by all Provincial Premiers, regardless of political 
belief. They have become fully-fledged intergovernmental meetings. In Australia, the Council of 
Australian Government (COAG) is a primarily intergovernmental institution, chaired by the Prime 
Minister and its members include all State Premiers and Chief Ministers, as well as the President of the Australian Local Government Association. Apart from the COAG, there are other forums to strengthen federal-state relations, namely, the Treaties Council (with the same membership as the COAG), the Leaders' Forum (whose membership consists only of State Premiers and Territory Chief Ministers), and 
Ministerial Councils. In Germany, the Bundesrat plays a very significant role as a chamber of states to 
protect states' rights and to foster federal-Lander relations. Also, there are a number of councils and 
meetings to enhance cooperative federalism, such as `the Conference of Ministers-President', and the Land based parliamentary group of the Bundestag (see Meekison, 2002; Leonardy, 1999). 
260 
instead, the impression is given in the eyes of people that development is coming from 
the federal level, not the state government. By so doing, the governing ruling party is able 
to gain political leverage by winning the hearts and minds of the people through 
`federally monitored development projects'. Thus, the establishment the FDD is a highly 
political aimed at maintaining the political power of the federal elites. This entire move is 
motivated by strong party competition in the pursuit of one party rule in the country, by 
the centre. 
6.3 Petroleum royalties payments: A case study of party political competition 
Much has been written about federal-state conflicts resulting from political party 
competition, prompted by the differences in federal and state political agendas. 23 All 
these studies prove that strained federal-state relations will tend to surface when federal 
political elites are threatened, which subsequently causes federal-state fiscal conflicts. 
The strained relations between the federal and Terengganu government over the issue of 
petroleum royalties is a manifestation of political party competition that results from 
clashes of interest between the federal and a state's political elites. Therefore this issue 
deserves special attention in this study, as it has ramifications for federal-state fiscal 
relations in general. At the same time it proves that fiscal federalism is a political process 
used to maintain federal political elites and single-party dominance in Malaysia in the 
quest for unity in diversity. This is because, to some extent, this issue has created 
problems in fiscal relations in the context of fiscal federalism in Malaysia. As said in 
Chapter 1, the federal government action to stop payment of petroleum royalties to 
Terengganu is a manifestation of severe party competition. In the following section, the 
legal and political arguments on this issue will show whether or not the decision made by 
the federal government is justifiable. 
23 See Yusoff (1998); Vejai (1998); Rais (1997); Shafruddin (1987); Salleh Abbas (1978); Lai (1968), 
Milne (1967). 
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6.3.1 Political perspectives - is this political punishment of the opposition party? 
The royalties payment tussle between the federal and Terengganu governments started 
when the newly installed Terengganu PAS-led government (after it won a landslide 
victory in the 1999 general election, sweeping 28 out of the 32 seats in the Terengganu's 
State Legislative Assembly) made a public announcement of the possibility of requesting 
the PETRONAS and federal government to increase the rate of petroleum royalties from 
the current 5% to around 20%. With the current rate of petroleum royalties, Terengganu 
would easily receive almost RM1 billion in 2000, following higher petroleum prices. For 
Terengganu, the petroleum royalties, which had been enjoyed for more than twenty years, 
contributed more than 50% of its total revenue. Since the first royalties payment in 1978, 
the total petroleum royalties payments received by Terengganu amounted to RM7 billion. 
Thus, the termination of the royalties payments had serious financial implications for the 
Terengganu PAS-led government. In this section, the decision to terminate the royalties 
payments will be discussed to see whether it was a bona fide or politically motivated. For 
simplicity, investigation of the federal government's point of view will be made first, 
followed by Terengganu's response then conclusions will be drawn on this issue by 
comparing the experience faced by the state of Sabah during the PBS-led government. 
The initial response by the federal government to the PAS-led Terengganu government's 
proposal to request higher royalties payments was quite accommodating. The Prime 
Minister promised to review the whole structure of petroleum royalties payments. 
However, the promise turned into a political wrangle when the Prime Minister argued 
that the royalties payments made to Terengganu thus far had been a mistake. He said, `I 
think this was a mistake because Terengganu was previously ruled by UMNO and we did 
not consider carefully the rights of the states in the peninsula to get royalties. As such, we 
believed that Terengganu was a poor state. '24 He further asserted, `We also thought then 
24 The Star, 30th June 2000 
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that our oil reserves were too small and that we would be paying Terengganu at the most 
RM 50 million in royalties. We were not that thorough. However, the royalties has now 
increased to RM 800 million and if the trend continues (oil price increases), we will be 
paying the state RM 1 billion in royalties in year 2000'. 25 
Following this statement, the former Terengganu Chief Minister (Wan Mokhtar Ahmad), 
who was defeated and his government toppled by the PAS government in the 1999 
general election, and who had signed the royalties agreement between PETRONAS and 
state of Terengganu on 22d March 1975, issued a statement saying that, `it is not so 
much an agreement but more of an understanding based on the federal government's 
policy of compassion. Terengganu was very backward and this prompted the federal 
government to extend aid in the form of royalties on compassionate grounds'. 26 But more 
significant was his statement that `furthermore, both the federal and state governments 
then were from the Barisan Nasional'. What this implies is that if different political 
parties rule at the federal and state levels, the states will be subject to various difficulties 
such as those experienced by Terengganu's PAS-led government. 
In response to the former Terengganu Chief Minister, the President and Chief Executive 
of Petroleum Nasional (PETRONAS), Hassan Marican, revealed that the petroleum 
royalties payment to Terengganu was based on an agreement signed on 22nd March 1975 
whereby `for as long as oil and gas is produced, royalties will be paid to the state and the 
royalties amount, accrued or due is RM810 million, which is 5% of the value of oil and 
gas produced'. ' Thus, the royalties payment to the Terengganu had a legal basis. The 
agreement entered between PETRONAS and the Terengganu government on 22nd March 
1975 referred to `the cash payment to be made by PETRONAS to the government in 
return for the ownership and the rights, powers, liberties and privileges vested as 
zs The New Straits Times, 30`h June 2000 
26 Utusan Malaysia, 28th June 2000 
27 The Star, 30th June 2000 
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aforesaid in respect of petroleum'. This agreement was to give effect to Section 4 of the 
Petroleum Development Act 1974 28 Section 1(1) of the agreement proved Hassan's 
statement; it says that `PETRONAS shall make to the government cash payment in the 
form of a yearly sum amounting to the equivalent of five percent of the value of the 
petroleum won and saved in Terengganu and sold by PETRONAS or its agents of 
contractors... ' and section 3 says `It is agreed and declared that the cash payment payable 
under this Agreement shall be payable only for so long petroleum is obtained ... 
'. His 
statement was a response to the allegation made by the former Terengganu Chief 
Minister that no agreement had been made with regard to petroleum royalties. Following 
this development, the Terengganu PAS government declassified confidential documents 
related to petroleum royalties to let the public know the actual position of the issue. 
Based on this agreement, PETRONAS was to pay the Terengganu government 5% of the 
total production of oil and gas in two instalments, the first on or before the first day of 
September, and the second on or before the first day of March of the following year. 29 
In September 2000, the Prime Minister made another statement saying that no such 
`petroleum royalties payment' to the Terengganu government existed. What had been 
is See Appendix iv of the thesis 
29 The computation of petroleum royalties, as stated in the second agreement between PETRONAS and the 
Terengganu government entered on 16th September 1987, was as follows: 
i) For payment of 1' half of &year (paid in September) 
R= [0.05 {(T')*(D")*(Pp)*(Xr)}l 
where: 
R= royalties payments 
T" = average production rate (barrel per day bpd) in the 1't half of na` year 
D" = number of days in the I' half of n"' year 
Pp = average petroleum price (in $US per barrel) 
Xr = exchange rate (USD/RM) 
ii) For payment of 2nd half of (n) 'year (paid in March of the following year) 
R= [0.05 {(T "4)*(D "-')*(pp)*(Xr))l 
where: 
R= royalties payments 
T" = average production rate barrel per da -bpd) in the 2d half of (n 1) th year D" = number of days in the 2" half of (n 1) year 
Pp = average petroleum price (in $US per barrel) 
Xr = exchange rate (USD/RM) 
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paid hitherto was a `wang ihsan' (compassionate payment), as Terengganu at that time 
(1975) was the poorest state and, more importantly, it was under the BN. There is a 
significant difference of interpretation between the terms `compassionate payment' and 
`royalties payment'; the former refers to a payment made solely at the discretion of the 
federal government, that is, it is not compulsory for it to be made if the federal 
government wishes not to do so; while the latter is a compulsory payment based on legal 
standing, which is the right of the state. With the Prime Minister's statement, the royalties 
payment was officially ended and replaced by a compassionate payment. The federal 
government argument for granting `petroleum royalties payment' or `compassionate 
payment' to Terengganu from 1978 to 1999 on the ground that Terengganu was the 
poorest state is arguable because Kelantan was the poorest at that time. The real reason 
was the fact that Terengganu at that time was under the BN and, therefore the federal 
government was more `cooperative and concerned' with the well-being of the former 
BN-led Terengganu government. The federal government's argument for denying 
petroleum royalties payment is that, the oil was found offshore, and so the federal 
government claimed Terengganu had no right to it. 
`Terengganu has no rights to such payments (petroleum royalties). All this while, what 
we gave Terengganu was based on compassion because it was once the poorest state in 
the country. It is true the payment was referred to as royalties, but in truth, Terengganu 
has no such rights because the oil comes from offshore and under the law of the country, 
everything that comes from offshore belongs to the federal government' (Dr. Mahathir 
Mohammed). 30 
Following the Prime Minister's statement, the de facto Law Minister, Rais Yatim, on 29th 
October 2000, declared that the agreement on the cash payment between PETRONAS 
and Terengganu entered on 22nd March 1975 was `null and void'. He claimed that `when 
one party revokes the agreement by not following the terms contained in it, it 
automatically causes the agreement to be invalid and ineffective'. Hence, the agreement 
was automatically nullified, as one side no longer observed any of the conditions 
30 The Star, 8t` September 2000 
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mutually agreed upon. What is surprising in this statement is that the agreement was 
revoked by the federal government (the sole stakeholder in PETRONAS) and not by 
PETRONAS, which signed the agreement with the Terengganu government. According 
to Rais Yatim, the decision to revoke the agreement was based on the law, that is, the 
PDA 1974 and the Continental Shelf Act 1966, which stipulated that states (including 
Terengganu) were not eligible to receive a cash payment in respect of resources found 
outside three nautical miles from states' territorial waters. With the annulment of the 
agreement, the state of Terengganu now did not have a right even to royalties payments 
for oil and gas found onshore of Terengganu, although the original dispute was only 
regarding oil found offshore. However, there was no exchange of words regarding oil 
found onshore as, thus far, all oil fields had been found outside the three nautical miles 
limit. This move clearly amounted to a breach of contract. However, `it is up to the 
Terengganu government to accept it as an official and final decision. The state 
government is free to take legal action if they are not satisfied with the decision' (Rais 
Yatim). 31 Rais Yatim further affirmed that the government decision was not politically 
motivated. 
What is implied here is that when a different political party (opposition party or non- 
coalition party component) rules Terengganu (or any other state), federal-state relations 
becomes strained and `uncompassionate'. The possibility of paying a high petroleum 
royalties to Terengganu's PAS government was viewed by the centre as politically 
dangerous, due to the possibility that `PAS might use the royalties payment to finance 
political activity of PAS government which can further strengthen opposition influence in 
neighbouring states, which could possibly threaten the BN government', as admitted by 
the one ruling party member. Thus, the main concern of the UMNO leaders (the main 
component of the BN coalition) was that Terengganu might turn out to be the launch pad 
31 The Star, 30th September 2000 
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for a greater PAS role in national politics. As discussed above, UMNO and PAS are bitter 
rivals in their contest for the Malay mandate and this action revoking the petroleum 
royalties was a way to derail the opponent from success in mainstream politics. The 
amount of royalties to be received by Terengganu in 2000 would have been very large, in 
view of high oil prices, which led the federal government to decide to review its policy of 
giving petroleum royalties, for fear that the large amount of money to be received by the 
Terengganu PAS-led government would be used wrongly to finance PAS activities, and 
so to strengthen and subsequently further spread the PAS influence to other states, 
especially to Pahang and Kedah, which have strong PAS support. This clearly 
contradicted the spirit of Article 4 of the PDA. 
In order to regulate the disbursement of `compassionate payment', the federal 
Government, through the Ministry of Finance (MOF), formed a committee known as the 
Jawatankuasa Peringkat Pusat (the Federal Level Committee (FLC)) on 5t' September 
2000. The main function of the FLC is to manage and monitor the disbursement of 
`compassionate payment' so that it would directly benefit the people of Terengganu. A 
statement issued by the MOF revealed that the motive for the establishment of the FLC 
was that `the federal government is less confident in the PAS state government's ability 
to co-operate in assuring prosperity and welfare of the people of the state', 32 unlike the 
previous BN government, which had `successfully transformed' Terengganu from the 
poorest state to a fairly developed state, through its development programmes. 33 
Therefore, it was claimed, the FLC was needed to ensure prudent spending that could 
directly benefit the people of Terengganu. However, this move is against democratic 
practices, as the FLC is not backed by a mandate of the people of Terengganu, unlike the 
Terengganu government, which was formed by people who gave their mandate through 
the democratic process of election. Before this, cash payment received from PETRONAS 
32 The Star, 6t' September 2000 
33 The New Straits Times, 6"' September 2000. 
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was treated as state revenue. Hence, it went to the State Consolidated Revenue Account, 
money from which could be used to finance annual expenditures, once the State Annual 
Budget had been tabled and approved by the State Legislative Assembly. This is in line 
with the Federal Constitution and the Financial Procedure Act, 1957. 
However with the termination of the royalties payment to Terengganu, the cash payment 
paid by PETRONAS is now credited to the federal government Consolidated Revenue 
Account, and so becomes federal government revenue instead of going to the state of 
Terengganu's Consolidated Revenue Account. Any cash payment to be used by the FLC 
will be drawn from this federal government Consolidated Revenue Account. Earlier, the 
federal government had announced that cash payment (to be paid to Terengganu) would 
be credited to a special Trust Fund under the MOF. However, when the 2001 Budget was 
tabled and approved by Parliament, `cash payment' received from PETRONAS was not 
credited to the Trust Fund. Up to now, the amount of `compassionate payment' supposed 
to be paid to the Terengganu government was far too low; only RM150 million has been 
disbursed through the FLC to finance various development programmes - town and rural 
roads, water and power supply, low-cost housing for fishermen and hardcore poor, loans 
for the purchase of fishing boats and related equipment, bursaries and schooling aid. The 
federal government's move to stop cash payment and replace it with `compassionate 
payment' channelled through FLC has caused great discontent and resulted in much anti- 
federal feeling by the PAS-led Terengganu government and the people of Terengganu, as 
it is a form of federal interference in the state's fiscal affairs that severely affects the 
administration and implementation of development projects. Clearly, the establishment of 
the FLC was politically motivated, although this was denied by federal political elites, as 
they did concerning the formation of FDD in Kelantan. 
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Terengganu government's response to the federal government action of terminating 
payments of petroleum royalties was reflected in a press statement by Hadi Awang, the 
Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) of Terengganu. He bemoaned that 
`the leadership of the central government is a leader who does not understand the concept 
of federalism, the basis of the existence of Malaysia, whereby the principle of respect 
between the constituent members in the Federation of Malaysia needs to be preserved, 
respected and maintained'. 
According to the Terengganu Executive Councillor, Tun Salleh Abbas, the former Lord 
President and a key person in the drafting of the Petroleum Development Act 1974, the 
federal government has no right whatsoever to deny petroleum royalties payment to the 
PAS-led Terengganu government . 
3S He confirmed that the cash payment should be made 
to Terengganu, as well as to other states if oil is found in them. No question arose as to 
whether or not Terengganu was the poorest state at the time of the agreement. The 
treatment of states in the federation with regard to cash payment should be equal, in the 
eyes of the law. Nik Aziz, the Chief Minister of the PAS-led Kelantan government 
asserted that if the basis of the cash payment to Terengganu was because Terengganu was 
the poorest state, then Kelantan, which is poorer than Terengganu, should also be entitled 
to cash payments. Hence, he claimed that the federal government's move to stop cash 
payment to Terengganu is contrary to a legal contract and to the Federal Constitution. 
The channelling of cash payment through the federal authority, namely the FLC, formed 
by the federal government, is obviously counter to the principle of democratic 
government. 
The Terengganu PAS-led government claimed that the former BN government spent 
money from petroleum royalties wastefully, as the state is still RM700 million in debt 
despite receiving RM7 billion in petroleum royalties since 1978. The former BN 
government spent money on unnecessary ventures such as the construction of high-rise 
34 The ChiefMinister's Office, Terengganu, 2000. 
35 This information was obtained from Warta Darul Iman (the Information Secretariat, Government of 
Terengganu), 8'h October 2000. 
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buildings and investing in problem-ridden companies, in particular, in the controversial 
Perwaja Steel which incurred RM3.5 billion losses, and bailing out the now defunct steel 
company (Gunawan Iron and Steel). Therefore, the federal government should investigate 
the financial misconduct by the former BN government, rather than penalising the barely 
one-year-old PAS government. 36 
Disgruntled with the federal government move, the PAS-led Terengganu government 
finally filed a lawsuit on 8a' March 2002, which reneged on agreements made on 22nd 
March 1975 and 16th September 1987, for a once-and-for-all solution. Terengganu named 
PETRONAS as the first defendant and the federal government second. In the lawsuit, the 
Terengganu government claimed that PETRONAS and the federal government's non- 
payment of petroleum royalties, totalling RM850 million, amounted to a breach of 
contract. The state insisted that the defendants honour the agreement. 
Me suit against PETRONAS is to get it implement the agreement by paying petroleum 
royalties to the Terengganu government, while the suit against the federal government is 
for using its power to interfere in the implementation of the agreement'. `We will also 
claim damages for loss suffered due to the interference (by the federal government) 
which resulted in projects and administration being affected' (Wan Abdul Mutalib 
Embong, Senior State Executive Councillor). 37 
In the first court hearing on technical issues in the Kuala Lumpur High Court on 19th 
February 2001, the court ordered PETRONAS and the federal government to deliver 
written submissions. Earlier in its defence, PETRONAS argued that it need not make any 
payment (since the September 2000 payment owing to Terengganu amounted RM850 
million) on the grounds that oil was obtained outside the state's territorial waters. The 
federal government in its defence argued that all payments to Terengganu since 1978 
were to be deemed as wang ihsan (compassionate payment) and not royalties payment as 
claimed by the Terengganu government. Counsel for the Terengganu state government, 
Tommy Thomas, said `Despite its failure to make the said cash payments to the 
36 Warta Darul Iman, (the Government of Terengganu Information Secretariat), 8t` October 2000 
37 Utusan Malaysia, 8'b January 2001 
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Terengganu state government, PETRONAS continued to make similar cash payments to 
other state governments and in particular to the state governments of Sabah and 
Sarawak'. 38 In other words, discriminatory action was practised by PETRONAS, by 
denying Terengganu cash payment for oil and gas harvested in Terengganu. The 
Terengganu counsel also claimed that the federal government, the stakeholder of 
PETRONAS, acted in bad faith when it directed PETRONAS to desist from making 
more payments to the PAS-led Terengganu government after the BN-led Terengganu 
government was defeated by PAS in the 1999 general election. As Counsel Tommy 
Thomas claims, 
`The federal government, acting through the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet, 
brought to bear the issue of party politics in the wake of the 1999 general elections results 
which saw the replacement of the BN government of Terengganu with that by members 
of a rival political party, PAS. The actions of the federal government and its agents and 
servants were oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional' (Counsel Tommy Thomas). 39 
On 2901 August 2002, during a second court hearing, the High Court ruled that the 
Terengganu government should be given an opportunity to proceed with its suit against 
PETRONAS and the federal government for non-payment of petroleum royalties. Under 
the ruling, the plaintiff can now call its witnesses to give evidence before a trial judge. 
The issues to be determined include: first, whether Terengganu had any right under the 
law to petroleum obtained adjacent to the state's coast, subject to the enactment of the 
PDA 1974, and the execution of the agreement dated 22nd March 1975, between 
Terengganu and PETRONAS; second, whether the Terengganu government has any 
rights to petroleum obtained off its coast via the vesting instrument and the agreement 
dated 22nd March 1975; and third, whether the Terengganu government was entitled to 
payment in respect of petroleum obtained off its coast under Section 4 of the PDA 1974. 
However, as expected, the High Court decisions on the determination of preliminary 
legal issues in the oil royalties suit were unwelcome by the defendants, and subsequently 
38 Harakah, 20th February 2000. `Oil Royalties: Petronas acted double standards'. 39 Harakah, 20th February 2000. `Oil Royalties: Petronas acted double standards'. 
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both filed appeals against the decisions. On 26a' July 2003, the Court of Appeal retained 
the judgment made by the High Court in the appeals brought by defendants. 40 However, 
on 29th August 2003, the Court of Appeal issued a new judgement that the High Court 
now would have to hear submissions from all parties before deciding if the case should 
be heard in full trial (as preferred by the Terengganu government) or could proceed by 
way of preliminary issues alone (that is, whether Terengganu had any right under the law 
over the petroleum obtained adjacent to the state's coast), as preferred by both 
defendants. However, until now no further hearing has occurred. Based on the latest 
development, that is, after the BN regain power from PAS, the new Chief Minister of 
Terengganu is likely to withdraw the legal suit put forward by the former PAS 
governmental 
The conclusion drawn over termination of petroleum royalties payment to Terengganu, 
from a political viewpoint, is that it was clearly politically motivated, although this was 
denied by the federal government. From the outset, the federal political elite felt that their 
authority was being challenged and their popularity diminished when PAS won a 
landslide victory in Terengganu and Kelantan, especially after it suffered a decline in 
popularity in some states like Kedah and Pahang in the 1999 general election. Clearly, 
the PAS strength was increasing and federal political elites believed that this would bring 
political catastrophe to Malaysia if PAS influence were not curtailed. As an opposition 
government made wealthy by the large contribution received from petroleum royalties, 
Terengganu had become a threat to the federal political elites. Indeed, it was because the 
amount of petroleum royalties was so large that the federal government revised the policy 
of giving royalties, in fear that the large amount of money to be received by the PAS 
Terengganu government would be used wrongly to finance PAS activities, and spread 
PAS influence to other states. 
40 Utusan Malaysia, 27th July 2003 
41 Utusan Malaysia, 31' March 2004, `Oil royalties case: Comprehensive study to be carried out' 
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In short, the action of the federal government was intended to undermine the PAS-led 
administration. If this argument is correct, then the statement by Yusoff (1998: 233) that 
`when a state was not viewed as being in line with the priorities of the federal leaders, 
clearly it risked becoming a target for financial sanction' is supported. This indicates that 
the decision to terminate the petroleum royalties payment had an element of political 
vindictiveness. Looking at the chronology of events leading to the decision to stop 
petroleum royalties, it is clearly evident that the decision was made amid strained 
political relationships between the UMNO and PAS after the1999 general election. This 
event was a huge blow to the UMNO, the largest component party in the BN. If the PAS 
influence was not curtailed early, it might cause a `domino effect' in which all adjacent 
states would fall to the opposition party (or coalition of opposition parties - Barisan 
Alternatif (Alternative Front)) 42 If this happened, the incumbent ruling party would not 
be able to maintain a two-thirds majority in Parliament. Thus, it would be politically wise 
to cut PAS's source of finance, so that the domino effect would not take place. As 
expected, in the 11th general election held on 21*` March 2004, the BN successfully 
toppled the PAS government in Terengganu with more than a two-thirds majority. 
From the above discussion, there are at least five important issues that need to be 
observed and investigated. First, the denial of the petroleum royalties payment to 
Terengganu by the federal government was on the basis that `oil comes from offshore 
and under the law of the country, everything that comes from offshore belongs to the 
federal government'. Second, the right of states in relation to oil found inland and 
offshore of the respective states, set out in the agreement for cash payment, has been 
annulled by the federal government. Both these issues can only be resolved by legal 
42 The AlternaiiVe Front (Barisan Alternatif - BA) was formed in 1999 by three major opposition parties - PAS (the Islamic based party), Parti Keadilan (formed to fight for justice for the former Deputy Prime 
Minister Anwar Ibrahim) and DAP (largely Chinese based opposition party). The aim of the BA uas to 
challenge the BN in the 1999 general election. 
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interpretation of the Federal Constitution and related act. Third, why has there been no 
investigation initiated against the former BN-led Terengganu government on the 
allegation by PAS that petroleum royalties was spent wastefully on unnecessary 
ventures? Fourth, why did the federal government realise that the petroleum royalties 
payment to Terengganu should be stopped only after the BN had failed to retain its power 
in Terengganu, after 22 years in office? Fifth, would the federal government have 
continued to pay petroleum royalties or cash payment or compassionate payment to 
Terengganu if the BN had won the 1999 general election and will it do so after winning a 
landslide victory in the 11`h general election? The answers to the last three questions 
relate to the fact that the former Terengganu government was politically affiliated to the 
centre, while the PAS is an opposition. Based on the Prime Minister's assurance, it is 
expected that huge petroleum moneys (in cash or in kind) will now again to Terengganu 
after the BN regain power in Terengganu after the 11`h general election. The Prime 
Minister assured, `I wish to pledge that the federal government will help the Terengganu 
so that the state government will not face financial problems in ensuring the success of 
the development programmes' . 
43 
Although the modus operandi on the decision to cease royalties payment seems to be 
politically motivated, the federal government claimed its decision has a strong legal 
standing. Hence, it is necessary to examine from a legal standpoint the question of states' 
rights to royalties in respect of petroleum discovered and obtained offshore and on the 
continental shelf, to see whether or not the federal government's claim to stop royalties 
payment has a legal basis. 
43 Utusan Malaysia, 29th March 2004. 'Abdullah directs Terengganu to implement development agenda'. 
After regaining power in Terengganu, the BN government also announced it would continue construction 
of the second phase of the East Coast Highway from Kuantan, Pahang to Chendering, Terengganu, 
costing RM1.6 billion, This project was put on hold during the PAS time in government due to political 
strife. The new BN Chief Minister of Terengganu also announced that new airport will be built costing 
RM1 billion. (UtusanMalaysia, 8t' April 2004). 
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6.3.2 What is the state's right? Legal perspectives 
As the petroleum sector became increasingly important to the Malaysian economy, the 
federal government determined to review its petroleum policy and to consider the 
possibility of exercising greater centralised control over the petroleum industry (Adnan, 
1978). It was not until 1964 that the Malaysian government began to realise the 
importance of proper regulation of the petroleum industry in Malaysia. The Malaysian 
government appointed Levy in 1964 to study and make recommendations on an 
appropriate future plan for effective development of the petroleum industry in Malaysia 
(Meng, 1984; Adnan, 1978). Of particular importance, Levy was assigned to recommend 
additional constitutional rights for the federal and state governments following new 
regulation of the petroleum industry. 
Before Malaysia was formed in 1963, each state had its own legislation to regulate the 
petroleum industry. However, the Levy Report recommended harmonisation of 
petroleum legislation for proper future development of the petroleum industry in 
Malaysia. The Levy Report stated that, `from an administrative point of view, and also 
from the point of view of an oil company engaged in exploration (or deciding whether or 
not to apply for exploration rights) in the various parts of Malaysia there would be 
considerable attractions in the simplicity of single hold petroleum agreement designed for 
universal application throughout Malaysia'. This means that all aspects of petroleum 
legislation, including the right of states to receive royalties, would be reviewed and 
harmonised. It is vital therefore to focus on the right of the states to receive petroleum 
royalties based on historical and legal arguments, as this is an important issue that affects 
federal-state fiscal relations. 45 
44 Levy Report, Para 48, Page 32, cited from Meng (1984). 
45 Information contained in this section was partly obtained from discussion with the officials from 
Petronas on 14th April 2000 while I was working with the Ministry of Finance. 
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The initial arrangement over petroleum royalties before Malaysia was formed in 1963 
was quite different between states in peninsular Malaysia and the states of Sabah and 
Sarawak. Petroleum royalties payment to states was closely related to the issue of the 
derivation of petroleum, that is, whether it was found onshore or offshore. A legal tussle 
emerged when petroleum was found offshore of the respective states, as there was no 
clear legal demarcation between onshore and offshore. There was a significant difference 
between interpretations of offshore between the states in peninsular Malaysia and Sabah 
and Sarawak. `Offshore' is defined based on jurisdiction over the continental shelf. States 
in peninsular Malaysia did not have jurisdiction over the continental shelf, unlike the 
states of Sabah and Sarawak, as will be shown shortly. For states in peninsular Malaysia, 
the definition of state. land, under Chapter 138 of the Land Code (1928), `including the 
foreshore and bed of the sea within the territorial waters' of the respective state. 
However, the boundary of territorial waters was not precisely defined, but following 
customary international law, it was recognised as three nautical miles from the low water 
mark. Section 2 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance, 1948, defined 
territorial waters in relation to any territory as the inland waters of the territory and part 
of the sea adjacent to it. However, Ordinance No. 7,1969, declares that the breadth of the 
territorial waters of Malaysia should be 12 nautical miles. Therefore, based on this legal 
interpretation, the rights of the peninsular states to the ownership over petroleum 
resources in states lands (defined to include the adjacent territorial waters) is extended to 
rights over the petroleum resources in the territorial waters only, not on the continental 
shelf. When the Federation of Malaya was formed in 1948, the right / jurisdiction over 
the continental shelf, including petroleum resources, was given solely to the federation. 46 
The operative legislation governing the petroleum industry in Malaysia was the 
46 This argument is true as reflected in the Petroleum Mining Act 1966 and the Continental Shelf Act, 1966. 
These acts governed petroleum exploitation in the states of peninsular Malaysia until the Petroleum 
Development Act, 1974 was promulgated However, these two acts were not made applicable to the 
states of Sabah and Sarawak. 
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Petroleum Mining Act, 1966 and the Continental Shelf Act, 1966. However, these acts 
were not extended to Sabah and Sarawak, since both states had their own separate 
legislation governing the exploitation of petroleum resources, not only onshore but also 
on the continental shelf. Taking a strict interpretation of the law, thus, it is legally 
sufficient to say that the states in peninsular Malaysia (including Terengganu), at least at 
that time, did not have any right over petroleum in the continental shelf, unlike the states 
of Sabah and Sarawak. In order to harmonise legislation governing the exploitation of 
petroleum resources, the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No. 10 (1969) (which 
was promulgated by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong on 7t' November 1969 following the 
outbreak of a communal crisis on 13 May 1969 and subsequently by national emergency 
on 15 May 1969), amended the Continental Shelf Act, 1966 and the Petroleum Mining 
Act, 1966 on 8`h November 1969 to include Sabah and Sarawak. To give effect to this 
amendment, the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No. 11 (1969) was instigated, 
which limited the territorial water of states (including Sabah and Sarawak) to three 
nautical miles from the low water mark. With the amendment of the Petroleum Mining 
Act, 1966 `all rights with respect to the exploration of the continental shelf and 
exploitation of its natural resources are hereby rested in Malaysia and shall be exercisable 
by the federal government'. 47 
However, the legal background over the right of the states of Sabah and Sarawak to 
petroleum found offshore / in the continental shelf is significantly different from that of 
their counterparts in peninsular Malaysia. The states of Sabah and Sarawak had a right 
over petroleum found offshore / in the continental shelf since before they joined the 
federation in 1963. It evolved from 1954, when the British parliament passed two Orders- 
in-Council, the Sarawak (Alternation of Boundaries) Orders-in-Council No. 839 of 1954, 
and the North Borneo (Alternation of Boundaries) Orders-in-Council No. 859 of 1954, to 
47 Section 3 of the Petroleum Mining Act (amended 8th November 1969). 
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define the boundaries of these states. Subsequent to this, another two Orders-in-Council 
were passed, the North Borneo Orders-in-Council No. 1960 of 1960 and the Sarawak 
Order-in-Council No. 402 of 1962, which altered and determined the boundaries between 
Sabah and Sarawak. With these Orders-in-Council, the boundaries of Sabah and Sarawak 
were extended to include not only the territorial seas but also the submarine area of the 
continental shelf adjacent to the two states. In 1956, the Sabah government amended its 
Land Ordinance (Chapter 68) to give effect to the North Borneo (Alternation of 
Boundaries) Orders-in-Council No. 859 of 1954 by including, inter alia, a provision 
enabling the state to grant licences or leases for oil exploration. In 1958, Sarawak enacted 
the Oil Mining Ordinance (Cap. 85), empowering the government to issue licences or 
leases for oil exploration in any land. Under the Sarawak Land Ordinance, land was 
defined to include the foreshore and submarine areas beneath Sarawak waters and also 
the areas of the continental shelf. Hence, these two states had legal claims and exercised 
sovereign rights over their respective continental shelves from the Order in Council 
Alternation of Boundaries for Sabah and Sarawak 1954. 
However, as discussed above, no such Orders-in-Council were made to define the 
territorial waters or the submarine areas of the continental shelf for the states of 
Peninsular Malaysia. As such, the jurisdiction of states of peninsular Malaysia over 
petroleum found in their territorial waters is limited to three nautical miles from the low 
watermark, while the jurisdiction of the states of Sabah and Sarawak is not confined to 
the territorial waters but also includes the continental shelf. This implies that for Sabah 
and Sarawak, the right to petroleum royalties extends to the continental shelf, and even 
when they joined the federation, the right remained unchanged. 
However, when the Continental Shelf Act, 1966 and the Petroleum Mining Act, 1966 
were amended on 8th November 1969 and extended to both states of Sabah and Sarawak 
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in order to harmonise regulations governing the exploitation of petroleum industry, a 
legal battle emerged between the federal government and the states of Sabah and 
Sarawak In particular, the states of Sabah and Sarawak were unhappy about the 
harmonisation of legislation on petroleum by which the states lost their rights over 
petroleum resources found on the continental shelf. The Sarawak government claimed 
that, by virtue of the Orders-in-Council, both Sarawak and Sabah had jurisdiction and 
rights not only over their territorial water but also over the continental shelf. They also 
claimed that these areas still belonged to the states, and hence the position remained 
unchanged, even when they joined the federation. The Sabah government was initially 
inclined to accept the federal government's views favouring harmonisation, but later 
followed Sarawak's stand. 
In response to the Sarawak government's claim, the federal government stood by its view 
that, constitutionally, on entry into Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak had lost jurisdiction 
over their continental shelf, which therefore passed into hands of the federal authorities. 
Following a legal tussle between the federal government and states of Sabah and 
Sarawak, a series of negotiations were held to resolve the constitutional and legal hurdles, 
but were suspended following a declaration of national emergency on 1St' May 1969 in 
response to the outbreak of communal disorder on 13'h May 1969. 
Hence, before 1969, the rights of the states to exercise jurisdiction and claims of 
ownership to the petroleum resources in the offshore areas were not uniform: the states in 
peninsular Malaysia did not have a right over the continental shelf in contrast to the 
states of Sabah and Sarawak that did. But after 1969, with the amendment of the 
Continental Shelf Act, 1966 and the Petroleum Mining Act, 1966, the previously distinct 
legislation governing petroleum exploitation for Malaysia was harmonised. This 
harmonisation of legislation brought about the desired uniformity of the legal status of 
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Malaysia's continental shelf (Moorthy, 1982). However, the Mining Ordinance of Sabah, 
the Oil Mining Ordinance of Sarawak and other state laws in force in Sabah and Sarawak 
continued, except in relation to the exploration, prospecting or mining for petroleum 
offshore, as it was handed over to the federal government through the Petroleum Mining 
Act 1966 (amended 1969). 
In 1974 a further step to regulate the petroleum industry in Malaysia was made when 
Parliament passed the Petroleum Development Act (PDA), in which the management of 
the petroleum industry was conferred on the federal authority known as Petroleum 
Nasional or PETRONAS. Among other goals, PDA aimed at effective management in 
the development of the petroleum industry in Malaysia. Of particular importance is the 
fact that the PDA provided for payment to be made (PDA Section 4) to state governments 
based on the derivation principle, that is, when petroleum was found onshore and 
offshore of respective states, payment was to be made to compensate them for handing 
over ownership of petroleum resources to this newly formed federal authority. To give 
effect to this section, thirteen agreements were signed between PETRONAS and the state 
governments. 48 
As discussed above, the legal interpretation regarding offshore territories was still not 
resolved, notably with regard to claims by Sabah and Sarawak that their right of 
petroleum resources stretched over the continental shelf, unlike that of the states in 
peninsular Malaysia, following the proclamation of a national emergency in 1969. Hence, 
the Sabah and Sarawak governments challenged the action of the federal government to 
centralise / harmonise the ownership of petroleum resources through the PDA, 1974. As a 
result, a legal wrangle over petroleum re-emerged, which it was perceived could affect 
48 Agreements were signed between PETRONAS and thirteen state governments: Penang (14th March), 
Terengganu, (22°d March), Sarawak (27t' March), Malacca (231 April), Perlis (25th April), Kedah (26th 
April), Perak (26th April), Kelantan (9th May), Negeri Sembilan (12th June), Johor (24th June), Pahang 
(11th September 1975), Selangor (1st June), and Sabah (14t' June 1976). 
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the solidarity of the infant Federation of Malaysia. This issue clearly caused serious 
tension between Sabah and Sarawak and Kuala Lumpur. According to Tun Salleh Abbas 
(the former Lord President / Attorney General), Sabah and Sarawak claimed sole 
ownership over the continental shelf on the grounds that they had enjoyed such a right 
before they joined the federation in 1963.49 Based on this claim, in 1974 the government 
of Sarawak threatened to file a lawsuit against the federal government. This caused a fear 
among the federal political elites that Sabah and Sarawak would follow in the steps of 
Singapore. Indeed, this was construed as a second threat to the solidarity of the federation 
after the departure of Singapore in 1965. Tun Salleh Abbas described the situation at that 
time as `tense and critical'. To solve the problem, the late Tun Abdul Razak (then the 
Prime Minister) directed Tun Ismail Ali (the former Governor of the Central Bank), 
Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah (the former Minister of Finance) and Tun Salleh Abbas (then 
the Attorney General) to find a political solution to the issue. Finally, both states accepted 
the political solution offered by the centre after they agreed to withdraw their total claim 
over the continental shelf but limited only to petroleum and subsequently; both states 
agreed to hand over it to PETRONAS. In return, PETRONAS agreed to make cash 
payments for oil found onshore and on the continental shelf of Sabah and Sarawak. 
However, according to Tun Salleh Abbas, the word `royalties' was not used at that time, 
as it was too sensitive to Sabah and Sarawak because they had just lost their rights to 
royalties to the federal government. Subsequently, the late Tun Abdul Razak agreed that 
cash payments should be made not only to Sabah and Sarawak but also to all states in the 
federation. This settlement became the basis of states' rights over petroleum found on the 
continental shelf. However, there was no agreement signed regarding this settlement; it 
was only de facto, not de jure. Therefore, the states in the federation did not have `legal 
ownership' over the petroleum found on the continental shelf. 
49 This information was obtained from the Marta Darul Iman (the Information Secretariat, Government of 
Terengganu), 8th October 2000. 
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6.3.3 The economic perspective 
The literature on intergovernmental fiscal relations with regard to the division of natural 
resources in the federation suggests that, for reason of efficiency and equity, it would be 
wise to assign natural resources to the centre to achieve balanced development, as well as 
for allocation and redistributive purposes (Mc Kenzie, 2002; Tanzi, 2001; Mieszkowski, 
1983). According to Mieszkowski, 
`as natural resource endowments are very unevenly divided between states and are 
relatively immobile, provincial taxation of minerals will cause a misallocation of labour 
and capital within the federation if mobile factors migrate to the taxing states to obtain 
their share in mineral rents. The centralisation of mineral taxes will eliminate this 
problem' (Mieszkowski, 1983: 129). 
However, McKenzie (2002) suggest that states should also be given a fair share of non- 
renewable resources extracted within states boundaries for compensation of revenue 
losses and for other externalities (such as environmental damage) to maintain harmony 
and cooperation within federation. There are many options to do this, such as through 
royalties payment, resource rent tax, or by allocating a certain share of the revenue 
derived from petroleum tax levied by the federal government, based on the derivation 
principle. The federal government's share would then be allocated to other states across 
the federation who were not endowed with natural resources, either through nationally 
provided public goods and services or federal transfers as part of redistribution 
programme (equalisation), or a combination of both. Hence, based strictly on economic 
efficiency and equity, petroleum royalties would be best managed by the federal 
government and, in return, distributed to the states. 
However, in the case of Malaysia, petroleum royalties were given to states based on the 
derivation principle, that is, only producing states would receive any royalties. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, there is an inherent danger within the derivation principle (Bahl 
and Linn, 1994). Derivation could undermine the objective of distribution policy to 
overcome inequality, as there is a tendency to promote and exacerbate invidious interstate 
disparities - states are rewarded not on the basis of any superior productive or revenue 
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mobilization effort, but on the basis of the geographical advantage. This could undermine 
the national economy and the political integration of the federation. As a result, it is 
doubtful that nationwide redistributive and macroeconomic reforms can be implemented 
effectively. To resolve this problem, the practical alternative is to allocate the federal 
government's share of revenue from royalties and petroleum taxes to states across the 
federation under an equalisation programme or intergovernmental transfers based on a 
revenue pooling arrangement 50 
Thus, based on a strict economic argument, the federal government's decision to stop 
petroleum royalties payments to a state supports the economic hypothesis that, for 
efficiency and equity considerations (redistribution objectives), petroleum royalties are 
best managed by the federal government To avoid a severe development gap between 
well-endowed states and those less fortunate, revenue from natural endowments should 
be centralised and, in return, the federal government should undertake the redistribution 
of these revenues to all states. By doing so, it could avoid the well-endowed states 
becoming richer while less endowed states become or continue impoverished. Alas, since 
the centralisation of petroleum royalties, states are still experiencing financial difficulties, 
and hence, the centralisation of petroleum royalties remains dubious from the economic 
efficiency viewpoint However, in the light of Malaysia's political and party system 
discussed above, the centralisation of petroleum resources would have given political 
leverage to the federal political elites in the struggle for power. Conceivably, this is why 
petroleum payments to the Terengganu government were stopped, while at the same time 
the states of Sabah and Sarawak continued to enjoy similar payments. 
a 6.4 Conclusion 
The foregoing discussion has unveiled the significance of the political and party systems 
in shaping the conduct of fiscal federalism in Malaysia. In particular, the working of 
50 See section 233 of Chapter 2 
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fiscal federalism depends on the extent of political cohesion at the federal and state 
levels. When political cohesion is strong at federal and state levels, federal-state fiscal 
relations will work well. Riker (1975) asserts that if the political system is over- 
centralised, any bargaining involving federal-state fiscal relations will favour the centre, 
and hence the fiscal structure will be more centralised. 
The preceding analysis of Malaysian politics and the party system proves that the 
working of Malaysia's fiscal federalism depends not only on the Constitution but also in 
practice on their political operations, which determine the direction of federal-state fiscal 
relations, and makes federalism in Malaysia rigid. Consequently, fiscal federalism in 
Malaysia has undergone little change since 1957. More importantly, fiscal federalism has 
been used to maintain strong political cohesion for one reason, that is, to ensure that the 
incumbent ruling party remains in power by securing a two-thirds majority in parliament. 
Thus, the foregoing analysis substantiated the view that fiscal federalism is indeed a 
political process used to maintain single party dominance, as the federal political elites 
believe, as a stakeholder of states, that only one party rule at the centre and state levels 
(in this case the BN led by UMNO) can ensure unity in diversity and development and 
wealth to the people and the country. In other words, the BN believe that unity in 
diversity can be achieved only when all states are ruled by the same party that rules the 
centre; otherwise, there would be political disarray. This is because, if all political parties 
toe the line, party competition can be minimised, political criticism will be lessened and 
unity will be assured. Thus, it is not surprising that the federal political elites perceived 
the presence of opposition parties as a serious threat to national unity. 
Political opposition is tolerated only to show that Malaysia is a liberal democracy in that 
party competition and citizen participation in the electoral processes are allowed. 51 In 
51 However, the democratic electoral process in Malaysia was fuelled with debate due to some irregularities 
brought about by inefficiency of the Election Commission: the institution which is supposed to act as an 
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these circumstances, the emergence of an opposition party needs to be defused and one 
way of doing it is through fiscal punishment, as has been observed in this case study of 
petroleum royalties payments and other federal-state conflicts in Sabah during the PBS 
government. Therefore, strengthening states' fiscal capacity is of key importance to 
ensure that federalism continues to flourish. This is the main thrust of the discussion of 
the next chapter, that is, to find ways to improve state governments' fiscal capacity in 
order to create propitious intergovernmental financial relations. 
To summarise, the economic backwardness of the opposition-led state governments was 
partly caused by the `cold-shoulder' fiscal treatment being practised by the federal 
government, following polarised party competition. Hence, the citizens, who are longing 
for development, are the ones who suffer from economic `collateral damage' as a result 
of severe federal and states political competition. Liberal democratic theory suggests that 
fiscal federalism should not be used as a means of political revenge to undermine 
opposition parties. For the country to become well-developed by 2020, Malaysia requires 
a mature and self-confident political system that recognises the legitimacy of elected 
opposition parties and governments in the federation. Unfortunately, the practice of fiscal 
federalism in Malaysia makes state governments subordinate to and dependent upon the 
largesse of the centre. Although there are detrimental effects brought about by single 
party dominance, it has one major benefit, that is, it has helped to minimise and control 
communal conflict, which leads to political tensions and disintegration if left unchecked. 
This is because, for multi-racial society like Malaysia, sources of conflicts are numerous: 
religion, linguistics, economics and cultural. Any discontentment could easily turn into 
racial conflicts and subsequently political chaos. 
impartial regularity body. There arc many explanations for this. One reason is that the Chairman of the 
Commission was appointed from the Civil Service whose members lean to the ruling party political elite, 
and, as a result of this 'closeness' to the ruling party, the Commission, to some extent, is discriminatory 
in its action (See Abdul Aziz Bari, 2003). This was evident, for instance, when the Commission failed to 
be fair to the opposition party about using mainstream media during the election campaign. The 
Commission should ensure a level playing field for the opposition in the electoral process 
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Chapter 7 
Strengthening States' Fiscal Capacity: Minimising 
States' Fiscal Dependency 
7.1 Introduction 
In Chapters 4 and 5 the problem of fiscal imbalances and measures taken to remedy this 
problem was examined. Based on empirical investigation, it may be concluded that; first, 
the problem of fiscal imbalance, in particular vertical imbalance, is long-term in nature. 
Second, fiscal adjustment undertaken by the federal government was, by and large, 
insufficient to undo this imbalance. The amounts of federal transfers were too small 
compared to the federal government's revenue, particularly due to the fact that the most 
lucrative revenue sources were assigned to the centre. Third, the federal transfers were 
not intended to overcome the financial difficulties faced by the state governments. 
Ilolzhausen describes the weakness of fiscal adjustment as: 
"Ihc practice of fiscal adjustment as it operates in Malaysia deviates in another important 
respect from the ideal solution-the system of adjustment largely consists of conditional 
grants and allocations under tax-sharing arrangements, which are not related to the states' 
financial needs. Nor are the major unconditional adjustment grants geared to a device 
indicating the actual requirements of the states. (Holzhausen, 1974: 142). 
Since it is acknowledged that the root cause of states' financial difficulties is their limited 
revenue potential, it would be apposite to reassign more independent revenue sources to 
states as well as to devise a proper grants system so that there is no necessity for the 
states to be so dependent on the federal government for funds. If this were done, the 
states would be able to kick-start their efforts to regenerate the state's economy and, 
subsequently, states' revenue could benefit from national GDP growth. As the Chief 
Minister of Kedah asserts, 
`When Kedah is developed, this poor state, which has been dependent on the federal 
government for assistance for so long, would finally be able to take its position of pride 
in the country. Kedah does not want to rely on the federal government for help forever, 
%-c %%-wt to be independent economically and serve as a model to the rest of the country, '' 
Kcdah Chicf Ministcr, Syed Raaak S3od Zain, The New SbuiLs Tunes, lP Dvccmber 2002, Kedah Afaju 
2010: Achieving Drº, rloped States : 
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This vision could become a reality if adequate sources of revenue are made available to 
states so that the revenue can be strengthened. As discussed in Chapter 6, the articles in 
the Constitution only reflect a degree of satisfaction or `balance' between states in the 
federation at the time of federating in 1948. Undoubtedly, in the long term this `balance 
of arrangements' cannot be sustained, as other sources of imbalance would emerge 
following rapid socio-economic and political developments taking place in the federation. 
Thus, the original fiscal arrangements as set out in the Constitution are subject to change 
over time, otherwise the arrangements may not working satisfactorily. As acknowledged 
by Watts, 
`... due to changing values of revenue sources and cost of expenditure responsibilities 
over time, regular processes for the systematic review and adjustment of the financial 
cqualisation arrangements are necessary. These recognise that the essence of federalism 
is not in static structures but in the dynamic processes of evolving intergovernmental 
relations responding to changing circumstances' (Watts, 2003b: 128). 
Recognising the fact that states' sources of revenue are limited, it is unfair to leave states 
alone to find their own ways and means to increase their revenue raising power. In line 
with the spirit of federalism, therefore, the drawbacks of the existing financial 
arrangement resulting from the shortcoming of the design of fiscal federalism need to be 
reviewed to ensure states' interests are preserved. This seems practical, since there has 
been no significant change in the division of revenue sources and fiscal adjustment since 
1957, except ad hoc measures taken to overcome a state's temporary financial difficulties 
(see Chapters 3 and 4). The following account of the need to strengthen state revenue 
raising power was drawn largely from interviews with fiscal practitioners at the Federal 
Treasury and selected state financial officers. 2 These expert opinions were obtained 
concerning three key issues: first, how to reassign revenue sources to state governments; 
2 My interviews with fiscal practitioners at both federal and states Levels were on an informal basis. I also 
dis ussod issues with members from both the ruling and opposition parties to obtain a fair view on 
political issues concerning the fxleral-state fiscal relations. I have concealed the names of t hr. fiscal 
practitioners and politicians involved, in accordance with a guarantee of anonymity given to the 
interviewees as a condition of their cooperation. Please refer to the separate reference attachW to the 
thesis. 
287 
second, how to improve the current transfer system for better intergovernmental fiscal 
relations; and finally, how to revive the role of the National Finance Council (NFC) from 
acting only as an advisory body to the government to a more efficient role in promoting 
better intergovernmental fiscal relations- 
7.2 Strengthening states' revenue raising powers 
Principally, in order to strengthen a state government's finance, it is necessary to reassign 
more independent revenue sources to the state. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the 
striking feature of public finance in Malaysia is the overwhelming share of revenue 
collected by the federal government. The Federal Constitution provides exclusive control 
of tax revenue (income taxes, imports and export duties and even taxes that are localised 
in nature, such as property taxes and road taxes) and non-tax revenue (such as licences, 
permits, and return on investments) to the centre. Such revenues in most federations are 
also available to the states 3 By and large, the federal government's major sources of 
revenues are flexible and have strong growth potential. On the other hand, states' revenue 
sources, as stated in Part III of the Tenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution, are 
limited, unproductive, have less growth potential and are expensive to collect. Besides 
the limited and unproductive revenue sources assigned to the state governments, 
economic growth has not favoured the states as much as it has the federal government. 
For instance, GDP growth increases direct taxes (income tax and company tax) collected 
by the federal government. In sum, the federal government revenue is more elastic to 
GDP. In 2000, the revenue elasticity to GDP was 1.0 compared to only 0.02 for states' 
own source of revenue. 4 Moreover, federal policies (such as revision of salaries in the 
public sector), growing demand for public services following urbanisation, the rising cost 
of the provision of public services, as well as inflation, have contributed to the increase in 
state governments' expenditures, which could not be met by existing revenues. Although 
3 See Watts (1999a), Bird and Vaillancourt (1998), Ter-Minassian (1997), and Shah (1994). 4 See Chapter 4 for analysis of the federal and state governments revenue. 
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revenue from municipal / town councils does not directly contribute to states' revenue, 
the less efficient and less developed municipal / town council is a fiscal liability to states 
whose financial position is already squeezed due to growing allocation for transfers. 
s 
Thus, state transfers to local authorities (local government) are another source of increase 
in state expenditure, as more and more urbanisation is taking place. The biggest 
proportion of states' tax revenues comes from land-based taxes, including mines and 
forests. Although non-tax revenue contributes the largest proportion to total consolidated 
states revenue, only a few states benefit, as non-tax revenue comes from royalties 
payments from petroleum and timber, which are not evenly distributed. Hence, most 
states continue to depend on land-based taxes as their most important source of revenue. 
However, revenue from land-based taxes is generally small, since the land is basically 
agricultural and underdeveloped, hence carrying a low premium. A fiscal practitioner in a 
state financial office, when interviewed, revealed that even revenue from land premiums 
is subject to political `consideration'. For instance, a company being alienated of state 
land can make an appeal to lower the premium imposed and in most cases a reduction 
was given for political reasons - especially if the company is related to a strong supporter 
of the states' ruling party. At the same time, the states ruling party (UMNO) itself is 
involved in business, which has negative consequences for the states' ability to raise 
revenue and poses a threat to public governance. 6 
Looking at the lop-sided revenue assignment between federal and states, the fiscal 
practitioners suggested that it is appropriate that the existing arrangement should be 
revised in order to strengthen state governments' revenue and subsequently to alleviate, if 
not totally eliminate, the problem of fiscal imbalances. Thus, the fiscal practitioner 
5 See Phang (1997) especially Chapter 7 for discussion on the financial issues facing local governments in 
Malaysia. 
6 See Shamsul A. B (1983), Jomo (1998), Gomez (1990), and Gomez and Jomo (1997) for fuller discussion 
on the nature of political patronage and political rewards for maintenance of political power of the 
governing ruling party. 
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suggested that drastic reforms should be made, aimed at redesigning a system of revenue 
allocation that can guarantee continuous and stable revenue inflow to the states, as states' 
financial difficulties are a long-term relentless problem. The limited financial resources 
of the state governments and their inadequate capacity to implement large socio- 
economic development projects, have led to greater federal government involvement in 
the development process `on behalf of the states. This causes states to continue to be 
subordinated and subservient to the centre, so that the nation state agenda promulgated by 
the centre will be achieved (Chapter 6). Although it is a good development policy from 
an economic standpoint, nevertheless, from the federalism point of view, it is a form of 
usurpation of the states' little remaining fiscal autonomy, which undermines the states' 
economic and political self- awareness. 
Revision of the existing revenue arrangement would seem to be in line with the spirit of 
Article 110(4) of the Federal Constitution, which allows the federal government to 
transfer the proceeds of any tax or fee collected to the state governments, as well as to 
reassign responsibility for collecting any taxes, to states. Specifically, Article 110(4) of 
the Federal Constitution says: 
`Parliament may by law: 
i. Assign to the States the whole or any portion of the proceeds of any tax or fee 
raised or levied by the Federation; and 
ii. Assign to the States the responsibilities of collecting for States purposes any tax 
or fee authorised by federal law'. 
Article 110(2) also provides that `Parliament may from time to time by law substitute for 
any source of revenue specified in section 1,3,4,5,6,7,8,12, or 14 of Part III of the Tenth 
Schedule or for any source of revenue so substituted, another source of revenue of 
substantially equal value'. Based on these two articles, clearly there is flexibility in the 
assignment of revenue sources and considerable scope for amending the existing revenue 
receipts of the states. However, as the fiscal practitioner asserted, `the federal government 
does not really exercise both articles amid financial difficulties faced by the states'. The 
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reason was due to `limited revenue sources that could be reassigned to states'. In 
addition, whatever the provision says, the alteration to be made under Article 110(2) and 
Article 110 (4)(a) must be initiated by the federal government, after consultation with the 
NFC, before being proposed to parliament. This is where the spirit of executive 
federalism should play a vital role to initiate proposal regarding alteration of the existing 
revenue assignment, as states themselves have no direct say in these decisions. States can 
only express their concern through their representatives at the NFC. However, as will be 
discussed later, membership of the NFC merely reflects the political hierarchy, which 
more often than not prevents a `free flow of discussion' and results in `one way traffic'. 
However, the states of Sabah and Sarawak enjoyed some degree of freedom in respect of 
alteration of the existing revenue assignment in the sense that the Constitution did not 
require these states to consult the NFC but any amendment `shall be made by order of the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong'. Article 112 D (5) says, 
`If on the occasion of any review under this Article the Government of the Federation 
gives notice to the states or state concerned of their intention to vary any of the 
assignments of revenue under Part V of the Tenth Schedule (including any substituted or 
additional assignment made by virtue of this Clause), or to vary Clause (4) of Article 
112C, the review shall take the variation into account, and provision shall be made by 
order of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong... '. 
Clearly, the states of Sabah and Sarawak were given power to negotiate with the federal 
government in order to get more favourable terms in respect of their revenues, as in the 
case of the abolition of import and excise duty on petroleum products. On 1" January 
2000 the federal government decided to abolish import and excise duties on petroleum 
products, which, under items I of Part V of the Tenth Schedule of the Federal 
Constitution, were assigned to the states of Sabah and Sarawak. This abolition was the 
federal government's commitment under the AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) in which 
member countries are required to abolish any import and excise duties on petroleum 
products. As a result, Sabah and Sarawak lost their revenue from these sources. This is 
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another source of potential conflicts in federation, following the growing trend of 
globalisation. 7 
Following this development, the federal government decided to allow these states to 
impose sales tax on petroleum products at the equivalent rate, to compensate for the 
revenue lost due to abolition of import and excise duties on such products. As a result, 
the two states should not, in theory, lose revenue following the abolition of these duties 
from the independent state revenue list. However, the states claim that the revenue 
collected from sales tax is too little compared with the revenue collected from import and 
excise duties on petroleum products. Furthermore, sales tax is already under the States 
List in Sabah and Sarawak, so giving them sales tax is immaterial. In addition, to top up 
the differences, both states demanded that the federal government reassign road tax, ' 
stamp duty and service tax. At the same time, both states requested that import duties and 
excise duties on petroleum should not be repealed from the State List on the ground that 
AFTA is situational, although administratively the states agreed with the centre's 
commitment to abolish import and excise duties on petroleum products. However, the 
federal government refused to fulfil this demand, on the ground that `these taxes have 
belonged to the federal for such a long time'. As an interim measure, the federal 
government agreed to pay RM200 million to Sabah and Sarawak. Subsequently, both 
states agreed on a payment of RM200 million every year, on condition that there should 
be a five percent increment each year. However, the federal government rejected this idea 
and instead insisted that the payment is only a temporary measure. However until now, 
no firm decision has been taken, despite three rounds of negotiations between state and 
federal officers. This type of arrangement is obviously more satisfactory to these states 
7 There is considerable argument on the effects of globalisation on the federal political system especially 
when country commitment does not correspond with the division of power / function between federal 
and state governments In more decentralised federations, globalisation increases states involvement in 
foreign affairs, which is a function of the federal government, especially in matters of international trade. 
See Klemen (2002), Singh and Srinivasan (2002), Fry (2000) and Fry (1999). $ This tax was previously assigned to Sabah and Sarawak until 1974, when it was taken over by the federal 
government for regularity purposes. 
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(Sabah and Sarawak), as it makes the states partners in the process of making decisions 
affecting states' interests. 
The foregoing discussion shows that there is enough flexibility for rearrangement of 
revenue sources to be made to strengthen state governments' finance. The fiscal 
practitioners suggested that the states' financial capacities could be strengthened by 
giving more revenue sources to states, and this could be done by a combination of the 
following. First, based on the derivative principle. Tax revenue should be collected by the 
centre (for efficiency purposes) and returned to the states based on its origin, that is, from 
where taxes were collected (Ter-Mlnassian, 1997). Currently, the number of taxes which 
can be allocated to the states based on this principle are rather limited. As taxes cannot be 
left entirely to the discretion of the states, the states could share the yield of a centrally 
administered tax with the state government, based on the principle of derivation of origin. 
Based on this principle, some portion of the import duties can be allocated to the state 
where the entry point is located. This is justifiable, as extensive cargo movement leads to 
higher costs for road maintenance where the entry points / ports are located. Thus, it is 
fair that these costs be partially borne from a share of the import duties collected. 
However, there are critics who argue that there is an inherent danger in tax / revenue 
sharing based on the derivative principle (Bahl and Linn, 1994). This is because the 
derivative principle could have a counter-equalising effect and undermine the distributive 
objective of overcoming income inequality, as there is a tendency to promote and 
exacerbate invidious interstate disparities, rewarding states on the basis of geographical 
advantage not on the basis of any superior productive or revenue mobilisation effort. This 
could also undermine the national economic and political integration of the federation. As 
a result, it is doubtful whether reassignment of revenue sources based on the derivative 
principle is capable of achieving nationwide redistribution and effective macroeconomic 
reforms. 
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The second possibility is by a federal-state revenue sharing arrangement. Based on this 
arrangement, revenue could be shared on the basis of absolute amounts or percentages of 
a given tax yield, with no reference to the derivation principle. A tax that could be shared 
between states based on this principle is petroleum duty, as currently the benefit from 
petroleum is only enjoyed by the oil rich states of Terengganu (before it was stopped), 
Sabah and Sarawak in the form of royalties. By such a sharing arrangement, every state 
could enjoy the benefits of the petroleum industry. Alternatively, the federal 
government's portion of petroleum royalties and petroleum taxes could be used to 
finance an equalisation programme for those states not endowed with petroleum 
resources. This is justifiable, as the ten per cent of revenue from the export of tin ore and 
the ten per cent of revenue from the export of iron ore is no longer enjoyed by the states, 
due to depletion of these resources. The adjustments could be achieved based on a 
revenue pooling arrangement, such as the one implemented in Nigeria through the 
Distributable Pool Account (DPA), in which revenue was pooled and then shared among 
the states on the basis of equity, needs, national interest, financial comparability, 
population and interstate equality (Suberu, 2002). Another alternative that could be 
considered is a tax-sharing arrangement, whereby states could levy a certain percentage 
of the tax collected by the federal government, or be allowed to add their own percentage 
tax rate to the federally administered tax, such as on individual income tax and company 
tax, instead of receiving an allocation from a purely federal tax. Based on this 
arrangement, the collection of tax would be conducted by the federal government for 
efficiency purposes and subsequently the federal government would transfer revenue 
back to respective state governments on the agreed formulae. This suggestion is feasible, 
as state governments do not have an efficient machinery to collect these taxes themselves. 
The ten percent of export duties on minerals as provided for under Article 110(3 A) of the 
Federal Constitution to the producing states is a form of tax sharing arrangement. 
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However, as there is currently no significant mineral production, none of the states enjoy 
revenue from this arrangement. As a result, it is appropriate to replace this source of 
revenue with other taxes with local characteristics such as income tax (individual and 
company) collected from the states. In other federations, such as the United States, states 
are allowed to levy some percentage of federally collected tax based on agreed formulae 
(Ter-Minassian, 1998; Shah, 1994). 
The third method is by reassignment of federally controlled taxes to states as of right, 
based on the efficiency principle, so that states would be guaranteed a stable revenue 
inflow, unimpeded by political wrangling. Based on this principle, certain taxes that are 
localised in nature could be more efficiently managed and collected by states and hence 
are appropriately assigned to the states. This measure could strengthen states' revenue so 
that states will not be continuously dependent on federal funds. However, the number of 
taxes which could be reassigned to the states is rather limited, while some taxes cannot be 
left entirely to the discretion of the states, due to poor tax collection machinery at state 
level. Among revenue sources which could be reassigned to the state based on this 
principle are property tax, stamp duties, and road tax (tax on vehicles) as well as 
production and consumption taxes as such excise duties, sales and service taxes. 9 The 
reassignment of road tax to states has been suggested and discussed in NFC meetings. 
However, the federal government was not in favour of assigning this tax to states, on 
grounds of efficiency and uniformity. As land matters are the responsibility of the states, 
it is appropriate to reassign property tax to the states, as the property tax is largely land- 
based. Any taxes related to landed property, such as estate duty, real property gains tax 
and stamp duty on land transfers, are appropriately assigned to the states, with policy 
determined by the federal authority for uniformity purposes. The respective state 
governments could then determine their own tax rates, depending on prevailing local 
9 Under Article 96 of the Federal Constitution, only the federal government can impose income taxes. 
295 
economic preferences. Reassignment of property taxes to states could encourage healthy 
competition between state governments and could promote business activities, especially 
the development of the property market, as investors would compare the government 
services they received / expected to receive with the tax rate in determining the location 
of their properties. However, there would be a negative impact for less developed states, 
as they would be less attractive to investors. This could be overcome by reducing the tax 
rate. Furthermore, these taxes are localised in nature and as such the problem of tax 
evasion (by moving to other states) could be minimised. Consequently, this measure 
would promote efficiency in tax collection efforts and would encourage business in the 
states. Similarly, tax on vehicles, which is also localised, is better collected by the states 
concerned, as the data base regarding information on vehicles is available in every state. 
A final alternative would be based on compensation for states' revenue losses. There are 
many federal projects in the states, for which states are required to alienate land and, as a 
result, states lose out in terms of land usage as well as revenue potential, as alienation of 
states land, especially in major towns and cities, does not correspondingly result in higher 
tax revenues from better land utilisation. The five percent administrative payment for 
federal projects implemented in states is made on the basis of the states' staff 
involvement in the projects, but is not intended to improve states' revenues (see Chapter 
4). No compensation system has been designed for such revenue loss; such a system 
needs to be considered as a potential state revenue source. Currently, land used for 
federal projects (federal building and installation, forest reservations and national parks) 
in the states is exempt from land tax (fixed rent on land) to states or is paid at a fixed 
minimum rate, but only for those buildings that have a Certificate of Fitness (CF). 
Ironically, most of the federal buildings in the states, such as schools, do not have a CF, 
as in most cases building plans were not required to be submitted to local councils for 
approval; local councils therefore refuse to issue a CF. Even highways built under the 
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privatisation programme are not subject to land tax. As a result, states have lost both 
useable land and revenue potential. The only benefit that states get is the spill over effects 
from such projects. Another reason why compensation should be used as a basis for the 
assignment of new sources of revenue to the states is due to revenue lost following states' 
efforts to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), such as sending trade missions abroad 
and expenditure on related industrial sites. Abdullah affirmed, 
`Although there have been substantial amounts of state governments development 
expenditure over the years, which originate from state initiatives or even federal 
government financing, the benefits of these development expenditure or investments have 
mainly accrued to the federal government in the form of income tax and export duties 
related to the output of these investments projects' (Abdullah, 1978: 312). 
All these efforts should be compensated because states did not receive any lucrative 
revenue for their efforts. For instance, income tax and company tax from the operation of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in states belongs to the federal government, although 
states receive some allocation for expenditure spent on the construction of an industrial 
zone. With a compensation system, states would not be deprived of revenues from federal 
activities in states. 
In the recent controversial issue over timber logging in Kedah, the federal government 
argued that the action of Kedah in granting concessions to the logging company near the 
Pedu Dam reserve forest would cause adverse impact to the environment, especially to 
the water catchments area. 10 However, as Kedah is ruled by the same party as the centre, 
the matter was resolved amicably and in return the federal government is considering 
special payment to the Kedah government on the basis of `potential revenue lost' from 
their projected profit from the logging activities. But this was not the case for 
Terengganu, when the opposition-led Terengganu government granted a logging 
concession near Kenyir Lake to the logging company. This concession was opposed by 
the federal government, ostensibly for fear of an environmental hazard. However, special 
10 Utusan Malaysia 19th May 2003: `Hands off Pedu Dam reserve forest, says Cabinet'. 
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payments were not considered as they had been in the case of Kedah. In a nutshell, these 
clashes of interest are indeed the manifestation of states being desperate for revenue 
while the federal government is concerned about the environmental implications. " 
Although reassignment of independent revenue sources to states is inevitable, the federal 
officials interviewed noted that reassignment of revenue sources to the states may not be 
viewed as appropriate, as most taxes are under federal jurisdiction. 12 Thus, any demand 
to revise the existing arrangements would result in a long constitutional battle. Therefore, 
federal government views states' suggestion for reassignment of revenue sources with 
mistrust, as it would give more fiscal autonomy to the states, which would threaten the 
political supremacy of the centre. Indeed, there is no simple answer to the problem of 
revenue assignment in a federation. However, three important principles should be 
considered if revenue sources are to be reassigned to the states: first, the importance of 
the economic functions of government, that is, the stabilisation function (to avoid 
macroeconomic drawback), the distribution function (to avoid unnecessary inequity 
among states) and the allocation function (efficiency in the allocation of scarce resources) 
should not be undermined. Second, the federal spirit (cooperation, trust, partnership and 
respect) should be maintained; and third, the political aspect of federalism (political 
system and party politics) should be considered. 
However, reassignment of taxes is only possible through the implementation of a fiscal 
decentralization process as practised in other federal countries-i3 According to 
Holzhausen, `a change in the substance and composition of the tax subjects or other 
uA similar situation arose in Pahang over a logging concession in Endau-Rompin forest reserve, which 
resulted in the removal of the Pahang Mentcri Besar (Chief Minister).. Sec Shafnlddin (1987), Chapter 9. 
22 Private interview with a government official who wants to remain anonymous. Please refer to separate 
reference attached to the thesis. 
13 See Bird and Vailaincourt (1998) for detailed discussion on the current practice of fiscal decentralisation. 
Ismail (1997) argues that fiscal decentralisation may not be suitable in Malaysia as Malaysia is a small 
country and citizens' were indifference, Abdul Rahim (2000) also shares the same opinion, that fiscal 
decentralisation may not be appropriate in Malaysia as the federal government is committed to undertake 
national development throughout the federation through the annual budgetary process. 
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assured sources of income of the states would be the most appropriate solution to any 
long-term imbalance in relation between the states' needs and resources' (Holzhausen, 
1974: 158). Nevertheless, the federal government views reassignment of taxation to solve 
the long-term fiscal imbalance as impossible, since the most important taxes have been 
exclusively assigned to the centre under the Federal Constitution. Based on past 
experience, the federal government resists the reassignment option for economic 
(macroeconomic management) and political reasons (the desire to control political 
behaviour of the states). Investigation of government fiscal policy shows that the ability 
and willingness of the federal government to implement new arrangements (tax 
assignment) are not always present, especially if the new arrangements mean a loss of the 
powers of the centre. 14 Therefore, reassignment of revenue sources requires strong 
political will, given the nature of the political system. In the absence of political will, 
federal transfers continue to be used as the main method of fiscal adjustment in Malaysia 
because they can serve both economic and political purposes. Politically, federal transfers 
can act as a `carrot' as well as a `stick' by which the central political leader can put 
pressure on recalcitrant states' opposition leaders. '5 Realising the fact that fiscal 
adjustment can only be made through federal transfers, the federal government should 
improve the existing grants system. 
7.3 Improving states' tax collection system 
Reassignment of revenue sources is only possible if it is followed by improvements in the 
states' tax collection system in order to increase states' absorptive capacity as well tax 
effort. The ability to collect revenue is vital to increase the states' fiscal capacity. It has 
been noticed that the tax collection system differs from one state to another. There is no 
standardised mechanism and structure of tax collection. As a result, states' revenue from 
14 For instance, in 1987 there was a demand by the states to reassign road tax and property tax to state 
governments as new sources of revenue but was turned down in the National Finance meeting as This was repeatedly done by delaying disbursement of grants to states, as experienced by Kelantan and 
Tcrcngganu. See also discussion on this matter in section 43 of Chapter 4. 
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land tax collection is still below its potential. Therefore, state governments should 
explore the potential of land tax as a major source of revenue in future. State 
governments should improve the efficiency of land office administration and should take 
steps to ensure constant collection of land revenue and follow up arrears. The inefficiency 
of land administration has in fact been criticised by the Deputy Prime Minister, Abdullah 
Ahmad Badawi16, who commented that, due to states' bureaucratic red tape, several land 
applications, for the issue of land titles and transfer of ownership have taken up to fifty 
years to be resolved. '? This bureaucratic red tape caused states to lose their revenue 
potential from land premium, although land tax collection is the second major source of 
states' revenue. 
Inefficiency has also been noticed in the collection of water charges. In Selangor and 
Kuala Lumpur, for instance, up to 30m September 2002, a total of RM230 million of 
water charges had not been collected, partly as a result of inefficiency in water 
management. As land and water are state matters, the respective states should take steps 
to modernise the management of these factors of production. Poor management skills 
would pave the way for federal interference in state fiscal affairs for the sake of 
efficiency. This was evident when the federal government in August 2003, through the 
formation of the National Water Council, decided to centralise water management away 
from the states, despite objections from the states led by the opposition. What will 
happen next is that, if a state fails to improve its tax collection system and, subsequently, 
its revenue performance, more and more functions will be usurped by the centre, and land 
management may be next on the list. Although land falls under the State List, the policy 
is a federal matter (through the National Land Council), and the amendment to the 
National Land Code 1965 enables the federal government to take over state land for 
16 On 1' November 2003, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi was `appointed' as the fifth Malaysian Prime Minister 
when the longest serving Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad voluntarily retired. lr Berita Harian, le December 2002. 
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federal purposes. It seems here that, as in the case of the NFC, the council becomes a 
strong instrument of power usurpation. 
Through improvement in the tax collection system, states' tax efforts can be increased to 
reach their full potential- Therefore, long term planning of state taxes should be made to 
increase states' tax efforts. The fiscal practitioners were of the opinion that without 
proper tax planning, state governments will be forever dependent on the federal 
government for funds. However, they also believed that it is easier to put effort into 
getting federal funds through good political relations with the centre, rather than to put 
effort into exploring states' revenue potential, such as by improving the tax collection 
system. This implies that the current system has made states more complacent, and this is 
perilous for states' fiscal management- 
7.4 Fiscal adjustment measures: Improving transfers system. 
The downside risk of the application of an efficiency rationale in tax revenue assignment 
is a high degree of tax centralisation, due to the poor tax collection mechanism at state 
level and the mobility of factors of production across the states. Thus, from the point of 
view of efficiency, the federal government is likely to collect most of the productive 
revenue indefinitely, unless there is strong state protest against the centralisation of taxes. 
Subsequently, the issue of non-correspondence between revenue and expenditure of the 
state governments will continue to be a long-term problem. This poses the question of 
how serious the federal government is about intergovernmental fiscal adjustment. Since 
the fiscal imbalance in Malaysia is long-term in nature, the most appropriate approach to 
fiscal adjustment is to assure a steady inflow of income to the state governments, 
regardless of economic and political cost. 
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The significance of federal transfers is justifiable because the federal government has 
strong revenue-raising powers, compared to that of the states. The aim of fiscal 
adjustment is primarily to ensure that the state governments have sufficient resources to 
finance the functions allocated to them under the Constitution, given the non- 
correspondence in the distribution of responsibilities and sources of revenue between the 
federal and state governments; and secondly, to equalise interstate fiscal disparities 
following differences in the fiscal capacities- The literature suggests three methods to 
remedy these imbalances: first by federal transfers, second by reassignment of revenue, 
and third by changes in tax components (Holzhausen, 1974). However, economists 
suggest that the first method is more practical than reassignment of taxation to the state 
governments, as it is relatively less difficult to be administered and recognises the lack of 
efficiency in revenue collection machinery at the state level. Within federal transfers, 
grants and tax revenue sharing are the most practical ways to remedy both vertical and 
horizontal imbalances (Ter-Minassian, 1997). Grants could be either conditional or 
unconditional, depending on their purpose and on the type of imbalances to be remedied 
(see Chapter 2). 
As discussed above, the problem of fiscal imbalance in Malaysian fiscal federalism is 
long-term in nature. One way to overcome long-term fiscal imbalance is to equate 
revenue and expenditure responsibilities. Any discrepancies (or fiscal gap), should they 
arise, should be balanced out by a proper grant / transfer based on fiscal needs and fiscal 
capacity. Fiscal needs would depend on such factors as the area, population, capacity to 
extend and socio-economic status such as production, employment, GDP, and incidence 
of poverty, health indicator and access to public amenities. On the other hand, fiscal 
capacity would depend not only on revenue collected but also on the ability to collect 
revenue. However, it is important that legitimate criteria be adopted to ensure a high 
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degree of transparency in the design and disbursement of the grants system. More 
importantly, grants should be stable, transparent and distributed on time. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the existing fiscal adjustment practices have several 
shortcomings- First, total federal transfers are very small compared with the total federal 
government revenue, and not all grants are real grants intended to balance state 
governments' accounts. Second, the instruments of federal transfer comprise various 
types, which were designed to meet different purposes and not all transfers are considered 
as real fiscal adjustments to eliminate revenue-expenditure mismatch. Third, the practice 
of federal transfers does have an equalising effect on all state governments, as states with 
a higher GDP continue to receive higher federal grants than lower GDP states. 
Furthermore, the grants do not have a built-in mechanism to respond to economic 
changes. Finally, fiscal adjustment, which includes both the adjustment of horizontal and 
vertical imbalances, has mostly been effected by conditional grants, mainly to enable the 
federal government to exercise control over the extent and quality of state services and 
state development expenditures. 
Analysis of state and federal financial data indicates that state governments' capability to 
undertake their constitutionally assigned functions is very strongly dependent on their 
own sources of revenue and transfers from the federal government (see Chapter 4). This 
is supported by the findings from regression analysis conducted for this research, which 
supports the hypothesis that there is a correlation between state government expenditure 
and federal transfers (see Chapter 5). However, the result of regression analysis did not 
strongly support the hypothesis that federal government revenue is a key determinant of 
federal transfers to the states. This is evident, as the amount of transfers is still low 
compared to the size of federal government revenue. As such, the federal government 
should revise the existing transfers / grants systems. 
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Under the Federal Constitution, besides flexibility being provided for reassignment of 
revenue sources, there is also sufficient scope to revise the existing transfers system to 
state governments. Article 109 (3) and 109 (6) of the Federal Constitution provides 
enough flexibility for fiscal adjustment to be made by introducing new grants (through 
enactment of a specific law). Specifically, Article 109(3) says, `Parliament may by law 
make grants for specific purpose to any of the states on such terms and conditions as may 
be provided by any such law', while Article 109 (6) provides further flexibility `the 
federation may from time to time, after consultation with the National Finance Council, 
makes grants out of the State Reserve Fund to any state for the purposes of development 
or generally to supplement its revenue'. However, despite this flexibility, the state 
government remain `voiceless' in the making of fiscal adjustment. This is because only 
the federal government can initiate the introduction of new grants, as stated in Article 108 
(4)(a) and Article 108 (5), which gives power to the federal government to introduce new 
grants to states after consultation with the NFC. However, the efforts taken by the federal 
government thus far to bring about financial relief to the state governments remain 
unsatisfactory, inadequate and not intended to solve long-term problem of fiscal 
imbalance. Indeed, the federal government had realised the weakness of the existing 
transfers system, as stated in the Ministry of Finance's Economic Report: 
`Over the years, grants given to the state governments were inadequate due to a number 
of factors. Firstly, the expenditure of the state governments has been increasing to cater 
for the expansion in services and development programmes. Secondly, the revenue from 
the states' own sources did not increase in line with the general growth of the economy. 
In some cases the revenue sources are in fact depleting. Thirdly, the structure of some 
federal grants does not have a built-in price adjustment factor and as such increase in cost 
and inflation have rendered the grants inadequate to meet their original 
purposes'(MOFER, 1992: 170). 
On closer scrutiny, the major hurdle is the lack of political will on the part of the federal 
government to review the whole structure of transfers systems to solve the long-term 
problem of fiscal imbalance. However, the position of the states of Sabah and Sarawak is 
relatively more satisfactory, in that these states can demand a review of the grant received 
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from the federal government, to ensure the `revenue is adequate to meet the cost' of 
provision of public services. This is clearly stated in Article 112D(2), 
`Any review under this Article shall take into account the financial position of the federal 
government, as well as the needs of the states or state concerned, but subject to that shall 
endeavour to ensure that the states revenue is adequate to meet the cost of state services 
as they exist at the time of the review, with such provision for their expansion as appears 
reasonable'. [Emphasis added]. 
Hence, if any fundamental imbalance should eventually arise, there is always a likelihood 
of revising the amount of the special grants. This provision is not applicable to states in 
Peninsular Malaysia. However, despite this provision, revision of special grants takes a 
long time to be implemented. For instance, since the last revision of special grants 
(Article 112C and 112D, and Part IV of the Tenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution) 
in 1973, there have been no revisions made. 18 
The success of any system of fiscal adjustment also depends largely on the formulae 
chosen in the design and the distribution of grants. In determining the amount of 
transfers, the financial need of the state governments (based on income per capita, 
expenditure per capita, and state GDP per capita) should be the main criterion, apart from 
the financial capacity of the federal government, with a view to remedy both vertical and 
horizontal imbalances. In this case, the grants based on the level of economic 
development provided under the State Reserve Fund can be developed into a 
comprehensive fiscal equalisation system, as this grant takes into account some elements 
of the states' fiscal needs. The justification for an effective fiscal equalisation programme 
is that it will promote the concept of equal rights, equal treatment and federal spirit in 
response to citizens' changing needs and preferences. Without a fiscal equalisation 
programme, federal-state fiscal conflicts could have a corrosive effect on the federation's 
18 In 2000, the Federal Government agreed to revise the whole arrangement of Part IV of the Federal 
Constitution following the abolishment of Section 1 of Part V (import duty and excise duty on petroleum 
products). This is part of the Federal Government's commitment towards AFTA, which requires the 
member country to abolish import duty and excise duty on petroleum products. As a result, the states of 
Sabah and Sarawak lost their revenue derived from these sources. New arrangements have yet to be finalised. 
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political stability and cause economic distortion when capital moves in favour of richer 
and more prosperous states. In the final analysis, fiscal equalisation should be able to 
remedy the financial hardship of the state governments, and subsequently iron out any 
fiscal imbalance (horizontal and vertical). However, in the view of the fiscal 
practitioners, a fiscal equalisation programme would be too expensive to implement and 
would have constitutional implications. In the absence of a fiscal equalisation 
programme, fiscal adjustment through the existing transfers / grants system should be 
reviewed by an independent and impartial authority to remedy the states' financial 
difficulties and, more importantly, federal transfers should be made unconditional - at the 
disposal of the states to spend without any strings attached, and the amount of the 
transfers should be revised annually. As discussed in Chapter 4, some grants were 
designed only to overcome states' temporary financial difficulties, as in the case of grants 
to ease current account deficits provided for under the State Reserve Fund. 
If a fiscal gap still persists, balancing grants with a built-in mechanism to correspond to 
economic fluctuation would be the best option, as they could automatically negate any 
revenue mismatch or non-correspondence. However, as also experienced by developed 
federations such as Canada and Germany, it is almost impossible to achieve the ideal 
situation of matching revenue with expenditure needs. Alternatively, a self-correcting 
mechanism with built-in flexibility (to avoid rigidity) for tax and grants arrangements 
would be the preferred option. At the same time, it would provide the best solution to 
changing economic and political conditions. Such a mechanism would automatically 
correct any revenue and expenditure discrepancies that may arise. It is essential, however, 
that the distribution of grants should be stable and transparent - not subject to political 
whim and fancy - regardless which political party rules the states. As the Treasury 
officials asserted when asked about the delay in disbursement of grants to states led by 
the opposition party, `the Constitution only provides what grants are to be paid to states 
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but the disbursement is solely within federal jurisdiction - when to pay cannot be 
questioned'. 19 Thus, it is appropriate that grants should be given to the states as of right 
and not subject to the vagaries of the centre's political agenda. According to Watts, 
`intergovernmental financial adjustments are therefore not simply technical adjustments 
but inevitably the result of political compromise' (Watts, 2002: 2). With regard to the 
practice of fiscal adjustment within Malaysian fiscal federalism, Holzhausen commented 
that `only if the whole question of financial adjustment is isolated from politics and 
handled by an independent panel of experts, is it possible to arrive at a solution, which 
will really meet the needs of the states' (Holzhausen, 1974: 160). More importantly, 
whatever the design, the new grants system should not only be capable of eliminating 
revenue-expenditure mismatch, but also encourage local tax efforts. 
7.5 Enhancing the role of the National Finance Council (NFC) 
As was seen in Chapter 1, the existence of the NFC to foster intergovernmental fiscal 
relations in Malaysian fiscal federalism is vital. The financial provisions of the 
Constitution came into force on 1'` January 1958 and hence the NFC legally came into 
effect. Unfortunately, the Council can only advise on matters of federal finance relating 
to states in Peninsular Malaysia. Hence, the current status of the Sabah and Sarawak in 
the NFC is merely as `sitting-in' members only. 
The NFC is a high level intergovernmental consultative body on financial matters as 
provided for in the Federal Constitution, to ensure that there are no open clashes in 
intergovernmental relations with regard to fiscal matters. Intergovernmental institutions 
like the NFC should become an effective intergovernmental negotiation body on finance 
to solve federal-state financial conflicts (Jeffery, 2003b). In the Constitutional 
Commission Report 1957, the Commission was directed to recommend `machinery for 
19 Private interview with a government official who wants to remain anonymous. Please refer to separate 
reference attached to the thesis 
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consultation between the central government and the states and settlements on certain 
financial matters to be specified in the Constitution' (Para 149). Subsequently the 
Commission recommended a body through which both levels of government can consult 
each other on various matters in which the states as well as the federal government would 
be interested. The federal government should be free to bring forward any other questions 
which require consultation between the federal and state governments, and the states 
should be free to consult the Council on any financial matters. 
'We recommend that this machinery should be purely consultative. We do not think that 
it would be right, or indeed practicable, to give any executive functions to the body which 
we recommend should be formed, or to allow its powers to affect or diminish the ultimate 
responsibilities of the federation and the states within their respective spheres' 
(Constitutional Commission Report 1957). 
The spirit of this recommendation has been embodied in the Constitution as found in 
Article 108. Article 108 (4) and (5) of the Federal Constitution outlines the main function 
of the NFC as follows: 
`(4). It shall be the duty of the federal government to consult the National Finance 
Council in respect of: - 
a. the making of grants by the Federation to the states; 
b. the assignment to the states of the whole or any portion of the proceeds of any 
federal tax or fee; 
c. the annual loan requirements of the Federation and the states and the exercise by 
the Federation and the states of their borrowing powers; 
d. the making of loans to any of the states; 
e. the making of development plans in accordance with Article 92; 
f. the matters referred to in Items 7(f) and (g) of the Federal List; 
g. any proposal to introduce a Bill for such a law as is mentioned in Clause (2) 
Article 109 or Clause (3) or (3a) Article 110; 
h. any other matter in respect of which this Constitution or federal law makes 
provision for consultation with the National Finance Council. 
(5). The federal government may consult the National Finance Council in respect of any 
other matter, whether or not it involves questions of finance, and the government of a 
state may consult the said Council in respect of any matter which affects the financial 
position of that state'. 
Clearly, the Federal Constitution provides ample room for negotiation and arbitration 
concerning federal -- state fiscal matters, to be undertaken by the NFC: the making of 
grants, revenue assignment, the making of loans to the states, the making of development 
plans, and any other federal-state fiscal matters. However the questions are: to what 
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extent can the Council meet this role, given the composition of the Council, and, 
subsequently, how can better use be made of the NFC in the promotion of better 
intergovernmental fiscal relations? In practice, however, the role of the NFC is limited by 
political influence in its conduct, as the members of the NFC represent the political 
echelons of the governing ruling party. It is not an impartial body in which fair decisions 
affecting states' interest are made. As stipulated in the Article 108(1), the NFC consists 
of the Prime Minister, such other ministers as the Prime Minister may designate and one 
representative from each of the states appointed by the Ruler or Governor. The state 
representative in the Council is the Menteri Besar or Chief Minister of the state. The 
NFC is summoned to meet by the Prime Minister as often as he considers it necessary 
and whenever the representatives of three or more states demand a meeting to be held. 
However, it is compulsory to hold at least one meeting every year. At any meeting, 
another minister of the federation may represent the Prime Minister; if the Prime Minister 
is not present, the minister representing him presides over the meeting. In practice, the 
Deputy Prime Minister always presides over the meeting in the absence of the Prime 
Minister. 
All Menteri Besar or Chief Ministers and members of the Council are from the ruling 
coalition party, except for those of Kelantan (from 1990 till now) and Terengganu (from 
1999-2004), who are from the opposition party (PAS). Hickling commented on the 
composition of the NFC: `The council is heavily in favour of the states: a fact perhaps 
likely to cause it to be viewed with a certain degree of suspicion by the federal 
government' (Hickling, 1960: 52). However this statement is grossly inaccurate, as 
numbers do not reflect actual states' strength in the Council because the Council 
decisions are not made by the number of votes. 20 In practice, there is no voting involved 
in making decisions; rather, decisions are taken by consensus, which means that the 
20 See also Lai (1968). 
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federal government and a majority of the states support the decision. As one fiscal 
practitioner said, `Everything has been sorted out at the officers' level and therefore the 
NFC meeting is only to endorse decision made at the State Finance Officers meeting held 
prior to the NFC meeting'. 21 Therefore, the influence of the Federal Treasury on the 
working of the NFC is significant as the Treasury is the only authority responsible for the 
NFC. This is another reason that makes the NFC impartial. Saharudin also admitted, 
`Although the Finance Council includes a representative from each of the states, its 
deliberation could be regarded merely as a formality, particularly because it is chaired by 
the Prime Minister who presides over the Cabinet' (Saharudin, 1998: 227). Indeed, the 
NFC is one council where numbers (thirteen representatives from states) do not constitute 
strength, as the position of the federal government in the NFC is stronger and more 
dominant than that of the states taken as whole. In the light of the powerful and decisive 
personality of the chairman of the NFC, that is, the Prime Minister or the Deputy Prime 
Minister, the states dare not dissent on most issues. As fiscal practitioners commented, 
`Who would dare to argue with the Chairman? '22 Hence, looking at this structure, federal 
politics that actually dominates the Council (Saharudin, 1998; Yusoff, 1998). Thus, 
decisions made by the NFC are politically determined according to the wish of the centre. 
In other words, the decisions of the NFC reflect the strong political cohesiveness of the 
ruling party both at the centre and at state levels. In this regard, the states of Sabah and 
Sarawak are in a better position, as they are not obliged to consult the NFC concerning 
the making of additional grants or reviewing existing grants. 
Although there is flexibility for fiscal adjustment, the practice cannot be considered 
adequate from the point of view of the state governments. This is because only the 
federal government can initiate such changes affecting states' financial interest (Article 
21 Private interview with a government official who wants to remain anonymous. Please refer to separate 
reference attached to the thesis. 
22 Private interview with a government official who wants to remain anonymous. Please refer to separate 
reference attached to the thesis. 
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108(4)(a)), while the state governments can only express their view through their 
representatives (the Chief Ministers) on the NFC. However, if their representative comes 
from the opposition party, the states concerned cannot rally support for issues affecting 
their states. It is in effect as though they had no representatives in the Council, and hence 
the say of the federal government is overriding and final. The ability of the federal 
government to win over the state governments into agreeing on certain financial matters 
can be attributed to its political supremacy over the states- This is not surprising because, 
as mentioned above, all of the members of the NFC are Menteri Besar or Chief Ministers 
(from the State Legislative Assemblies), whose selection as candidates for election is 
made by the UMNO Central Executive Committee (except for the opposition party) and 
whose appointment as a Menteri Besar is in the hands of the Prime Minister. As such, 
they are obliged to agree with the Chairman on most matters raised in the NFC. Thus, the 
federal government is always in a strong position to obtain the compliance of the state 
governments controlled by the ruling party (the Barisan Nasional in which UMNO is the 
main component) owing to the internal power structure of the party. Hence, the federal 
government in effect controls the NFC with little protest from its members because only 
two members belong to the opposition party (for period 1999-2004). This factor has led 
the federal government to assume a supervisory role over state finances (through the 
NFC). Although this is undoubtedly required to ensure `prudent fiscal management' and 
to improve the degree of public governance, it was implemented to such an extent that it 
coerces state fiscal affävs, which make states weak and complacent. Indeed, it is a way of 
degrading the states' capability to undertake fiscal functions. 24 
The federal government is merely obliged to consider the recommendations of the 
Council, and its decision affecting federal government interest is final. This is clearly 
seen in the case of loan repayment by the state to the federal government, where the 
23 Sec Chapter 6 for discussion of the party system in Malaysia. 24 See also Jomo and Wee (2002). 
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decision was made to deduct sums from grants to states in lieu of loan repayment. 
25 The 
states cannot object, due to the `political supremacy' of the federal government in the 
Council, as discussed above. In view of the practical problems with the NFC, it is timely 
to have an independent body so that proper review of federal-state financial relations can 
be made on a regular basis for the benefit of the both levels of government. According to 
Holzhausen, 
,... if politicians feel that federalism should, nevertheless, play a useful role...., a larger 
measure of responsible participation of the states in decisions vital to their independence 
would certainly be appropriate. In these circumstances there would then be a need for a 
review of the various aspects of federal/state financial relations in Malaysia' 
(Holzhausen, 1974: 159) 
Although it is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, in practice the federal 
government is not really obliged to follow the advice of the Council, if the decision made 
by the Council departs from the federal government's wishes. As such, the effectiveness 
of the NFC as an institution for overseeing intergovernmental fiscal relations is 
questionable. The fact that the NFC has merely an advisory function and cannot force the 
central government to accept its recommendations is contrary to its role as an institution 
for coordinating federal-state financial relations. Another factor, which also tends to 
weaken its significance, is its limited jurisdiction with regard to the financial relations 
between the federal government and the states of Sabah and Sarawak, as the states are not 
obliged to consult the NFC. As stated in Article 112D (7) of the Federal Constitution, the 
jurisdiction of the NFC does not extend to cover the interests of the states of Sabah and 
Sarawak in the matter of reviewing special grants to these States. On a positive note, this 
article actually gives a better position to the states of Sabah and Sarawak, as they can 
remain aloof from political wrangling, should the states become politically unaffiliated 
from the centre. However, as was seen in Chapter 6, this constitutional guarantee still 
25 The NFC 2000 meeting warned that the federal government could invoke Article 98 (2) of the Federal 
Constitution to reduce grants to states if states failed to make repayments of the loans taken from the 
federal government. In fact this has already been done. In 1995, payments for Road Grants to Kedah, 
Kelantan and Negeri Sembilan were reduced by the amount of defaulted payment (Kedah's grant was 
reduced by RM 3.3 million, Kelantan's by RM 6 million and Negeri Sembilan's by RM 4.6 million). 
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fails to safeguard the states from central intrusion, as the centre can use other means to 
pressure the states to toe the line, as in case of Sabah while under the PBS government 
(1985-1990). On a negative note, however, this article may induce the central political 
leader to put undue pressure on a state over its fiscal affairs. Nevertheless, with regard to 
possible future conflicts between the federal government and the states of Sabah and 
Sarawak on the subject of the special grants, Article 112D (6) of the Constitution 
provides for arbitration by an independent assessor. The recommendations of the assessor 
are binding on both governments concerned and shall be given effect as if they were the 
agreement, unlike recommendations of the NFC (for states in the Peninsula) which are 
not binding on the federal government. 
Since the purpose of the establishment of the NFC is to provide room for negotiation on a 
wide array of federal-states fiscal relations, it may be desirable to revise the function as 
well as the structure of the NFC so that it can play a more effective coordinating role for 
the betterment of the intergovernmental fiscal relations. To achieve this aim, it is crucial 
for the NFC to be made impartial, in that the representation of the two levels of 
government on the Council should be based on the strength of their expert knowledge on 
the constitution, economics, federalism and fiscal federalism. In the case of the failure to 
make the NFC an impartial body, there should be an independent authority with 
executive function, comprising members from a wide array of expertise, not bound by 
political bias and empowered with broader supervisory functions, including the power to 
review a wide range of federal-state financial relations on a regular basis, especially with 
regard to the system of fiscal adjustment, in order to strengthen state governments' 
finance and, subsequently, to ensure continuous efficient working of the whole system of 
federal-states financial arrangements. More importantly, its recommendations, especially 
those concerning the intergovernmental financial adjustment, should be final and binding 
on the federal government. 
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7.6 Liberalising the borrowing power to states 
Literature shows that hardly any government can undertake rapid socio-economic 
development without some kind of borrowing (Oates, 1972). Even in developed 
economies, borrowing is an integral part of the financing of public investments. The need 
for borrowing is a manifestation of inadequate resources to finance public investment. If 
the revenue falls short of expenditure or if the government decides to undertake a fiscal 
expansionary programme for which expenditure exceeds available resources, then the 
government will resort to domestic / external sources. Undoubtedly, public borrowing 
plays a significant role in the financing of development projects at both federal and state 
level. For state governments, the need for borrowing is also a sign of inadequate transfers 
from the higher level of government. As far as public finance is concerned, there are four 
issues that need to be considered. First, both levels of government should equally benefit 
from public borrowing. Second, if only the federal government has borrowing powers, to 
which states do not have access, the distribution of loans from the federal to states 
government should conform to the principle of equity. Third, if states have access to 
borrowing, the level of borrowing should be determined for the purpose of prudent debt 
management and for monetary policy purposes. Finally, borrowing from central bank 
should be avoided. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the federal government has exclusive powers to resort to 
borrowing, as well as absolute control over the borrowing needs of the states. Therefore, 
states should benefit from borrowing made by the federal government and the 
distribution of loans should conform to the principle of equity. There are two sources for 
states' borrowing. First, for loans of duration of more than one year, the states may 
borrow from the federal government. The terms and conditions of all loans are 
determined by the Treasury, and strict conditions are attached to the loan agreements 
between the federal government and the borrowing state. The terms and conditions under 
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which loans are made vary with the purpose of the loan. Borrowing can only be used to 
finance approved development projects, in particular for land development schemes, low- 
cost housing schemes, water supply, agriculture related projects and industrial estate 
schemes. This is one way in which the centre induces the states to conform to its policies, 
especially to deal with those states led by the opposition party. Borrowing conditions 
have often been the cause of friction between the federal and state governments. 
Second, for loans of duration of one year or less, states may borrow from banks, but must 
first obtain the approval of the federal government. Nevertheless, borrowing from the 
banking system is limited, as the states' credit rating by and large is weak. Therefore, 
most of the borrowing contracted by states comprises loans from the federal government. 
For the states of Sabah and Sarawak, borrowing within the state is allowed under state 
law, provided the borrowing has the approval of the Central Bank. Table 7.1 shows the 
borrowing raised by states from the federal government for selected years. 
Table 7.1 
State Governments Borrowing from the Federal Government* 
(RM million) 
1996 1997 1998 
Gross 
Borrowing 
Principal 
Repayment 
Gross 
Borrowin 
Principal 
Repayment 
Gross 
Borrowin 
Principal 
Ra ent 
Perlis 6.6 1.0 1.5 14.0 9.1 5.4 
Kedah 133.9 61.6 116.5 84.0 76.4 30.8 
Penang 21.4 14.4 35.1 0 95.7 18.9 
Perak 8.7 22.4 17.7 21.3 15.7 14.9 
Selangor 71.2 27.2 15.5 37.5 34.5 75.7 
Negeri Sembilan 42.9 38.1 77.5 39.6 160.6 29.7 
Melaka 24.9 36.0 83.4 13.0 59.0 27.0 
Johor 14.1 96.6 52.7 39.4 29.9 32.8 
Pahang 41.6 53.4 73.6 48.8 92.3 25.6 
Teren u 54.5 93.1 107.5 31.3 126.3 28.4 
Kelantan 0 12.2 0 20.4 0 19.4 
Sabah 22.1 7.6 14.3 0 121.4 7.8 
Sarawak 74.2 15.1 75.2 41.5 130.4 74.3 
Note: * This loan is largely to finance low cost housing projects, projects under State Development 
Corporation, and water supply projects. 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
With the federal government's power to allow or refuse loans for any purpose, borrowing 
power becomes another instrument of control over the direction of states' economic 
development. Of late, there is growing practice for the federal government to give loans 
315 
rather than grants to states. Nevertheless, this is annoying, as states' capacity to pay back 
loans is limited (see Table 7.2). States' fiscal practitioners argue that, since federal 
transfers are too small and not intended to negate fiscal discrepancies, states should be 
allowed to borrow within their financial capacity, to enable them to tap finance from the 
capital market especially through long-term bonds. This is because repayment of bonds 
could be spread over the generation and therefore minimise states' repayment burden. As 
such, bonds are preferred for financing long-term investment or development 
expenditures of which the benefit of the projects goes beyond the current generation. 
However, bonds should not be used to finance current expenditures because they place 
the burden of financing current benefits on future generations. If borrowing is allowed, 
some form of control is necessary but not to an extent that it coerces states' fiscal affairs 
because of political incompatibility. The rationale for controlling states borrowing is that 
uncontrolled borrowing by state governments would not be in the national interest, as 
excessive state borrowing would cause moral hazard, contingent liability and bail out, as 
well as cause a crowding out effect. While this is appropriate from the public finance and 
macroeconomic standpoints, the tight restriction on borrowing in Malaysia is a definite 
check on states' fiscal autonomy. 
Table 7.2 shows that `have not states' (Perlis, Kedah, Negeri Sembilan, Melaka, Pahang 
and Kelantan) are seriously in debt, as the share of debt to the state GDP is high (more 
than ten per cent) compared to the rest of the states. This also indicates the difficulty of 
these states to serve debts (loan repayment and interest payment), due to their limited 
revenue raising power. The states are unable not only to service the interest but also to 
pay the principal. Even principal repayments are not made on time. The outstanding 
interest payment would normally be capitalised, causing states' debt to grow larger. 
However, the way federal government responded to the states' failure to service the debt 
by reducing the amount of grant they received is rather annoying. In the final analysis, 
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this practice has a persistent chain of effects, whereby solving states' fiscal problem 
becomes more complicated, which causes moral hazard. 
Table 7.2 
State Governments Debt* 
(RM million) 
1997 1998 
State 
GDP 
Debt % Debt 
to GDP 
State 
GDP 
Debt % Debt 
to GDP 
Perlis 956.9 108.1 11.3 918.8 111.9 12.2 
Kedah 7061.1 1,131.5 16.0 6724.6 1,158.9 17.2 
Penang 11221.2 231.8 2.1 10612.8 308.6 2.9 
Perak 12141.9 187.3 1.5 11652.0 188.2 1.6 
Selangor 29778.6 1,119.1 3.8 27882.5 1,078.2 3.9 
Negeri Sembilan 5045.6 714.1 14.2 4782.4 813.8 17.0 
Melaka 3862.5 442.3 11.5 3660.8 474.3 13.0 
Johor 17301.7 819.5 4.7 16361.8 813.3 5.0 
Pahang 6612.6 640.4 9.7 6390.3 698.2 10.9 
Teren anu 10288.2 644.0 6.3 10029.2 742.6 7.4 
Kelantan 3175.5 624.4 19.7 3093.7 605.1 19.6 
Sabah 9219.5 143.1 1.6 9155.9 258.8 2.8 
Sarawak 11610.3 671.1 5.8 10712.2 728.3 6.8 
Note *: Debt due to borrowing from the Federal Government 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Department 
The appalling aspect of loan repayments by states is that they are capitalised on by the 
ruling party for political purposes, especially when default is by states led by the 
opposition party. According to the 1998 Auditor-General's Report, at the end of 1998, 
total unpaid loan arrears by Johor stood at RM229.78 million, Kedah at RM225.54, 
Sarawak state government at RM86.22 million, Kelantan at RM44.88 million, Pahang at 
RM44.88 million, Terengganu at RM27.34 million26 and Sabah at RM24.53 million. 
Clearly, Kelantan and Terengganu do not head the list of loan arrears to the federal 
government; this position goes to the states of Johor and Kedah. However, due to the 
political cohesion of Johor and Kedah with the central political leadership, this is not an 
issue. For Kelantan and Terengganu, however, the scenario is different; they have been 
repeatedly accused by governing elites of being the major loan defaulters, because these 
26 For Terengganu, where PAS took over power from BN government in 1999, PAS `inherited' more than 
RM700 million of debt to the federal government, despite payment of large sums in petroleum royalties. 
However, the new PAS government has been able to pay off loans according to the schedule. At the same 
time, PAS government demanded investigation into the malpractice of the former BN government, due to 
its aggressive involvement in doubtful businesses (Warta, 2000). 
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states are governed by the opposition party- Thus, the voters are induced to believe that 
opposition governments are less reliable in terms of repaying federal government loans. 
The tight restriction on borrowing makes states dependent on the federal government for 
funds. Subsequently, it makes it difficult for them to undertake rapid socio-economic 
development and further sets a limit on their fiscal autonomy, since the final decisions as 
to which projects are to be accepted as loan commitments are federal. This has been a 
source of difficulty and in some circumstances annoyance for the state governments, 
particularly for states controlled by a party different from that controlling the federal 
government. There have been instances where politics was a basis for approving or 
rejecting loan applications by state governments, as in the case of a loan application made 
by the Kelantan government to finance the construction of a bridge over Sungai Kelantan 
to link Pasir Mas and Tumpat Another example is financial assistance in terms of soft 
loans to Kelantan, amounting to RM600 million, to improve the existing water system. 
The former Second Finance Minister (Mustapa Mohamed) commented that the people of 
Kelantan still need federal government assistance; although it is governed by the 
opposition (since 1990), it will continue to receive its fair share of financial assistance as 
stipulated in the Constitution. Subsequently, the loan was granted on 2" d April 1999. 
However, after the I Oa' general election (29th November 1999), in which the BN coalition 
failed to recapture Kelantan from the opposition, the federal government requested the 
Kelantan government to resubmit the proposal if the state still wished to obtain the 
facility. 28 This implies that political interest influences loan decisions. 
Based on past experience, therefore, there is a strong possibility in future that the ruling 
party will be reluctant to aid development (by giving loans) to a state governed by an 
opposition party, for political reasons (party competition). As noted in Chapter 6, the 
27 Utusan Malaysia. 4th April 1999. `Kelantan in need of help 28 Utusan Malaysia, I lth January 2000. `Water company to be privatised if loans is rejected'. 
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party system has an impact on federal-state fiscal relations, especially in cases where 
different political parties have power over the two levels of government. The rivalry and 
competition between government ruling parties at federal and state levels significantly 
influence the conduct of fiscal federalism, which may undermine the working of fiscal 
federalism. 
In order to strengthen state governments, there should be an independent loan council 
composed of representatives from states and federal government, as well as experts from 
the relevant fields, to oversee federal and states' borrowing and debt management. 
Although there was a suggestion of establishing a loan committee by the Raja Uda 
Committee in 1955 to enable consultation and coordination to take place between state 
and the federal government in regard to borrowing, it was not incorporated in the 1956 
financial reforms or in the Independence Constitution 1957.29 In other federations, 
borrowing arrangements are assigned to an impartial body. In Australia, for example, the 
Australian Loan Council, essentially a centre-state body, controls both external and 
internal public borrowing. Thus, in Australia, neither the central nor the constituent 
governments have any independent borrowing power. The borrowing requirement by 
both level of government is determined by the Council. In Malaysia, the only way the 
states can voice their views on borrowing matter is through the NFC which, under Article 
108(4) (c) and (d) of the Federal Constitution, has to be consulted by the federal 
government on the annual loan requirements of the states and on the making of loans to 
any of them. With the power to allow or refuse loans, the federal government has control 
over the direction of development in the states, even in areas of states' competence. With 
the establishment of an independent loan council, borrowing powers could be assigned to 
states to raise loans or bonds on a case-by-case basis, based on economic and financial 
justifications, unbound by any political wrangling. 
29 See Malaya (1955) and Malaya (1957c). 
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7.7 Conclusion 
The foregoing analysis reveals that states' finances need to be strengthened to promote 
states' financial `independence' and to minimise states' over-dependence on the centre 
for funds. More importantly, it is hoped that strengthening states' revenue-raising power 
through the reassignment of revenue could alleviate fiscal imbalance. However, as noted 
earlier, the centre seems hesitant to reassign more revenue sources to the states, due to the 
`limited revenue sources' that can be reassigned to the states, while politically giving 
more resources to states could weaken the political leverage of the centre. 
Another way to strengthen the states' finances is through proper fiscal adjustment based 
on a basket of socio-economic indicators, such as the fiscal needs of the states, 
population, health, price index, remoteness, and states' level of economic development. 
In the final analysis, fiscal adjustment should be able to eliminate revenue-expenditure 
mismatch. Nevertheless, the significance of fiscal adjustment is undermined by the 
inefficiency of the NFC. The institutions of intergovernmental fiscal relations, such as the 
NFC, have political influence, in that most of the decisions made are the outcome of 
political leverage as part of the centre's political endeavour to pursue the maintenance of 
one-party dominance, unlike in some federations such as India and Australia, where the 
institutions of intergovernmental fiscal relations are to some extent politically 
independent. 
Although the Federal Constitution has provided for flexibility in the matter of alterations 
to revenue assignment and fiscal adjustment, in practice, however, no significant changes 
have been made since independence. The underlying factor is the question of political 
will on the part of the federal government. Without political will, there appears to be no 
foreseeable prospect of fiscal reform. Put differently, resolving fiscal imbalances requires 
political solutions within the spirit of federalism. This is because only the federal 
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government can initiate any form of fiscal adjustment. For this reason, a political climate 
conducive to genuine co-operation will have to be created to foster co-operation between 
the federal and states, especially with the opposition-led state governments. Often, the 
opposition-led state governments claim that the federal government purposely uses 
delaying tactics in grant disbursement, as part of the political game. It is hoped, therefore 
that the federal government will make a concerted effort to have overall financial 
arrangements reviewed, particularly the grants system. 
In light of these circumstances, it seems timely to review the financial arrangements, as 
since independence, there have not been any significant changes in the division of 
revenue arrangements. Reforms should obviously be aimed at a system of revenue 
allocation from the federal to states, based on objective criteria, and take into account the 
particular difficulties of states. More importantly, in allocating funds and in the 
disbursement of grant to states, political differences should not be used as one of the 
main determinants as that could distort the states' economic development. Otherwise, the 
federal government could be held partly to blame for the economic backwardness of the 
states ruled by the opposition party, such as the `economic eclipse' experienced by Sabah 
during the PBS government as well as by Kelantan and Terengganu, simply due to 
political differences. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion: 
Fiscal- Federalism as a Political Process for 
Accomplishing Unity in Diversity 
This chapter elucidates, concludes and acknowledges the achievement of research 
objectives drawn from the problem statements and research questions, and presents the 
findings of the research. This chapter also discusses research contribution as well as 
suggesting future directions of study for the benefit of the enhancement of knowledge in 
the area of fiscal federalism in general and in Malaysia in particular. 
8.1 Prologue 
Federation is deep-rooted in the idea of covenantal theory, in which two or more 
previously independent states are bound together into a larger political union in a moral 
contract or agreement of trust (see Chapter 2). The relationship so established is 
essentially federal, and the liveliness of this relationship is based on the federal spirit, that 
is, mutual recognition, trust, tolerance, respect, obligation, cooperation and responsibility, 
the underlying forces of federal creation. In short, a federal form of government results 
from the voluntary joining together of a number of previously independent states into a 
new and larger political system by way of a treaty between sovereign states, in which 
both the federal and the states have their own power I jurisdiction. Unlike constituent 
state governments, the source of the federal government's power originates from the 
states and is established through the bargaining process at the time of federating, while 
the constituent units continue to maintain significant powers and competences. This is the 
source of Elazar's `self-rule and shared rule' principle, indicating power at both levels of 
government within the federation. This division of powers, including financial 
arrangements, is established according to covenantal theory. Therefore, this argument 
supports the hypothesis that every sphere of federal-state relations in a federal system, in 
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particular the aspects of intergovernmental fiscal relations or fiscal federalism, should be 
designed and implemented on the basis of the federal spirit and not merely on economic 
expediencies. 
Fiscal federalism is the salient feature of any federation, which can create cordial federal- 
state relations, or be a source of federal-state conflict if it is not benignly managed. 
Inappropriate design of intergovernmental fiscal relations leads to problems of fiscal 
imbalance between the centre and lower levels of government (vertical imbalance) as 
well as among the lower levels of government (horizontal imbalance), which can cause 
detrimental effects on regional economic development and subsequently create conflicts 
and disunity and might even pose a threat of disintegration to the federation itself. 
Indeed, fiscal federalism is a political device used in the political process to fulfil the 
purpose of federation by facilitating flexibility and appropriate adjustments to 
accommodate diversity and thus ensure stable and cordial federal-state relations. It is a 
political process of unending negotiations to resolve conflicts, based on the spirit of 
federalism. Therefore, fiscal federalism is much more than federal-state financial 
arrangements. At the heart of fiscal federalism are political objectives rather than merely 
economic gains, which is usually found in the literature on fiscal federalism. 
As a political process, therefore, the good design of fiscal federalism is of paramount 
importance to ensure cordial relations between federal and state governments, as it allows 
the voices of the constituent states to be heard in all decisions that directly affect the 
states' interest. Building the federal spirit into the design of fiscal federalism could 
promote unity in diversity. However, the conventional study of fiscal federalism views 
this important subject almost entirely in economic terms, focusing on the issues of 
efficiency and equity in the division of functions and taxes, as well as intergovernmental 
transfers and borrowing powers. It fails to emphasise the importance of the political 
aspects of the particular federation, in particular the implications of political and party 
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systems for centre-state fiscal relations. This gap exists in the conventional study of fiscal 
federalism in Malaysia where there is an absence of federal spirit and a lack of attention 
given to the implications of the party system in the design and implementation of fiscal 
federalism. Indeed, as has been seen, the working of fiscal federalism is very much 
influenced and shaped by the conduct of the political parties and party system. 
Consequently, the economic analysis of fiscal federalism, while important, has only a 
partial significance once the political aspects of federalism are also considered. The thesis 
has demonstrated that federal-state relations in Malaysia are strongly influenced by 
political party interactions. In this situation, the effective role of institutions of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations is of paramount importance. Although fiscal federalism 
is of great importance to ensure cordial federal-state relations, there is no concrete theory 
or model of fiscal federalism in the literature that can serve both the economic and 
political purposes of federalism, and which is universally applicable for every federation. 
What does exist is only a fragment of theory drawn from the economic theory of multi- 
level finance in a multi-level or decentralised system of government. 
Due to the significant implications of fiscal federalism for federal-state relations, there is 
evidence of a renewal of interest in the study of fiscal federalism. Such interest is also 
motivated by a growing movement toward fiscal decentralisation in recent years, 
advancements in economic theory and, more importantly, a growing demand for local 
participation in the decision-making process involved in the delivering of public goods 
and services, as well as the high demand for public governance from the electorates. 
Financial arrangements in federal systems of government are constitutionally entrenched, 
largely the upshot of the political bargaining process at the time of federating. Hence, the 
fiscal relationship between federal and state governments is a relationship between co- 
ordinated partners in the governmental process and not between superior and 
subordinates. Thus, there is a fundamental difference of financial arrangements between 
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federal and non-federal systems I multi-level governance- Financial arrangements in the 
latter are not necessarily constitutionally entrenched; but are based instead on 
concessions, which can be rescinded unilaterally. The relationship between the higher 
level of government and the government below is in the form of principle-agent 
relationship. 
Intergovernmental fiscal relations in federal systems should ideally guided by three 
principles. First, the economic functions of government (stabilisation, redistribution and 
allocation) and the principles of public I federal finance (utility maximisation). Second, 
the federal spirit (cooperation, trust, partnership and respect). Finally, the political aspect 
of federation (the political system and its operation). However, the second and third 
principles have usually not been given due recognition in the design of conventional 
studies of fiscal federalism. This is the missing link of conventional studies of fiscal 
federalism, in particular, the role of the various political parties and the party system in 
shaping intergovernmental fiscal relations. Therefore, this study aims to fill the gap in 
previous studies on Malaysia's fiscal federalism, which were limited to the economic 
approach- In order to appraise the significance of these principles, it is necessary to 
examine both the economic and political aspects of Malaysian fiscal federalism in order 
to assess to what extent it conforms to the concept of federalism and the theory of fiscal 
federalism. By so doing, it is then possible to analyse the reasons why fiscal federalism in 
Malaysia is not working as effectively as it should. The following section will summarise 
the research findings of this study. 
8.2 Research findings 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the general research question addressed in this study is why 
fiscal federalism entrenched in the Constitution is not working according to the federal 
spirit. Is this due to shortcomings in the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations in 
Malaysian fiscal federalism that cause persistent long-term fiscal imbalance? Due to 
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inherent weaknesses in the existing fiscal adjustment system, is there any political will to 
introduce structural reform of federal-state fiscal arrangements to eliminate endemic 
fiscal disparity and bring unity in diversity to the Malaysian federation? These issues 
suggest that better use should be made of the National Finance Council (NFC) as an 
institution of intergovernmental fiscal relations in order to foster cordial federal-state 
relations. In the final analysis, the findings of the research are aimed at strengthening the 
financial position of the constituent states, thereby reducing their financial dependence on 
the federal government. This is one of the key issues that has been verified in this thesis, 
using a case study approach drawn from Bell (1993), Stake (1994), Yin (1994) and Punch 
(1998). The reason for choosing the case study approach, as discussed in Chapter 1, is the 
strength of the case study method in allowing the researcher to concentrate on one 
detailed specific case, namely, that of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in the 
Malaysian federation, which is a matter of particular public interest. 
As examined in Chapter 3, fiscal federalism in Malaysia evolved from the political 
process leading to the creation of the Federation of Malaya in 1948 and subsequently to 
the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. Given the `design' of fiscal federalism, the study 
undertook to investigate the concept of federalism and the theory of fiscal federalism and 
subsequently conducted an analysis of Malaysian fiscal federalism and its 
implementation, its strengths, weaknesses, and threats, to gauge the extent to which it 
relates to the federal concept and the theory of fiscal federalism. The conclusion reached 
is that, due to shortcomings in the design of fiscal arrangements during the creation of the 
federation, the constituent states are heavily dependent on the federal government for 
funds to finance their constitutionally assigned functions. Given the background of the 
political system, fiscal federalism has been used to maintain the dominance of the 
incumbent ruling party, to ensure its continuation in power, and to make states dependent 
on the largesse of the federal government so that, they remained subordinate and 
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subservient to the centre. This is why fiscal federalism as set out in the Constitution is not 
working properly. As a result, if a constituent state is ruled by a political party or 
coalition of parties different from that of the centre, it will be subjected to undue financial 
pressure to come back into line. On the other hand, if a state is ruled by the same political 
party as the centre, the state will become complacent and unable to prevent federal 
coercion and usurpation. In the final analysis, this practice of fiscal federalism leads to 
the emergence of a so-called `leviathan government', referred to later in the conclusion. 
This conclusion supports and reinforces the findings of the study by Rais Yatim 
concerning executive supremacy in Malaysia: 
`The supremacy of the executive in Malaysia is complete and comprehensively self- 
sustaining. There does not seem to be any sign of a major fissure in its propulsion to stay 
that way for some time to come. It has come to occupy a truly supreme position that 
renders the other segments of government - Parliament and the judiciary - subservient to it' (Rais Yatim, 1994: 362). 
Hence, Rais Yatim's assertion and the conclusions of this study demonstrate that the 
dominance of a leviathan government for years to come is self-evident and irrefutable. 
Indeed, it has already taken root. ' This conclusion is supported by what follows in the 
next section. 
8.2.1 Lack of priority on federal-state fiscal arrangements during the creation of the federation. 
As hypothesised, there are a number of flaws in the structure of Malaysian fiscal 
federalism originating from its design, which have caused persistent long-term fiscal 
imbalance and subsequently reduced its efficiency. From close analysis, it was found that 
fiscal federalism in Malaysia is not designed according to the federal spirit (see Chapter 
3) in that states have little bargaining power because the Malay states during the 
federating process were not yet independent; they were still under British colonial rule. 
' This was evident in the political sphere, in which the ruling elite uses the most powerful instruments to 
strengthen its continuation in power, such as the powerful Internal Security Act (ISA), the mass media 
control (the Printing and Publication Act and the Sedition Act), judicial interference and executive 
supremacy, in the guise of maintaining security and public order. In the sphere of fiscal federalism, this 
study shows how political affiliation shaped the federal-state fiscal arrangements. Thus, all available 
means are used to create a larger and more powerful central government. 
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There was no representation from the states in the making of the memorandum for the 
independence Constitution, except by the Alliance Working Party composed of UMNO, 
MCA, MIC, and the rulers' representatives entrusted to review the Reid Commission 
Report. The members of the Alliance Working Party was primarily concerned with 
communal and political issues, notably, citizenship, Malay rulers' position and the desire 
of the Malays to preserve their political supremacy over non-Malays, especially the 
Chinese. As such, political interests were given more attention than fiscal matters and 
state rights. In addition, a strong central government theme imposed by the British 
authority as prerequisite for self-government, resulted in the centralisation of functions. 
The creation of a strong central government was seen as important in view of the 
prevailing situation at the time of federating, that is, for the fostering of national unity in 
the new union as well as for facing the common threat (a communist insurgency) in the 
newly formed federation. As a result, the majority of powers including federal-state fiscal 
matters were assigned to the centre, while the less important powers remained with the 
states, namely, those functions traditionally associated with the sultans - religion, 
religious education, and cultural affairs. The Constitution therefore severely limits the 
importance of state governments in the overall fiscal arrangement. 
However, when the Federation of Malaysia was formed in 1963, the asymmetrical 
position of Sabah and Sarawak put them in a much better position than that of the 
original member states in the sense that these states enjoyed some degree of fiscal 
autonomy (more revenue sources, transfers and borrowing powers). This constitutional 
asymmetry was a result of the strong political bargaining by the two states concerned 
before they entered the federation, since prospective members enter a federation 
voluntarily only if they expect to gain from it; otherwise they can remain outside, as in 
the case of Brunei. 
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The upshot of these circumstances is that fiscal federalism in Malaysia has many 
shortcomings, especially concerning the division of revenue (taxation) sources, 
intergovernmental transfers and borrowing. The federal government has exclusive power 
over important functions, making state governments subordinate to the centre. The 
federal government also possesses lucrative revenue sources and vested with the power 
and responsibility to obtain and collect all major revenues, as well as access to sources of 
borrowing (domestic and external). Thus, all major taxes such as income tax, customs 
duties, and licences from motor vehicles, which in most federations (such as in the USA, 
India, and Canada) are also available to individual states, are not available to the 
constituent states in Malaysia. Hence, the federal revenue has grown much faster than the 
states' revenues, because the federal government administers all income-elastic taxes. 
The assignment of favourable revenue sources to the federal government is justifiable 
from the point view of the economic functions of the government - stabilisation, 
allocation and distribution functions (See Chapter 2). 
The Federal Constitution also provides for all major areas of expenditure to be borne by 
the federal government. Expensive matters such as education and health, which in other 
federations are undertaken by the states, are in Malaysia undertaken (both policy and 
executive authority) by the federal government. The significance of federal responsibility 
for important expenditures is understandable, as the Constitution assigns the bulk of the 
revenue sources, that is, the power to raise all major taxes and to raise new sources of 
revenue, to the federal government. The federal government, therefore, is in a position to 
undertake surplus or deficit budgeting to suit the prevailing economic conditions in order 
to meet intended national economic objectives. This power is not available to state 
governments. Thus, the centralising forces in Malaysia are further strengthened by the 
exclusive fiscal powers of the federal government, because fiscal and monetary policies 
are within the control of the federal government, which can raise revenues or loans and 
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increase its expenditure at any time. Overall, the federal government has complete fiscal 
power to determine the direction of the public sector, leaving the state governments with 
matters of secondary importance. 
On the other hand, the state governments are assigned the less productive sources of 
revenue in line with their constitutionally assigned functions. The states' independent 
revenue sources are limited, local in nature and more difficult and expensive to 
administer and to collect than federal revenues, which are more productive, lucrative and 
elastic. With limited sources of revenue and restricted borrowing powers, state 
governments face great financial difficulties in seeking to finance their own functions. 
This situation has resulted in a long-term fiscal imbalance, vertical and horizontal, due to 
non-correspondence or mismatch between revenue collected and responsibilities to be 
performed. Consequently, transfers of funds from the federal government to states are 
needed to meet states' financial difficulties. 
However, the federal transfers, as a means of financial adjustment to overcome fiscal 
imbalance, were not properly designed: they were not intended to eliminate the financial 
non-correspondence facing the state governments. As a result, the design of fiscal 
adjustments made to remedy this problem were not sufficiently effective in bringing 
financial relief to state governments and have failed to have an equalising effect, as not 
all grants are real grants intended to balance out state' governments' accounts. 
Furthermore, total federal transfers are too small compared to the total federal 
government revenue. To make matters worse, the grants system does not have a built-in 
mechanism to respond to economic changes, and the distribution, more often than not, is 
partisan. As a result, the current practice of transfers not only fails to bring equalising 
effects, but also is used as a political instrument to strengthen the power of the ruling 
party and to prevent the opposition from rallying political support. Hence, in the final 
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analysis, the `have' states (those with high GDP) receive higher amounts of grants than 
the `have not' states, and consequently, in the long term, the rich states become richer 
(see Chapter 4). 
Moreover, the role of the NFC as an institution designed to foster intergovernmental 
relations is also not effective. By and large, the decisions it makes are indirectly 
influenced by political motivation, they are not binding on the federal government, and 
only the federal government can initiate changes on fiscal matters concerning the states' 
finance. Hence, the NFC acts only as an agent of endorsement of the federal 
government's fiscal policies involving states' matters, in line with its role as a `caretaker' 
of the state government. Clearly, state governments are firmly subordinated by the 
actions of the federal government. Although this makes state governments weak, there is 
no concerted action by the states to improve the current arrangement. This is because one 
political party has dominated the federal government since independence, making it 
impossible for state politicians to oppose existing arrangements (see Chapter 6) for fear 
of losing political popularity in the eyes of federal political elites. Hence, the behaviour 
of state politicians that puts their political interests first has `let the federal government 
pursue their priorities' (Abdul Aziz Ban, 2003: 135). 
Although the design of Malaysian fiscal federalism exhibits some shortcomings, there are 
some elements that conform to the economic theory of fiscal federalism, in particular, the 
subsidiarity and efficiency principles in the division of power / function (see Chapter3). 
According to these principles, functions that have benefit throughout the federation and 
are important for macroeconomic purposes (for stabilisation, , allocation and 
redistribution) are assigned to the centre, while selective functions of a localised nature 
are assigned to the state governments. Nonetheless, there are some violations of the 
efficiency principle in the division of the revenue sources, in that localised taxes such as 
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property taxes, consumption taxes, and vehicle taxes, which should be handled by the 
state governments, are assigned to the centre. However, the assignment of important 
revenue sources - corporate tax and income tax - to the centre does not violate the 
principles of efficiency and equity, instead will promote economic incentives and will 
avoid unnecessary tax competition. 
8.2.2 Increasing states' dependence on the largesse of the federal government for funds 
The constitutionally assigned state revenue sources are characterised as narrowly based, 
inelastic and lacking in buoyancy. The finding from this study suggests that states' 
revenue raising powers should be strengthened. This means that reassignment of revenue 
sources to the states is necessary. Reforms should obviously be aimed at a system of 
revenue allocation to states, as of right, based on objective criteria and taking into 
account the particular difficulties of the individual states. Of particular importance, 
states' revenue sources should be stable and unimpeded by political wrangling. In doing 
so, the combination of the derivation principle, federal-state revenue sharing 
arrangements, the efficiency principle, and compensation for states' revenue losses can 
be considered (see Chapter 7). Besides, three important principles should also be 
considered in reassigning revenue sources to the states. First, the adherence to the 
economic functions of government (stabilisation, distribution, and allocation functions). 
Second, the federal spirit (cooperation, partnership and respect). Third, the political 
aspects of federation. These three principles bring together economics and politics, thus 
affording a proper design of fiscal federalism. From the economists' point of view, the 
most important criterion for intergovernmental fiscal arrangements is that the design 
should be capable of promoting incentives at all levels of government, fostering business 
activity / growth, providing public services efficiently, and promoting equity. From the 
political standpoint of the federal system, however, the design should be capable of 
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providing territorial justice and political stability: a fundamental prerequisite for any 
stable government and federation. 
Apart from these measures, the modernisation of the tax collection system at states' level 
is important. It is noticeable that the system of tax collection by the state governments is 
not consistent from one state to another. No standard mechanism of administration is 
practised. There is also tremendous revenue potential in land taxation, as land tax 
collection is still not fully developed. State governments should therefore improve the 
efficiency of their land office administration and should take steps to ensure regular 
collection of land revenue and arrears. State governments need to explore the potential of 
land tax as a major source of revenue in the future. Long term planning of state taxation 
should be carried out to encourage them to explore the potential of land tax and 
betterment charges. Without proper planning of future resources, state governments will 
be forever dependent on the federal government, leaving state government as beggars for 
federal funds and further strengthening federal encroachment on state affairs. 
8.2.3 The `breach of political contract' in the implementation of intergovernmental 
transfers 
The existing arrangement of intergovernmental fiscal relations causes, a revenue- 
expenditure gap among and between states, due to the limited, narrow and unproductive 
revenue base, as the most productive taxes fall under the federal government's 
jurisdiction. This problem creates fiscal imbalances (vertical and horizontal) as some 
states have more than enough revenue to meet their expenditure while others struggle in 
debt. Vertical imbalance (non-correspondence between revenue and expenditure) occurs 
as a result of limited revenue versus expenditure requirements (or needs), escalating 
maintenance costs and inflation, and an increase in the number of federally sponsored 
projects in the states. Horizontal imbalance, on the other hand, occurs among states 
arising from differences in their fiscal capacities, and differences in the cost of fulfilling 
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state responsibilities and duties. Although fiscal imbalance is a normal characteristic of 
every federation, fiscal imbalance in Malaysian fiscal federalism is different, because no 
adjustment is made to attempt to eliminate the revenue - expenditure mismatch. These 
imbalances need to be corrected through fiscal / financial adjustments. There are three 
methods to remedy fiscal imbalance: by federal transfers, by reassignment of revenue, or 
by changes in tax components. However, the most practical choice is by federal transfers, 
as it is relatively less difficult to administer and recognises the lack of efficiency in 
revenue collection machinery at the state level. To this end, the grant design should not 
only be able to eliminate the revenue-expenditure gap, but, more importantly, it should be 
able to encourage local tax effort, discourage wasteful spending and ensure that grant 
objectives are achievable. 
Analysis of fiscal imbalance in Chapter 4 and regression analysis of determinants of 
federal transfers in Chapter 5 showed that federal transfers are inevitable, as most of the 
productive resources and revenue raising power are centralised. Thus, federal transfers 
become important elements in intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, federal transfers have been ineffective in bringing about fiscal equalisation 
effects, and the size of transfers are small compared with the amounts of revenue 
collected by the federal government. Currently, the federal government gives little 
attention to the issue of federal transfers in the annual budget. The federal government 
should act as `helping hands', not `grabbing hands'. This problem is further exacerbated 
by a lack of political commitment on the part of the federal government to undertake 
transfer reforms that can have an equalising effect on state governments, although the 
Constitution provides for such flexibility. 
To achieve optimum distribution of income and wealth, balanced geographical 
development, national unity, harmonisation and integration among members in the 
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federation, the issue of transfers must be addressed amicably within the framework of the 
federal spirit. It is a form of political contract established during the time of federating 
and therefore should be honoured. Thus, the federal government should take the initiative 
to improve the current practice of transfers to the state governments, as provided in the 
constitution (Article 110), to address the problems of vertical and horizontal imbalance. 
Failure to undertake necessary adjustments means a breach of political contract and an 
undermining of the common purpose of federation. In this case, an effective equalisation 
programme as practised in Canada, Australia and Germany could be an alternative worth 
considering in Malaysia's fiscal federalism. However, an equalisation programme (as a 
means of redistribution of wealth) across the federation may not be viewed as fair, 
especially by richer and more prosperous states, unless there is a strong sense of 
nationhood and if the political power of the poorer states is important to the politics of 
the ruling government. Equalisation requires the `have' states to share their good fortune 
with the `have-not' states; otherwise an equalisation programme will not work 
effectively. This is evident in the case of German unification, in which the richer Länder 
in the west shared their wealth with their new counterparts in the former East Germany. 
Inappropriate design of intergovernmental transfers can give rise to financial constraints 
on the constituent governments' finance and, as a result, other sources of financing, 
notably borrowing rights, are needed to overcome the constraint. However, as state 
borrowing also has a significant impact on the overall national economic management, 
proper design of state borrowing is needed to ensure that it will not cause unnecessary 
fiscal imprudence, without undermining the states' rights and the importance of the 
states' fiscal affairs. Therefore an independent loan council, not bound by political 
wrangling, is of paramount importance in this matter. This is another area of concern for 
fiscal federalism. 
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From the economic point of view, the constituent governments should be granted 
borrowing powers, as their revenue raising powers are limited and the federal transfers 
are not intended to meet the states' full financial needs. However, borrowing should be 
allowed only to finance long-term public investment projects, which can generate long- 
term benefits to tax payers. For this reason, the state governments should be allowed to 
borrow from domestic sources, provided borrowing is not excessive, does not cause 
financial crowding . 
out effects on the private sector, and the funds are raised at market 
interest rate, without any implicit or explicit government subsidy. The states should also 
be allowed to raise loans or bonds from the capital market to finance long-term 
development projects. However, borrowing from the central bank should be prohibited; 
otherwise the central government could lose its control over the country's monetary 
policy. This is important to ensure that constituent governments' borrowing does not 
become a major cause of macroeconomic instability and unnecessary inflationary 
pressure put on the economy. 
8.2.4 The National Finance Council (NFC) as an instrument of control and 
centralisation 
The NFC is an institution of intergovernmental fiscal relations, which promotes and 
fosters better fiscal relations between federal and state governments, to ensure no open 
clashes in intergovernmental fiscal relations. It is a high level intergovernmental 
consultative body as far as fiscal federalism in Malaysia is concerned- Both levels of 
government should be free to bring forward any financial matters that require 
consultation between the federal and state governments. This is the spirit of the NFC's 
real role, inspired by the Constitutional Commission during the drafting process of the 
Federal Constitution. 
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This thesis, however, has shown that the NFC is not effective in fulfilling its role as an 
institution of intergovernmental fiscal relations, as the decisions made by the Council are 
(indirectly) politically influenced. This is not surprising, as the members of the Council 
are largely drawn from the ruling party (see Chapter 7). In effect, the position of the 
federal government through the controlling power of the Prime Minister, as the chairman 
of the Council, is stronger than that of the thirteen states taken as whole. Thus, federal 
political strength actually dominates the Council, and hence, the impartiality of the 
Council is in jeopardy. In other words, the federal government virtually controls the NFC 
through political hegemony and allows little opposition. At the same time, fiscal 
federalism in Malaysia suffers from the lack of intergovernmental institutions that could 
foster good federal-state relations, in particular with states ruled by different political 
parties from that of the centre. The existing mechanism, such as the Council of Chief 
Ministers Meeting, presided over by the Prime Minister, only involves the Chief Minister 
of states from the ruling party. In the Canadian, Australian and German federations, 
intergovernmental institutions are very well developed, which promotes a high degree of 
cooperative federalism, regardless of political party differences (Jeffery, 1999; Watts, 
1999d). 
The failure of the NFC has led the federal government to assume a supervisory role over 
state finances, even to the extent of coercing state governments to follow the centre. As a 
result, any differences of opinion are easily overruled by the federal government. Thus, 
the Council is little more than a platform for the exchange of views between the two 
levels of government, given the political supremacy of the federal government on the 
Council. Consequently, the NFC is an indirect instrument of federal control of the state 
governments' fiscal affairs, further strengthening centralising forces and buttressing the 
federal government's overall hegemony. This has become a major hindrance, preventing 
the Council from becoming an impartial body able to discharge its function as, an 
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institution of intergovernmental fiscal relations. In addition, the decisions made by the 
Council are not binding on the federal government, even though the Constitution 
provides that the federal government must consult the Council should financial conflicts 
arise. To be signif cant, the decisions made in the Council should be final and binding on 
both levels of government. 
In other federations, the institution fostering good intergovernmental fiscal relations is an 
impartial body. For instance, the Finance Commission of India and the Commonwealth 
Grant Commission of Australia are two good examples of institutions of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. The members of these institutions are professionals 
familiar with the various aspects of intergovernmental fiscal relations. In this way, any 
political influences on decisions are minimised. The NFC, which to date acts merely as 
an advisory body to the federal government, could be reorganised so that its members 
consist of professionals from various backgrounds and decisions made would be binding 
on both levels of government. To strike a balance, there is an urgent need for an impartial 
institution of intergovernmental fiscal relations, so that the Council can effectively 
coordinate and review federal-state financial relations on a regular basis, unimpeded by 
party politics, as the states are becoming politically and economically mindful of their 
rights. Regular meetings should be held to supervise any practical difficulties in federal- 
state fiscal matters. 
8.2.5 Increasing states' fiscal complacency, deteriorating fiscal responsibility and 
public governance 
Shortcomings in the design of fiscal federalism have resulted in a lack of states' fiscal 
responsibility as state governments become highly dependent on the federal government 
for funds to finance their own responsibilities. This is noticeable in the way state 
governments respond to citizens' demands for public services. Instead of responding 
positively, state governments, especially those ruled by the same political party as the 
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centre, have a tendency to transfer the responsibility to the federal government, since they 
rely on having good political relations with the federal political leaders- This is how their 
political allegiance to the centre is `compensated', though it makes the state government 
complacent. This practice of fiscal federalism is clearly inimical to the principle of public 
governance, as fiscal relations between states and federal government become less 
transparent, especially when the institution of intergovernmental fiscal relations (the 
NFC) is also ineffective. This has led to excessive, inefficient, irresponsible public 
spending, and the sidestepping of financial accountability. As a result, states are unable to 
protect themselves from the growing centripetal force of the centre, as states become 
financially weaker and incompetent in every sphere, and hence strengthen the federal 
claims that states should be put under federal supervision; in short, the federal claim 
becomes a seif-fulfilling prophecy. 
In the light of the centralising nature of the Malaysian political system, states' over- 
dependence on funds from the federal government has political consequences if the state 
government is controlled by the opposition. The effect can go far beyond the financial 
consequences- more often than not it results in political leverage for the federal political 
elites in the face of severe party competition to control states. This is an undesirable 
aspect of the states' financial over-dependence on the federal government, as it is used to 
maintain one-party rule over the country. 
8.2.6 The political uses of fiscal federalism 
The division of power between federal and state governments into three lists, the Federal 
List, the State List and the Concurrent List, shows the kind of fiscal federalism existing in 
Malaysia. These lists provide legal boundaries, within which the constituent members of 
the federation work. In other words, the division of powers and functions as enumerated 
in the constitution is only a guideline - the dos and don'ts -- to be followed by both 
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federal and state governments to avoid possible clashes of powers / functions between the 
two levels of government. Due to comprehensive lists of functions, conflict between the 
states and the federal government over the division of functions and revenue seems 
unlikely (see Chapter 3). 
Nevertheless, difficulties arise in the course of time due to unforeseen circumstances, 
especially owing to changes in political conditions which affect the conduct of federal- 
states fiscal relations, as evident in the case of royalties payments, disbursement of 
grants, borrowing and other forms of fiscal control by the federal executive. Therefore, 
the actual working of fiscal federalism lies not so much in the Constitution per se, but in 
accordance with the political operations, in particular the political interaction between 
federal and state levels, which affects the whole spectrum of federal-state relations (see 
Chapter 6). With regard with the disbursement of grants, Abdul Aziz Bari commented, 
`it may be argued that the situation would not have become worse if the provisions have 
been implemented as they are; hence there should be no question of federal grants being 
denied or delayed for political reasons. And the situation would not have deteriorated had 
the state governments put their constitutional rights above their party's political interest. 
Alas, in practice politicians tend to give priority to their parties rather than their states' 
(Abdul Aziz Bari, 2003: 135) 
Hence, the political system and its operations have a significant bearing on the working 
of fiscal federalism. The economic model alone cannot entirely explain this phenomenon; 
it is necessary to look at the non-economic factors - political, cultural and social - which 
affect the conduct of fiscal federalism. As Vile claimed, 
`'Ilse major characteristics of the federal structure, a mixture of mutual independence and 
interdependence, must have their political aspects as well as their constitutional basis, 
and in the long run their continuance will depend more upon the political than upon 
formal legal structures' Vile (1973: 16). 
Thus, the best guarantee of cordial federal-state relations and fiscal federalism in 
Malaysia lies not in the Constitution provisions per se but rather in the political system, 
in particular, membership of the same party at federal and state levels. In the words of 
Abdul Aziz Bari, `it is quite apparent that thus far the problems that have undermined 
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Malaysian federalism were not entirely legal but instead political' (Abdul Aziz Bari, 
2003: 140). 
To make matters worse, the Senate, which is supposed to safeguard state interests, is also 
ineffective, as its members are largely from the ruling party, which prevents the 
opposition from rallying support on matters of the states' interest (see Chapter 3). 
Furthermore, the federal and states bureaucracy is also controlled by the federal 
government (Zakaria Ahmad, 1987). For instance, the legal advisers and state financial 
officers (except in the former non-federated Malay states (Kelantan, Kedah, Terengganu 
and Johor) appointed from the federal service. Besides, the federal influence is also 
significant through the nationwide economic development policy and federally sponsored 
projects which require states to accept federal bureaucracy. 
8.2.7 The deterioration of fiscal federalism in the presence of `leviathan government' 
Another key finding of this study that supports the emergence of a `leviathan 
government' is the implication of political interaction between federal and states which 
significantly determines, shapes and influences the conduct of fiscal federalism. The 
centre exercises its fiscal muscle over states led by any political party not affiliated to the 
centre, and the centralising nature of the political system, as well as the executive 
supremacy of the ruling party, encourages a sustainable `leviathan government'. The 
emergence of a `leviathan government' is based on the leviathan hypothesis expounded 
by Brennan and Buchanan (1980), which state that the size of a government will be 
smaller if more tax and expenditure functions are decentralised. Put differently, the size 
of government will be larger ("leviathan") if more and more government functions are 
centralised. Using the justification of economic efficiency, the Malaysian federal 
government has successfully usurped the role of the constituent state governments on 
grounds of their fiscal inadequacy. In the final analysis, the centralisation of power makes 
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the role of the federal government in the economy dominant. The bigger and more 
dominant fiscal function of the federal government and the centralising nature of the 
Malaysian political system undoubtedly help the federal government to maintain control 
over state governments in the party competition. Indeed, the shortcomings of fiscal 
arrangements, which favour the centre, provide political leverage for the federal 
government to prevent the states from joining the ranks of the opposition. Therefore, to 
combat a leviathan government, fiscal decentralisation should be promoted (Oates, 1985; 
Rodden, 2002). 
Close analysis reveals that the real reason behind the federal move to push states towards 
federal patronage is primarily to promote the building of `a nation state' (riegara bangsa), 
a vision that sees Malaysia as a single state based on one culture and one political belief. 
This vision cannot be realised if the states are moving in the opposite direction to the 
centre. Therefore, the federal government sees fiscal federalism as an instrument of 
national integration that will guarantee the dominance of the BN, led by UMNO, in a 
reconstituted nation state. However, this notion of a nation state means renunciation of 
the existence of the state government concept, which is clearly antithetical to the federal 
principle. 
8.3 Research contribution and direction for future research 
8.3.1 Research contribution 
This thesis represents the first ever study of Malaysian fiscal federalism from the 
perspectives of both economics and political science. This is as it should be, because a 
more holistic approach recognises the fact that fiscal federalism is essentially a political 
process whose ultimate aim is unity in diversity within the federation. As the study of 
federalism and fiscal federalism in Malaysia is still , relatively new, 
this study is a 
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contribution to the body of existing knowledge on the study of fiscal federalism. 
Specifically, the contribution of this research is as follows: 
i. One significant contribution from this study is that the working of the federal system, 
in particular the federal-state fiscal relations, should be based on the spirit of 
federalism, that is, partnership, cooperation, trust and tolerance between federal and 
constituent state governments. Federal-state financial conflicts in the federal system 
cannot be solved by economic mechanisms alone, in particular using efficiency and 
equity considerations, but, more importantly, by adherence to the federal spirit in 
conflict management. Hence, the states' financial problems arising from structural 
shortcomings in the design of fiscal federalism require treatment using both economic 
and political considerations within the federal framework. Having examined the case 
of Malaysian fiscal federalism, where a federal culture is not well-established, fiscal 
federalism, as set out in the Constitution, will not work properly. Therefore, given the 
strong centralist nature of the Malaysian political system and single party dominance 
since independence, fiscal federalism becomes an important political instrument of 
the ruling party to maintain its power. In a nutshell, if the federal and state 
governments are ruled by different political parties, the ruling party at the centre will 
use fiscal means to put undue pressure on those states led by the opposition in order 
to maintain its power, making states dependent on the mercy of the federal 
government and permanently subordinated to the centre. As has been demonstrated, 
this practice of fiscal federalism leads to the emergence of a "leviathan government'. 
Therefore, no matter how good the economic justification of fiscal federalism is, it 
will not work well in Malaysia if the governing ruling party is different at federal and 
state levels. So this is why fiscal federalism as ' set out in the Constitution is not 
working effectively: if states are ruled by the opposition, fiscal federalism will be 
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strained and, if states are ruled by the same political party of the centre, the states 
become complacent. 
ii. This study is also important for many people who have an interest in fiscal federalism 
and wish to understand how it works as a political device for achieving the goal of 
federating. The conventional study of fiscal federalism, which focuses on economic 
efficiency and equity considerations (for stabilisation, redistribution and allocation 
purposes, as well as the principles of federal finance, that is, utility maximisation), 
has only a limited application when the political aspects of federalism are added into 
the picture, as in the case of the Malaysian political system. The operation of fiscal 
federalism therefore is a delicate process involving the solving federal-state conflicts. 
If conflicts are not solved according to the spirit of federalism, the consequences are 
beyond mere economic matters, and can extend to matters of political legitimacy, 
stability and even the disintegration of the state. 
iii. Last but not least, this thesis helps the governing political elites and policy makers to 
understand why the federal spirit and democratic culture are so important in the 
design and implementation of fiscal federalism. Fiscal federalism is an implicit 
political contract that cements members of the federation together to achieve unity in 
diversity. As such, the spirit of federalism should be the guiding principle in solving 
any conflicts affecting states' interest in the federation. 
In light of the practical suggestions to strengthen state government finance, as discussed 
in Chapter 7, structural reform of the federal-state fiscal arrangements seem timely. This 
is due to the fact that, since independence, no major change has been made to alleviate 
the states' financial difficulties. Any structural reform should obviously take into 
consideration the socio-economic and political developments that have taken place since 
independence. 
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To summarise, this thesis as a whole paves the way for the future study of fiscal 
federalism in Malaysia to be understood from a political economist's perspective rather 
than just as economics. This is the missing link in previous studies of fiscal federalism in 
Malaysia, that is, the ignorance of the federal spirit and the crucial political aspects of 
federalism. Hence, this research will open new dimensions and debate in the study of 
fiscal federalism. 
8.3.2 Directions for future research 
Studies of fiscal federalism and federalism have been growing significantly in parallel 
with the movement towards greater fiscal decentralisation. Fiscal arrangements continue 
to be salient features in the study of federal systems. They create much conflict and will 
shape the future of any federation. Ultimately, it is a political process towards the goal of 
federating: unity in diversity. As such, research on intergovernmental fiscal relations in 
federal systems is now growing widely and reflects the interest of many academic 
disciplines. Political scientists continue to study the implications of fiscal relations for the 
future of federation, especially with regard to conflict management in federations, in 
order to achieve unity in diversity, while economists' interest in the study of fiscal 
aspects of the federal system is primarily to investigate whether functions should be 
centralised or decentralised, based on efficiency and equity considerations. Those in 
favour of centralisation will argue that fiscal matters should be put under the central 
government, while those in favour of decentralisation argue that fiscal aspects should be 
decentralised to the lowest level possible. 
The findings of this case study open up more areas of study on Malaysian fiscal 
federalism in the future. One possible area is a more focused investigation into the 
politics of fiscal federalism, which requires in depth interviews with politicians - their 
attitudes, aspirations and perceptions towards federalism, unity in diversity, and 
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democratic government as well as the federal culture. Indeed, very few politicians 
apparently care about federalism. A second area of study that merits close scrutiny is the 
comparative analysis of fiscal federalism and fiscal decentralisation, following the states' 
growing economic and political awareness, and its implications for federal-state relations. 
A third is a study of the significance of federal transfers for regional economic 
development and their relation to national integration, based on both economic and 
political perspectives. Finally, based on the findings of this thesis, a comparative study of 
the relationship between the fiscal aspects of federalism and its role as an instrument of 
national integration is an important project that should be undertaken in the future. 
8.4 Epilogue: The future of fiscal federalism - maintaining unity in diversity 
Federalism is like a living organism. It is dynamic in the sense that each federation will 
change according to complex social, economic and political transformations over time. 
Concomitantly, the issues of what are to be federal matters and what belongs to the states 
are changing. Hence, the fiscal aspects of federations, in particular the states' 
development needs, are growing in line with changes in socio-economic and political 
conditions. Therefore, the functions of both levels of government,; the fiscal arrangements 
and subsequently their financial requirements are bound to change over time, according 
to the prevailing economic and political situation of the federation. Therefore, as the 
federation evolves, the initial Constitutional arrangements need to be re-examined. This 
is because the articles in the Constitution only reflect a political accommodation among 
all members of the federation and its inhabitants at the time of federating. 
In view of the above circumstances, structural reform should be considered in order to 
guarantee a significant measure of constituent states' fiscal autonomy. Structural reform 
requires political commitment. Nonetheless, given the nature of the political and the party 
systems in Malaysia, it is impossible to undertake structural reform without strong 
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political backing from the government of the day. Therefore, any attempt to improve the 
practice of fiscal federalism in Malaysia requires not only economic but, more 
importantly, political determination. 
As noted above, it has been proven that fiscal federalism is indeed a political process for 
achieving unity in diversity. Conflicts in fiscal federalism pose threats to the federation, 
even to the extent of disintegration. Examination of political aspects in this study reveal 
that the present fiscal arrangements in Malaysia can only, work well when political 
cohesion at the states and federal level is maintained. In other words, the best guarantee 
of cordial federal-state fiscal relations continues to depend on the harmonising influence 
of membership of the same party at the federal and state levels, nonetheless, this makes 
states complacent and contingent on the federal government. With the highly centralised 
structure of the ruling party (the Barisan Nasional, led by UMNO), a cordial relationship 
hence depends heavily on the UMNO and its political operations. Succinctly, if the 
political party at the federal level is different from that at the states level, fiscal relations 
will be strained and federal-states relations will be difficult, in that federal funds would 
not be forthcoming in the normal way. This is evident from the experience of states ruled 
by the opposition party (during PAS rule in Kelantan and Terengganu and PBS rule in 
Sabah), as compared to the states led by the same political party as the centre. This is the 
main source of future conflict in Malaysian federalism. As states are now economically 
and politically becoming more self-aware, they will demand more fiscal powers in future, 
especially those states ruled by the opposition. As such, fiscal federalism goes beyond the 
constitutional and economic division of fiscal functions and revenue assignments; it is a 
mode of political activity necessary to achieve unity in the federation, and this requires 
certain kinds of cooperative relationships in the political 'system. Alas, unity in diversity 
in Malaysia can only be attained through the dominance of the BN government; 
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currently, the BN believes that, as a stakeholder of states, only the BN government can 
ensure national unity. 
In light of these circumstances, there are two developments that can be expected to 
happen to Malaysian fiscal federalism in the future, both of which are equally strong but 
pull in opposing directions. The first is the continued strong centripetal forces that 
buttress the centralisation of constitutionally assigned state functions, justified by 
increasingly inadequate state financial capacities, and the states' apparent complacency. 
The federal government views the centralisation of functions as inevitable, as can be seen 
from the expanding privatisation programmes, for example, in the, privatisation of 
sewerage, garbage collection and centralisation of water management, all of which are 
constitutionally located under the States List. While privatisation could ensure efficiency 
in the provision of public goods and services, federally sponsored privatisation of state 
functions results in states losing power to the centre, as the supervision and policy of the 
privatised entity become federal matters. If this happens, states will be subordinated to 
the centre and the original arrangement of the federal system will become complete 
unitary in character. As Malaysia is a small country and determined to achieve the status 
of a developed economy, many state functions are being usurped by the centre for the 
sake of optimal management of resources and balanced economic development. 
Therefore, centralisation of functions, which the states fail to undertake efficiently due to 
lack of `resources and expertise', as a result of shortcomings in the design of fiscal 
federalism, is inevitable. Consequently this further strengthens the case for the federal 
government to retain full control of taxation and expenditure functions. At the same time, 
the federal government's move is justified on the grounds that the sense of nationhood 
and national unity can be achieved only by a strong central government, led by the BN, 
which controls both federal and state politics. Unfortunately, this move has caused the 
states to lose their fiscal autonomy. To Riker (1964), the cause of federal usurpation of 
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states' functions is due to the strong executive branch of the ruling party, and hence to 
protect against federal intervention strong state-based political parties could be promoted. 
According to Inman and Rubinfeld (1997), there are three ways to protect states from 
federal intervention: first, the rational behind the division/assignment of functions should 
be understood by both federal and state governments; second, any violation of those 
assigned functions should be exposed to the public; and finally, political institutions must 
have the capability to provide protection to the assigned functions against any threat of 
usurpation. 
The second development is a growing trend towards fiscal decentralisation as states are 
becoming politically and economically self-aware. Therefore, most economists view 
fiscal decentralisation as a retreat from the centralising nature of fiscal federalism. The 
underlying premise of fiscal decentralisation is that decentralised decision-making for the 
provision of local public goods and services is more efficient, as lower level governments 
are closer to local citizens and thus they will easily monitor the government's activities. 
Based on this hypothesis, then, more powers should be assigned to state governments, 
unless there are strong arguments for leaving them with the federal government, such as 
national defence. 
Why fiscal decentralisation? It is rational to assign responsibilities to lower levels of 
government for several reasons. First, local provision of public goods and services allows 
for differences in tastes and needs of the residents of the different states. Second, 
provision of these goods and services at a lower level is likely to be more efficient than 
by the federal government, as state governments are in a better position to monitor local 
projects and local residents are better able to communicate with their nearest level of 
government. Besides, inter jurisdictional competition may lead to efficiency in the 
provision of public goods and services. Currently, Malaysia is one of the most centralised 
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federations, with comparatively few powers assigned to the states (see Chapter 3). As 
such, to gain the benefits of fiscal decentralisation, states need to be assigned more 
functions and sufficient revenue sources. Third, fiscal decentralisation could promote a 
democratic culture and encourage re-democratisation of government operations and 
institutions as well as their political system. This is because `a decentralised country is 
less likely to become a dictatorship than a centralised one' (Prud'homme and Shah, 2002: 
2). At the same time, fiscal decentralisation can promote public governance in the public 
management system as local citizens can participate in the decision-making process and 
perform `checks and balances' on their elected representatives. Finally, fiscal 
decentralisation would empower the states when facing the worldwide trend of 
globalisation. Globalisation, combined with reconciling unity in diversity (due to ethnic, 
religion, linguistics, and economics diversity), will put further pressure on the federal 
political system, as there are already strong tendencies for states to be involved in 
international trade, which affords opportunities in some cases for participation in foreign 
affairs. 
However, the literature reveals mixed views on the advantages of fiscal decentralisation. 
Some are in favour of fiscal decentralisation (McLure and Martinez, 2000; Bird and 
Vaillancourt, 1998, Bahl and Linn, 1994). Knowledge of local conditions, the ability to 
vary provision in line with local preferences, and local government's efficiency in the 
provision of public services, are among the arguments for implementing fiscal 
decentralisation. However, decentralisation does not automatically, mean that state 
governments will become more efficient in discharging their functions and contribute to 
higher economic growth. Excessive decentralisation is likely to increase corruption. As 
such, some other economists are sceptical about the advantages of fiscal decentralisation 
(Zhang and Zou, 1998; Tanzi, 1996; Prud' homme, 1992). 
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For states to be able to undertake more functions, sufficient and stable independent 
revenue sources should be assigned to the states. Otherwise, the development of an 
effective transfer system to strengthen the fiscal position of the states is desirable, as 
states' revenue sources are limited. Prudent fiscal management is also equally important 
to the success of fiscal decentralisation apart from strong political commitment. In 
particular, the federal government must be willing to assign more fiscal power to the 
states. Without prior political commitment, fiscal decentralisation could not be 
implemented efficiently. This is the major 'obstacle in the design of fiscal 
decentralisation. Only when there is a strong political commitment can fiscal 
decentralisation be successfully implemented. As Vile (1973: 16) claimed, `any attempt 
to analyse or indeed to create a decentralised system of government whether federal or 
not, must pay at least as much as attention to the political as, to the legal'. According to 
Abdul Rahim (2000), in the case of Malaysia, fiscal decentralisation is irrelevant, as the 
federal government is serious in its commitment to deliver development to each and 
every constituent state. 
Another argument against fiscal decentralisation is that improvement in communications 
and information technology, as well as better transportation in Malaysia, have reduced 
regional and local variations in consumers' preferences and tastes. In other words, 
preferences are becoming homogenous across states of the federation. As a result, the 
argument for decentralisation of residence-based services to accommodate the variation 
of consumers' preferences is not fully justified. Unlike in the case of a geographically 
large country, tastes and preferences differ significantly; hence, it would be justifiable for 
residence-based services to be decentralised, as the local state understands better the 
needs of the citizens and can tailor its services accordingly. For example, in the USA and 
Canada, where tastes and preferences of the citizens differ, residence-based services are 
better delivered by the states than the federal government. 
351 
Those against fiscal decentralisation also argue that only the federal government can best 
manage equity and distribution functions, because not only are resources at the disposal 
of the state government extremely limited, but they also vary. significantly from one state 
to another. Therefore, the issue of distribution has to be looked at from the national 
perspective; otherwise it may exacerbate interstate disparities if it is left entirely to the 
respective state governments to undertake the redistribution function. As Malaysia 
accords a high priority to economic growth with equity, there is a tendency for more and 
more responsibilities to be assigned to the federal government. However, it should be 
borne in mind that over-centralisation could result in serious threats to public governance 
and, hence, the future will feel these two opposing forces: the first pulling towards fiscal 
decentralisation and the second towards fiscal centralisation. Looking at the current 
political system of the highly centralised structure of the governing ruling party, the 
Barisan Nasional (BN) and UMNO, as well as the supremacy of federal executive power, 
centralisation forces continue to dominate, making states subordinate to the centre. 
To sum up, despite several shortcomings and some disturbances, federal-state fiscal 
relations in Malaysia are regarded as stable and have been so since independence in 1957 
and after the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. This is primarily attributed 
to the ability of the BN government to prevent the federal and state governments from 
falling into opposition hands. Also, the federal government, ' with the power to manage 
the country's resources (finances) and regulate policies on major areas of public affairs, 
has a firm grip on the states. This has contributed to the accomplishment of unity in 
diversity in the federation. However, this success has been achieved at the expense of 
states' being subordinate to the centre and continue to ' be dependent on the federal 
government through one-party dominance and executive supremacy of the'centre. This is 
Malaysia's version of federalism as a means of accomplishing and maintaining unity in 
diversity. 
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However, the future of Malaysian fiscal federalism remains bleak, unless political 
congruence and cohesion at the federal and state levels can be maintained, as experienced 
by the government of Kelantan, Terengganu and Sabah, while ruled by the opposition 
party. More often than not, states led by the opposition have been treated with contempt, 
solely because of political differences. In future, the use of fiscal means by the ruling 
party at the centre to put undue pressure on the state led by the opposition can be 
expected, which increases economic `collateral damage' on the citizens' well-being as 
federal funds would not be forthcoming in the normal way. This is due to the `democratic 
and federal spirit deficits' in the overall conduct of federal-state relations. Therefore a 
high premium on the quality and creativity of central political leadership is essential if 
federalism in Malaysia is to continue to flourish. As has been seen, states are becoming 
politically and economically aware of their rights; this poses a serious threat to the 
federal political elites. Having said that, fiscal federalism in Malaysia works reasonably 
well, but much needs to be improved. Ideally, fiscal federalism should be able to promote 
territorial justice, economic efficiency and, more importantly, political stability, 
regardless of which political party has control of the federal and state governments. In a 
nutshell, fiscal federalism is a real test of federalism for it to achieve and preserve unity 
in diversity. Therefore, it is right to conclude that fiscal federalism is not merely an 
economic matter, but is the interaction between economics and politics, that is, a political 
process for resolving conflicts in the quest for unity in diversity, the underlying aim of 
the federal raison d'etre. 
'Like a river, Malaysian centre-state relations have a starting point and 
that is the federal design. As a river flows it, so to speak, `lives . So it is 
with centre-state relations. It flows precisely because federalism is a 
living thing, and its process very much determines the nature, style and 
content of this f low which, unlike that of a river, need not necessarily be 
only in one direction. ' (Shafruddin, 1988: 3) 
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Appendix i 
TREATY OF FEDERATION, 1895 
AGREEMENT between the Governor of the Straits Settlements, acting on behalf of the 
Government of Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India, and the Rulers of the following 
Malay States: - that is to say, Perak, Selangor, Pahang and the Negeri Sembilan. 
1. In confirmation of various previous Agreements, the' Sultans of Perak, the Sultan of 
Pahang and the Chiefs of the states which form the territory known as the Negeri 
Sembilan, hereby severally place themselves and their states under the protection of the 
British Government. 
2. The above-named Rulers and Chiefs of the respective States hereby agree to constitute 
their countries a Federation, to be known as the 'Protected Malay States, to be 
administered under the advice of the British Government. 
3. It is to be also understood that the arrangement hereby agreed upon does not imply that 
any one Ruler or Chief shall exercise any power or authority in respect of any State other 
than that which he now possesses in the State of which he is the recognised Ruler or 
Chief. 
4. The above-named Rulers agree to accept a British Officer, to be styled The Resident- 
General, as the agent and representative of the British Government under the Governor of 
the Straits Settlements. They undertake to provide him with suitable accommodation, 
with such salary as is determined by Her Majesty's Government, and to follow his advice 
in all matters of administration other than those touching the Muhammadan religion. The 
appointment of the Resident-General will not affect the obligations of the Malay Rulers 
towards the British Residents now existing or to be hereafter appointed to offices in the 
above-mentioned Protected States. 
5. The above-named Rulers also agree to give to those States in the Federation which 
require it such assistance in men, money, or other respects as the British Government, 
through its duly appointed officers may advice; and they further undertake, should war 
break out between Her Majesty's Government and that of any other Power, to send, on 
the requisition of the Governor, a body of armed and equipped Indian troops for service 
in the Straits Settlements. 
Nothing in this Agreement is intended to curtail any of the powers or authority now held 
by any of the above-named Rulers in their respective States, nor does it alter the relations 
now existing between any of the States named and the British Empire. 
The above Agreement was signed and sealed by the under-mentioned Rulers and Chiefs 
of the various States in July 1895. 
His Highness of the Sultan of Perak 
His Highness of the Sultan of Selangor 
His Highness of the Sultan of Pahang 
His Highness of the Yam Tuan Besar of Sri Menanti 
The Dato' Bandar of Sungei Ujong 
The Dato' of Johol 
The Dato' of Jelebu 
The Dato' of Rembau 
The Tungku Dewa of Tampin 
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Appendix ii 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND 
THE STATE GOVERNMENT 
WHEREAS mutual agreements subsist between His Britannic Majesty and His Highness 
the Sultan of the State and territory of [name of the State]: . 
AND WHEREAS it is expedient to provide for the constitutional development of the 
Malay States under the protection of His Majesty and for the future government of the 
State and territory of [name of the State]: 
It is HEREBY AGREED between Sir Harold Mac Michael, G. C. M. G., D. S. O., the 
Special Representative of His Majesty's Government within the, United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland on behalf of His Majesty and His Highness [name of 
the ruler of the State] the Sultan of the State and territory of [name of the State] for 
himself, heirs and successors: - 
1. His Highness of the Sultan agrees that His Majesty, shall have full -power and jurisdiction within the State and territory of., [name of the State]. 
2. Save in so far as the substituting agreements are consistent with this Agreement or 
with such future constitutional arrangements for Malaya as may be approved by 
His Majesty, the said agreements shall remain of full force and effect. 
Signed this [date] 
H. A Mac Michael 
Special Representative of His Majesty's 
Government within the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
[Name of the ruler of the State] 
His Highness the Sultan of the State and Territory [name of the state] 
Note: 
The date of agreement is as follows: Johor (20th, October, 1945), Selangor (24`h October, 
1945), Pahang (2"d November, 1945, Negeri Sembilan (14th November, 1945), Perak 
(22nd November, 1945), Kedah (2 December, 1945), Perlis (4th December, 1945), 
Kelantan (17th December, 1945), and Terengganu'(21ý December, 1945). 
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Appendix iii 
THE TWENTY- POINTS' 
1. Religion 
While there was no objection to Islam being the national religion of Malaysia, there 
should be no state religion in North Borneo, and the provisions relating to Islam in the 
present Constitution of Malaya should not apply to North Borneo. 
2. Language 
a) Malay should be the national language of the Federation. 
b) English should continue to be used for a period of ten years after Malaysia day. 
c) English should be an official language of North Borneo for all purposes, State or 
Federal, without limitation of time. 
3. Constitution 
Whilst accepting that the present Constitution of the Federation of Malaya should form 
the basis of the Constitution of Malaysia, the Constitution -of Malaysia should be a 
complete new document drafted and agreed in the light of a free association of states and 
there should be a series of amendments to a Constitution drafted and agreed by different 
states in totally different circumstances. A new Constitution of North Borneo (Sabah) 
was of course essential. = 
4. Head of the Federation 
The Head of State in North Borneo should not be eligible for election as Head of 
Federation 
S. Name of Federation 
Malaysia but not Melayu Raya 
6. Immigration 
Control over immigration into any part of Malaysia from outside should not rest with the 
Central Government but entry into North Borneo should also require the approval of the 
State Government. The Federal Government should not be able to veto the entry of 
persons into North Borneo for State Government purposes except on strictly security 
grounds. North Borneo should have unfettered control over the movements of persons 
other than those in Federal Government employ from other parts of Malaysia into North 
Borneo. 
7. Right of Secession 
There should be no right to secede from the Federation. 
R Rnrnennisatinn 
Borneonisation of the public service should proceed as quickly as possible 
9. British Officers 
Every effort should be made to encourage British Officers to remain in the public service 
until their places can be taken by suitably qualified people from North Borneo, 
The Twenty Points were a memorandum submitted by the five political parties to the I. G. C, aiming to 
safeguard State as well Sabah interests in the federation This is the full text of the memorandum 
extracted from the Sabah Annual Report, 1962 (pp24-26).. 
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10. Citizenship 
The recommendations in paragraph 148(k) of the Report of the Cobbold Commission 
should govern the citizenship rights of persons in the Federation of North Borneo persons 
subject to the following amendments: 
a) Sub-paragraph (1) should not contain the proviso, subject to five years' residence; 
b) In order to tie up with our law, sub-paragraph (ii)(a) should read `seven out of ten 
years' instead of `eight out of the twelve years'. 
c) Paragraph (iii) should not contain any restriction tied to the citizenship of parents- 
a person born in North Borneo after Malaysia must be a Federal citizen: 
11. Tariffs and Finance 
North Borneo should retain control of its own finance, development and tariff, and should 
have the right to work up its own taxation and to raise loans on its own credit. 
12. Special Position of Indigenous Races 
In principle, the indigenous races of North Borneo should enjoy special rights analogous 
to those enjoyed by the Malays in Malaya, but the present Malay's formula in this regard 
is not necessarily applicable in North Borneo. 
13. State Government 
a) The Chief Minister should be elected by unofficial members -of Legislative 
Council. 
b) There should be a proper Ministerial system in North Borneo. 
14. Transitional Period 
This should be seven years and during such period, legislative power must be left with 
the State of North Borneo by the constitution and not merely delegated to the State 
Government by the Federal Government. 
15. Education 
The existing educational system of North Borneo should be maintained and for this 
reason it should be under state control. 
16. Constitutional Safeguards 
No amendment, modification or withdrawal of any special safeguards granted to North 
Borneo should be made by the Central Government without the positive concurrence of 
the Government of the state of North Borneo. 
The power of amending the Constitution of the State of North Borneo should belong 
exclusively to the people in the State. (Note: The United Party, the Democratic Party and 
the Pasok Momogun Party considered that a three-fourth majority would be required in 
order to effect any amendment to the Federal and State Constitutions whereas the UNKO 
and the USNO considered a two thirds majority would be sufficient). 
17. Representation in Federal Parliament 
This should take account not only of the population of North Borneo but also of its size 
and potentialities and in any case should not be less than that of Singapore. 
18. Name of Head of State 
Yang Dipertua Negari 
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19. Name of State. 
Sabah 
20. Land, Forest, Local Government, etc. 
The provision in the Constitution of the Federation in respect of the powers of the 
National Land Council should not apply in North Borneo. Likewise, the National Council 
for Local Government should not apply in North Borneo. 
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Appendix iv 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN PETRONAS AND STATE OF TERENGGANU 
ON ROYALTY PAYMENT' 
AN AGREEMENT made this 22"d day of March 1975 BETWEEN the Government of 
the State of Terengganu (hereinafter referred to as the government) of the one part AND 
Petroliam Nasional Berhad, a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1965 
whose registered office is situated at No. 21, Jalan Melaka, Kuala Lumpur (hereinafter 
referred to as PETRONAS of the other part. 
WHEREAS by the Petroleum Development Act, 1974 the entire ownership in, and the 
exclusive rights, powers, liberties and privileges of exploiting, winning and obtaining 
petroleum whether lying onshore or offshore of Malaysia is vested in PETRONAS. 
AND WHEREAS the vesting of the ownership, rights, powers, liberties and privileges 
hereinbefore mentioned and taken effect pursuant to the execution of the instrument in 
that behalf, 
AND WHEREAS the Government and PETRONAS are desirous of entering into an 
agreement pursuant to section 4 of the aforesaid Act regarding the cash payment to be 
made by PETRONAS to the Government in return for the ownership and the rights, 
powers, liberties and privileges vested as aforesaid in respect of petroleum; 
NOW THEREFORE in return for the ownership and the rights, powers, liberties and 
privileges in respect of petroleum vested by the Government in PETRONAS, IT IS 
HEREBY AGREED as follows: 
1. (1) PETRONAS shall make to the Government cash payment in the form of 
yearly sum amounting to the equivalent of five percent of the value of the 
petroleum won and saved in Terengganu and sold by PETRONAS or its agents of 
contractors during the period provided in clause 2. 
(2) The value to be applied for the purpose of subclause (1) shall be the realised 
six-monthly average f. o. b price obtained by PETRONAS or its agents. 
(3) Any petroleum which is use by PETRONAS, its agents of contractors for 
purpose of carrying on drilling and production operations shall be deemed to be 
sold for the purpose of calculating the cash payment under this clause. 
2. The cash payment payable under this Agreement shall be paid semi-annually. 
Payment in respect of petroleum won and saved and sold in the first half-year 
period shall be made on or before the first day of September and payment in 
respect of petroleum won, saved and sold in the second half-year period shall be 
made on or before the first day of March of following year. 
3. It is agreed and declared that the cash payment payable under this Agreement 
shall be payable only for so long petroleum is obtained and shall not be payable if 
petroleum ceases to be obtained due to any reason or case whatsoever, in which 
case no payment by way of compensation shall be payable for the loss of the cash 
payment which would otherwise be payable under this Agreement. 
Similar agreements were also signed with other states' governments as follows: Penang (14 March 1975), 
Sarawak (27 March 1975), Malacca (23 April 1975), Perlis (25 April 1975), Kedah (26 April 1975), 
Perak (26 April 1975), Kelantan (9 May 1975), Negeri Sembilan (12 June 1975), Johor (24 June 1975), 
Pahang (11 September 1975), Selangor (1 June 1976), and Sabah (14 June 1976) 
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4. In this Agreement, the word `petroleum' has the meaning assigned to it by the 
Petroleum Development Act, 1974. 
5. The marginal notes are for convenience only and do not form part of this 
Agreement. 
6. This Agreement shall be expressed in Bahasa Malaysia and the English 
Language. In case of doubt the text of Agreement in English shall prevail. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be duly 
executed. 
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Appendix v 
PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT ACT, 1974 
Schedule 
Section (2)) 
GRANTS OF RIGHT, POWERS, LIBERTIES, AND 
PRIVILEGES IN RESPECTS OF PETROLEUM 
I, WAN MOKIITAR BIN AIIMAD, Menteri Besar of Terengganu on behalf of the 
Government of Terengganu, on this 22nd day of March 1975, hereby grant in perpetuity 
and convey to and vest in PETRONAS the ownership in and the exclusive rights, powers, 
liberties and privileges of exploring, exploiting, winning and obtaining petroleum 
whether lying onshore or offshore of Malaysia. The grant, conveyance, and vesting made 
hereunder shall be irrevocable and shall tenure for the benefit of PETRONAS and its 
successor. 
IN WITNESS whereof I on the behalf of the Government Terengganu hereunto set my 
hand the day and year first herein above written. 
MENTERI BESAR 
TERENGGANU 
.................................. 
on behalf of the Government of 
Terengganu 
DATO WIRA JAYA 
SETIAUSAHA KERAJAAN 
TERENGGANU 
................................. Witness's signature 
I, TENGKU RAZALEIGH BIN TENGKU MOHD. HAMZAH, Chairman and Chief 
Executive of PETRONAS, on behalf of PETRONAS hereby accept the grant, 
conveyance, and the vesting made above. 
............................. 
............................ 
Witness's signature 
Done at Kuala Terengganu this 22nd day of March 1975. 
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The Data Used for Regression Analysis (Model 1) 
1nTft_2 =a+ I311nX1t + ß21nX2t + P31nX3t + R41nX4t + 051nX5t+ 06 lnX6t+ ß7X7t+ ß8X8t 
Year 1nTft_2 1nXit 1nXit 1nX3t 1nX* 1nX5t 1nX6t X7t XAt 
1970 2.24 3.38 3.46 2.80 2.84 4.09 1.03 0 1 
1971 2.22 3.38 3.54 2.84 2.89 4.11 1.03 0 1 
1972 2.29 3.47 3.63 2.86 3.02 4.15 1.04 0 1 
1973 2.34 3.53 3.65 2.96 3.03 4.27 1.04 0 1 
1974 2.41 3.68 3.79 3.01 3.10 4.36 1.05 0 1 
1975 2.53 3.71 3.85 3.06 3.20 4.35 1.05 0 1 
1976 2.44 3.79 3.90 3.17 3.15 4.45 1.07 1 1 
1977 2.59 3.89 4.01 3.24 3.27 4.51 1.10 0 1 
1978 2.61 3.95 4.05 3.28 3.30 4.58 1.11 0 1 
1979 2.57 4.02 4.09 3.49 3.45 4.67 1.12 0 1 
1980 2.57 4.14 4.25 3.48 3.53 4.73 1.14 0 1 
1981 2.57 4.20 4.40 3.49 3.65 4.76 1.15 0 1 
1982 2.94 4.22 4.44 3.59 3.67 4.80 1.16 0 1 
1983 2.94 4.27 4.41 3.60 3.73 4.85 1.17 0 1 
1984 3.00 4.32 4.41 3.65 3.71 4.90 1.18 0 0 
1985 2.94 4.32 4.41 3.62 3.69 4.89 1.20 0 0 
1986 3.06 4.29 4.44 3.65 3.68 4.85 1.21 0 0 
1987 2.95 4.26 4.40 3.67 3.65 4.91 1.22 1 0 
1988 2.97 4.34 4.42 3.73 3.77 4.97 1.23 0 0 
1989 3.05 4.40 4.49 3.75 3.79 5.02 1.24 0 0 
1990 3.09 4.47 4.55 3.83 3.86 5.08 1.26 0 0 
1991 3.11 4.53 4.58 3.79 3.89 5.13 1.27 0 0 
1992 3.02 4.59 4.62 3.83 3.86 5.18 1.28 0 0 
1993 3.09 4.62 4.63 3.87 3.86 5.24 1.29' 1 0 
1994 3.11 4.69 4.67 3.90 3.89 5.29 1.30 1 0 
1995 3.12 4.71 4.70 3.92 3.91, 5.35 1.32 1 0 
1996 3.13 4.77 4.77 3.98 3.96 5.40 1.33 1 0 
1997 , 
3.16 4.82 4.78 4.00 3.99 5.45 1.34 1 0 
1998 3.21 4.75 4.80 3.93 3.97 5.45 1.35 0 0 
1999 3.16 4.77 4.84 3.92 3.95. 5.48 1.36 0 0 
2000 3.18 4.79 4.93 3.93 3.96 5.51 1.37 0 0 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
Note: 
1nTf_2 = log federal transfers - two years lagged effect 
lnXtt = log federal government revenue (FGREV) (from all sources of revenue - tax 
revenue, non-tax revenue and non-revenue receipts, classification used by the 
Ministry of Finance, Malaysia) 
InXý = log federal government expenditure (FGEXP) (operating expenditure and 
development expenditure combined) 
1nX3t = log state government own source revenue (STREV) 
1nX4t = log state government expenditure (STEXP) 
1nXst = log GDP (current) 
InX& = log population (POPVAR) 
Xn = Dummy variables of state governments financial position (STFINPOS) (0 = 
deficit / 1= surplus) 
X8t = Dummy variable of political affiliation (POLVAR) (0 = non-affiliated (at least 
one state is rule by the non-BN party) /I= affiliated (all states are rule by the 
BN party). 
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Appendix vii 
The Data Used for Regression Analysis (Model 2) 
1nYt =a+ ßilnXlt + ß21nX2t 
Year In Yt In Xlt In X2t 
1970 2.84 2.80 2.24 
1971 2.89 2.84 2.22 
1972 3.02 2.86 2.29 
1973 3.03 2.96 2.34 
1974 3.10 3.01 2.41 
1975 3.20 3.06 2.53 
1976 3.15 3.17 2.44 
1977 3.27 3.24 2.59 
1978 3.30 3.28 2.61 
1979 3.45 3.49 2.57 
1980 3.53 3.48 2.57 
1981 3.65 3.49 2.57 
1982 3.67 3.59 2.94 
1983 3.73 3.60 2.94 
1984 3.71 3.65 3.00 
1985 3.69 3.62 2.94 
1986 3.68 3.65 3.06 
1987 3.65 3.67 2.95 
1988 3.77 3.73 2.97 
1989 3.79 3.75 3.05 
1990 3.86 3.83 3.09 
1991 3.89 3.79 3.11 
1992 3.86 3.83 3.02 
1993 3.86 3.87 3.09 
1994 3.89 3.90 3.11 
1995 3.91 3.92 3.12 
1996 3.96 3.98 3.13 
1997 3.99 4.00 3.16 
1998 3.97 3.93 3.21 
1999 3.95 3.92 3.16 
2000 3.96 3.93 3.18 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
Note: 
lnYt = log state government expenditure (STEXP) 
lnXlt = log state government own source revenue (STREV) 
lnX2t = log federal government transfers (FGTF) 
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